Anatomy of the Bear

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Anatomy of the Bear

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Title: Anatomy of the Bear


1
Anatomy of the Bear
  • Lessons From Wall Street's Four Great Bottoms

Russell Napier
2
Isnt history bunk?
  • Progress is cumulative in science and
    engineering but cyclical in finance - James
    Grant (Money of the Mind)
  • . . . for having integrated insights from
    psychological research into economic science,
    especially concerning human judgment and
    decision-making under uncertaintyDaniel
    Kahneman, Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 2002
  • What is financial history if it is not a study of
    human judgement and decision-making under
    uncertainty?

3
Defining the bottom of a bear market
  • When were the best subsequent returns achieved?
  • Calculate hindsight value
  • August 1921, July 1932, June 1949 and August 1982
  • Not December 1974

Source CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets
4
Hindsight value
Source Smithers Co., CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets
5
Definition of Q
  • Market value of equities Equity q
  • Tangible assets minus net corporate debt
  • Rationale behind Q - because stocks represent a
    title to the ownership of real assets, they
    should, if fairly valued in a competitive
    economy, have a market value equal to the cost of
    their production

6
Methodology
  • Value considerations are not enough to find the
    bottom - Q ratio relative to geometric mean -
    equities get cheap and keep getting cheaper
  • Analyse the turning points in these bear markets
    with the benefit of hindsight
  • Analyse the turning points based on contemporary
    opinion right and wrong
  • 70,000 WSJ articles - good sample of contemporary
    opinion

7
Q ratio
8
Equities become cheap slowly- Cyclically
adjusted PE
9
Conclusions - Strategic
  • Bear markets are long - at least a decade
  • Equities move from over- to undervaluation slowly
  • Equities become cheap following a major
    disturbance in the general price level
  • Fiscal deteriorations are irrelevant
  • Return of price-stability signals the death of
    the bear
  • The bottom for equities follows the bottom for
    government bonds and corporate bonds

10
Conclusions II
  • Equities will trade at a 70 discount to the
    replacement value of assets
  • They will reach this discount 2009-14 - probably
    nearer 2014
  • Between 2005 and 2014 the following will happen
  • a disturbance to the general price level
  • a selloff in government bonds
  • a selloff in corporate bonds
  • a recession
  • The bear market ends when price stability returns

11
Long bear markets (DJIA) 1899-1921
12
SP Composite Index Earnings (1871100)as a
ratio of US nominal GDP
13
Long bear markets II 1937-1949
14
Long bear markets III 1964-1982
15
General price disturbanceslead to cheap equities
Source Economagic, CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets
16
General price disturbanceslead to cheap equities
III
17
What signals the death of the bear?1. Evidence
of price stability
  • Inventory in the system is low
  • Some commodity prices start to stabilise
  • Demand evident at lower price particularly for
    luxury goods or goods in structural demand
  • Greater certainty on general price level and
    valuations more certain
  • Corporate bond rally?

18
Commodity prices bottom with equities
  • Commodity prices bottom Aug 1921 with equities
  • Commodity prices bottom July 1932 with equities
  • Commodity prices bottom July 1949 with equities
  • Commodity prices bottom Oct 1982 just after
    equities
  • Copper price bottoms August 1921, June 1932, June
    1949 and June 1982

19
Bonds first, then equities
  • August 1921- May 1920 government bonds, June 1921
    Baa corporates, August 1921 commodities
  • July 1932- January 1932 government bonds, May
    1932 Baa corporates, July 1932 commodities
  • June 1949- October 1948 government bonds, January
    1948 corporate bonds, July 1949 commodities
  • July 1982- October 1981 government bonds,
    February 1982 Baa corporates, October 1982
    commodities

20
Conclusions - Tactics
  • There is good news at the bottom of the market
  • There are lots of bulls at the bottom of the
    market
  • The final market collapse is not on high volume
  • Watch Fed interest-rate policy, not changes in
    the Fed balance sheet

21
Myths debunked 3 Capitulation 1921
22
Capitulation 1932
23
Capitulation 1949
24
Capitulation 1982
25
Myths debunked 4Fed watching of limited use at
bottom
  • August 1921 Fed's balance sheet still
    contracting in 1924
  • July 1932 Fed attempted balance sheet expansion
    in mid-1931 prior to 50 collapse in market
  • June 1949 Fed supporting bond prices and balance
    sheet signals confused
  • August 1982 Fed balance-sheet expansion evident
    by October 1982 but trigger was evident distress

26
Other tactical considerations
  • Not absence of good news but apathy towards it
  • Market falls on small volume and rises on larger
    volume
  • Short position rising but market not falling
  • The dance of the little bears
  • Market rising and bears not covering

27
Other tactical considerations
  • Over a real bear market , volume decline is much
    larger than market decline with a major caveat
  • The success of Dow Theory Market is in a basic
    upward trend if one of two averages (DJ
    Industrials and DJ Transport) advances above a
    previous important high, accompanied or followed
    by a similar advance in the other. Both averages
    dipping below previous important lows confirms a
    downward trend
  • The autos sector led the economic recovery on all
    four occasions
  • News which threatens the financial system, July
    1982, signalled a buy when the Fed is unfettered
  • Interest in equities declines

28
Interest in equities declines
  • Turnover-rate declines
  • 1919 153 1921 - 59
  • 1929 119 1932 - 32
  • 1946 22 1949 - 13
  • 1968 24 1982 - 42

29
NYSE membership prices 1932-49
Source NYSE
30
Turnover of NYSE shares traded as a percentage
of total listed
31
Why October 2002 was not1921, 1932, 1949 or 1982
  • Stocks are never cheap - Cyclically adjusted PE
    29x versus long term average of 14.9x. Q ratio
    1.32x geometric mean not the 70 discount
    expected.
  • A 1929-32 short bear market is exceptional
  • There was no disturbance to the general price
    level
  • Turnover rate rose from 88 (2000) to 105 (2002)

32
Conclusions - Strategic
  • Bear markets are long - at least a decade
  • Equities move from over- to undervaluation slowly
  • Equities become cheap following a major
    disturbance in the general price level
  • Fiscal deteriorations are irrelevant
  • Return of price stability signals the death of
    the bear
  • The bottom for equities follows the bottom for
    government bonds and corporate bonds

33
Conclusions II
  • Equities will trade at a 70 discount to the
    replacement value of assets
  • They will reach this discount 2009-2014- probably
    nearer 2014
  • Between 2005 and 2014 the following will happen-
  • a disturbance to the general price level
  • a sell off in government bonds
  • a sell off in corporate bonds
  • a recession
  • The bear market ends when price stability returns

34
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