PhysicsGlobal Studies 280 Module 6: Defenses Against Missiles

1
Physics/Global Studies 280 Module 6 Defenses
Against Missiles

• Part 1 Introduction to Missile Defenses
• Part 2 The 1980s Star Wars ABM Program
• Part 3 The Current Missile Defense Program
• Part 4 The Current Midcourse Intercept Program
• Part 5 Proposed Boost-Phase Intercept Program
• Part 6 Theater Missile Defense Systems
• Part 7 Space Weapons
• Part 8 Detection of Nuclear Cargo Delivery

Selected slides are marked by
2
Module 6 Part 1

• Introduction to Missile Defenses

3
Types of Defenses Against Nuclear Attack

• Passive defense (civil defense)
• Seeks to deter or mitigate rather than defend
  against attack
• Requires sheltering and crisis relocation
• Has been embraced and discarded several times
• Active defense (weapons to destroy weapons)
• Seeks to prevent nuclear weapons from detonating
  at their targets
• Requires destruction of delivery vehicles
  (aircraft, ICBMs, SLBMs, cruise missiles, etc.)
  before they reach their targets
• Must be nearly perfect to avoid enormous death
  and destruction (offensive weapons costing 1M
  can destroy 1B worth of property)

4
Passive Defense Against Attacks 1

• Sheltering
• Blast shelters (could withstand 50100 psi
  overpressures)
• Only a very small fraction of the land area of
  the US would be subjected to 50 psi, even in an
  all-out attack
• However, most people live in cities and hence
  would likely be subject to blast, fire, etc.
• Fallout shelters (could have protection factors
  100)
• Radiation from fallout decays rapidly with time
• Cumulative exposure would still be serious
• Submarine attacks might continue for weeks or
  months
• Problems and costs of providing adequate
  sanitation, ventilation, food, and water are
  enormous
• Warning time could be very short ( 10 minutes or
  less), so most people would not reach shelters

5
Passive Defense Against Attacks 2

• Crisis relocation (Reagan,1980s)
• Plans developed by Federal Emergency Management
  Agency (FEMA)
• Plans called for evacuation of all urban and
  other high risk populations and quartering of
  evacuees in host communities
• There was confusion over whether many communities
  were high-risk or low-risk
• Feasibility of successful evacuation is very
  doubtful
• Many urban areas and host regions refused to
  participate in planning, finding the concept
  offensive, ludicrous, or dangerous
• By 1985, civil defense was again dropped

6
Active Defense Against Attacks

• Many aspects of this problem are
  counter-intuitive
• Very important to distinguish
• Technical issues (nature cannot be fooled)
• Policy issues (what is the goal)
• Arms race issues (effects on arms races)
• Costs vs. benefits, alternatives, opportunity
  costs
• Possible threats and threat evolution (number,
  characteristics, responsive vs. nonresponsive)
• Crucial to avoid the fallacy of the last move

7
Current Threats to the United States
8
Defending the United States Against Attack by
Ballistic Missiles

• Evolution of perceived threats
• Soviet long-range ballistic missiles
  (1950s  1990s)
• Chinese long-range ballistic missiles (1960s
  today)
• Accidental or unauthorized launch of ballistic
  missiles (1990s)
• North Korean or Iranian long-range missiles
  (1990s today)
• Possible Approaches
• Seek friendly relations
• Attempt diplomacy to remove threatening missiles
• Attempt to destroy threatening missiles on the
  ground
• Attempt to destroy attacking missiles in flight
• History of U.S. anti-ballistic missile weapon
  programs
• Nike-Zeus (1950s)
• Sentinel-Safeguard (1970s)
• Star Wars (1980s)
• National Missile Defense (1990s)
• Current Missile Defense Program

9
History of U.S. ABM Programs

• Nike-Zeus (1950s)
• Nike-X (1960s)
• Sentinel (196668)
• Safeguard (196976)
• Star Wars (19831990)
• GPALs (19911997)
• National Missile Defense (19972001)
• Current Missile Defense Program

10
History and Problems of Missile Defense
Security problems
Uncertainty Instabiliity
Armament dynamics
Costs
Space weapons
Counter- measures
Impact on arms control
Technical problems
Bush2 Missile Defense
Bush1 Patriot GPALS
Clinton BMD TMD
Reagan Star Wars SDI
ABM- Treaty Detente
Sputnik- Shock
Early ABMs
ABM-debate
V1 V2
Air defense
2010
2000
1990
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
11
U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Programs Have
Always Been Highly Controversial

• Missile defense would not be controversial if
• An effective defense was clearly possible with
  current or near-term technology
• It would not bankrupt the United States
• It would not distract the United State from other
  actions that would more certainly increase U.S.
  security
• It would not cause other countries to do things
  that would decrease our security
• Historically missile-defense programs have been
  used for many purposes other than defending
  against missiles
• To destroy hated arms control agreements
• As bargaining chips
• To support defense contractors
• To win political advantage
• To create a (so far false) sense of security

12
Goals of U.S. ABM Programs 1

• Some historical ABM program goals
• Defend U.S. cities against a massive attack by
  Soviet ICBMs (19551962)
• Support the aerospace industry, defend the
  Johnson administration from attacks by
  Republicans, defend the United States against a
  limited attack by future Chinese missiles (1968)
• Defend some U.S. ICBM silos against a Soviet
  counter-force attack (19681975)
• Make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete by
  creating an impenetrable shield that would
  completely protect the U.S. and all its friends
  and allies (Reagan, 19831988)
• Enhance deterrence, defend U.S. missile silos,
  achieve political advantage, etc. (everyone else,
  19831988)

