Title: Vietnam War (1945-1975)
1Vietnam War (1945-1975)
2Vietnam War (1945-1975)
- The Vietnam War was the longest war in United
States history. - Promises and commitments to the people and
government of South Vietnam to keep communist
forces from overtaking them reached back into the
Truman Administration. Eisenhower placed military
advisers and CIA operatives in Vietnam, and John
F. Kennedy sent American soldiers to Vietnam.
Lyndon Johnson ordered the first real combat by
American troops, and Richard Nixon concluded the
war.
3Early Involvement
- After World War I, a nationalist movement formed
in Vietnam led by Ho Chi Minh. Ho was educated in
the West, where he became a disciple of Marxist
thought. Ho resented and resisted the French.
When the Japanese invaded Vietnam during World
War II, they displaced French rule. Ho formed a
liberation movement known as the Viet Minh. Using
guerrilla warfare, the Viet Minh battled the
Japanese and held many key cities by 1945.
Paraphrasing the Declaration of Independence, Ho
proclaimed the new nation of Vietnam a new
nation Western powers refused to recognize.
4Early Involvement
- France was determined to reclaim all its
territories after World War II. The United States
now faced an interesting dilemma. American
tradition dictated sympathy for the
revolutionaries over any colonial power. However,
supporting the Marxist Viet Minh was unthinkable,
given the new strategy of containing communism.
Ho Chi Minh
5Domino Theory
- American diplomats subscribed to the domino
theory. A communist victory in Vietnam might lead
to communist victories in Laos, Cambodia,
Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Such a
scenario was unthinkable to the makers of
American foreign policy. - President Truman decided to support France in its
efforts to reclaim Indochina by providing money
and military advisers. The United States
financial commitment amounted to nearly 1
billion per year.
6Early Involvement
- The French found Ho Chi Minh a formidable
adversary. Between 1945 and 1954 a fierce war
developed between the two sides. Slowly but
surely, the Viet Minh wore down the French will
to fight. On May, 8th, 1954 a large regiment of
French troops was captured by the Vietnamese led
by communist general Vo Nguyen Giap at Dien Bien
Phu.
7French Withdrawl
- The rest of the French troops withdrew, leaving a
buffer zone separating the North and South.
Negotiations to end the conflict took place in
Geneva. A multinational agreement divided Vietnam
at the 17th parallel. The territory north of this
line would be led by Ho Chi Minh with Hanoi its
capital.
8The US Takes Over
- The southern sector named Saigon its capital and
Ngo Dinh Diem its leader. This division was meant
to be temporary, with nationwide elections
scheduled for 1956. Knowing that Ho Chi Minh
would be a sure victor, the South made sure these
elections were never held.
9The US Takes Over
- During the administrations of Eisenhower and
Kennedy, the United States continued to supply
funds, weapons, and military advisers to South
Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh turned North Vietnam into a
communist dictatorship and created a new band of
guerrillas in the South called the Viet Cong,
whose sole purpose was to overthrow the military
regime in the South and reunite the nation under
Ho Chi Minh.
10The US Takes Over
- The United States was backing an unpopular leader
in Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem was corrupt, showed little
commitment to democratic principles, and favored
Catholics to the dismay of the Buddhist majority.
In November 1963, Diem was murdered in a coup
with apparent CIA involvement.
11Buddhist Protests
- On June 11th, 1963 a Buddhist protest march was
making its way down one of Saigons busiest
arteries, Phan-Dinh-Phung St. The procession of
around 400 Buddhist monks and Nuns moved through
the city until they hit Le-Van-Duyet St where a
light blue Austin that was part of the
procession, the car seen in the background of the
picture, stopped. The hood was raised as if the - car had engine trouble while the nuns and monks
in the parade quickly surrounded the car forming
a circle of some seven monks deep. Thich Quang
Duc a 66 year old monk calmly got out of the car
and walked to the center of the circle sitting on
a cushion provided for him. His religious
brothers removed a jerry can of fuel from the car
and proceeded to pour it over Quang-Duc who was
now meditating in the lotus position. Quang-Duc
with his Buddhist prayer beads in his right hand,
then opened a box of matches, lit one and was
instantly engulfed in flames. He did not move
while his body was incinerated, while Malcome
Browne the only western reporter present snapped
the picture of the monk on fire..
