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Health and Safety Executive

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Title: Health and Safety Executive


1
Health and SafetyExecutive
  • Human Factors
  • in Accident
  • Investigation
  • David Birkbeck
  • HID Onshore Human
  • Organisational Factors Group

2
Human Factors in Accident Investigation
  • David Birkbeck
  • HID Onshore Human Organisational Factors Group

3
Introduction
  • To say accidents are due to human failing is
    like saying falls are due to gravity. It is true
    but it does not help us prevent them Trevor
    Kletz
  • Aim today is to present methods that are known to
    help identify human failure in accident
    investigation and prevent reoccurrence
  • Not a black art, a pragmatic and robust process

4
What we expect
  • Methodical process for gathering information,
    analysing what went wrong (and right), and
    learning lessons in order to
  • Manage risk
  • Prevent reoccurrence
  • Retrospective tool, but can be powerful in
    promoting change

5
Accident reports
  • What happened
  • Who to
  • When
  • How it happened
  • But not why
  • Technical myopia
  • Failure to consider human factors

6
Significance of human factors
  • Up to 90 of accidents attributable to some
    degree to human failures
  • ...Texas CityBuncefield... Texaco Milford Haven
    ... Southall and Ladbroke Grove crashes
    ...Zeebruger
  • Proportion and significance increasing as
    technical safety measures improve

7
Recent news
8
But not as simple as we think..
  • This accident was the result of human error
  • ..pilot error
  • Error or rule-breaking put down to
  • Lack of competence
  • Poor supervision
  • Not paying attention
  • Its not usually as simple as that!

9
Human failure taxonomy
Human failures
Unintended actions
Intended actions
Errors - Unintended consequences
Violation - Intended consequences
Mistakes
Lapses
Slips
When the person decided to act without complying
with a known rule or procedure
When the person forgets to do something
When the person does something, but not what they
meant to do
When the person does what they meant to, but
should have done something else
10
Slip, lapse or mistake?
Involuntary or non-intentional action
No
Was there intention in the action?
Was there prior intention to act?
No
Spontaneous or subsidiary action
Yes
Yes
Did the actions proceed as planned?
Unintentional action (slip or lapse)
No
Yes
Did the actions achieve their desired end?
Intentional but mistaken action
No
Yes
Successful action
11
How to apply
  • Create timeline
  • Identify significant behaviours
  • Analyse behaviours
  • Identify effective measures to prevent
    reoccurrence
  • Record

12
Errors
  • Slip
  • When a person does something, but not what they
    meant to do
  • Lapse
  • When a person forgets to do something
  • Both are unintended actions with unintended
    consequences

13
Example slip Emirates EK407
  • Emirates Flight EK407
  • Pre-flight take off calculations were based on an
    incorrect take off weight (262M/t rather than
    362M/t)
  • This weight was entered into take off performance
    software on separate laptop
  • Captain noticed something was wrong at the end of
    the runway, took manual control and selected
    maximum thrust

14
Example slip Emirates EK407
15
Example slip Emirates EK407
  • After the accident, Captain and First Office were
    asked to resign by Emirates and did so
  • ATSB investigation revealed
  • Captain had flown 99 hours in last month (1 hour
    below maximum)
  • Had slept for 3.5 hours in 24 hour period prior
    to flight (shift rotas)
  • Excessively complex system for calculating take
    off speed (manual transfer of information from 2
    automated systems)
  • No automated failsafe

16
Mistakes
  • When a person does something they intended to do,
    but should have done something else
  • Rule based choosing a standard solution for a
    known problem the maintenance worker who
    selects the wrong isolation procedures
  • Knowledge based working from first principles
    3 Mile Island shift team dismissed a potential
    explanation for the unfolding incident as they
    believed a valve was closed

17
Mistakes
  • Because the action is intended, mistakes are much
    harder to detect at the individual level
  • People believe what they are doing is right and
    often dismiss evidence to the contrary
  • Bias
  • Tunnel vision