13
Goals of U.S. ABM Programs 2

• Some historical ABM program goals (continued)
• Defend the United States against accidental
  launches of Soviet ICBMs (19881990)
• Defend the United States against an unspecified,
  emerging Third-World ballistic missile threat
  (19901991)
• Counter the threat of theater ballistic missiles
  (19911998)
• Defend the Clinton administration against attacks
  by Republicans, defend the U.S. against missile
  attacks by emerging ballistic missile states with
  which the U.S. did not have friendly relations
  (19982001)
• Reward Bush supporters, defend U.S. against
  missile attacks by the axis of evil states
  (North Korea, Iran, and Iraq), or China, or an
  accidental launch from Russia, or
  (2001present)

14
Anti-Ballistic Missile Weapon Systems Must be
Highly Effective

• If you were President, how effective do you
  believe an ABM system would have to be to
• Allow you to ignore completely nuclear-armed
  ballistic missiles held by an adversary?
• Cause you to decline to authorize a pre-emptive
  attack on missiles being fueled and armed by an
  adversary in a crisis?
• Allow you to decide to attack an adversary that
  has nuclear-armed ballistic missiles?
• Deter North Korea from launching a nuclear
  ballistic-missile attack against the United
  States that it would otherwise execute?
• Deter Russia from launching a ballistic missile
  attack against the United States?

15
Flight of Ballistic Missiles

• Phases of flight
• Boost phase (rocket motors burning)  1 to 4 min
• Post-boost phase (MIRVed missiles)  5 min
• Midcourse phase (ballistic flight)  20 min
• Terminal phase (within atmosphere)  2030 sec
• Types of re-entry vehicles
• MRV multiple RV (not independently targetable)
• MIRV multiple, independently targetable RV
• MARV maneuverable RV

16
Types of ABM Systems

• Terminal defenses would attack RVs during
  re-entry
• Traditional (radars rockets armed with
  conventional or nuclear warheads)
• Simple/novel systems (curtains of projectiles,
  dust defense using buried bombs)
• Mid-course defenses would attack RVs in space
• IR sensors, particle-beams and neutron detectors
• Kinetic-energy warheads or particle beams
• Boost-phase defenses would attack missiles
  during powered flight, when their rocket motors
  are burning
• IR sensors
• Kinetic-kill vehicles (KKVs), lasers, particle
  beams

17
ABM System Requirements

• Sensors
• Goal detect, identify, and track targets
• Passive (optical, IR)
• Active (radar, particle beams)
• Weapons
• Goal destroy missile boosters or warheads in
  flight
• Battle management
• Detection
• Identification
• Tracking
• Discrimination
• Targeting
• Damage assessment
• Retargeting

18
Module 6 Part 2

• The 1980s Star Wars Program

19
Star Wars Weapons Program  1

• President Reagans speech of March 23rd, 1983
• Surprised and stunned the entire US government,
  including the Pentagon
• Expressed a grand vision, intention to replace
  deterrence by a defensive system
• Was a radical departure from previous US policy
• Contradicted the results of just-completed
  studies by the White House and the DoD
• Did not say success was assured, but implied it
  was highly likely and could be achieved soon
• Launched a major, long-term research and
  development program (the Strategic Defense
  Initiative SDI)

20
Star Wars Weapons Program  2

• Reasons for everyones surprise
• The President consulted with only a few advisors
  (not including the Sec Def) before his speech
• The U.S. already had a large research program
  investigating ABM weapons
• The White House Science Council had just
  completed a study which concluded that a missile
  defense would be technologically infeasible for
  the foreseeable future
• The Department of Defense had just completed
  studies that concluded the prospects for success
  were very poor and recommended reducing the
  funding of the existing ABM research program
  (DDRE was testified that day)

21
Star Wars Weapons Program  3

• Some consequences of Reagans speech
• Raised public hopes and expectations that could
  not be fulfilled (protection of our population
  against nuclear attack is a practical possibility
  and might even be accomplished soon)
• Led to doubling and tripling of expenditures on
  ABM weapon research and development, exacerbating
  the enormous budget deficits of the Reagan years
• Closed off pursuit of alternative approaches to
  reducing the threat of nuclear weapons
• Accelerated the building of offensive weapons
• Started expensive programs to develop and deploy
  extensive missile defenses that continue
  unsuccessfully to this day
• The Star Wars program did not cause the Soviet
  Unions collapse

22
Star Wars Weapons Program  4

• Some technical realities of the time
• A system that was 90 effective would have
  allowed a Soviet attack to kill 75 of the US
  population immediately, with millions of later
  deaths
• IR laser weapons would have required space-based
  mirrors 10 times larger than the largest ever
  built on the ground and lasers gt 106 times
  brighter
• Midcourse intercept would have required
  detection, tracking, and discrimination of
  100,000 objects in space, at existing Soviet
  force levels
• Battle management computer programs would have
  required more than 100,000 man-years to write
  using the most advanced techniques then available
  and would have had to work almost flawlessly the
  first time they were used

23
Star Wars Weapons Program  5

• Sensors, computers, and weapons would have had to
  be integrated into an enormously complex system
  that
• Would have had to attack ballistic missiles
  within seconds after having been dormant for
  years
• Would have had to work almost perfectly the first
  time it was used, even though it could not be
  tested under realistic conditions
• Would have had to work almost perfectly while
  being attacked by Soviet nuclear and space weapons

24
Star Wars Weapons Program  6

• For every ABM weapon concept that was proposed
  or imagined, including all space-based weapons,
  a counter-measure had already been identified.
• Unlike the weapons themselves, these
  counter-measures were
• Possible with existing technology
• Relatively cheap
• Moreover, the SDI program did not even attempt to
  address nuclear weapons carried by
• Air-, sea-, or ground-launched cruise missiles
• Submarine-launched ballistic missiles
• Bombers
• Ships
• Yet it was supposed to make nuclear weapons
  impotent and obsolete

