The Scottish Parliament

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The Scottish Parliament

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The Scottish Parliament
September 2000
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The Scottish Parliament
Holyrood Report, Fraser Chapter 8 page 97
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Scottish Parliament Project Organisation
Structure 2000
Multi Headed Client, Fraser Report Chapter 12
page 194
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• Other Parliamentary buildings
• http//www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/resear
  ch/briefings-03/sb03-52.pdf

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STANDARD PROJECT MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
(adapted from Meredith et al, 2004 and Fraser,
2004)
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(adapted from Meredith et al, 2004 and Fraser,
2004)
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• This is a good site
• http//www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/
  holyrood/inquiry/sp205-00.htm
• Lists everything

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• http//www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/researc
  h/pdf_res_notes/rn01-64.pdf

Mr Davidson drew a number of conclusions in his
report including the following it must be
noted that in costing terms the Spencely Report
indicated a realistic price range expectation of
195 Million to 230Million. This was at a stage
when some of the design difficulties were not
fully designed through. The conclusion from this
is that the motion put to and passed by the
Scottish Parliament, known as the Jackson
Motion, which was for a fixed cash sum at
current prices of 195 Million, was somewhat
optimistic and, in light of the complexity of the
tender and control process inherited from the
previous Scottish Office Administration, naïve
for such a complicated and indeed unique design.
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• http//www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committ
  ees/historic/audit/reports-00/aur00-06-03.htmana0
  1
• 28 SEPTEMBER 2000.
• At the Audit Committee meeting on Tuesday, 26
  September, Muir Russell agreed to provide notes
  on a number of issues that were touched on during
  the evidence taking session on the Auditor
  General for Scotland's Report on the new Scottish
  Parliament Building.
• I thought it would be helpful to put in writing
  the areas on which the Committee is expecting to
  receive clarification. These are
• Details of the person specification and
  recruitment method adopted for the replacement
  project manager

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• RESPONSE
• Appointment of Project Manager
• As Dr Gibbons and I told the Committee, we were
  able to minimise the gap following the
  resignation of the former project manager because
  the project team was clear about the type of
  person and experience needed for project manager
  in the circumstances of this project and a
  suitably experienced person was available to
  transfer to this role. He was at that time
  project manager on the interim Parliament project
  (the Mound), performing successfully in that
  role, so he was a known quantity.
• His appointment to that post followed a decision
  to establish separate project management for the
  interim Parliament project, to ensure its
  successful delivery and to enable the Holyrood
  project team to concentrate on the main project
  itself. He was appointed after discussion with a
  number of project management companies on how
  best to secure the capability to move the interim
  Parliament project forward quickly, and was
  seconded from Project Management International
  Plc, of which he was and remains an employee,
  with reimbursement made to the company

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• http//www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/note
  s/snpc-03357.pdf
• Lord Fraser highlighted in the Holyrood Inquiry
  that
• the 40 million figure could never have been a
  realistic estimate for anything other than most
  basic of new Parliament buildings. However, what
  can be stated clearly is that at the time 40
  million was included in the White Paper, there
  was no clear understanding whether that was a
  total cost including professional fees or only a
  construction cost. It was certainly not explained
  to the Scottish public what the figure

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• The Auditor General Report of 2004 made the
  following conclusions
• Spillage
• The main cause of the 20 months delay to the
  project since September 2000 was the
• production of detailed design variations and the
  late supply of information during the
• construction process.
• Cost Increases
• The main reasons for construction cost increases
  after 2000 were design development
• and delay in the construction process. The design
  development was entirely related to
• realising the detail of the building and aspects
  such as the quality of finish and the
• palette of materials that were used, in
  accordance with the clients requirements.
• Project management and control
• Although it is likely that a high quality
  building is being delivered, the time and cost
• objectives have not been met. The same quality
  could have been achieved for less if
• the whole design and construction process had
  been better executed.

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• Summary of the Holyrood Inquirys Conclusions
  and
• Recommendations
• The Holyrood Inquiry was published in September
  2004 by Lord Fraser.
• One of the principal conclusions found in the
  Holyrood Inquiry was that whenever there was a
  conflict between quality and cost, quality was
  preferred.
• Lord Fraser further concluded that since Donald
  Dewar was determined in building a new parliament
  for Scotland as soon as possible, the timetable
  dictated the high risk and fast track
  procurement route.
• In regards to the procurement method adopted,
  there was an inadequate level of evaluation or
  understanding of the construction management
  route subsequently ministers were not informed
  of all the risks involved.

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• The Origins of the 40 million Figure
• The evidence before the Inquiry is reasonably
  clear that
• this figure originally came from Mr Wyllie. On
  10 June 1997 he
• minuted Mrs Doig with his costing of the option
  of onstructing
• a new building on a greenfield site. Assuming a
  building with
• an area of 15,000m² gross (11,250m² net a net
  to gross ratio
• 25) including 1,000m² for the Chamber, 3,000m²
  for
• Committees and Ministers and 11,000m² for the
  remainder, he
• put forward figures in the order of 35-40
  million.His
• minute made it clear that the figures included
  professional
• fees, fit out, furniture and VAT although the
  position in this
• respect contrasts with his written recognition in
  which he said
• that his figures had excluded site works, fit
  out, professional
• fees and VAT. In a further minute of the same
  date to Dr
• Gibbons he elaborated on that range of figures as
• follows

