Deterrence

1
Deterrence

• Deterrence is the effort by one actor to persuade
  another actor to refrain from some action by
  convincing the opponent that the costs will
  exceed the rewards of the act.
• Deterrence, in order to be successful, must meet
  two conditions
• The capabilities to complete the threat must be
  present, and
• The will, or intent, or resolve, must be present.
• These two elements make the deterrent credible

2
Mutually Assured Destruction

• In the age of MAD, the possession of a protected
  first strike capability means that one can always
  inflict unacceptable harm.
• Such a condition becomes self-limiting, a
  constraint as well as an asset.
• You cannot press to the limit for something it is
  clear that you are not willing to risk unlimited
  destruction.

3
Brinkmanship

• Push the other side to the limit to see who backs
  down.
• Cuban missile crisis 1963
• Till the other side blinks
• There is no crisis if both states level of
  resolve is known.
• It is uncertainty that makes Brinkmanship
  feasible.

4
Strategic doctrine

• The doctrine of massive retaliation gave way to
  flexible response as Soviet military capability
  made the capability calculus more suspect, and
  the resolve less credible.
• Note that doctrine must evolve to maintain
  credibility in the face of evolving political and
  military realities.

5
Flexible response

• Flexible response buttresses up nuclear
  deterrence by allowing low-level nuclear
  exchanges
• Such low-level exchanges carry the risk of
  further escalation, hence retain credibility
  where MAD would not.
• This returns to Hermann Kahns escalation ladder.

6
Deterrence and Rationality

• Discussions of deterrence state that deterrence
  relies on the assumption of rational behavior
  on the part of the opponent.

7
The Deterrence sequence

• Determine apparent threat.
• Assess own interests and capabilities.
• Assess opponents interests and capabilities.
• Make implicit or explicit threat to impose costs
  if event occurs.
• Follow up deterrent threat if required.
  Otherwise credibility becomes lower in later
  deterrent situations.

8
Some propositions about deterrence

• Deterrence is not simply a matter of announcing a
  commitment and backing it up with threats
• It is heavily context dependent.
• It is difficult to design a deterrent threat that
  will deter all options available to the attacker
• Deterrence often fails in stages rather than all
  at once.
• Deterrence is often at best a time-buying
  strategy.

9
Coercive diplomacy

• Coercive diplomacy seeks to reverse actions which
  have already occurred.
• A combination of diplomatic action and military
  force which occurs to force the other side to
  back down. Usually more difficult to implement.
• Best example of success Cuban Missile Crisis
• Best example of failures Persian Gulf/Iraq
• Often a try-and-see strategy

10
Stable Deterrent

• Not only should a deterrent be credible, it needs
  to be stable.
• A deterrent threat should not provoke the other
  side to act.
• Does SDI make nuclear deterrence unstable?

11
SDI and Deterrence Stability

• If Flexible response is a policy that exists
  under the umbrella of Mutual assured destruction,
  does a defensive shield destabilize deterrence?

12
NMD

• The deployment of NMD is generally suggested by
  one of two scenarios
• A rogue state
• An accidental launch
• Likely rogue states
• North Korea, Iran, (Iraq prior to 2003)
• Syria?, Libya?
• Aberrant Russian commander?

13
Accidental launch

• Command control in emerging nuclear arsenals is
  less secure?
• Why should CC be less capable in a newly
  emerging nuclear arsenal?
• Suppose probability of 1/50
• Is risk a series model?
• A parallel model?

14
Rogue states

• Are rogue states deterable?
• It all becomes a question of resolve
• Does NMD influence resolve?
• Does the uncertainty of the effectiveness
  influence resolve?

15
Extended Deterrence

• When a deterrent threat is extended to cover an
  ally, we call this extended deterrence.
• Extended immediate deterrence is the situation
  where the ally is threatened by immediate action
  on the part of the attacker and failure to act
  will result in an immediate attack on the ally
  state.

16
Military/Political Doctrine

• Purist - Military should leave politics to
  politicians.
• Give advice strictly on military terms
• Fusionist the nature of the modern world
  dictates that politics and military issues have
  converged.
• Military advice must be hedged or advised by
  political advice

17
Arms Races - Definition

• Arms races are reaction processes whereby the
  participants react towards arms acquisitions by
  partners (opponents) by acquiring more
  themselves.
• The arms race implies an escalating cycle of
  acquisition/purchasing.

18
Arms races Friendly Ones?

• Arms races are typically between opponents
• e.g US-Soviet, Egypt-Israel, India-Pakistan
• Occasionally, they are between friendly rivals
• Britain-France, US-Britain

19
Arms Races - Types

• Quantitative
• Increased spending ()
• Increases in system components (ships, missiles,
  warheads)
• Qualitative
• Changes in system type
• The New Look
• Star wars
• NMD

20
Quantitative arms races

• Spending
• Ships
• Missiles
• Warheads
• Soldiers

21
Qualitative arms races

• Nuclear weapons
• Historical examples ?
• Technology
• Persian Gulf
• Air defense interdiction
• Stealth
• ECM