25
Star Wars Weapons Program  7

• Knowledgeable people inside and outside the
  government knew the goal of complete protection
  was impossible
• Consequently
• Knowledgeable scientists and others outside the
  government spoke out strongly
• Gave public speeches, talks, articles, etc.
• Pledged not to participate
• Knowledgeable people inside government spoke out
• Made cautious public comments
• Some gave forceful secret advice
• Allies of Reagan tried to move the goal posts
  to
• Enhancing deterrence
• Causing the Soviets to spend money on
  countermeasures
• All this had relatively little impact on the
  publics perception

26
Star Wars Weapons Program  8 

• As a result of its technological unreality, the
  emphasis of the SDI program fluctuated wildly
  from year to year 
• Space-based X-ray lasers
• Space-based particle-beam weapons
• Space- and ground-based optical and UV lasers
• Space-based kinetic energy weapons
• Smart rocks
• Brilliant pebbles
• High- and low-altitude rocket interceptors

27
Star Wars Weapons Program  9

• Some disadvantages of the massive increase in
  spending on ABM weapon research
• Spurred race in offensive weapons
• Spurred Soviet efforts to develop space weapons
• Poisoned arms control efforts
• Enormous opportunity cost Diversion of money,
  manpower, and other resources from education and
  internationally competitive civilian industries
  and products to uncompetitive military industries
  and products
• SDI ended up costing more 60B, with little to
  show for it
• The SDI program was greatly reduced by Bush-I and
  terminated by Clinton, but U.S. spending on
  missile defense has continued at about the same
  pace, totaling more than 100B since 1984

28
Star Wars Weapons Program  10

• Consequences if Star Wars weapons had been
  deployed
• Would have aggravated crisis instability
• Would have shortened decision times, removing
  humans from the loop
• If matched by the Soviets, it would have disarmed
  U.S. allies
• It would have had an enormous financial cost the
  proposed prototype system would have cost more
  than 1 trillion
• It would have created a false sense of security,
  possibly led to tragic mistakes

29
The Nitze Criteria for Deploying an ABM Weapon
System

• In the early 1980s, Paul Nitze argued
  convincingly that to be considered for
  deployment, an ABM system must first meet the
  following three criteria 
• 1. The system must be effective
• 2. The system must be able to survive attack
• 3. The system must be cost-effective at the
  margin
• These criteria became known as the Nitze
  criteria.
• Officially adopted about 1985, these criteria
  effectively ended any chance of deploying a
  nationwide missile defense system during the
  1980s and 1990s, because no system then under
  development could come close to meeting them.

30
Module 6 Part 3

• The Current Missile Defense Program

31
Lessons from Star Wars

• Missile defense technology is highly challenging
• Technology cannot be coerced by wishful thinking,
  ideology, or policy (to paraphrase the Nobel
  Laureate Richard Feynman, engineering programs
  must be consistent with technical realities,
  because nature cannot be fooled)
• It is important to understand what technology
  can and cannot do in a given situation, because
  policy must be consistent with the available
  technology for a program to be successful
• An RD program without clear goals will always
  waste time and money
• Frequent testing is critical and the budget for
  tests must therefore be large if there is no
  commitment to such an effort, the program will
  fail
• An independent evaluation and review process is
  critical

32
Whats Different about BMD Today?

• Todays defined threat is numerically smaller,
  but nuclear and chemical or biological warheads
  still require that the defense meet very high
  performance standards
• Geographical range of threat is larger
• Defenses against shorter range (theater,
  battlefield) missiles are technically easier
  because of slower missile speeds
• Legacy technologies from of Star Wars
  occasionally helpful, but by-and-large the
  benefits from the expenditure are small

33
Whats the same?

• The amazing thing is how few important things
  have changed 
• Missile defense is still personally identified
  with the President
• Missile defense programs are still ideologically
  driven
• Technical goals are still unspecified or
  nonexistent
• The policy goals and framework keep shifting
• The RD program is poorly defined and
  overextended
• Tests are infrequent and unrealistic or
  nonexistent, and budgets for testing are far too
  small
• Misleading information all over the place
• Tests and demonstrations of little relevance
  (stunts) get wide publicity while vital technical
  information is hidden from the Congress and the
  public behind a wall of secrecy

34
Example Capability-Based Acquisition

• The Nitze Criteria have been officially dropped
• Instead, the current program is
  capability-based, which means 
• It has no specific goals or requirements
• Congress is supposed to give the Missile Defense
  Agency (MDA) whatever money it asks for
• MDA will say later what it has been able to do
  with the money
• MDAs budget this year is 10 billion (twice the
  entire budget of the National Science Foundation)
• The President has asked Congress to double MDAs
  budget over the next few years, to about 15
  billion per year

35
Elements of the Current U.S. Anti-Ballistic
Missile Weapon Program

• Terminal defenses   e.g., Patriot and THAAD, for
  use against TBMs
• Midcourse defenses land- and sea-based
  interceptors
• Boost-phase defenses
• The Airborne Laser (ABL), initially for TBMs,
  eventually for ICBMs
• Land- and sea-based interceptors
• Space-based interceptors

36
Developments in Missile Defense Budget

• FY 2005 10.1 b requested, 9.9 b approved for
  missile defense
• FY 2006 reduce MDA budget to 7.8 b from 8.8 b
  in 2005
• Planned cuts on missile defense by five billion
  dollars over next six years
• Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) cuts by 800 m
  dollars in 2006
• Six missiles for midcourse defense in silos at
  Fort Greely, Alaska and two at Vandenberg Air
  Force Base in California
• Third site with ten interceptor missiles at
  location in Europe (later 2010)
• Army 856 million against short- and
  medium-range ballistic missiles 108 PAC3 and
  Medium Extended Air Defense System
  (Germany/Italy)
• Air Force 757 m (158 m) for Space-Based
  Infrared System-high
• System not operational in 2004, testing delays,
  technology unproven.