12Buddhist Protests
- Passers-by stop to watch as flames envelope a
young Buddhist monk, Saigon, October 5th, 1963.
The man sits impassively in the central market
square, he has set himself on fire performing a
ritual suicide in protest against governmental
anti-Buddhist policies. Crowds gathered to
protest in Hue after the South Vietnamese
government prohibited Buddhists from carrying
flags on Buddha's birthday. Government troops
opened fire to disperse the dissidents, killing
nine people, Diems government blamed the incident
on the Vietcong and never admitted
responsibility. The Buddhist leadership quickly
organized demonstrations that eventually led to
seven monks burning themselves to death.
13The US Takes Over
- Few of Ngo's successors fared any better, while
Ho Chi Minh was the Vietnamese equivalent of
George Washington. He had successfully won the
hearts and minds of the majority of the
Vietnamese people. Two weeks after the fall of
Diem, Kennedy himself was felled by an assassin's
bullet. - By the time Lyndon Johnson inherited the
Presidency, Vietnam was a bitterly divided
nation. The United States would soon too be
divided on what to do in Vietnam.
14Gulf of Tonkin Incident
- In August 1964, in response to American and GVN
espionage along its coast, the DRV launched a
local and controlled attack against the C. Turner
Joy and the U.S.S. Maddox, two American ships on
call in the Gulf of Tonkin. The first of these
attacks occurred on August 2, 1964. A second
attack was supposed to have taken place on August
4, although Vo Nguyen Giap, the DRV's leading
military figure at the time, and Johnson's
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara have
recently concluded that no second attack ever
took place. In any event, the Johnson
administration used the August 4 attack as
political cover for a Congressional resolution
that gave the president broad war powers. The
resolution, now known as the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, passed both the House and Senate with
only two dissenting votes (Senators Morse of
Oregon and Gruening of Alaska). The Resolution
was followed by limited reprisal air attacks
against the DRV.
15Gulf of Tonkin Incident
- Throughout the fall and into the winter of 1964,
the Johnson administration debated the correct
strategy in Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
wanted to expand the air war over the DRV quickly
to help stabilize the new Saigon regime. The
civilians in the Pentagon wanted to apply gradual
pressure to the Communist Party with limited and
selective bombings. Only Undersecretary of State
George Ball dissented, claiming that Johnson's
Vietnam policy was too provocative for its
limited expected results. In early 1965, the NLF
attacked two U.S. army installations in South
Vietnam, and as a result, Johnson ordered the
sustained bombing missions over the DRV that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff had long advocated.
16Operation Rolling Thunder
- The bombing missions, known as OPERATION ROLLING
THUNDER, caused the Communist Party to reassess
its own war strategy. From 1960 through late
1964, the Party believed it could win a military
victory in the south "in a relatively short
period of time." With the new American military
commitment, confirmed in March 1965 when Johnson
sent the first combat troops to Vietnam, the
Party moved to a protracted war strategy. The
idea was to get the United States bogged down in
a war that it could not win militarily and create
unfavorable conditions for political victory. The
Communist Party believed that it would prevail in
a protracted war because the United States had no
clearly defined objectives, and therefore, the
country would eventually tire of the war and
demand a negotiated settlement. While some naive
and simple-minded critics have claimed that the
Communist Party, and Vietnamese in general, did
not have the same regard for life and therefore
were willing to sustain more losses in a
protracted war, the Party understood that it had
an ideological commitment to victory from large
segments of the Vietnamese population.
17The Tet Offensive
- By 1968, things had gone from bad to worse for
the Johnson administration. In late January, the
DRV and the NLF launched coordinated attacks
against the major southern cities. These attacks,
known in the West as the Tet Offensive, were
designed to force the Johnson administration to
the bargaining table. The Communist Party
correctly believed that the American people were
growing war-weary and that its continued
successes in the countryside had tipped the
balance of forces in its favor. Although many
historians have since claimed that the Tet
Offensive was a military defeat, but a
psychological victory for the Communists, it had
produced the desired results. In late March 1968,
a disgraced Lyndon Johnson announced that he
would not seek the Democratic Party's
re-nomination for president and hinted that he
would go to the bargaining table with the
Communists to end the war.