Holyrood Report, Fraser, Chapter 3 Page 23
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• http//www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/holyrood/inq
  uiry/sp205-11.htm1
• Was a Pause Recommended?
• Within the Spencely Report there is no specific
  recommendation for a two month pause in the
  Project to enable a costed design to be achieved.
  However, in evidence Mr Spencely explained that
  the eight week pause was implicit within
  paragraph 5.4 of his Report
• It is clearly imperative that the Brief is
  frozen now and that the Design Team proceeds
  immediately to produce a Scheme Design including
  a cost plan to a Brief and a budget approved by
  the client, so that approval may be given to
  proceed with the Project by 8 June 2000.
• There has been some uncertainty amongst witnesses
  as to whether SPCB members were aware that Mr
  Spencely was recommending a pause. During a
  discussion of the Reports findings at the SPCB
  meeting on 28 March, Dr Gibbons advised that
  "Detailed design and construction would continue
  to run in parallel and there was no reason for a
  pause until 8 June." There is also reference to
  Mr Spencely recommending one option as "the
  cessation of all project activity for a period of
  three months" in the SPCBs report to Parliament,

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• In relation to the functions of his suggested
  "Progressing Group" Mr Spencelys evidence was as
  follows
• "I expected the Progressing Group to operate as
  the Client receiving reports and
  recommendations "upwards" from the Project
  Sponsor and acting on the latter to accept,
  modify or reject and receiving and sifting
  requests for variations to the Brief "downwards"
  from MSPs and Parliamentary staff all in the
  light of the Budget and the Programme and to
  control Budget expenditure and Programme by
  making the appropriate management decisions".

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• http//www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/holyrood/inq
  uiry/sp205-10.htm3
• In his oral evidence Dr Gibbons, when asked about
  viability at handover, said
• "From what we know now, it clearly was not."
• I am bound to conclude that
• 1. The Brief was not up to date, and did not
  reflect the changes made since November 1998.
• 2. The Brief did not anticipate the requirements
  of the Parliament with the inevitable result that
  adherence to it would have produced an unsuitable
  building.
• 3. The budgeted construction cost of 62 million
  was flawed in that
• a. there was inadequate accounting for risk, and
  the stated budget bore no relationship to a cost
  planb. there had been a failure to fully
  appreciate the complexity of the design andc.
  account had not been taken of considerations of
  blast and security.
• In short, the Project was not in a viable and
  healthy condition when it was handed over to the
  SPCB on 1 June 1999.

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• http//www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli/holyrood/inq
  uiry/sp205-14.htm12
• Impact on Overall Cost and Programme
• 13.77 There is no doubt that by having to focus
  on specific recurring themes in relation to
  Queensberry House, the HPG and the Project Team
  found it difficult to make progress and that
  these issues were discussed at the highest level
  by the First Minister and Presiding Officer to
  try and find a resolution. Crucially, however, it
  is to be noted this did not cause any delay to
  the overall programme, as Queensberry House was
  never on the critical path. At the same time the
  costs of Queensberry House have been
  significantly greater than anticipated at the
  outset.

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• http//www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committ
  ees/audit/reports-04/grice-auditrep.htm
• Adequacy of Cost Plan
• AGSs comments in paragraphs 4.3 4.7 of the
  report reflect a misunderstanding of the purpose
  of the Cost Plan at Stage D. Such a plan is
  needed to translate the Stage D design into
  individual works packages and to estimate the
  value of the works under each package. This
  provides a basis for project management and the
  consultants to compare the values of tenders
  based on the Stage D design. The adequacy of the
  Cost Plan for this purpose is reflected in the
  fact that, on average and after allowing for
  inflation, tenders on which contracts were based
  were within 5 of the Cost Plan Estimate. In view
  of the uncertainties identified in Exhibit 9,
  this could be regarded as a reasonably
  satisfactory result.

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• Really use this web site
• http//www.audit-scotland.gov.uk/publications/pdf
  /2004/04pf07ag.pdf

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• http//www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/commit
  tees/historic/finance/or-02/fi02-2502.htm
• Alasdair Morgan I find it difficult to
  understand why the target date has not only
  slipped three to four months since last you gave
  evidence on 8 October, but has become less
  certain rather than more certain.
• Sarah Davidson The current target date of best
  completion at the end of August, which means that
  everything will have happened to the best
  possible outcome, has the same status as the
  previous date of the end of April.
• Alasdair Morgan Do you have a worst possible
  outcome date?
• Sarah Davidson No.
• Alasdair Morgan What kind of Gantt chart is
  used? Some kind of worst-case scenario must have
  been considered.
• Robert Brown The object of the exercise is to
  finish the thing as quickly as possiblethat is
  clearly what we are after and the progress group
  is keeping on top of the contractors to try to
  ensure that that happens. However, as we have
  already explained, the business of the glazing
  and blast proofing could have had a dramatic
  effect on the progress of the contract. Had last
  Friday's blast test failed, we would be coming to
  the committee today to report a serious
  situation there are no two ways about that.
  Happily, the blast test was passed. Although we
  have to take account of the fact that the test
  had to happen in the first place, that is part of
  the risk review that is taking place at the
  moment. The major concerns that we would have had
  if the blast test had failed have not
  materialised. We are therefore able to come to
  the committee with good news on that particular
  point because passing the test removes what was
  probably the single biggest risk that remained on
  the contract.