37
Module 6 Part 4

• The Current Midcourse Intercept Program
  Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)

38
Components of the Proposed GMD System 1

• The currently proposed system has six distinct
  parts, all of which must perform perfectly for
  the system to work
• Satellites for initial launch detection and
  tracking
• Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites with IR
  sensors, for now
• Later, Space-Based Tracking and Surveillance
  System (STSS), greatly delayed
• Radars for subsequent tracking and trajectory
  prediction
• Five ultra-high-frequency (UHF) ground-based
  radars (USA, Greenland, UK)
• Receive initial tracks from DSP, project the
  flight envelopes of the missiles
• Must be upgraded to improve their performance
• Radars for discrimination of RVs and decoys
• 4 - 9 X-band radars, including one each in UK,
  and Greenland
• First X-band radar is being built on Shemya
  Island in the Aleutians

39
Components of the Proposed GMD System 2

• Interceptor boosters
• For cheap and rapid procurement, the booster was
  to be off the shelf a modified three-stage
  commercially available booster built by Boeing,
  which has not been developed and has had
  enormous cost over-runs
• The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is also funding
  a costly second booster development program
  managed by Lockheed at additional cost
• No usable booster is yet in sight
• The exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV)
• Weighs 130 pounds, is 51 inches long and closes
  on its target at some 15,000 mph
• Is intended to destroy the target RV by a
  body-to-body collision
• During interceptor boost, the EKV receives
  updated information on the changing position and
  velocity of the target and passes it to the
  booster
• After separation from its final boost stage, the
  EKV turns on its onboard optical and IR sensors
  to acquire, track, and discriminate the target
• Uses small onboard thrusters to maneuver to hit
  the target

40
Components of the Proposed GMD System 3

• Battle management, Command, Control, and
  Communications (BMC3) network
• Receives data from separate elements and links
  them together
• Analyzes parameters of the attack, such as the
  speed, trajectory, and projected impact point of
  hostile warheads
• Computes the optimum intercept point
• Cues and fires the interceptor
• Provides in-flight target updates to the booster
  and EKV
• Assess the success or failure of the intercept
  attempt
• If a failure, repeats the process for subsequent
  intercept attempts
• In reality, the defense is likely to fire a
  barrage or net of interceptors at each
  target, in order to increase the chances of a
  successful intercept.
• In this case the individual components must be
  designed not to interfere with one another and
  the BMC3 network must be designed to handle more
  than one intercept attempt in parallel.

41
Technological Challenges toMidcourse Intercept

• The technological challenge is formidable, most
  difficult is discrimination
• The system has to confront an attacking missile
  that is designed to fool the interceptor into
  going after one of many decoys RVs
• The general performance characteristics of the
  EKV (com links, sensor suite, agility) will be
  known to the adversary
• The missiles payload could be one or more
  nuclear warheads, or dozens or hundreds of
  hardened chemical or biological munitions
  (bomblets)
• The system must identify and track RVs in the
  face of countermeasures, including decoys and
  anti-simulation devices
• The Welch panel labeled the current program Rush
  to Failure
• The system has failed many tests. The DoD has
  therefore exempted the system from any further
  testing until it is deployed

42
Criteria for the Proposed GMD System

• Deployment criteria established by the Clinton
  administration
• The threat
• The expected cost
• Technological maturity
• Arms control impacts
• The Bush II administration has set aside these
  considerations.

43
Technological Challenges toMidcourse Intercept

• The technological challenge to a successful
  system is formidable
• The most difficult is discrimination
• The system has to confront an attacking missile
  that is designed to fool the interceptor into
  going after one of many decoys RVs
• The general performance characteristics of the
  EKV (com links, sensor suite, agility) will be
  known to the adversary
• The missiles payload could be one or more
  nuclear warheads, or dozens or hundreds of
  hardened chemical or biological munitions
  (bomblets)
• The system must identify and track RVs in the
  face of countermeasures, including decoys and
  anti-simulation devices
• The Welch panel labeled the current program Rush
  to Failure

44
Module 6 Part 5

• Proposed Boost-Phase Intercept Program(Son of
  Star Wars)

45
Why is There Interest inBoost-Phase Intercept?

• Midcourse Intercept Appears Extremely Challenging
• Each missile could launch 
• Multiple warheads
• Dozens of chemical or biological submunitions
• This could overwhelm the defense
• Each missile could launch 
• Countermeasures and penetration aids, including
  large numbers of lightweight decoys
• These would be difficult to distinguish from real
  warheads above outside the atmosphere
• This could confuse the defense

46
Why is There Interest inBoost-Phase Intercept?

• Boost-phase intercept has been described as
  easier
• ICBMs are described as slowly-moving, fragile
  targets
• ICBMs have bright exhaust plumes that are easy to
  track
• An ICBM is a unitary target if it can be
  intercepted before it deploys its warheads
• It is usually assumed that there are few if any
  effective countermeasures to boost-phase
  intercept
• It is therefore argued that boost-phase intercept
  . . .
• Is an attractive alternative to midcourse
  intercept, or
• Would reduce the challenge faced by the midcourse
  layer if it were the first layer of a layered
  defense