18My Lai Massacre
March 28, 1968 - The initial report by
participants at My Lai states that 69 Viet Cong
soldiers were killed and makes no mention of
civilian causalities. The My Lai massacre is
successfully concealed for a year, until a series
of letters from Vietnam veteran Ronald Ridenhour
spark an official Army investigation that results
in Charlie Company Commander, Capt. Ernest L.
Medina, First Platoon Leader, Lt. William Calley,
and 14 others being brought to trial by the Army.
A news photos of the carnage, showing a mass of
dead children, women and old men, remains one of
the most enduring images of America's involvement
in Vietnam.
19Escalation of the Vietnam War
- The situation inherited by Richard Nixon was no
less a "mess" than it was in November 1963 when
Lyndon Johnson rose to the presidency. In fact,
it was much worse. Over 500,000 troops were
stationed in Vietnam Americans killed in action
averaged 1200 a month. And domestic opinion
about the war was divided (no consensus on a
course of action in Vietnam), negative (a
majority felt that the war was a mistake), and
pessimistic (people saw little progress at the
peace talks and believed the fighting would go on
for at least 2 more years). Added to the mix
were the racial divisions in the country, the
skepticism toward within the anti-war movement,
and a long standing antipathy toward Nixon among
Democratic loyalists.
20Escalation of the Vietnam War
- Nixon and Kissinger quickly agreed upon two
premises about American policy in Vietnam. First,
the war in Vietnam was not "winnable" in any
conventional sense of the term. Public opinion
would tolerate neither an escalation nor the
continuation of a status quo that included over
1,000 killed per month. Second, a unilateral
withdrawal was not feasible because the political
costs, both domestic and international, were
unacceptable. Withdrawal would dissolve Nixon's
political base at home and, as Kissinger
continually emphasized, undermine American
credibility abroad. 2 Apart from the military
situation in Vietnam, the political problem
confronting President Nixon was complex. How
could Nixon "buy time" to achieve his
understanding of "peace with honor" without
succumbing to Lyndon Johnson's fate of eroding
public support?
21Escalation of the Vietnam War
- The history of his first administration reveals
that Nixon's strategy consisted of four
components - 1. Vietnamization
- 2. The "Politics of Polarization"
- 3. The "Madman" scenario
- 4. Triangular Diplomacy
22Escalation of the Vietnam War
- Vietnamization
- First, it was necessary to reduce American
casualty rates and the number of combat troops in
Vietnam. To this end, Nixon defined his policy
as "Vietnamization" -- the idea that South
Vietnamese would gradually assume a greater
combat role and ultimately eliminate the need for
American ground forces. Because the US would not
withdraw abrubtly, the policy of Vietnamization
would require time. The domestic political
objective was to convince the public that the
Army of South Vietnam could eventually handle the
war on their own.
23Escalation of the Vietnam War
- The "Politics of Polarization"
- To buy time, Nixon had to build a larger and more
reliable base of support within the American
public. His popular vote margin in the 1968
election was razor thin. However, to his
advantage, the Democratic coalition was shattered
in 1968 and there were political opportunities.
To exploit these opportunities, the
administration would pursue a "politics of
polarization" in which it would, at one and the
same time, appeal to a "silent majority" and
attempt to isolate opponents and paint them, in
one manner or another, as extreme.
24The Silent Majority
- The "Politics of Polarization"
- To buy time, Nixon had to build a larger and more
reliable base of support within the American
public. His popular vote margin in the 1968
election was razor thin. However, to his
advantage, the Democratic coalition was shattered
in 1968 and there were political opportunities.
To exploit these opportunities, the
administration would pursue a "politics of
polarization" in which it would, at one and the
same time, appeal to a "silent majority" and
attempt to isolate opponents and paint them, in
one manner or another, as extreme.
