Grice on Meaning

1
Grice on Meaning

• Lecture 1

2
Communication

• Communication is primarily a matter of a speaker
  seeking either to inform a hearer of something or
  to enjoin some action upon him - where enjoin
  should be construed broadly to include not only
  commanding, but requesting, advising, etc.
• This is not to deny that language has other uses
  that will be one my main points once we complete
  our study of communicative behavior.

3
Grice Meaning (1957) Preliminaries

• Grice presents his first attempts to say exactly
  what meaning is. It ought to be possible, he
  suggests, to explicate the meaning of an
  expression (or any other sign) in terms of what
  its users do with it, i.e. in terms of what its
  users (could/would/should) mean by it on
  particular occasions of use.

4
Two main ideas

• 1. The most basic notion of meaning is that of
  an utterer U meaning something by doing something
  on a particular occasion. All other notions of
  meaning are to be treated as derivative and
  explicated in terms of the more basic notion.
• As Grice puts it it is necessary to
  distinguish between a notion of meaning which is
  relativized to the users of words or expressions
  and one that is not so relativizedof the two
  notions the unrelativized notion is posterior to,
  and has to be understood in terms of, the
  relativized notion what words mean is a matter
  of what people mean by them.

5

• 2. The locution by uttering x, U meant that p
  can be analyzed in terms of complex
  audience-directed intentions on the part of U.
• What U means by producing x on a given occasion
  is a function of what U intends, in a complex
  way, to get across to his audience. The basic
  idea in Meaning is, roughly, that for an
  indicative-type utterance, the locution by
  uttering x, U meant that p is true iff U uttered
  x intending to produce in audience A the belief
  that p by means of As recognition of Us
  intention.

6
Central to Grices Analysis of meaning

• Attempt to analyze or explicate meaning in terms
  of (for him) more basic notions such as
  intention, belief, desire, and recognition.
• The analysis of locutions of the forms X did Y
  intentionally, X caused Y, X is true, X
  entails Y, X is red, and so on, has been
  regarded by many philosophers as a central task
  of philosophy. There are a number of different
  views about the exact aims and proper methods of
  analysis.
• Grices conception appears to have a reductive
  and explicative flavor in that it appears to be
  his view that locutions of the forms by uttering
  X, U meant that p, X means p, and by
  uttering X, U said that p can be wholly
  explicated without appealing to semantical
  concepts.

7

• Grice seeks to explain what it is for someone or
  something to mean something (but not in a sense
  of mean found in sentences such as those spots
  mean measles, that buzz means someone is at the
  door, or that groan means Bill is in pain.).
• He starts out with what people mean rather than
  with what this or that expression, sign, or
  action means.
• His plan is to analyze utterers meaning in terms
  of complex audience directed intentions of the
  utterer, and to analyze utterance-type meaning
  (e.g., sentence and word meaning) in terms of
  utterers meaning.

8
Elaborate Basic Analysis

• Variety of Sentences which employ the verb to
  mean
• 1. He meant to tell her.
• 2. Music means a lot to me.
• 3. This time I really mean it.
• 4. Spots mean measles.
• 5. By uttering Its raining he meant that its
  raining.

9

• In (1), where the verb is followed by an
  adverbial occurrence of an infinite, it can be
  replaced with intends
• In (2), where it is followed by an adverbial
  quantity, it can be replaced with matters.
• In (3), where it is followed by a pronoun, it can
  be replaced by serious and sincere about.

10

• (4) and (5) look replaceable by nothing other
  than trivial variants of means as in 'signify.
• (4) is not concerned with language or
  communication. The use of means in (5) can but
  need not concern language but always
  communication.
• Grice distinguishes natural (4) meaning from
  non-natural (5) meaning.

11
Observations about the two uses

• Natural 'x means that p' entails that p. If
  those spots on your face mean that you have
  measles, then you have measles.
• Non-natural 'x means that p' does not entail
  that p. If you mean that its raining with your
  utterance of its raining it does not follow
  that it is raining.
• N We cannot argue from the sentence 'Those spots
  mean measles' to any conclusion about what was
  meant those spots. Its not as if nature meant to
  convey that you had measles by those spots.
• NN We can argue from a sentence like Its
  raining' to a conclusion about what was meant by
  those words.
• Look at Grice (1957) for more disanalogies.

