Title: NONPROLIFERATION AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
1NON-PROLIFERATION AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
- I. National Implementation of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of - Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
- II. The Agencys (IAEA) Safeguards System
- III. National Implementation of the Convention on
Physical - Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and
its Amendment - Protocol
- IV. The Agencys Legislative Assistance
Activities -
Tufan HÖBEK Legal Counsellor Permanent Mission of
Turkey to the United Nations and other
International Organizations in Vienna..
2I. States Obligations Arising out of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
- A Brief History of and Facts about the Treaty
- Three Pillars of the Treaty
- Basic Commitments of a Non Nuclear Weapon State
(NNWS) under the Treaty
3The Three Pillars of the NPT
4Basic Commitments of a Non-Nuclear Weapon State
under the NPT
- ...not to receive...nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or control over such
weapons or explosive devices... - not to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices - and not to seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices. (Art II) -
5Basic Commitments of a NNWS (cont.)
- to accept safeguards, as set forth in an
agreement with the IAEA, for the exclusive
purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its
obligations assumed under the NPT with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from
peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other
explosive devices. (Art.III/1) -
- to conclude agreement with the IAEA to meet the
requirements of this Article... (Art.III/4)
6Basic Commitments of a NNWS (cont.)
- not to provide
- source or special fissionable material, or
- equipment or material especially designed or
prepared for the processing, use or production of
special fissionable material, - to any NNWS for peaceful purposes, unless the
source or special fissionable material shall be
subject to the safeguards of the IAEA. (Art.
III/2)
7II. The Agencys (IAEA) Safeguards System
-
- International safeguards, as implemented by the
IAEA, represent a key means of verifying the
compliance by States with commitments not to use
nuclear material or technology to develop nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
8Definitions (INFCIRC/26)
- Agency safeguards means the measures pursuant to
the Statute to prevent loss or diversion of
materials, special equipment or principal nuclear
facilities. - Diversion means the use by a recipient State of
fissionable or other materials, facilities or
equipment supplied by the Agency so as to further
any military purpose or in violation of any other
condition prescribed in the agreement between the
Agency and the State concerning the use of such
materials, specialized equipment or principal
nuclear facilities.
9Fundamental Objectives
- to help ensure that nuclear material is not
diverted for use in the production of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices - to enable the IAEA to review information, reports
and records provided by or available in a State
for the purpose of preventing the unauthorized
use of nuclear material
10Foundations of the Safeguards System the IAEAs
Statute
-
- The Agency is authorized to apply safeguards, at
the request of the Parties, to any bilateral or
multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a
State, to any of that States activities in the
field of atomic energy (Art.III.A.5) - Projects assisted by the IAEA are subjected to
the Agencys safeguards to be specified in an
agreement (Art.XI.F.4)
11Foundations of the Safeguards System the IAEAs
Statute (Cont.)
- The Agency is required to ensure that assistance
provided by or through it is not used in such a
way as to further any military purpose (Statute
Art.II) - The Agency is authorized to establish and
administer safeguards to ensure that nuclear
energy projects carried out by the IAEA or under
its auspices do not further any military purpose
(Art.III.A.5)
12Non-Proliferation Treaties and Agreements
- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (Art.III.1 III.4) - Regional treaties
- Tlatelolco Treaty (Latin America)
- Rarotonga Treaty (South Pacific)
- Bangkok Treaty (South East Asia)
- Pelidaba Treaty (Africa)
- Bilateral agreements
13Types of Safeguards Agreements
- Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements
(INFCIRC/153-Corrected) - - Small Quantities Protocol (SQP)
- Item Specific Safeguards Agreements
(INFCIRC/66/Rev.2) - Voluntary Offer Agreements
- Protocols Additional to Safeguards Agreements
- (INFCIRC/540-Corrected)
14Objective of Safeguads under a CSA
- Timely detection of diversion of significant
quantities of nuclear material from peaceful
nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or for
purposes unknown, and deterrence of such
diversion by the risk of early detection
15Functions of Safeguards
- Accountancy
- Containment and surveillance
- Inspection
16Basic Commitments of a NNWS under a Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement (CSA)
- Basic undertaking to accept safeguards on all
source or special fissionable material in all
peaceful nuclear activities within the States
territory or under its jurisdiction or carried
out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive
purpose of verifying that such material is not
diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices
17Basic Commitments of a NNWS under a CSA (Cont.)
