Title: Nuclear Politics in South Asia
1Nuclear Politics in South Asia
2Presentation Overview
- History of Nuclear Weapons Programs (1947-1998)
- Post-1998 Developments
- Similarities
- Discussion Issues
- Suggested Readings
- QA
3Nuclear Weapons Development 1947-981940s -1959
- India
- 1948 AEC created, Homi Bhabha strongly supports
creating a self-sufficient nuclear infrastructure - Building the nuclear infrastructure and creating
a large pool of trained personnel - Chinas development of nuclear weapons is
acknowledged in internal discussions - Political establishment against nuclear weapons
- Pakistan
- 1956 Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
created - Late 1950s Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister for
Fuel and Natural Resources, advocates the
development of nuclear weapons
41960s
- India
- 1960s increased nuclear assistance from foreign
countries - 1962 - Disastrous border war with China shifts
opinion gradually in favor of nuclear weapons - 1964 Chinas nuclear test further strengthens
the pro-bomb lobby. - 1965 SNEPP initiated, Indo-Pak war (Chinas
support for Pakistan U.S. refusal to supply
arms) - 1966 SNEPP halted
- Late 1967 new effort to develop nuclear
explosives initiated - 1968-70 India opposes the NPT
- Pakistan
- Pakistan acquires and begins operating Pakistan
Atomic Research Reactor (PARR) - Mid-1960s Bhuttos request for building nuclear
weapons is rejected by Gen. Ayub Khan - 1964-65 Pakistan takes notice of Indias
reaction to Chinas nuclear test - 1965 Indo-Pak war (U.S. refusal to supply arms)
- Late 1960s - Bhutto writes Myth of Independence
in which he advocates the development of nuclear
weapons.
51970s
- India
- 1971 Indo-Pak war
- 1972 Approval given for fabricating a nuclear
explosive - 1974 India tests a nuclear explosive, dubbed as
a PNE. Exact yield is still unclear (between 4
12 kilotons) - Post 1974 further development of nuclear
weapons is slowed down (halted??)
- Pakistan
- 1971 Indo-Pak war
- January 1972 Bhutto convenes a meeting of
scientists and announces the decision to develop
nuclear weapons - 1973-77 Pakistan tries to acquire reprocessing
plants from France, but U.S. intervenes - 1974 A.Q. Khan, working in the Netherlands,
offers his assistance - 1975 Pakistan starts acquiring equipment for
uranium enrichment and other components of the
nuclear fuel cycle - Pakistan shifts from a plutonium based nuclear
arsenal to HEU based arsenal
61980s
- India
- Early to mid 1980s nuclear weapons development
proceeds in fits and starts. 1974 design is
improved - 1982 Additional nuclear tests planned but
cancelled - 1983 India sanctions the Integrated Guided
Missile Development Program (IGMDP) - 1986-87 Operation Brasstacks, first nuclear
crisis
- Pakistan
- Pakistan steadily makes progress in its nuclear
weapons program (enrichment facility operational,
cold tests conducted, nuclear test-site built) - U.S. ignores Pakistans nuclear weapons program
due to the Afghan war - 1987 Op. Brasstacks, A.Q. Khan delivers an
implicit nuclear threat to an Indian journalist.
Officially, a Pakistani minister delivers a
similar nuclear threat - Late 1980s Pakistan begins development of
ballistic missiles
71990s
- India
- 1990 crisis over Kashmir (second nuclear
crisis) - 1995 NPT extended indefinitely
- 1995 India prepares for nuclear test(s) but
cancels after U.S. discovers test(s) preparations - 1996 CTBT opens for signature
- May 1998 India conducts 5 nuclear tests
- Pakistan
- 1990 crisis over Kashmir (second nuclear
crisis) - Pakistan acquires ballistic missile technology
from North Korea - April 1998 Pakistan tests the Ghauri ballistic
missile - May 1998 Pakistan conducts 6 nuclear tests
8Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia
- Indian nuclear tests May 11 and 13, 1998
- Diplomatic efforts to stop Pakistani tests
- Pakistan nuclear tests May 28 30, 1998
- Immediate economic sanctions on both India and
Pakistan
9Post-1998 Developments
- India
- Formulates a nuclear doctrine adopts a no-first
use posture and a triad based on a minimum and
survivable deterrent force - Constitutes a tri-service Strategic Rocket
Command to manage land-based nuclear missiles - Creates a Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) to
manage nuclear forces - 1999 Kargil conflict
- 2002 Increased tensions
- Pakistan
- Creates a National Command Authority to manage
nuclear forces - Formulates a nuclear doctrine, rejects no-first
use of nuclear weapons. Official doctrine not
released - 1999 Kargil conflict
- 2002 Increased tensions
10Pakistans Ballistic Missile Systems(Source
Arms Control Today)
System Status Range/Payload Source
Hatf-1 Operational 80-100 km/500 kg Domestic Production
Hatf-2 Tested/Development 190 km/500 kg Domestic/China
Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi) Tested/Development 280 km/500 kg Domestic/China
Tarmuk  Development  300 km/800 kg  Domestic/China
Haider-1 Development 350 km/? kg Domestic Production
Shaheen-1 Tested/Development 750 km/500 kg Domestic/China
Ghauri-1 (Nodong-1) Tested/Development 1,300 km/700 kg Domestic/N. Korea
Ghauri-2 Tested/Development 2,300 km/700 kg Domestic/N. Korea
Shaheen-2 Development 2,500 km/1,000 kg Domestic/China
Ghauri-3 Engine Tested/Development 3,000 km/? kg Domestic/N. Korea
11Indias Ballistic Missile Systems (Source Arms
Control Today)
System Status Range/Payload Source
Prithvi-1 Operational 150 km/1,000 kg Domestic Production
Prithvi-2 Operational 250 km/500 kg Domestic Production
Dhanush/ Prithvi-3 Tested/Development 350 km/1,000 kg Domestic Production
Agni-1 variant Tested/Development 725 km/1,000 kg Domestic Production
Agni-1 Tested/Prototype Only 1,500 km/1,000 kg Domestic Production
Agni-2 Serial Production 2,000 km/1,000 kg Domestic Production
Agni-3 Development 3,000-5,500 km/? kg Domestic Production
Surya Development 5,500 km/2,000 kg Domestic/Russia
Sagarika (SLBM) Development 350 km/500 kg Domestic/Russia
12Indian Background
- Tension with China
- 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE)
- Today 80-100 nuclear weapons
- Goal regional stability
13Pakistani Background
- Nuclear weapons capability by 1989-1990
- Today 90-110 nuclear weapons
- Goals overcoming conventional inferiority,
- keeping regional balance of power
14Nuclear Hopes and Fears
- Pakistan Army better able to negotiate with
India? - Fears of radical Islamic elements within Pakistan
Army - Fear of nukes falling into terrorist hands
15Similarities
- Decision-making on nuclear weapons is highly
personalized - Significant foreign assistance
- Due to export controls, both the countries
operated clandestine networks to procure nuclear
equipment and materials - Scientific establishment given high degree of
autonomy - Both the countries have not signed the NPT and
the CTBT - Symbolism associated with nuclear weapons
- Anti-nuclear movement is not well developed
- Institutionalization of nuclear forces is less
advanced
16Discussion Issues
- Nuclear Stability
- Nuclear Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)
- Nuclear Command Control
- Trajectory of Weaponization
- Number of nuclear weapons definite numbers not
available - Delivery systems
- Second-tier Proliferation
- Integrating India and Pakistan into the
Nonproliferation regime - U.S. Nonproliferation policy toward S. Asia