47
The American Physical Society Study of
Boost-Phase Intercept Systems

• The APS Study was planned by an ad hoc NMDAC
  chaired by FKL.It proposed a study plan in Nov
  2000 that was accepted by the APS leadership.
• How the study developed (July 2001 July 2003)
• The Study was initially asked to focus on systems
  using land- and sea-based rockets and to produce
  an unclassified report based on publicly
  available information
• The APS asked that the scope of the Study be
  expanded to consider in detail systems using the
  Airborne Laser and, later, space-based
  interceptors
• Substantial new analyses were found to be needed
  and the Study Groups eventual report was based
  almost entirely on its own research
• The Study Groups two-volume, 476-page final
  report was released at a press conference at the
  National Press Club July 15, 2003

48
The American Physical Society Study of
Boost-Phase Intercept Systems

• The Study Group
• 12 members including experts on missiles and
  missile-defense systems as well as respected
  senior physicists
• Expert Consultants
• The Study Group was assisted by several dozen
  expert technical consultants drawn from the
  defense community

49
The American Physical Society Study of
Boost-Phase Intercept Systems

• Purpose To help the United States make the best
  possible choices about missile defense
• Study and Results
• Questions addressed and approach followed
• Summary of the Study Groups findings
• Basis of the Study Groups findings concerning
  systems using terrestrial- and space based
  interceptors
• Basis of the Study Groups findings concerning
  the Airborne Laser
• Impact of the Study to date, status of the BPI
  program

50
Key Issues for Boost-Phase Intercept

• ICBM boost phases are short (4 min liquids, 3 min
  solids)
• The defense has little time to decide whether to
  fire
• Interceptors have little time to reach the ICBM
• Geographical constraints require high interceptor
  speeds
• Intercept points for ICBMs from North Korea and
  Iran are 500 to 1,000 km from potential
  interceptor basing locations
• ICBMs in powered flight accelerate unpredictably
• Burn variations, energy management, programmed
  evasion
• Interceptors would have to be fast and agile
• A successful intercept is unlikely to destroy
  warheads
• Live warheads could impact the territory of the
  United States or U.S. friends and allies
  (shortfall management problem)

51
The Study Groups Approach

• Relied on the threat assessments in unclassified
  summaries of recent National Intelligence
  Estimates and Congressional testimony by NIC
  staff
• Considered a range of possible goals for the
  defense (defending all 50 states, only the
  largest cities, only one coast, only Hawaii, ...)
• Made generally optimistic assumptions about the
  performance of boost-phase defense systems
• Assumed the attacker would have only early-1960s
  technology
• Assumed the defense would be able to deploy the
  most advanced technology available ten years from
  now
• Set aside all battle management, communications,
  command, control, lethality, and reliability
  issues and countermeasures
• Identified system architectures that could work
  in principle
• Constructed computer models of missiles, missile
  tracking systems, interceptors, and kill vehicles
  and carried out simulations to determine the
  performance that would be required for these
  systems to work

52
Why the APS Studys Results Differ From Those of
Some Other Studies

• We considered liquid-propellant model ICBMs based
  on 40-year-old technology, but did not assume
  they would have very long (300 second) boost
  phases
• We considered solid-propellant model ICBMs based
  on 40-year-old technology
• We did not assume the defense is omniscient 
• We did assume the ICBMs performance
  characteristics are known exactly (but they may
  not be)
• We did not assume knowledge of the attackers
  intent
• Initial direction of flight and target unknown in
  advance
• ICBMs flight path not known in advance
• We carefully analyzed kill-vehicle performance
  required to intercept an accelerating ICBM
• We carefully examined the defense technologies
  likely to be in hand in 1015 years and their
  implications for interceptor and kill-vehicle
  performance

53
Why Solid-Propellant ICBMsNeed to Be Considered

• The two fundamentally different types of ICBMs
  (liquid- and solid-propellant) present very
  different challenges
• Although North Korea might initially deploy
  liquid-propellant ICBMs, recent NIE summaries
  point to significant transfer of solid-rocket
  technology among North Korea, Iran, Pakistan,
  China, and other countries of concern
• On the basis of unclassified summaries of the
  most recent U.S National Intelligence Estimates
  and briefings, the Study Group concluded that
  countries of concern might deploy
  solid-propellant ICBMs within the next
  1015 years, if they were able to purchase or
  acquire solid-propellant missiles or technology
  and the U.S pursued a boost-phase missile defense
• Because it would take at least a decade for the
  United States to field a boost-phase missile
  defense, a defense that is effective only against
  liquid-propellant ICBMs would risk being obsolete
  when deployed or soon afterward

54
Key Findings of the APS Study

• Defending the 50 states against liquid-propellant
  ICBMs from North Korea may be feasible, but would
  push the limits of what is possible physically,
  technically, and operationally
• Defending the 50 states against liquid-propellant
  ICBMs from Iran might be possible but would be
  much more challenging
• Defending the 50 states against solid-propellant
  ICBMs is unlikely to be practical when all
  factors are considered
• Defending only the West Coast against ICBMs from
  North Korea would be easier than defending all 50
  states
• Defending only part of the United States against
  ICBMs from Iran would not be easier than
  defending all 50 states

55
Requirements for a Successful Intercept

• The interceptor rocket must reach the target ICBM
  before the ICBM has achieved a velocity that will
  allow its warheads to reach the defended area
• The interceptors final stage (kill vehicle)
  must be able to maneuver to hit the ICBM and
  disable its warhead(s)

56
Reaching the ICBM

• In many situations the interceptor rocket would
  have only  2 min (solids) or  3 min (liquids)
  to reach the target ICBM, even with a
  state-of-the-art space-based detection and
  tracking system
• In some situations, the defense would have only
  seconds to decide whether to fire, and even if
  its interceptors were fast and fired immediately,
  they could have difficulty reaching the ICBM in
  time