- to cooperate with the Agency to facilitate the
implementation of the safeguards - to provide the Agency with information concerning
nuclear material, facilities and activities - to take the necessary steps to ensure that the
Agency inspectors can effectively discharge their
functions - to establish and maintain a State system of
accounting for and control of all nuclear
material
18State System of Account and Control (SSAC)
- The State System of Account and Control should be
based on a structure of material balance areas. - Material balance area means an area in or
outside of a facility such that - (a) The quality of nuclear material in each
transfer into or out of each material balance
area can be determined and - (b) The physical inventory of nuclear material
in each material balance area can be determined
when necessary.
19SSAC (Cont.)
- A State System of Accounting and Control should
include - A measurement system
- A system for the evaluation of measurement
accuracy - Procedures for reviewing measurement differences
- Procedures for carrying out physical inventories
- A system for the evaluation of unmeasured
inventories - A system of records and reports for each material
balance area - Procedures for reporting to the IAEA
20Common Elements of a States Regulatory System
- Regulatory Authority
- -Convention on Nuclear Safety (Art.8)
- -Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management (Art.19) - -Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material (Amendment Protocol Art.6) - Licensing
- Inspection and Assessment
- Enforcement
21Functions of the Regulatory Authority
- To fulfil its responsibilities, the Regulatory
Body liases with the IAEA on an on-going basis,
inter alia, as regards - the submission of reports required by the
safeguards agreement - the provision and updating of information
concerning nuclear material - the provision and updating of information
regarding design of nuclear facilities - requesting exemption from or termination of
safeguards on nuclear material - notification of exports and imports of nuclear
material - providing support to the inspectors of the IAEA
- accompanying of IAEA inspectors during
inspections and visits
22Basic Commitments of a NNWS under an AP
- Provision of additional information on, inter
alia - any nuclear fuel cycle research and development
not involving nuclear material - information requested by the IAEA on locations
outside facilities in which nuclear material is
customarily used (LOFs) - all buildings on the site of each facility and
LOF - the estimated annual capacities of uranium and
thorium mines and concentration plants
23Basic Commitments of a NNWS under an AP (Cont.)
- source material that has not reached the
composition and purity suitable for enrichment or
fuel production - exempted material
- immediate and high level radioactive waste on
which safeguards have been terminated - specified equipment and non-nuclear material
24Basic Commitments of a NNWS under an AP (Cont.)
- Provision of information updates
- Granting complementary access to any location
specified in the AP - Provision of access to locations to carry out
environmental sampling
25III. States Obligations Arising out of the
Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material (CPPNM)
- A Brief History of and Facts about the Convention
- Scope of the Convention
- Protection of Nuclear Material During
International Transport - Duties of Information
- Criminalization
- Jurisdiction
- Prosecute or extradite (Aut Dedere Aut Judicare)
- Fair Treatment
- Mutual Legal Assistance
26Scope of the Convention
- The Convention applies to nuclear material used
for peaceful purposes while in international
nuclear transport. (Art.2/1) - With some exceptions the Convention also applies
to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes
while in domestic use, storage and transport.
(Art.2/2)
27Protection of Nuclear Material During
International Transport
- Each State Party shall take appropriate
steps...to ensure that, during international
transport, nuclear material...is protected at
levels described in Annex I. (Art.3)
28Protection of Nuclear Material During
International Transport (cont.)
- Each State Party shall take measures with a view
to receiving assurances that nuclear material
will be protected before - Exporting or authorizing its export
- Importing or authorizing its import
- Allowing its transit between States that are not
Parties to the Convention - Transporting it from a part of the State to
another part of the same State through
international waters or airspace (Art.4/1-4)
29Duties of Information
- Each State Party undertakes to ensure that the
following duties of information are carried out - The States which the nuclear material is expected
to transit by land/internal waterways or whose
airports/seaports it is expected to enter, are
identified and informed in advance (Art.4/5) - Central authority or point of contact responsible
for physical protection of nuclear material and
for coordinating recovery and response operations
is identified and made known to other States
(Art.5/1)
30Duties of Information (cont.)