25The Silent Majority
-
- The polarizing effect of Vice President Agnew's
attacks were intentional and part of the
political strategy of the administration. As
Agnew noted, "I say it is time for a positive
polarization. It is time to rip away the rhetoric
and to divide on authentic lines." 9 President
Nixon and his political advisors were strongly
influenced by The Emerging Republican Majority,
published by Kevin Phillips in 1969 and called
"The Political Bible of the Nixon Era" by
Newsweek magazine. In the book, Phillips argued
that the once potent New Deal coalition of the
Democrats was in shambles. Nixon could, Phillips
contended, build a permanent national majority
for the Republicans by holding his traditional
Republican base while augmenting that base with
southern Democrats (many of whom voted for George
Wallace in 1968) and other conservative elements
in the Democratic Party. - At 930 PM on November 3, President Nixon
addressed a national television audience from the
White House. This speech, whose date was
announced just two days before the first
moratorium, was designed to buy time in Vietnam
and to reach out to dissident Democrats along
with Nixon's core constituency. In the speech,
the president traced the history of American
involvement in Vietnam, highlighted the
negotiating efforts of administration since
taking office, outlined his policy of
Vietnamization, and placed the blame for the
continuation of war on the government of North
Vietnam. The speech reached its crescendo when he
appealed to the public for support
26The Silent Majority
- And so tonight-- to you, the great silent
majority of my fellow - Americans-- I ask for your support. I pledged
in my campaign - for the Presidency to end the war in a way that
we could win the - peace. I have initiated a plan of action which
will enable me to - keep that pledge. The more support I can have
from the - American people, the sooner that pledge can be
redeemed for - the more divided we are at home, the less likely,
the enemy is to - negotiate at Paris. Let us be united for peace.
Let us also be - united against defeat. Because let us understand
North Vietnam - cannot defeat or humiliate the United States.
Only Americans - can do that.
- - Nixons Silent Majority Speech Nov. 3, 1969
27The Silent Majority
- The public reaction to the president's speech was
most favorable. Among those who watched the
address, 77 approved of how Nixon was handling
the situation in Vietnam and only 6 disapproved.
In the wake of the speech, Nixon's overall
approval rating climbed from 56 to 67. Although
Nixon had increased his personal support, other
indicators suggested that the public remained
divided on policy in Vietnam. 55 of public now
classified themselves as "doves" with only 31
using the "hawk" label (down from 41 after the
TET offensive).
28Escalation of the Vietnam War
- The "Madman" scenario
- A "madman theory" was devised for negotiating
with the government of North Vietnam. In this
gambit, Henry Kissinger would emphasize, in his
meetings with representatives of North Vietnam,
the volatility of President Nixon's personality.
He would warn the North Vietnamese that Nixon was
unpredictable, that he could fly into a rage, and
that this could happen in response to either
North Vietnamese military action or intransigence
in the peace talks. A similar theme was sounded
by Kissinger in his dealing with the American
press. Over the course of the term, Nixon
provided a number of examples to give credence to
Kissinger's claims secretly bombing Cambodia,
bombing Hanoi and Haiphong, invading Cambodia and
mining Haiphong harbor.
29Escalation of the Vietnam War
- Triangular Diplomacy
-
- Finally, Nixon pursued a "geopolitical" approach
to the war as well. During the first years of
his term, Nixon discovered reason to believe that
both the Soviet Union and People's Republic of
China were interested in what became known as
detente -- an easing of Cold War tensions and
expanding trade relations. This interest, plus
the suspicions between USSR and the PRC, would
provide Nixon with leverage for pressing the
Soviets and Chinese to "do business" with the
U.S. and to pressure the North Vietnamese to
settle the war. - When we examine the history or chronology of the
first Nixon administration, each component is
evident as is the manner in which the components
"meshed" into both a political strategy for
getting America out of Vietnam and reelecting
Nixon in 1972.