57
Whether the Interceptor Rocket Could Reach the
ICBM in Time Depends . . .

• As noted earlier, the time available to reach the
  ICBM depends strongly on whether the target ICBM
  is a liquid-propellant or a solid-propellant
  missile
• The global geography determines how early in its
  flight the target ICBM must be intercepted
• Regional geography determines how close to the
  target ICBMs flight path interceptors could be
  based
• Generally interceptors must be based far from the
  intercept point, must fly almost their maximum
  range ( 500 km for solid ICBMs or  1,000 km for
  liquid ICBMs), and must intercept the ICBM at the
  last possible moment

58
Global Geography Determines How Early the ICBM
Must Be Intercepted
These maps show when an attacking missile could
release its warheads to strike U.S. territory
all warheads would be released within 500 km of
the missile launch site.
Solid-propellantfrom North Korea
Solid-propellant from Iran
59
Regional Geography Determines How Close
Interceptors Could Be Based
Basing areas for a 5 km/s interceptor to defend
Boston against a liquid-propellant ICBM launched
from North Korea
Basing areas for a 6.5 km/s interceptor to
defend Boston against a liquid-propellant ICBM
launched from North Korea
60
Regional Geography Determines How Close
Interceptors Could Be Based
Basing areas for intercepting a solid-propellant
ICBM fromNorth Korea to Fairbanks
Basing areas for intercepting a solid-propellant
ICBM from North Korea to Boston
61
Regional Geography Determines How Close
Interceptors Could Be Based
Basing areas for intercepting a liquid-propellant
ICBM from Iranto the Lower 48 States
Basing areas for intercepting a solid-propellant
ICBM from Iranto the Lower 48 States
62
Reaching and Hitting the Target Would Require
Large, Fast Booster Rockets
63
Implications of the Time Constraints

• The very short time available to complete the
  intercept poses significant command-and-control
  issues 
• In some situations the decision whether to fire
  interceptors would have to be made within a few
  seconds after a firing solution was obtained
• There would generally be too little time to
  determine using the systems sensors whether the
  rocket is an attacking ICBM, a theater ballistic
  missile, or a rocket launching a satellite
• Consequently, interceptors would have to be fired
  whenever a large rocket in powered flight is
  detected, without waiting until the nature of the
  rocket or its trajectory is established
• Giving commanders the ability to divert or
  destroy interceptors in flight might extend the
  assessment time by 100 seconds or so

64
Hitting an ICBM in Powered Flight is Very
Challenging
65
Hitting an ICBM in Powered Flight Requires a
Highly Capable Kill Vehicle

• The APS Study found no fundamental obstacle to
  developing adequate kill vehicles, but 
• The kill vehicle must have sensors capable of
  tracking the cool missile body in the face of the
  bright exhaust plume, which is displaced from it
• Passive infrared, optical, and UV sensors
• Active sensors such as LIDAR
• The kill vehicle must be able to compensate fully
  for changes in the flight of the target missile
• Must have adequate total divert capability (2.0
  to 2.5 km/s)
• Must have sufficient acceleration for the endgame
  (15 g)
• Must have fast guidance and control and quick
  dynamic response(0.1 s or less total lag)
• Kill vehicles with these capabilities would be
  relatively heavy (90140 kg)

66
Assumptions for the SBI Results Presented Here

• SBI orbits have 45 inclinations
• Required a high probability that at least one
  interceptor is within range of a single ICBM
  launch site, for sites between 35 and 45 north
  latitude (on average, two interceptors would be
  within range)
• Interceptors are stationed at an altitude of
  300 km
• The missile is a solid-propellant ICBM similar to
  our model S2
• The interceptor is fired with zero decision
  time(45 sec after ICBM launch)
• The last chance to intercept is 5 sec before
  burnout
• Intercepts take place at an altitude of 200 km

67
BPI Mass, Range, and Constellation Size as
Functions of Flyout Velocity
68
Tradeoff Between Flyout Velocity, Decision Time,
and Constellation Size
69
Tradeoff Between Flyout Velocity, Decision Time,
and Mass-In-Orbit
70
A System of Space-Based Interceptors Would
Require Many Large Satellites

• Placing interceptors in space would avoid
  geographic restrictions on basing, but global
  geographic constraints would still determine when
  ICBM must be intercepted
• To counter solid-propellant ICBMs, at least 1,600
  interceptors would be required, each at 840 kg,
  for a minimum mass in orbit of 2,000 tonnes
• Would require a 5- to 10-fold increase in the
  annual U.S. space launch capability
• To counter liquid-propellant ICBMs, roughly half
  as many interceptors and space launches would be
  required
• However, a space-based system designed to counter
  only liquid-propellant ICBMs could become
  obsolete quickly

71
The Airborne Laser Concept
72
The Airborne Laser Would Have Limited Utility
Against ICBMs

• The ABLs range would not be limited by time, but
  by the distance a focused beam could be
  propagated through the atmosphere
• The ABL could in principle be used against ICBMs,
  if the laser works as advertised
• If it works as advertised, the ABL would have a
  range up to 600 km against a liquid-propellant
  ICBM
• Would be useful against ICBMs from North Korea,
  but not from Iran, unless ABL aircraft could fly
  over the lower Caspian Sea or Turkmenistan
• The ABL would have a range of only 300 km against
  a solid-propellant ICBM
• Would not be effective in any of the scenarios we
  examined

73
The Airborne Laser Would Have Limited Utility
Against ICBMs
Basing areas for intercepting a solid-propellant
ICBM from Iran
Basing areas for intercepting a solid-propellant
ICBM from North Korea
74
Shortfall Would Be Difficult to Manage

• The goal of a boost-phase defense is to protect
  the target by causing the attacking missiles
  munitions to fall short
• A problem inherent in boost-phase defense is that
  causing the attacking missiles munitions to fall
  short could cause nuclear, chemical, or
  biological weapons to impact other populated
  areas in the United States or other countries
• Some or all of these weapons could be live when
  they impact
• Timing intercepts accurately enough to avoid
  causing this would be very difficult, if its
  possible at all
• An alternative would be to design the interceptor
  to destroy all warheads or submunitions, but this
  is likely to be difficult