- States and international organizations are
informed of any theft, robbery or other unlawful
taking of nuclear material or credible threat
thereof (Art.5/2-a) - Information is exchanged with other States and
international organizations with a view to
protecting threatened nuclear material, verifying
the integrity of the shipping container, or
recovering unlawfully taken nuclear material
(Art.5/2-b) - Confidentiality of any information received in
confidence is protected (Art.6/1)
31Duties of Information (cont.)
- The Director General of the IAEA (depositary) is
informed of the States laws and regulations
which give effect to the Convention (Art.14/1) - If the State has prosecuted an alleged offender
for an offence established in accordance with the
Convention, the final outcome of the proceedings
is communicated to the States directly concerned
and to the Director General of the IAEA
(Art.14/2)
32Criminalization
- Each State Party undertakes to establish the
following acts as criminal offences punishable by
appropriate penalties taking into account their
grave nature - an act without lawful authority which constitutes
the receipt, possession, use, transfer,
alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear
material and which causes or is likely to cause
death or serious injury to any person or
substantial damage to property
33Criminalization (cont.)
- a theft or robbery of nuclear material
- an embezzlement or fraudulent obtaining of
nuclear material - an act constituting a demand for nuclear material
by threat or use of force or by any other form of
intimidation -
34Criminalization (cont.)
- a threat
- to use nuclear material to cause death or serious
injury to any person or substantial property
damage, or - to commit the offence of theft or robbery of
nuclear material in order to compel a natural or
legal person, international organization or a
State to do or to refrain from doing any act - an attempt to commit any offence described above
- an act which constitutes participation in any
offence described above
35Jurisdiction
- The Convention requires Contracting States to
- establish its jurisdiction over the offences set
forth - in Art. 7 based upon
- Territoriality (Art. 8/1a)
- Registration of the ship or aircraft involved
(Art. 8/1a) - Nationality of the alleged offender (Art. 8/1b)
36Jurisdiction (Cont.)
- Jurisdiction to be established for extradition or
prosecution once an alleged offender is present
in the territory of a State Party (Art.8/2) - Any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance
with national law (Art.8/3) - Arbitrary jurisdiction when a State Party is
involved in international nuclear transport as
the exporting or importing State (Art. 8/4)
37Aut Dedere Aut Judicare
- Security Council decision 1373 (2001)
- ...Decides also that all States shall
- ...Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan,
- support or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe
- havens (Art. 2/c)
38Aut Dedere Aut Judicare (Cont.)
- ...the State Party in whose territory the alleged
offender is present shall take appropriate
measures, including detention, under its national
law to ensure his presence for the purpose of
prosecution or extradition...(Art.9) - The State Party in whose territory the alleged
offender is present shall, if it does not
extradite him, submit...the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution...(Art.
10)
39Political Motives
- No reference to any exception based on political
or discriminatory grounds - Security Council decision 1373 (2001)
- Calls upon all States...that claims of
political motivation are not recognized as
grounds for refusing requests for the extradition
of alleged terrorists (Para. 3/g)
40Fair Treatment
- Alleged offenders shall be guaranteed fair
treatment at all stages of proceedings carried
out in accordance with the Convention (Art. 12)
41Mutual Legal Assistance
- States Parties shall afford one another the
greatest measure of assistance in connection with
criminal proceedings...including the supply of
evidence at their disposal necessary for
proceedings...(Art.13)
42Amendment Protocol
- A Brief History of the Protocol
- New Definitions
- Purpose of the Convention
- Scope of the Convention
- Exemption from the Application of the Convention
- Fundamental Principles of Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities - Criminalization
- Denial of a Request for Extradition or Mutual
Legal Assistance
43New Definitions
- Nuclear Facility (Art.1/d)
- Sabotage (Art.1/e)
44Purpose of the Convention
- to achieve and maintain worldwide effective
physical protection of nuclear material used for
peaceful purposes and nuclear facilities used for
peaceful purposes - to prevent and combat offences relating to such
material and facilities worldwide - to facilitate cooperation among States Parties to
those ends (Art.1A)
45Scope of the Convention
- The Convention applies to nuclear material used
for peaceful purposes in use, storage and
transport and to nuclear facilities used for
peaceful purposes - Articles 3, 4 and 5/4 of the Convention also
apply to nuclear material used for peaceful
purposes while in international nuclear transport
(Art.2/1)
46Exemption from the Application of the Convention
- The activities of armed forces during an armed
conflict (Art.2/4-b) - The activities undertaken by the military forces
of a State (Art.2/4-b) - Nuclear material used or retained for military
purposes nuclear facility containing such
material (Art.2/5)
47Fundamental Principles of Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
- Responsibility of the State
- Responsibilities During International Transport
- Legislative and Regulatory Framework
- Competent Authority
- Responsibility of the License Holders
- Security Culture
48Fundamental Principles of Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (Cont.)