12
Goal to give an analysis of non-natural meaning

• 1. Utterance x meansnn something
• But what about (2)?
• 2. Speaker S meansnn something
• (1) and (2) are themselves ambiguous

13
4 readings

• 1a. X meansnn something (on a particular
  occasion).
• 1b. X meansnn (timeless) something.
• Draw type/token distinction.
• 2a. S meansnn something by x (on a particular
  occasion).
• 2b. S meansnn (timeless) something by x.

14
4 more readings whole utterance or parts?

• 1a. X (a whole utterance) meansnn something (on
  a particular occasion)
• 1a'. A (an utterance part) meansnn something (on
  a particular occasion).
• 1b. X (a whole utterance) meansnn (timeless)
  something
• 1b'. A (an utterance part) meansnn (timeless)
  something.
• Grice first we analyze whole utterance because
  not all utterances are structured flag-waving,
  whistling, nods, hand-waving, etc.
• Grice second we analyze an utterance on a
  particular occasion rather than timeless

15
We analyze 1a/2a before 1b/2b

• Final target S means something on a particular
  occasion by x (Grice, 1957)
• Question what are we trying to accomplish with
  an analysis? Reduction? If not that, then what?
  Explication? Whats that?

16
Stevensons Causal Proposal

• For x to mean something, x must have (roughly)
  a tendency to produce in an audience some
  attitude (cognitive or otherwise) and a tendency,
  in the case of a speaker, to be produced by that
  attitude, these tendencies being dependent on "an
  elaborate process of conditioning attending the
  use of the sign in communication. (Grice 1957,
  p.379, quoting C.L. Stevenson)
• Problems? Tuxedo and dance we are talking about
  communication and not merely info.
• Other counter-example J is athlete -gt J is
  tall

17
Analysis I

• Grices first proposal 'S means something by
  uttering x' is true iff S uttered x intending to
  induce a response in some audience (and to say
  what the response is is to say what S means)
• (Well focus on belief/assertion/indicatives for
  now but of course the response might be an
  action/command/imperative, e.g.)

18
Counter-Example to I

• A may leave Bs handkerchief by the scene of a
  crime in order to induce in the detective on the
  case the response of believing that B was the
  criminal. Yet leaving the handkerchief does not
  mean that B was the criminal. (Grice, 1957, pp.
  381-382)
• Why not? The case leaves out any communication
  between A and the detective.
• To see why, compare this case with the one where
  A unintentionally drops it while leaving the
  crime scene. In both cases the detective will
  come to believe B did it (relying on the same
  evidence)
• Use the photograph vs. drawing case intentions
  of shower irrelevant in first case but not in
  second.
• Difference between inferring from an action what
  might be so from that action communicating what
  is so to you.

19
Analysis II Fix up of I

• II. S meant something by uttering x iff S uttered
  x intending
• A. that Ss utterance of x produce a certain
  response r in a certain audience A B. that A
  recognizes Ss intention.
• Solves last problemdo you see that?

20
Counter-Example to II

• Herod presents Salome with Johns head on a
  platter, intending her to have the response to
  believing that John is dead and intending also
  that she recognize that he intends her to believe
  John is dead.
• So both conditions in II are satisifed.
• Yet his action does not nn-mean this. It doesnt
  nn-mean anything.
• Whats missing is a communicative link between H
  and S. He is not trying to communicate that J is
  dead hes showing her that he is.

21
Elaboration of problems with II

• S comes to have the belief that J is dead because
  she sees his severed head.
• The connection between Hs intention and Ss
  response is incidental.
• What we need is a connection between the
  audiences recognition of the speakers intention
  and the response the audience is intended to
  have.
• We need some assurance that the the response is
  dependent upon the recognition of the speakers
  intention otherwise, theres no difference
  between letting or getting someone know or think
  something and telling her that it is so.