75
Munitions from North Korean Missiles Could Impact
Russia or Canada

• If launched against a target in the central
  United States, this particular missile would have
  to be intercepted in a small window between about
  225 and 230 seconds after launch, to avoid
  dropping warheads on Russia or Canada
• In reality, the performance characteristics of
  attacking missiles and their targets are unlikely
  to be known exactly in advance
• Hence timing intercepts accurately enough to
  avoid causing possible live munitions to fall on
  Russia or Canada would be very difficult, if its
  possible at all

76
Munitions from Iranian Missiles Could Impact
Western Europe

• If launched against a target in the central
  United States, this particular missile would have
  to be intercepted in a small window between about
  225 and 230 seconds after launch, to avoid
  dropping warheads on Russia or Canada
• In reality, the performance characteristics of
  attacking missiles and their targets are unlikely
  to be known exactly in advance
• Hence timing intercepts accurately enough to
  avoid causing possible live munitions to fall on
  Russia or Canada would be very difficult, if its
  possible at all

77
Countermeasures Would Challenge Boost-Phase
Intercept

• A boost-phase defense would not be susceptible
  tosome of the proposed countermeasures to
  midcoursedefense, but it would face
  countermeasures
• Examples of countermeasures to both hit-to-kill
  and the ABL
• Launch several ICBMs nearly simultaneously
• Deploy solid-propellant ICBMs
• Examples of countermeasures to hit-to-kill
• Deploy payload during powered flight
• Program evasive maneuvers
• Deploy decoys and jammers
• Deploy fast-burn boosters with multiple upper
  stages
• Mask the kill-vehicle aim point (to defeat
  warhead kill)
• Examples of countermeasures to the ABL
• Attack the airframe
• Roll the ICBM
• Use ablative coating
• Change the optical properties of the ICBM

78
Where Boost-Phase Defenses Might Contribute to
Defending the U.S.

• Intercepting short- and medium-range ballistic
  missiles launched from ships off the coast of the
  United States
• Providing a partially-effective first layer in a
  multi-layered defense against ICBMs

79
Summary of APS Study Findings

• Hit-to-kill interceptors could potentially defend
  the United States against liquid-propellant ICBMs
  launched from some countries
• Boost-phase defense against solid-propellant
  ICBMs is unlikely to be practical during the next
  decade, when all factors are considered
• A boost-phase defense against short-or
  medium-range missiles launched from platforms off
  U.S. coasts appears feasible
• A space-based boost-phase intercept system
  appears infeasible until the masses of kill
  vehicles can be reduced substantially
• The ABLs range is likely to be too short for it
  to be useful except against liquid-propellant
  ICBMs from North Korea
• Countermeasures are possible and should be
  expected

80
Module 6 Part 6

• Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Systems

81
Patriot Weapon System

• Originally an anti-aircraft system (IOC in 1985)
• Given some ATBM capability in 1988 (PAC-1)
• Software upgrade
• Specifically designed to counter Soviet TBMs
• Given improved ATBM capability in 1990 (PAC-2)
• Faster fuse
• Fragmenting warhead with larger pellets
• Some capability against Soviet Scud missiles
• No capability against Iraqi Al-Hussein missiles

82
Patriot in the 1991 Gulf War

• The system
• US had only 3 PAC-2 interceptors in its inventory
  at the time the Iraqis invaded Kuwait
• Changes in system software were made hastily
  after the invasion
• 600 PAC-2 interceptors were manufactured by
  January 1991
• PAC-2 interceptors were incorporated into all
  units deployed to the Gulf
• Critical software errors were discovered in the
  field, one may have caused major US fatalities
• No data was recorded in the field to evaluate the
  Patriot systems performance

83
Patriot in the 1991 Gulf War (contd)

• Events that formed the publics impression
• TV videos of Patriot engagements and consistent
  reports from military spokesmen and news
  reporters of Patriots successes
• General Schwarzkopf The Patriots success is
  100so far, of 33 Scuds engaged, there have
  been 33 destroyed.
• President Bush, during a celebratory visit to
  Raytheon, said Patriot is 41 for 42, 42 Scuds
  engaged, 41 intercepted... Patriot is proof
  positive that missile defense works.

84
Patriot in the 1991 Gulf War (contd)

• Studies of performance
• First Army study (92 Feb) was found to have many
  serious flaws by GAO and CRS
• Second Army study (92 Apr) reported success
  rate gt 70 in Saudia Arabia and gt 40 in Israel
  (success incoming WH destroyed, dudded, or
  deflected) this is still the official DoD claim
• GAO (92 Sep) reviewed second Army study, found
  only 4 engagements (9 of total) in which there
  was strong evidence of a Patriot kill
• Postol Lewis (MIT, 199192) found evidence of
  three hits but no kills
• Pedatzur (Tel Aviv) reported (92 Apr) only one
  Scud hit by by a Patriot in Israel four Patriot
  warheads fell and exploded in populated areas

85
Approaches to TMD

• Preventive measures
• Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
• Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
• Other cooperative measures to address threats to
  security of states, prevent spread of TBMs
• Passive defense measures
• Dispersing troops
• Using protective clothing
• Building shelters

86
Approaches to TMD (contd)

• Counterforce attacks
• Destroying missiles and launchers on the ground
• Destroying missile and warhead production and
  assembly facilities
• Destroying command and control infrastructure
• Active defenses
• Destroying, dudding, or deflecting missiles and
  warheads after they are launched
• All four measures require adequate C3I systems in
  order to function effectively