18
Violations
  • The Texas City technicians who filled the
    raffinate splitter to 90-100 capacity rather
    than 50 as stated in procedures
  • The Assistant Boson who was asleep rather than
    checking the bow doors were closed on the Herald
    of Free Enterprise
  • The technicians who knowingly maintained the
    Chernobyl reactor in an unsafe state to allow a
    safety study to be conducted

19
Violations
  • Violation
  • When a person decides to act without complying
    with a known rule or procedure
  • Note that, in this context, there must be an
    known rule or procedure
  • This is not a moral or ethical judgement

20
Violations
21
Violations
  • Note that we all integrate rule violation into
    our day to day lives so the identification of a
    violation should not be regarded as a precursor
    to discipline
  • Indeed, we tend to like those who break the rules

22
Violations
23
Violations
  • Types of violations
  • Routine
  • Exceptional
  • Acts of sabotage
  • The key to the effective analysis of violations
    is to understand why
  • What antecedents were present?
  • What behaviour was observed?
  • What consequences resulted?

24
Performance Influencing Factors
  • Defined as the characteristics of the job, the
    individual and the organization that influence
    behaviour
  • Considered during behavioural analysis, often at
    the end of the process
  • Very broad topic including a range of factors
    e.g. fatigue, group effects, design of equipment,
    mental wellbeing, task knowledge/complexity
  • A comprehensive list available on HSE website
  • Often have a critical role in error causation but
    equally often overlooked (e.g. fatigue EK407)

25
Performance Influencing Factors
  • Can profoundly influence potential for error
    (proposed nominal human unreliability). Task is
  • Routine, highly practiced, rapid task involving
    relatively low level of skill (0.02)
  • Miscellaneous task for which no description can
    be found (0.03)
  • Fairly simple task performed rapidly or given
    scant attention (0.09)
  • Totally unfamiliar, performed at speed with no
    real idea of consequence (0.55)
  • Williams, J.C. HEART Technique

26
Common issues
  • Failure to correctly specify behaviour
  • The individual involved
  • The task they were engaged in at the time
  • What they did (or did not do)
  • What the outcome was
  • Making early decisions and sticking to them
  • As information becomes available, a mistake can
    become a violation
  • Failure to identify the multiple behaviours
    contributing to an accident or incident
  • Timeline critical

27
Why bother with any of it?
  • Each failure type has a different set of
    solutions designed to prevent their reoccurrence.
    For example (not exhaustive)
  • Slip/Lapse
  • NOT training
  • Hardware solutions
  • Cross checks
  • PIFs
  • Error
  • Training e.g. scenarios
  • Group support
  • Challenge
  • Violations
  • Behaviour modification
  • Culture improvement

28
What to remember
  • Human behaviour can be predicted with reasonable
    accuracy
  • Correctly integrating HF into your accident
    investigation process will reap rewards just
    look at the contemporary causation figures
  • Separating error, mistake and violation
    represents a highly valuable first step
  • Help is out there
  • Guidance
  • HSE
  • Industry working groups e.g. Energy Institute

29
A final thought
  • The most powerful influence on human behaviour is
    outcome
  • Therefore managing human failure requires a high
    degree of corporate honesty
  • What behaviour is really rewarded?
  • Are we willing to look at organizational factors,
    especially when we see rule breaking?
  • Are we willing to make the investments that are
    likely to prevent reoccurrence?
  • Are we willing to strive for objectivity and
    pragmatism?

30
Sources of guidance
  • Reducing Error Influencing Behaviour HSG 48
  • Investigating Incidents Accidents HSG 245
  • Successful Health Safety management HSG 65
  • Human Factors Website pages
  • http//www.hse.gov.uk/humanfactors/majorhazard/ind
    ex.htm
  • Energy Institute guidance
  • http//www.energyinst.org.uk/index.cfm?PageID1268
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