22
Fix up II Analysis III

• III. S meant something by uttering x iff S
  uttered x intending
• a. that Ss utterance of x produce a certain
  response, r, in a certain audience A
• b. that A recognize Ss intention (a) and
• c. that As recognition of Ss intention (a)
  function as As reason for r. (note reason for
  response, not just a cause)

23
Grices Strategy

• The difference between a mere sound or mark and
  an act of communication is this
• when there is communication, agents with
  appropriate audience-directed beliefs and
  intentions produce the sounds.
• To this end, Grice requires the audiences
  response be occasioned by a recognition of
  speaker intentions.

24
Three general problems with (III)

• (i) The first clause problem.
• (ii) The third clause problem.
• (iii) The analysis is too weak.

25
The first clause problem

• Grice provides a number of examples in which it
  would be correct to say that U means that p but
  incorrect to say that U intends A to believe that
  p.
• Suppose U is answering an examination question
  and says The Battle of Waterloo was fought in
  1815. Here U meant that the Battle of Waterloo
  was fought in 1815 but U did not intend the
  examiner to think that The Battle of Waterloo was
  fought in 1815 (typically, U will be under the
  impression that the examiner already knows the
  answer).

26
Grices Response to first clause problem

• Grice suggests that clause (a) in III be changed
  to (a)
• III. S meant that p by uttering x iff S uttered x
  intending
• a. that Ss utterance of x produce a belief in A
  that p
• a. That Ss utterance of x produce a belief in
  A that S thinks that p.

27
Still worries with a?

• The suggested revision is that it does not fit in
  well with the commonly held view that the primary
  purpose of communication is the transfer of
  information about the world on the revised
  account, the primary purpose seems to be the
  transfer of information about ones mental
  states.
• Even if the proposed revision does constitute an
  improvement, it does not weaken the analysis to
  let in cases of reminding. Suppose S knows that A
  thinks that p but needs reminding. So S does
  something by which he means that p. Not only does
  it seem incorrect to say that S intends A to
  think that p S knows that A already thinks that
  pit also seems incorrect to say that S intends
  A to think S thinks that p (S may know that A
  already thinks S thinks that p).

28
Deeper problem with II?

• Does Grice pay too much attention to examples in
  which S intends to induce in A some propositional
  attitude or other, and so, has Grice mistakenly
  taken a particular type of intention that does in
  fact accompany many utterancesthe subintention
  specified in clause (a)to be an essential
  ingredient of communicative behavior? There are
  many cases of meaning involving linguistic (or
  otherwise conventional) utterances in which S
  does not seek to induce in an audience any
  propositional (or affective) attitude.
• It is not at all clear what attitude I M-intend
  to impart when making a promise by uttering a
  sentence of the form I promise to f.
• Sometimes I dont care whether I am believed or
  not I just feel it is my duty to speak up.
• Only an egocentric author intends me to believe
  that p because he has said so

29
One last effort

• These are genuine difficulties for Grices
  analysis as it stands, and they suggest that the
  specification of the type of response mentioned
  in IIIa needs to be weakened to something like
  the following
• (a) A actively to entertain the
  belief/thought/proposition that p.
• Of course, in many cases S also intends A to go
  on to believe that p, but this fact would not
  enter into the analysis of utterers meaning.

30
(ii) The third clause problem.

• The original motivation for clause (b) is
  perfectly clear. It is not enough, Grice points
  out, for S to mean that p, that S utter x
  intending A to think that p. Recall, S might
  leave Bs handkerchief near the scene of the
  murder with the intention of getting the
  detective (actively) to entertain the thought
  that B is the murderer. But there is no
  temptation to say that by leaving the
  handkerchief, S meant that B is the murderer.
  Hence clause (b), which requires S to intend A to
  recognize the intention specified in the first
  clause (however stated). But what about IIIc?

31

• Grice wants IIIc in order to filter out cases in
  which some natural feature of the utterance in
  question makes it completely obvious that p.
  Recall He is worried by cases like (a) Herod
  presents Salome with the head of John the Baptist
  on a charger (b) in response to an invitation to
  play squash, Bill displays his bandaged leg.
• According to Grice, we do not want to say that
  Herod meant that John the Baptist was dead nor
  do we want to say that Bill meant that his leg
  was bandaged (though we might want to say that he
  meant that he could not play squash, or even that
  he had a bad leg).

