No Strategic Exit for FARC?

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No Strategic Exit for FARC?
Woodrow Wilson Center Washington April 3th, 2008
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Key Strategic Features of FARC

• A decentralized organization in military and
  financial terms.
• Each bloc and front collects its own money and
  recruits its own combatants.
• Combat units develop their own logistical
  networks independently.
• Each member of the Secretariat represents a
  particular regional bloc inside the leadership of
  the organization.
• A peasant armed group in an urban country.
• Most of FARC combatants are of peasant origin.
• Increasing difficulties to find new recruits
  because of the decline in the Colombian rural
  population as a consequence of the quick
  urbanization process.
• FARC units resort to recruit women and children
  to compensate for the lack of young males willing
  to join its ranks.
• The lack of a significant number of combatants
  of urban origin means that FARC has confronted
  insurmountable problems to build terrorist major
  cities of Colombian.

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Key Strategic Features of FARC

• High level of corruption and criminalization
• A great proportion of FARC militants have been
  assigned tasks connected with different illegal
  business -trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, etc
  - instead of fighting against Colombian
  government troops.
• Sectors of the guerrilla highly cohesive in
  ideological terms and active in the military
  field have been struck particularly hard by the
  Colombian Armed Forces. (Example Teofilo Forero
  Mobile Column )
• The joining into the ranks of FARC of an
  increasing number of recruits coming from social
  sectors connected to the drug industry has
  increased the contamination of the organization
  with the narco culture.
• A number of guerrilla units have changed their
  organizational culture from having a
  revolutionary type morale to acquiring a more
  narco way of living. (Example 16th Front).
• A significant number of middle rank commanders
  have deserted taking with them money from the
  organization.

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Key Strategic Features of FARC

• A Terrorist organization with a high level of
  internationalization.
• The guerrilla has the control of networks to
  smuggle cocaine through Venezuelan territory.
• FARC also has connections with Mexican and
  Brazilian drug cartels.
• FARC developed a close relationship with the
  Provisional IRA acquiring new military technology
  and new tactical procedures.
• The organization has been involved in black
  market operations in Central America, and Eastern
  Europe to acquire MANPADS.
• A 35kg. Uranium cache belonging to FARC captured
  by Colombian authorities shows the role played by
  the guerrilla in the smuggling of nuclear
  materials.
• FARC has developed connections with medium and
  high ranking officials in Venezuela and Ecuador.

5
The governmental military campaign

• A structural increase in the lethality of
  Colombian Armed Forces military operations
  against FARC.
• - An improvement in the reaction capability of
  the Military Forces.
• - An increase in the accuracy of the attacks
• - An acceleration in pace of Counterterrorist
  Operations.
• - Better coordination between military and
  police units.
• A break up of the guerrilla Command and Control
  structure because of
• - The governmental improved capability to
  monitor guerrilla communications.
• - New demobilization program aimed at middle
  rank commanders.
• -The capability to neutralize the leadership of
  the organization.
• An expansion of the programs of rewards to give
  incentives to the reporting of the localization
  of FARC units and leaders.

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The impact of changes in the military balance

• The break down of the combat morale of FARC
• There is an increase in the number of cases of
  collective defections and the total number of
  defectors
• The dissolution of the guerrilla social base as a
  consequence of the expansion of State control
  over most of the Colombian territory.
• The weakening of the Command and Control
  structure.
• The change in the strategic value of time.
• The increased pace of attrition of FARC military
  structure changes the pressure from the
  government side to the guerrilla side in order to
  find a strategic rupture through
• - An agreement for demobilization
• - A radicalization of the military response by
  the guerrilla resorting to alternative tactics
  (urban terrorism) or special weapons (MANPADS).

7
The political side of the strategic game

• The strategy of FARC to improve its political
  image has failed at least temporarily
• - FARCs cheating during the negotiation with
  the Pastrana administration continues damaging
  the credibility of the organization as a
  potential participant in any negotiation process.
• -The Emmanuel affair when FARC offered to
  release a child-hostage who was no longer in
  their hands.
• - The international rejection of president
  Chavezs proposal to give FARC political
  recognition as a step to open negotiations.
• - The implication of FARC in nuclear material
  smuggling has increased the difficulties of
  taking them out of the international lists of
  terrorist organizations.
• -The Venezuelan-Colombian crisis makes the
  continuation of president Chavezs role as
  mediator impossible.

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The Venezuelan Factor

• There are common political goals between
  Venezuela and FARC
• -Both have a Bolivarian ideology understood as a
  populist and nationalistic political project.
• -Both of them share the same interest of erasing
  US influence in Latin America.
• -Both are equally interested in expanding the
  Bolivarian revolution to Colombia.
• In this sense, the Venezuelan government has a
  strategic interest in
• -Preventing the military defeat of FARC
• -Promoting FARC as a political actor which has
  to be taken into account in defining the
  political future of Colombia
• -Forcing a negotiation where FARC has a military
  position strong enough to be able to demand
  drastic changes in the Colombian political and
  economic system in exchange for peace.

9
The Venezuelan Factor

• As a consequence, radical sectors of the
  Venezuelan administration could be interested in
  supporting FARC
• - Allowing the use of Venezuelan territory as a
  safe heaven for guerrilla
• - Providing military equipment and training to
  FARC militants.

10
No Strategic Exit

• A political option
• Making additional concessions to improve the
  image of the organization (For instance, by
  liberating Mrs. Betancourt or other hostages)
• But..
• - It doesn't fit in the traditional strategic
  culture of FARC based on a systematic refusal to
  make unilateral concessions.
• - The unilateral release of hostage reduces the
  assets in the hands of FARC to capture public
  attention and press for concessions from the
  Colombian authorities and other governments.
• -Finally, the end of international attention
  aroused by the hostages in the hands of FARC
  would render a militarily weakened organization
  politically irrelevant.

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No Strategic Exit

• A military option
• Abandon the idea of improving the international
  image of the group and turn towards a military
  escalation with two goals
• -Increase the military attrition of the
  Colombian government.
• -Prolong war to wait for a new Colombian
  government prone to making political concessions
  to the guerrilla.
• But
• The improvement in the military performance of
  the Colombian armed forces is a structural one
  which is irreversible.
• The rebuilding of the guerrillas military
  capability would also require the active support
  of one or several of the countries surrounding
  Colombia.
• The US pressure will work as a powerful
  deterrent to prevent any Latin American country
  from deciding to support a terrorist organization
  such as FARC.
• The strategic dependence of FARC on any
  government supporting it would make the guerrilla
  looks like a proxy finishing with its
  nationalistic credentials and provoking a
  political crisis inside the organization.

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The route to internal fragmentation

• Several factors would stimulate the internal
  division of FARC
• The financial and military autonomy of FARC blocs
  and fronts.
• The lack of ideological cohesion and the
  weakening of internal discipline.
• The increasing level of corruption
• The weakening of FARCs command and control
  structure
• The lack of clear strategic options in a
  particularly difficult situation for the
  organization.

13
The Strategic Consequences of the FARC Split

• As a consequence, at least, two sectors would
  appear
• A pragmatic side
• Ready to opt for the IRA option
• Negotiating with the government for the
  demobilization of the group in exchange for a
  complete amnesty and some political concessions.
• A radical side
• Ready to opt for the Shining Path option
• Escalating military activity by resorting to
  urban terrorism
• And also
• Ready to opt for the Polisario Front option
• Becoming a strategic proxy of one or several
  neighboring countries and increase military
  activity in the border areas of Colombia.