Talking about Nuclear Weapons

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• Talking about Nuclear Weapons
• Lessons from Recent Opinion and Messaging
  Research
• Connect US Briefing
• July 16, 2009

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Agenda

• Overview of research projects
• American Environics
• Greenberg, Quinlan, Rosner
• Topos Partnership
• Summary of findings on public thinking
• Points of consensus Big themes to convey
• Tensions and disagreements Tough choices for
  advocates
• Questions/discussion

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• Recent research on public opinion and
  understanding of nuclear weapons policy

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• Methodology
• Four focus groups (Atlanta and Chicago)
• Explored the reasoning behind attitudes toward
  civil liberties and national security did not
  test specific policy proposals or messages.
• Research Subjects
• Recruited psychographically Town Square
  Faithfuls and Reluctant Fearfuls.
• Swing segments most likely to be receptive to
  progressive positions.

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• Communications Challenge Addressed
• Ways in which fear and security concerns shape
  attitudes.
• How to shape the public discourse on this
  subject.
• Key Findings
• Fear leads people to justify the status quo, and
  support a strong military, including nuclear
  weapons. 
• Linking terrorists with nuclear weapons will
  cause people to embrace the weapons.
• Nuclear weapons thought of as a shield that
  should not be weakened.

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• More Key Findings
• Non-proliferation viewed to only work with
  reasonable states.
• Rogue states cannot be reasoned with in these
  cases military force is acceptable.  
• Main Messaging Recommendations
• Do not link terrorists and nukes.
• Frame the US stockpile as duplicative and
  unnecessary.
• Feature India and Russia as disarmament examples.

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• Methodology
• Survey of 1,300 likely voters, including an
  oversample of 500 opinion formers.
• Focus groups with opinion formers in DC and Los
  Angeles.
• Focus groups were composed of the likely swing
  element on this issue.
• Research Subjects
• Opinion elites.
• Prevent it from emerging as a topic of public
  controversy.
• Elites will emerge as the arbiters of this issue.

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• Communications Challenge Addressed
• Strengthen elite support while maintaining
  initial public support.
• Close off exit ramps that present opportunities
  for support to wane.
• Key Findings
• Viewed as a low priority.
• Skepticism that verification can work.
• Most believe getting to zero is unrealistic.
• Cuts are perceived as weakening the US.
• People are uncomfortable with unilateral action.
• Emphasize legislation and seek to trigger policy
  support in the current political/partisan
  context. 

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• Main Messaging Recommendations
• Promote a message that reinforces the positive
  aspects of existing public opinion
• 1) Keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of
  terrorists, rather than eliminating them.
• 2) Make verification believable.
• 3) Prove the sufficiency of a smaller arsenal.
• 4) Remain non-partisan.
• 5) Assure that it is multi-lateral and focused on
  enhancing security.

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• Methodology
• Combination of two methods.
• Focus groups provided before and after windows
  into patterns of thinking.
• TalkBack testing allowed for the evolutionary
  development of messages.
• Research Subjects
• Four focus groups in Indianapolis with engaged
  citizens of mixed demographics.
• Indianapolis chosen as a middle American city in
  a swing state, with no particular connection to
  nuclear weapons.

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• Communications Challenge Addressed
• Approaches with greatest potential to move
  dialogue towards consideration of reductions and
  even a global ban.
• Identify key patterns in current thinking that
  shape opinions on the issue.
• Key Finding
• Nuclear weapons must be reframed as a problem,
  not the solution to a problem.

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• Main Messaging Recommendations
• Nuclear weapons create risk in todays world,
  rather than reduce it.  This reframe requires
  several supporting points
• 1) Nukes dont help against current threats like
  terrorism
• 2) More weapons mean greater risks
• 3) Nuclear destruction is unique and affects
  everyone
• 4) Nukes are unnecessary because we have better
  ways to ensure security
• 5) Leaders of both parties agree. 

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• Strong public support for nuclear arms
  reductions in the abstract

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• But deeply engrained perceptions and patterns of
  thinking that undermine prospects for sustained
  support.
• Nuclear weapons viewed as a metaphorical shield.
• Dangerous world full of crazy, evil,
  unpredictable people/countries.
• U.S. is a person defending their home in a bad
  neighborhood.
• Nuclear weapons are like conventional weapons
  only bigger, better, more effective.
• Nuclear weapons make us safe the ultimate
  protective weapon.

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• Cognitive dissonance created by tension between
  what is moral and what is necessary to keep us
  safe and therefore also moral. Resolved by
  justifying status quo (certain things are
  deplorable but necessary when lives are at
  stake).
• Serious doubts about ability to verify compliance
  by others.
• Dont believe U.S. reductions will affect
  policies of Iran or North Korea.
• The existence of nuclear weapons around the world
  is seen as inevitable.

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• Arguments for arms reduction easily perceived as
  coming from a pacifist (and naïve) perspective.
• Most people dont think about this issue most of
  the time. The fact that its not on the radar
  screen is both an opportunity and a challenge
• Opportunity because people are open to learning
  more and having their opinion shaped
• Challenge because many feel that it must not be
  that important since it doesnt come up often.

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• In short
• Skepticism about feasibility
• Susceptibility to fear-based arguments about not
  giving up the most powerful weapon in our
  arsenal
• Tendency to think in terms of individual foes
  (crazy, evil) and personal protection
• Unwillingness to put principle before safety

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• What is this about?