30Invasion of Cambodia
- On April 20, 1970, President Nixon addressed a
national television audience. In his speech, he
reviewed the progress of his Vietnamization
policy and announced that 150,000 American troops
would be withdrawn from Vietnam in the following
year. This was the third and largest announcement
of troop withdrawals since Nixon took office.
And, unlike the troop increases of the Johnson
years, the announcements by Nixon were well
publicized.
31Invasion of Cambodia
- Ten days later, Nixon took to the airwaves again.
The news this time was more controversial as the
president announced that American and South
Vietnamese forces were launching an invasion of
Cambodia. The object of the offensive was to wipe
out sanctuaries within Cambodia that were used by
the North Vietnamese infiltrating the south.
- In his speech, Nixon emphasized not only the
strategic value of the operation but also
American credibility. "If, when the chips are
down," the president argued, "the world's most
powerful nation, the United States of America,
acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces
of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free
nations and free institutions throughout the
world." In order to persuade the public, the
speech exaggerated the strategic value of the
operation and contained a number of "whoppers."
13 The address concluded with a classic
Nixonian flourish as the president asserted that
"I would rather be a one-term President and do
what is right than to be a two-term President at
the cost of seeing America become a second-rate
power and to see this Nation accept the first
defeat in its proud 190-year history."
32Invasion of Cambodia
- The response of public opinion to the military
action was peculiar. The public approved of the
way Nixon was handling the situation in Cambodia
by a margin of 50 to 35 in response to the
question of whether U.S. troops should be sent to
Cambodia, only 25 responded affirmatively while
59 said troops should not be sent.
33Kent State Massacre
- Despite the nature of the polls, the "Cambodian
decision" triggered a firestorm of protest. The
most publicized occurred on the campus of Kent
State University in northeast Ohio. On the
evening of May 1, 1970, antiwar protests turned
violent when the ROTC (Reserve Officers' Training
Corp) building was torched. In response, the
Governor of Ohio, James Rhodes, dispatched the
National Guard to Kent. During another
demonstration on Monday, May 4th, members of the
National Guard began firing at demonstrators.
Four students were killed and eight injured.
34Kent State / Jackson State
- In the wake of Kent State, all hell broke loose.
Two students were killed when Mississippi State
police fired on a crowd of students at Jackson
State University. 450 colleges and universities
went on strike Governor Ronald Reagan closed the
entire college and university system in
California within a week, the National Guard had
been deployed in sixteen different states and on
21 different campuses. A number of universities
simply closed down for the year.
35Kent State / Jackson State
- In the weeks after Kent State, "hard hats" ---
the slang for workers in construction and the
building trades --- staged a series of
demonstrations in support of Nixon. In one New
York city demonstration the "hardhats" attacked a
group of antiwar demonstrators with "fists,
boots, and hammers, chanting 'Love It or Leave
It.' " These blue collar workers, traditionally
Democratic voters, were one of the groups Nixon
hoped to attract with the politics of
polarization. - The remainder of 1970 saw a continuation of the
Vietnamization policy. By the end of the 1970,
there were 335,000 American troops in Vietnam
(down from 537,000 at the end of Johnson's term)
with an average monthly casualty rate of 344
(down from an average of 1,200 during 1968).
36The Laotian Incursion
- In early February, 1971,the South Vietnamese
army, backed by the US air and tactical support,
launched an incursion into Laos with the intent
of cutting off the Ho Chi Minh trail. Initially,
the operation was successful with South
Vietnamese forces moving twenty miles deep into
Laos. On February 20th, the North Vietnamese
launched a counteroffensive and, during nearly a
month of fighting, captured the territory
initially occupied by South Vietnamese forces. On
March 19th, the U.S. began an airlift to remove
South Vietnamese from Laos and on March 24th, the
operation was officially declared at an end
37The Laotian Incursion
- The Laotian incursion was seen as the first
"test" of Nixon's Vietnamization policy in the
sense of revealing whether the army of South
Vietnam could sustain an offensive. The results
were, at best, mixed. As Stephen Ambrose notes,
"the offensive designed to prove that
Vietnamization was working had turned into a
rout, made painfully visible to American
television viewers by footage showing ARVN troops
fighting among themselves for a place on American
helicopters extracting them from Laos."