87
Types of Active TMD

• Point (lower-tier) defenses
• To protect small areas like weapon sites,
  airfields, ports, and command and control centers
• Examples
• Patriot/Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT)
• Aegis lower tier
• Area (upper-tier) defenses
• To protect large areas ranging from a few hundred
  to a few thousand km in diameter
• Examples
• Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
• Aegis upper tier
• Boost-phase defenses

88
Possible ATBM Goals

• Area to be protected
• Weapon sites, airfields, ports, command posts
• Large military complexes or population centers
• Particular regions of a country
• A whole continent
• Leakage rate
• Systems with moderate leakage might have some
  utility in protecting military forces (need to
  consider costs vs. benefits, alternatives)
• Systems with very low leakage rates would be
  required to protect population centers

89
Patriot System Upgrades

• A minor upgrade was made after the Gulf War,
  before systems were shipped to South Korea
• New fusing
• Improved missile fragment discrimination
• Planned PAC-3 upgrade
• Improved interceptor
• Shaped fragmentation pattern (vs. hit-to-kill)
• Improved end-game seeker (radar vs. IR)
• Enlarged intercept area (footprint)
• Interceptor batteries netted together

90
Aegis Theater Missile Defense(Aegis BMD)

• Navys Aegis upper-tier has several potential
  advantages over the Armys THAAD 
• US would not have to secure airfields in order to
  transport systems to the theater
• Systems could be deployed more quickly if ships
  are near the threatened region
• Aegis upper tier is being designed to defend a
  much larger area than THAAD

91
Theater High-Altitude Area Defense(THAAD)

• An exoatmospheric upper tier for Patriot
• Will use X-band radar to find targets
• Will use new interceptor with IR seeker
• Will use hit-to-kill method
• Supposed to defend a large footprint
• Prototype testing was scheduled to begin in 1995
• Testing would have required adjustments in the
  ABMT

92
Active TMD Dollar Costs

• Patriot (lower tier)
• 3 billion to build and deploy 1,500 missiles,
  modify 180 launchers and 74 radars
• Aegis (low tier)
• 4 billion to modify 1,820 missiles and 50
  ship-based radars
• THAAD (upper tier)
• 9 billion to build and deploy 1,422 missiles, 14
  command centers and radars, launchers
• 200 million/year to operate

93
Module 6 Part 7

• Space Weapons

94
From the Militarization to the Weaponization of
Space?
Military use of satellites -reconnaissance, -co
mmunication, -navigation, -weather
forecast Development/testing of missile defense
and ASAT ? No space weapons yet

• US Space Command US dominance in space
• Space Commission 2001 Pearl Harbor in space
• ? Should the threshold to space weaponization be
  passed?

95
Missile Defense and the Long-Range Plan of the
US Space Command
US Space Command 1998
96
Classes of Space Weapons

• 1. Orbiting weapons against space, air, ground
  targets
• 2. Weapons against space objects
• Mechanisms for interference and destruction
• Signal disruption
• Orbital intercept
• Conventional explosives
• Nuclear explosive devices
• Kinetic-energy weapons
• Directed-energy weapons

97
Vulnerability and Disruption of Satellites

• Vulnerability
• Hostile space environment (vacuum, radiation,
  temperature extremes, energy supply,...
• Stress during launch (acceleration, vibration)
• Predictable orbits, visible targets
• Collision with debris
• Reentry in low-earth orbits

Disruption Event Natural, human or technical
malfunction, accidental collision, intentional
sabotage/attack Impact on ground station,
communication link, satellite Satellite
components propulsion/fuel, guidance/attitude
regulation, temperature regul., energy supply,
antenna, sensors, data processing Mechanisms
electronic disturbance, sensor blinding, orbit
change, chemical/ radiol. substances, direct
attack through explosion, collision, shrapnel,
radiation
98
Reduce Vulnerability of Space Objects

• Protected/hidden/mobile ground components
• Communication extremely high frequency, mixed
  spectra, signal focusing
• Physical hardening/shielding (radiation, laser,
  debris)
• High altitude, manoeuverability, autonomy
• Deception
• Attack warning
• Distribution/proliferation of key functions,
  replacement
• Keep away' buffer zones
• Active defense, shoot back
• Deterrence

99
Types of Anti-Satellite Weapons

• Maneuvrable space objects
• Space mines
• Nuclear explosions
• Ground-based non-nuclear interceptors
• Air-based interceptor
• Directed energy weapons (laser, particle beam)
• Micro satellites
• ASAT and missile defense
• ? Compare costs and risks

100
The Complex Pentagon of Space Warfare
101
Implications for U.S. Security

• Proposed uses of space weapons
• Protection of U.S. satellites
• Denial of the hostile use of space to adversaries
• Global force projection
• Space-based missile defense
• Utility of space is limited by three main factors
• High cost
• Considerable susceptibility to countermeasures
• Availability of cheaper, more effective
  alternatives.

Garwin et al. 2004
102
Potential U.S. Role in Space Security

• U.S. commitment not to be the first to deploy or
  test space weapons or to further test destructive
  antisatellite weapons should be supported by a
  U.S. initiative to codify such a rule, first by
  parallel unilateral declarations and then perhaps
  a formal treaty. A treaty would have the added
  benefit of legitimizing the use of sanctions or
  force against actions that would imperil the
  satellites of any state.
• A regime that effectively prohibits the
  deployment of space weapons and the use of
  destructive ASAT before they can destroy U.S. or
  other satellites would be a smart, hard-nosed
  investment in U.S. national security, but would
  require U.S. leadership.
• DeBlois/Garwin/Kemp/Marwell, SpaceWeapons,
  International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall
  2004), pp. 5084.

Garwin et al. 2004
103
Options for Strengthening International Security
in Space

• Rules of