The Start of the Cold War

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The Start of the Cold War
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NEW RULES THE COLD WAR

• Two actors (bipolarity, no longer a multipolar
  world)
• Basis of Conflict Now Different Ideology
• New nature of global conflict (i.e., a new game).
  
• Whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it
  his own social system
• (Stalin as quoted on Smith, 118).

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NEW RULES THE COLD WAR

• The game becomes zero-sum (for the most part)
  Each side strove mightily to establish military
  superiority over the other, yet there existed no
  plausible change of military victory (Smith,
  121).
• Not empires, but more large spheres of influence
• Worldwide in scope
• Not within a subsystem
• Proxy warfare

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Truman Doctrine

• (PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN'S ADDRESS BEFORE A
  JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS, MARCH 12, 1947)
• One of the primary objectives of the foreign
  policy of the United States is the creation of
  conditions in which we and other nations will be
  able to work out a way of life free from
  coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war
  with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over
  countries which sought to impose their will, and
  their way of life, upon other nations.

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Truman Doctrine

• I believe that it must be the policy of the
  United States to support free peoples who are
  resisting attempted subjugation by armed
  minorities or by outside pressures.
• I believe that we must assist free peoples to
  work out their own destinies in their own way.

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Early Reactions to the Cold War in the Hemisphere

• US was already increasingly viewing the region
  through a security lens.
• Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
  Assistance) of 1947
• The OAS
• US Mutual Security Act of 1952

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More Truman Admin

• By the end of the Truman administration
• Increased Military assistance to Latin America
  (1951, 38.2 million in direct military
  assistance, 51.7 million un 1952Smith, 126).

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More Truman Admin

• Kennan recommended three major foreign policy
  goals
• The protection of our raw materials.
• The prevention of military exploitation of Latin
  America by the enemy.
• The prevention of the psychological mobilization
  of Latin America against us.

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Everybody Likes Ike! (Right?)

• Heading into the Eisenhower administration Ike
  criticized the Truman administration for
  neglecting Latin America in the campaign, but
  once in office adoption similar policies
• The View from the South
• We are puzzled and dismayed by the fact that
  while the nations that suffered most of the
  impast of the Second World War, have been
  entirely rebuily and even exceeded the levels
  enjoyed before the conflict, other nations are
  suffering a decline in their public and private
  revenues (Oswald Aranha, Brazils wartime
  foreign minister as quoted in Raymont, 92).

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More Eisenhower

• SecState John Foster Dulles
• Do nothing to offend the dictators, they are the
  only people we can depend on (John Foster
  Dulles, SecState for Ike, as quoted on Smith
  131).
• stop coddling the Latins Dulles to the State
  Department Staff (Raymont, 93).

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More Eisenhower

• State Department official Louis Halle Communist
  infection is not going to spread to the U.S. But
  if it should in the fullness of time spread over
  much of Latin America it would impair the
  military security of the Hemisphere and thus of
  the U.S. (Weeks 2008107).
• Domino Theory
• Guatemala

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Eisenhower

• The view from the South
• As you know, reaction throughout Latin America
  has been bad. Intervention is considered a worse
  evil than communism, especially since
  intervention is never applied to foster a
  democratic cause (Costa Rican President José
  Figueres to Adolf A. Berle, a former adviser to
  FDR, as quoted in Smith, 142).

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VP Nixon Goes South
On May 13, 1958, it may have seemed to many
people that Latin Americans just did not like the
United States anymore. That afternoon, Vice
President Richard Nixon, while on a good will
mission to South America, headed a motorcade into
Caracas, Venezuelas capital. When the cars
slowed down, onlookers rushed to gather around
them. For twelve minutes, the crowd rocked the
vehicles, bashed them with sticks and iron bars,
spat on the windows, and shouted at the
passengers. The U.S. delegates and their
Venezuelan escorts feared for their lives, and
barely escaped. The incident brought a climax to
protests that marred every stop on Nixons
itinerary. Whatever else this was, most witnesses
agreed, it was anti-Americanism--unbridled
hostility toward "the United States." Costa Rican
president José Figueres, like others, tried to
define the problem narrowly "People cannot spit
on a foreign policy which is what they meant to
do." Others feared a tide of revolution. As one
aide told Secretary of State John Foster Dulles,
"The preponderance of U.S. influence in Latin
America is being challenged." Among shaken U.S.
diplomats, the general consensus was at least
that "real violence" against U.S. representatives
was "something new," a qualitative leap in
boldness stemming from resentment against nearly
every aspect of U.S. influence in Latin America.

Source Alan McPherson, Yankee No!
Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations
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