The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism

1
The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism

• Dr. Charles D. Ferguson
• Science and Technology Fellow
• Council on Foreign Relations
• September 29, 2004
• Georgetown University
• Financial support John D. and Catherine T.
  MacArthur Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, and
  Nuclear Threat Initiative

2
Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism

• Acquisition of an intact nuclear weapon
• Crude nuclear weapon or Improvised Nuclear Device
  (IND)
• Attack against or sabotage of a nuclear power
  plant or other nuclear facility
• Radiological dispersal device (RDD) or dirty
  bomb

3
Holmes to Watson Its Elementary

• Motive
• Means
• Opportunity

4
Assessing Risk

• Risk Probability X Consequence
• Large uncertainties
• Lack of data
• Alternatively
• Risk Motivation X Intention X Capability X
  Consequence

5
Terrorist Motivations

• Why havent there been any RDD or crude nuclear
  weapon terrorist attacks?
• Those who study terrorist motivations are
  underwhelmed by the probability of such an event
  for most but not all terrorist groups.
  Jerrold Post (IAEA presentation, Nov. 2001)
• Psychological and political constraints are great
  for most groups

6
Terrorist Motivations (continued)

• Traditional thinking Terrorists want a lot of
  people watching, not a lot of people dead.
• -- Brian Jenkins, RAND
• New Breed of Terrorist Group
• Al Qaeda politico-religious
• Aum Shinrikyo Apocalyptic
• ? Want to kill many and have even more watching
  in dread

7
But Can They Get the Means?

• Nuclear weapons and fissile material are
  difficult to obtain
• Radioactive materials are much more accessible
• Variety of nuclear facilities to target Security
  also varies

8
Acquisition of Intact Nuclear Weapon

• Theft
• Purchase
• Gift
• (a little help
• from their friends)?
• Coup

9
Estimated Nuclear Arsenals
Nation Total Active Weapons Relatively Portable Weapons
United States 7,650 3,000
Russia 8,200 8,000-10,000
France 348 60?
Britain 200 Unknown
China 380 Unknown
Israel 75-200 Unknown
India 30-35 Unknown
Pakistan 24-48 Unknown
North Korea 0-8? Unknown
10
Greatest Risks of Terrorist Acquisition

• Russia
• Large numbers of portable, forward deployed
  tactical nuclear weapons
• Pakistan
• Presence of al Qaeda
• Unstable political system
• Parts of government (ISI) sympathetic to
  terrorist causes
• Nascent nuclear command control system

11
Highest Priority Efforts Intact Nuclear Weapons

• U.S. should
• press Russia to fully implement 1991-1992
  Presidential Nuclear Initiative pledges.
• revamp policy prohibiting security assistance to
  operational Russian nuclear weapons.
• declare its intention to remove its tactical
  nuclear weapons in Europe.
• provide security assistance to Pakistan
  contingent on constraints of NPT

12
Can Terrorists Build Their Own Nuclear Bomb?

• Gun-type
• Simplest design
• Cannot use plutonium must use HEU

13
Can Terrorists Build Their Own Nuclear Bomb?
(continued)

• Implosion-type
• More sophisticated, but still first generation
  weapon
• Can use either plutonium or HEU

14
Major Hurdle Acquisition of Fissile Material
Material Type Global Inventory (metric tons)
Military plutonium (Pu) 250
Civil Pu (separated) 205
Military HEU 1,670
Civil HEU 20
15
Highest Priority Put HEU at the Head of the
Queue

• Accelerate down-blending of Russian HEU
• Speed up repatriation of Soviet/Russian- and
  U.S.-origin HEU and accelerate conversion of
  research reactors
• Use Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility to
  secure HEU
• Subordinate Plutonium Disposition Program to HEU
  First Strategy

16
Attacks on Nuclear Facilities

• Commercial nuclear power plants
• Research reactors
• Spent fuel storage pools
• Reprocessing facilities

17
Nuclear Facilities Highest Priority Efforts

• Design basis threat should reflect 9/11 magnitude
  of attack
• Rapidly identify and implement urgent upgrades to
  vulnerable plant systems
• Need performance-based (not-compliance based)
  security system
• Need formal government assessment of potential
  vulnerabilities at research reactors

18
Dirty Bombs Myth versus Reality

• RDDs (Dirty Bombs) are NOT Weapons of Mass
  Destruction
• Few, if any, people would die immediately or
  shortly after exposure to ionizing radiation from
  typical RDD
• RDDs can be Weapons of Mass Disruption
• Major effects
• Panic (psychological and social effects)
• Economic costs (decontamination and rebuilding)

19
High-Risk Radioactive Sources

• Finding Only a small fraction of commercial
  radioactive sources pose inherently high security
  risks
• But still large number
• High-risk sources are
• Portable
• Dispersible
• More radioactive

20
Dirty Bombs Highest Priority Tasks

• Improve security of high-risk radioactive sources
• Preparation and Response
• Develop and stockpile effective decontamination
  technologies
• Involve public in development of decon standards
• Provide better training of emergency first
  responders
• Educate public about real versus perceived risks
  of radiation psychological immunization