The Chinese Room Argument Part II

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The Chinese Room ArgumentPart II

• Joe Lau
• Philosophy
• HKU

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The issues

• Certain computations are sufficient for cognition
  (computational sufficiency).
• Objection The Chinese room argument
• Evaluation Not valid.
• A more general argument
• The argument from syntax and semantics

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The argument

• Computer programs are formal (syntactic).
• Human minds have mental contents (semantics).
• Syntax is neither constitutive of nor sufficient
  for semantics.
• Conclusion Programs are neither constitutive of
  nor sufficient for minds.

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Initial comments
Comment 1 The argument is valid. That is, if
the premises are true, the conclusion must also
be true. So we have to decide whether premises 1
to 3 are true or not.
Comment 2 The second premise is obviously
true. To have a mind, one must have mental states
with content. Thoughts, beliefs, desires all have
content (intentionality, aboutness). Brentanos
mark of the mental
1. Programs are formal. 2. Minds have contents.
3. Formal syntax not enough for
contents. Conclusion 4. Programs not enough
for minds.
Comment 3 The Chinese room argument is an
argument is supposed to provide independent
support of premise 3.
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First premise Programs are formal

• True in the sense that
• Symbols are defined independently of meaning.
• Computational operations are defined without
  reference to the meaning of symbols.
• False in the sense that
• Programs cannot / do not contain meaningful
  symbols.
• The function of symbols is to encode content!

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Third premise Syntax not sufficient for
semantics

• Question Do the symbols have meaning or not?
• If so, then there is content / semantics.
• The symbols in the Chinese room do have content.
• Symbols in AI programs can have assigned content.
• So programs with meaningful symbols might still
  be sufficient for minds.

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What is semantics for Searle?
Having the symbols by themselves is not
sufficient for having the semantics. Merely
manipulating symbols is not enough to guarantee
knowledge of what they mean.

• So having meaningful symbols in a system is not
  enough for mental content.
• The system must know what those symbols mean.

But why?
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Response

• Mental representations (symbols) are used to
  explain intentional mental states.
• E.g. X believes that P X has a mental
  representation M of type B with content P.
• X is not required to understand M.
• They cannot do that if they themselves have to be
  understood or interpreted.
• Infinite regress otherwise.

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Summary

• Searle thinks that the symbols in a system must
  be understood / interpreted by the system to
  generate meaning / understanding.
• Begs the question against the thesis of
  computational sufficiency
• Understanding is having symbols that encode
  information in the right way.
• The symbols do not require further understanding
  or interpretation.

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Remaining issues

• Suppose formal operations on meaningful symbols
  can be sufficient for mental states.
• Q1 Where do the meanings of symbols come from?
• Q2 Can formal operations be sufficient to give
  symbols meaning?

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Where does meaning come from?

• The meaning of words (linguistic meaning) depends
  on conventions governing their use.
• Words are voluntary signs (John Locke)

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A different theory is needed

• The theory of linguistic meaning does not apply
  to mental representations
• No conventions governing the use of the mental
  representations.
• Presumably we cannot change the meanings of
  mental representations arbitrarily through
  conventions.