Information
Understanding
Big ideas and paths of hidden reasoning (e.g.,
its about fairness, teamwork, David and Goliath,
wise management, heroes rescuing victims, a
stitch in time, etc.)
Cultural Logic
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Suggested elements of a
shared big story

• Nuclear weapons are ineffective against modern
  security threats and a liability in todays
  security environment.
• We have other, better ways of ensuring our
  security.
• There are concrete, achievable steps we can take
  toward reducing (and even eventually eliminating)
  nuclear weapons.
• When we join other nations in efforts to reduce
  the risk created by nuclear weapons, it makes us
  safer and helps to create a more manageable
  world.
• Bipartisan/military leaders and experts say so
  crosscutting theme.

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• Nuclear weapons are ineffective against modern
  security threats and a liability in todays
  security environment.
• More nuclear weapons means more chance of
  accident or theft. They create risk rather than
  reducing it.
• Not effective against modern security threats
  like terrorism.
• Uniquely destructive use would have devastating
  unintended consequences that would affect us all.

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• We have other, better ways of ensuring our
  security.
• Conventional forces?
• If military strength is not part of your
  alternative security strategy, people may feel
  youre asking them to replace our most powerful
  weapon with a nonmilitary option, which is
  unlikely to persuade.

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• There are concrete, achievable steps we can and
  should take toward reducing the nuclear weapons
  danger.
• Weve made progress before
• Serious people tell us its realistic

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• ? When we join other nations in efforts to reduce
  the risk created by nuclear weapons, it makes us
  safer and helps to create a safer, more
  manageable world.
• Its a collaborative effort were acting in
  concert with others, not on our own.
• We benefit from signing on to international
  agreements that give us more information, more
  ability to predict, more tools for enforcement.
• And our participation/leadership in these efforts
  strengthens our leverage in future negotiations,
  so we can get tougher agreements and build a
  united front to halt the spread and reduce the
  number of these dangerous weapons.

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• Make nuclear weapons the problem, not the
  solution.
• Evoke a big-picture, global perspective
• Emphasize that concrete, achievable steps can be
  taken toward the big goal of reducing nuclear
  weapons.
• Highlight past successes.
• Remind your audience that there is bipartisan
  political and military support including from
  some surprising messengers for reducing the
  number of nuclear weapons.
• Put concerns about the effectiveness of
  international agreements into perspective an
  agreement doesnt have to be perfect to be good
  for us and others. Explain how global
  cooperation on this issue makes us safer and
  creates a more manageable world

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• Don't reinvigorate an "us versus them" mindset or
  encourage people to think in terms of individual
  foes and the need to protect ourselves from
  crazy, unpredictable enemies.
• Dont overpromise (for example, suggesting that
  cutting US arsenals will persuade Iran to abandon
  its nuclear program). But do reassure people
  that the steps we take with others now can make
  us safer and the world more manageable.
• Avoid suggesting that the U.S. is solely
  responsible for the lack of progress on
  nonproliferation.
• Avoid putting principles over safety (arguing
  that we need to lead by example can create this
  impression).
• Dont promote cooperation for its own sake talk
  about how international agreements help us manage
  and reduce risk, and make us safer.

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• If youre calling for US leadership, emphasize
  team leadership and how it will give us the
  leverage we need to achieve our security goals
  (not leadership for its own sake, or the U.S.
  doing it all).
• Remember that concern about the danger posed by
  nukes can be constructive (when combined with
  solutions), but fear of the scary other can be
  counterproductive.

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• Points on which researchers agree, but
  implications for advocates may need sorting out

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• Making zero the explicit policy goal provokes
  counterproductive skepticism. Advocates seem
  naïve, unrealistic.
• That said, a narrative about reducing the risk
  created by nuclear weapons leads many to bring up
  zero.
• Do we know enough now to make informed choices
  while reinforcing some shared ideas that benefit
  everyone?

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• Promoting a ban on testing is difficult.
• Doesnt fit easily into the risk reduction
  narrative
• May undermine the narrative by accepting that our
  nukes need to be maintained in working order
  (because theyre useful weapons)
• RD seen as a good thing
• Implications for advocates
  who work on this issue?

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• Talking about Iran is particularly challenging
• Avoid making this the prototype
• Avoid overpromising
• Avoid activating perception of world filled with
  fanatical, implacable foes
• How to address hard cases without falling
  into framing traps?

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• Different objectives and assumptions
• American Environics - Investigating the mechanism
  of fear
• GQR - Talking to where people are right now
• Topos - Trying to change the public conversation

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Points of disagreement Tough choices for
advocates

• Talking about verification
• A helpful dose of reassurance? OR
• A problematic reminder that the world is full of
  untrustworthy, dangerous foes?

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• Talking about terrorism
• Steer clear entirely dont stimulate fear?
• Treat preventing nuclear terrorism as a central
  argument?
• Make the right linkage between nuclear weapons
  and terrorism?
• How to acknowledge concerns about terrorism and
  nuclear terrorism while avoiding framing pitfalls?

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• Sufficiency arguments (well still have enough
  for deterrence)
• A helpful and necessary reassurance, OR
• A problematic reactivation of the notion that
  nuclear weapons are useful against todays
  threats?
• One of the toughest choices facing advocates
  especially those who target policymakers

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Questions about strategy and policy

• For example, on strategy
• An elite/policymaker strategy or a public
  strategy, or both and how do they complement
  and differ from one another?
• Supporting policy advocacy that is already under
  way while also coming to broader consensus
  around a shared big story?
• Coordinating for an overarching communications
  and media strategy?

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• On policy
• Are there disagreements within the community, for
  example on ratification of CTB, or on deterrence
  theory?
• Do advocates need to talk about trade-offs and
  policy priorities, how to deal with partial wins
  etc.?

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• QUESTIONS
• and
• DISCUSSION