32
The analysis is too weak

• Suppose A, a friend of mine, is about to buy a
  house. I think the house is rat-infested, but I
  dont want to mention this outright to A so I let
  rats loose in the house knowing that A is
  watching me. I know that A does not know that I
  know that he is watching me do this. I know A
  will not take the presence of my rats to be
  natural evidence that the house is rat-infested
  but I do know, indeed I intend, that A will take
  my letting rats loose in the house as grounds for
  thinking that I intend to induce in him the
  belief that the house is rat-infested. Conditions
  III(a)-(c) above are fulfilled. But surely it is
  not correct to say that by letting rats loose in
  the house I mean that the house is rat-infested.

33
Fix up

• The problem is that in this example my intentions
  are not, as Strawson puts it, wholly overt. One
  possible remedy involves adding a fourth clause
• (d) A to recognize that U intends (b).
• But as Strawson points out, with enough ingenuity
  the same sort of
• counterexample can still be generated, and then
  we need a fifth clause, then a sixth, and so on.
  At the end of Utterers Meaning and Intentions,
  and again at the end of Meaning Revisited,
  Grice proposes a way out of blocking an infinite
  regress by adding a condition that would prohibit
  any sneaky intention instead of adding a
  fourth (fifth, .. .) clause, the idea is to add a
  second part to the entire analysis, the rough
  import of which is that S does not intend A to be
  deceived about Ss intentions (a)-(c). As long as
  S does not have a deceptive intention of this
  sort, s is deemed to mean that p.

34
Grices final effort

• In view of the earlier discussion of clause
  III(c), you might be inclined, then, to take
  something like the following as the
  characterization of utterers meaning emerging
  from
• Grices writings
• (IV) By uttering x, S meant that p iff for some
  audience A,
• (a) S uttered x intending A actively to
  entertain the thought that p (or the thought that
  S believes that p)
• (b) S uttered x intending A to recognize that S
  intends A actively to entertain the thought that
  p
• (c) S does not intend A to be deceived about Ss
  intentions (a) and (b).

35
Is III sufficient?

• A soldier is captured. He has invaluable info
  that his capturers want and so they torture him.
  They torture him (a) intending to produce a
  response in him of his offering info (b) they
  intend that he recognize that this is their
  intention and (c) they intend that he offer the
  info because he recognizes that they have this
  intention.
• But it does not seem that their act of torturing
  him means that he should offer his information.
• Why not?

36
Answer

• Because the prisoner can know what his capturers
  intention is w/o having to be tortured. The
  torture is merely an inducement.
• What we need is that the audience came to
  recognize the speakers intention at least in
  part on the basis of being presented with the
  utterance.

37
Analysis IV

• S meant something by uttering x iff S uttered x
  intending
• a. that x have a certain feature f
• b. that A recognize that x has f
• c. that A infer at least in part from the fact
  that x is f that S uttered x intending
• d. that Ss utterance of x produce response r in
  A and
• e. that As recognition of Ss intention (d)
  should function as partly As reason for having r.

38
Key to Analysis IV

• As recognition of the speakers intention is
  based on As recognition of some feature of the
  utterance.
• The relevant features to our concerns are
  meaning-bearing features.
• Which ones are those?

39
Examples of Meaning-Bearing Features

• 1. S utters grr intending A to recognize that
  grr has the feature of resembling the sound
  that dogs make when they are angry and intending
  A to infer that S intends A to believe that S is
  angry.
• 2. S utters The cat is on the mat intending A
  to recognize that this string is an English
  sentence that means that the cat is on the mat,
  and intending A to infer that S intends A to
  believe as much.

40
Note

• S intends A to recognize the meaning-bearing
  feature of the string only if S believes that A
  speaks English or understands certain natural
  signs.
• In this regard (IV) captures the idea that a
  basis for communication between individuals
  requires a certain common understanding.