- Threat
- Graded Approach
- Defence in Depth
- Quality Assurance
- Contingency Plans
- Confidentiality
49Criminalization
- Element of environment (Art.7/1-a)
- An act which constitutes the carrying, sending or
moving of nuclear material into or out of a State
without lawful authority (Art.7/1-d) - An act directed against a nuclear facility, or an
act interfering with the operation of a nuclear
facility...(Art.7/1-e) - Threat Element of environment and acts against a
nuclear facility (Art.7/1-g) - An act of a person who organizes or directs
others to commit any offence...(Art.7/1-j) - An act which contributes to the commission of any
offence...(Art.7/1-k)
50Denial of a Request for Extradition or Mutual
Legal Assistance
- Not of a nature of political offence or as an
offence connected with a political offence or as
an offence inspired by political motives - Not a ground for denying a request for
extradition or mutual legal assistance
51IV. The Agencys Legislative Assistance Activities
- Introduction
- Objectives
- Technical Cooperation Projects and Challenges
- Tools
- How to apply for the Agencys legislative
assistance
52Introduction
- The Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) has provided
legislative assistance to more than 100 Member
States since the Agencys inception - Legislative assistance has been provided,
however, in a more systematic manner since 1997
when the first Technical Cooperation Project was
established for this purpose
53Introduction (Cont.)
- The Agencys Legislative Assistance Programme
covers all areas i.e. nuclear safety, security,
safeguards and liability for nuclear damage. - The Programme has been implemented through a
multi-faceted approach, i.e. a combination of - - Workshops and seminars
- - Training of individuals
- - Bilateral assistance and
- - Development of reference material for
assessment - and drafting of legislation
54Objectives
- to create awareness in Member States of
international instruments in the nuclear field - to enable Member States to comply with their
international obligations - to enable Member States to establish national
legislative frameworks for the safe and peaceful
uses of nuclear energy and - to transfer relevant knowledge to Member States
(sustainability)
55Technical Assistance Projects
- Technical Assistance Project for Africa
- International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability
(INLEX) Funds - Nuclear Security Plan
- EU Initiative on Safeguards
56Challenges
- Increasing number of complexity of international
instruments in the area of safety, security and
safeguards - Increasing interest in the field of liability for
nuclear damage through the work of the INLEX - Increasing shortage in available outside legal
expertise
57Tools
- Establishment and training of a pool of legal
experts from which OLA can draw to provide
required assistance and training - Creation and maintenance of an International
Nuclear Law Website (and underlying database of
nuclear information) - Develop new training material in all languages
58Tools (Cont.)
- Convert training material into distance learning
tools and make them available on the
International Nuclear Law Website - Hold standardized training seminars at regular
intervals in the different regions - Continue to provide bilateral legislative
assistance to Member States - Develop brochure outlining the services available
under the Legislative Assistance Programme - Hold workshops on nuclear law for diplomats
59How to Apply
- Member States wishing to benefit from the IAEA
legislative assistance activities should either
request the IAEA Office of Legal Affairs or one
of the technical departments such as the
Department of the Technical Cooperation. - International Atomic Energy Agency, P.O. Box
200, Wagramer Strasse 5, A-1400 Vienna, Austria - Telephone (431) 2600-0 Facsmile (431) 2600-7
E-mailOfficial.Mail_at_iaea.org
60THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION