The China Factor in the Cold War

1
The China Factor in the Cold War
2
The Common Misconception

• All Communists want to destroy the free world and
  establish world communism.
• The USSR and China are Communist-ruled nations.
• Therefore, the Soviet Union and Communist China
  must be united and working to destroy the free
  world and establish world communism (Schwartz).

3
The Reality

• July 31, 1963
• The indisputable facts prove that the policy
  pursued by the Soviet Government is one of
  allying with the forces of war to oppose the
  forces of peace, allying with imperialism to
  oppose Socialism, allying with the United States
  to oppose China, and allying with the
  reactionaries of all countries to oppose the
  people of the world (Shwartz).

• August 2, 1963
• The leaders of China have shown to the whole
  world that their policy leads to the aggravation
  of international tensions, to further stepping up
  the arms race, to still further expansion of its
  scope and scale (Shwartz).

4
Chief Factors in the Development of Sino-Soviet
Relations

• Common Allegiance to Marxism-Leninism and the
  dream of a future communist world.
• The perception that a public feud between them
  would harm the image of Communism.
• Common hatred and fear of the United States.

5
The Korean War

• The war was in the Common interest of both China
  and the USSR.
• The threat pf possible Soviet intervention in the
  war was a major factor in the decision of the US
  and the UN to not carry the fight beyond Korea,
  into China (Shwartz).
• Chinese participation in the conflict increased
  Chinas dependence upon the USSR for weapons,
  munitions, and military aid.
• The heavy cost of war contributed to Chinas
  increasing economic dependence on the USSR.

6
Factors in the Deteriorating Sino-Soviet Alliance

• China was never invited to the Cominform or the
  Comecon.
• USSRs handling of the Cuban Missle Crisis, and
  willingness to sign agreements with America
  restricting nuclear testing.
• Conflict of ideology.
• Krushchevs secret speech attacking Stalin.
• Personality clash between Krushchev and Mao
  Zedong.
• Longstanding national rivalries.
• Differing levels of economic development.
• Rivalry for leadership of the Socialist Camp and
  the emergence of China as a a major player on the
  world stage.
• USSRs adoption of a strict stance of neutrality
  in the border conflicts between communist China
  and India.

7
Consequences of a Strained Relationship

• The USSR reneged on their agreement to supply
  China with the technical data necessary to build
  an atomic bomb.
• The USSR supported of an unsuccessful challenge
  to Maos leadership by his defense minister
  (Donaldson).
• USSR curtailed its economic assistance and
  withdrew thousands of specialists.
• An end to meetings between the two nations.
• Massive buildup of forces among their common
  border.
• Forever destroyed the Marxist myth that
  proletariat forces engage in international
  relations of a new type (Donaldson).
• Each party clearly regarded the other- and no
  longer the United States- as its primary security
  threat (Donaldson).
• Both sides turned to the United States for
  assistance against the other.
• The three major powers began to visibly compete
  for influence upon emerging states in the
  developing world.
• The decline of rigid bipolarity and the emergence
  of triangular politics.

8
China and America

• The Americans are paper tigers (Lafeber).
• Imperialist/ conquering force.
• China would encourage wars of liberation
  throughout the newly emerging nations (Donaldson).

• Feared a communist dominated Far East.
• Restraining China by the threat of war will not
  work because of the lower value they attach to
  human life (Lafeber).
• Wars of liberation are not possible in areas the
  United States considers vital to her interests
  (Lafeber).

9
The Vietnam War

• President Johnson entered Vietnam to counter the
  deepening shadow of communist China (Lafeber),
  and because the contest in Vietnam is part of a
  wider pattern of aggressive purposes (Lafeber).
• Johnson feared along war would leave Vietnam more
  open to Chinese pressure, however, it was the
  Soviets that soon became the most important
  source of support and aid for the Vietnamese
  Communists (Lafeber).
• This greatly angered China.
• After Nixon came to power he embarked on a policy
  of carpet bombing North Vietnam so the Russians
  and Chinese would understand they were dealing
  with a madman and so better force North Vietnam
  into a settlement before the world was consumed
  in a larger war (Lafeber).
• After Vietnam invaded Cambodia to topple their
  pro-Chinese government, China responded by
  invading Vietnam to punish them for their
  aggression.
• While Vietnam was indeed an ally of the USSR, she
  was not willing to risk war with China to come to
  the aid of an ally.
• By this time, China had become a thermonuclear
  power.

10
Deténte

• Came about, in part, as a result of the failure
  of the traditional US policies of containment, as
  demonstrated through the Vietnam War.
• Also in the hopes that the USSR would pressure
  North Vietnam to make peace.
• Détente led to the realization that one Communist
  power could be played against another and that
  led to Nixons belief that an era of
  confrontation was ending, and an era of
  negotiation beginning (Lafeber).
• Relations between the USA and China began to
  improve as both Nixon and Mao used the other to
  check Soviet Power. In 1971 Nixon became the
  first president to visit China.
• This put Nixon in the position to Visit Moscow.
• Both visits were great successes and helped ease
  the tensions amongst the Great Powers.
• Brezhnev designed his détente policy in part to
  ensure that it would remain in Nixons interests
  to deal with him instead of moving closer to Mao
  (Lafeber).

11
Steps Towards the Normalization of Relations
Between USSR and China

• Elimination of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
• Elimination of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia.
• Demilitarization of the common border.
• Steps towards these goals led to the first
  Sino-Soviet summit in 2O years, in May 1989.

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Bibliography

• Donaldson, Robert H., and Joseph L. Nogee. The
  Foreign Policy of Russia Changing Systems,
  Enduring Interests. New York M.E. Sharpe, 2005.
• Lafeber, Walter. America, Russia, and the Cold
  War, 1945-2006. Boston McGraw Hill, 2008.
• Schwartz, Harry. Tsars, Mandarins, and
  Commissars. Philadelphia J.B. Lippincott Co.,
  1964.
• Zagoria, Donald S. The Sino-Soviet Conflict
  1956-1961. Princeton, NJ Princeton University
  Press, 1962.