Missile Defense and the SDI

1
Missile Defense and the SDI
2
The SDI in US Nuclear Strategy

• Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) was the
  theoretical foundation of the US-USSR nuclear
  relationship
• Anything that hindered the opponent from
  inflicting assured destruction was considered
  destabilizing
• This premise was used by opponents of missile
  defenses

3
Arguments against MAD

• Hoffman claims that MAD should not be the sole
  guiding principle, since US-USSR relations are
  far more complicated
• Military competition around Soviet efforts at
  peripheral expansion and American efforts to
  contain them
• For instance, according to Hoffman it is unclear
  whether we would really retaliate if the USSR
  invaded Europe mutual destruction was not
  necessarily assured
• The USSR concentrated on its conventional forces
  in preparation for a potential quick victory in
  Europe despite MAD
• Furthermore, the USSR maintained ballistic
  missile defenses, air defenses, and shelters for
  political leaders
• Furthermore, MAD did not fit the domestic
  political structure of the United States. The
  perverted logic was not really acceptable to the
  American public, and the USSR even had reason to
  believe that the West would not be able to keep
  up qualitatively

4
SDI and MAD

• Assured destruction implies that only offensive
  weapons can make MAD stable defenses are only
  useful if they protect a nations second strike
  capability
• However, defenses that reduce civilian casualties
  are inherently destabilizing
• Even if one percent of offensive warheads were to
  get through an SDI system, the US would have to
  survive one hundred nuclear attacks
• According to MAD doctrine, defense have to be
  leakproof to be useful semi-effective defenses
  are the worst
• Hoffman claims that missile defenses should be
  analyzed by how they deter preemptive attack and
  reduce collateral damage

5
Impact of Defenses on the Nuclear Balance

• Less than comprehensive defenses will raise the
  offensive force requirements
• Dual use missile defenses make economizing
  offensive forces for maximum effectiveness
  difficult
• Since the attacker must assume that the defender
  has assigned the majority of its defensive forces
  to each target, the defense has the strategic
  advantage
• Given this premise, missile defenses may aid
  deterrence, since it deceases the attackers
  preemptive advantage.

6
Questions

• Is MAD an overly simplistic governing theory as
  Hoffman claims it is?
• Do partially effective defenses undermine
  deterrence or enhance it?
• Are missile defenses irrelevant in the context of
  a full scale attack?