38The Spring Protests, 1971
- The coming of spring brought more anti-war
protests to Washington D.C. There were sizable
demonstrations in March, April, and May. The
April demonstrations were led by the organization
known as Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW).
The most dramatic moment of the April protests
occurred near the Capitol Building where numerous
combat veterans threw back their medals to
protest Nixon's continuation of the war.
Another round of demonstrations began on May 3,
1971. For the Silent Majority this was proof
that the students were out of control. It also
led country music singer Merle Haggard to write
Okie from Muskogee which became a rallying song
for the Silent Majority.
39The Spring Protests, 1971
- On April 7, 1971, Nixon announced, in a
nationally televised speech, that 100,000 troops
would be withdrawn by the end of the year. In an
impromptu news conference on November 11th, he
reported that another 45,000 would be withdrawn
by February 1st, 1972. By the end of 1971, the
number of U.S. troops in Vietnam would stand at
157,000 the average number of casualties per
month would fall to 123.
40The Pentagon Papers
- In 1971, the New York Times published excerpts
from the Pentagon Papers, a top-secret overview
of the history of government involvement in
Vietnam. A participant in the study named Daniel
Ellsberg believed the American public needed to
know some of the secrets, so he leaked
information to the press. The Pentagon Papers
revealed a high-level deception of the American
public by the Johnson Administration.
41The Pentagon Papers
- Many statements released about the military
situation in Vietnam were simply untrue,
including the possibility that even the bombing
of American naval boats in the Gulf of Tonkin
might never have happened. A growing credibility
gap between the truth and what the government
said was true caused many Americans to grow even
more cynical about the war.
42The Pentagon Papers
- By December 1972, Nixon decided to escalate the
bombing of North Vietnamese cities, including
Hanoi. He hoped this initiative would push North
Vietnam to the peace table. In January 1973, a
ceasefire was reached, and the remaining American
combat troops were withdrawn. Nixon called the
agreement "peace with honor," but he knew the
South Vietnamese Army would have difficulty
maintaining control.
43The Pentagon Papers
- The North soon attacked the South and in April
1975 they captured Saigon. Vietnam was united
into one communist nation. Saigon was renamed Ho
Chi Minh City. Cambodia and Laos soon followed
with communist regimes of their own. The United
States was finally out of Vietnam. But every
single one of its political objectives for the
region met with failure. - Over 55,000 Americans perished fighting the
Vietnam War.
44The Fall of Saigon
By April 25th, 1975, after the NVA captured Phuoc
Long city, Quang Tri, Hue, Da Nang and Hue, the
South Vietnamese Army had lost its best units,
more than a third of its men, and nearly half its
weapons. The NVA were closing in on Saigon, which
forced President Ford to order an immediate
evacuation of American civilians and South
Vietnamese refugees in Operation Frequent Wind.
The operation was put into effect by secret
code. Remaining citizens, refugees, and officials
were to stand by until the code was released.
"White Christmas" was the code, which was
broadcast on the morning of April 29th. Refugees
and Americans then "high-tailed" it to designated
landing zones.
U.S. Marine and Air Force helicopters, flying
from offshore carriers, performed a massive
airlift. In 18 hours, more than 1,000 American
civilians and nearly 7,000 South Vietnamese
refugees were flown out of Saigon.
45The Fall of Saigon
South Vietnamese pilots also were permitted to
participate in the evacuation, and they landed on
U.S. carriers. More than 100 of those
American-supplied helicopters (more than 250,000
each) were then pushed off carrier decks to make
room for more evacuees. At 403 a.m., April
30th, 1975, two U.S. Marines were killed in a
rocket attack at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut airport.
They were the last Americans to die in the
Vietnam War. At dawn, the remaining marines of
the force guarding the U.S. Embassy lifted off.
Only hours later, South Vietnamese looters
ransacked the embassy as Soviet-supplied tanks,
operated by North Vietnamese, rolled south on
National Highway 1. On the morning of April 30th,
Communist forces captured the presidential palace
in Saigon, which ended the Second Indochina War.