41
Counter-examples to sufficiency of IV

• Strawson (1964) Suppose S puts a wet umbrella
  in the entrance to your apartment knowing you
  will see it there. Indeed, S knows that A sees
  him wet the umbrella and put it there and S also
  knows that A does not know that S knows A is
  watching and so S knows that A will not think
  that the umbrella is wet from rain. Still, S
  intends that A will take Ss putting the wet
  umbrella there as evidence that S intends A to
  believe that it is raining. Further, S knows
  that A is convinced of Ss reliability and
  sincerity.
• Strawson says we would not want in this case to
  say that Ss putting the wet umbrella there
  communicates that it is raining.

42
Strawson on his counter-example

• Whats missing is that A is not intended to know
  that S knows that A is watching S.
• It seems a minimum further condition of his
  trying to communicate with A that he S should
  not only intend A to recognixe h is intention to
  get A to think that it is raining but that he
  should also intend A to recognize his intention
  to get A to recognize his intention to get A to
  think that (Strawson, p. 29).

43
Strawsons Analysis V

• V. S meant something by uttering x iff S uttered
  x intending
• a. that x have a certain feature f
• b. that A recognize that x has f
• c. that A infer at least in part from the fact
  that x is f that S uttered x intending
• d. that Ss utterance of x produce response r in
  A
• e. that As recognition of Ss intention (d)
  should function as partly As reason for having
  r.
• f. That A should recognize Ss intention (c).

44
Counter-example to V

• S intends to get A to leave the room by singing
  Hey Jude. S intends A to recognize that S is
  singing Hey Jude and that A should infer from
  this that S is singing to get A to leave the
  room. (S sings horribly and A is sensitive to
  this.)
• Further S intends A to recognize Ss intention to
  get A to leave, for S wishes to show his contempt
  for A.
• Also, S intends that A believe that S plans to
  get A out by means of his singing S intends that
  As reason for leaving will be As recognition of
  Ss intention to him to leave.
• This satisfies V but is it a case of
  communication?

45
Moral of Counter-Examples

• Im less interested in intricacies of the
  counter-examples than in why they keep arising.
  Theres a pattern here.
• In each case genuine communication is frustrated
  because of an element of deceit.
• And just as there is a pattern to the
  counter-examples theres a pattern to the
  remedies. We keep adding intentions for say, an
  analysis invokes n intentions, with a new
  counter-example we ask that A recognize Ss n-th
  intention in the next analysis.
• Each time we do that we are trying to transform a
  case of merely getting something across into a
  genuine case of communication (by eliminating
  deceit).

46
Problems with this strategy

• 1. It threatens a regress. In Grices 1969 paper
  he suggests we have to stop at a certain point
  because speakers cannot have such complex
  intentions. Problem is any cut off point leads
  to counter-examples.
• 2. Another way of thinking of whats going on
  here is to notice that we are constantly in a
  defensive stance. We are always trying to
  eliminate deceit.

47
Grices solution

• In the more sophisticated analyses we looked at,
  there exist two avenues of communication info
  can be passed along either as a result of As
  recognition of Ss intention that A recognize the
  meaning-bearing feature of Ss utterance or it
  can be passed on as a result of As recognition
  of some wider intention that S possesses.
• In each counter-example S exploits the split in
  intentions to deceive A.
• Grice tries to force the speakers communicative
  intentions into line with the utterances
  meaning-bearing features

48
Grices new analysis VI

• VI. S meant something by uttering x iff
• (1) S uttered x intending
• a. that x have a certain feature f
• b. that A recognize that x has f
• c. that A infer at least in part from the fact
  that x is f that S uttered x intending
• d. that Ss utterance of x produce response r in
  A
• e. that As recognition of Ss intention (d)
  should function as partly As reason for having
  r.
• (2) there is no inference-element E such that S
  uttered x intending both
• That As determination of r should rely on E and
• That A should think S to intend (a) to be false.
  (Grice 1969l, sec. 3)

49
Explanation of VI

• (2) is added to rule out deceit.
• He wants to avoid positing an infinity of
  backwards looking intentions since that he says
  would give us a model that cannot be implement
  (by us).