Title: Fiduciary Conflicts: What (or Where) are they now??
1Fiduciary Conflicts What (or Where) are they
now??
- Clint Lackey
- Director of Compliance Oversight,
- Fiduciary and Insurance Activities
- Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
2Disclaimer
- The views expressed today are my own and do not
necessarily reflect the views of Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A.
3Topical Objectives
- Review conflicts and self-dealing
- Risk and regulatory concerns
- Where might we find conflicts now?
- How do we prevent or address conflicts?
4Starting Point Common Law Duty of Loyalty
5The Duty of Loyalty
the most fundamental duty owed by the trustee to
the beneficiaries of a trust.
- Not imposed by the terms of the trust, but by the
nature of the relationship which arises from
the creation of the trust. - The trustee must administer the trust solely in
the interest of the beneficiaries. - The trustee must not put himself in a position
where it would be for his own benefit to violate
his duty.
6Duty of Loyalty (Cont.)
- Chief Judge Cardozo in his opinion rendered in
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545,
546 (1928), described a fiduciary's duty of
loyalty as follows - "Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday
world for those acting at arm's-length, are
forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A
trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone,
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,
is then the standard of behavior. As to this
there has developed a tradition that is unbending
and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been
the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned
to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
'disintegrating erosion' of particular
exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct
for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than
that trodden by the crowd."
7What is Self-Dealing? (Cont.)
- A clear statement of law regarding self-dealing
was expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Michoud v. Girod, 11 L.Ed. 1076, 1099 - "The general rule stands upon our great moral
obligation to refrain from placing ourselves in
relations which ordinarily excite a conflict
between self-interest and integrity. . . . It
therefore prohibits a party from purchasing on
his own account that which his duty or trust
requires him to sell on account of another, and
from purchasing on account of another that which
he sells on his own account. In effect, he is not
allowed to unite the two opposite characters of
buyer and seller, because his interests, when he
is the seller or buyer on his own account, are
directly conflicting with those of the person on
whose account he buys or sells."
8Conflicts of Interest Self-Dealing
- Duty of Loyalty the interest of your client is
paramount. - Statutory/Regulatory citations of interest
- 12 USC 92a(h)
- ERISA
- State statutes
- 12 CFR 9
- Contrast with conflicts under the fiduciary
standards for others in financial industry.
9Permissive Exceptions toDuty of Loyalty
- The duty of undivided loyalty can only be waived
if - Authorized by applicable law
- Governing Instrument
- State Law
- Federal Law
- Court Order
10Permissive Exceptions toDuty of Loyalty
- Beneficiary Approval
- Must fully disclose the conflict.
- Must not be in contravention to local law.
- Revocable Trust Grantor Approval
- Written direction of the grantor required.
11Regulatory Perspectives
- Common Law
- Federal Law (US Code)
- State Statutes (Uniform Trust Act?)
- Federal Regulation
- Policy and Procedure
12Federal Laws
- 12 USC 92a(h) - Loans of Trust Funds to Officers
and Employees Prohibited Penalties - National bank is strictly prohibited from lending
funds from the fiduciary accounts it administers
to the banks officers, directors, or employees. - If any bank officer, director, or employee makes
or receives any such loan, that person may be
fined up to 5,000, imprisoned, or both. - The regulators may bring enforcement actions
against the bank and its officers, directors, and
employees, including the imposition of civil
money penalties. - No exceptions to this prohibition are allowed
under 12 USC 92a(h). The statute prevails over
any instrument authority, beneficiary consent, or
court order purporting to authorize the
transaction. - The strict statutory prohibition (carrying
criminal sanctions) against lending trust assets
to bank employees and insiders does not extend to
their related interests or to bank affiliates. - Obligations of directors, officers, or employees
received in kind are not prohibited by 12 USC
92a(h) unless they are renewed or carried past
due at the banks discretion. - Demand loans of directors, officers, or employees
received in kind should be paid within a
reasonable time.
13Federal Laws (Cont.)
- 29 USC Ch. 18 - Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) - The primary objective of ERISA is to protect the
rights and interests of employee benefit plan
participants and their beneficiaries. - Two government agencies are primarily responsible
for administration and enforcement of ERISA. - The Department of Labor is responsible for
interpreting and enforcing fiduciary provisions
of ERISA and also interprets those sections of
the Internal Revenue Code dealing with fiduciary
requirements for employee benefit plans. - The IRS is responsible for IRAs, Keogh accounts
that cover only the individual/employer, and
various tax-related provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code. - Commonly referenced sections of ERISA
- Section 1104 - Fiduciary duties
- Section 1105 - Liability for breach of
co-fiduciary - Section 1106 - Prohibited transactions
- Section 1107 - Limitations on acquisition and
holding of employer securities - Section 1108 - Exemptions from prohibited
transactions - Section 1109 - Liability for breach of fiduciary
duty
14 Federal Regulations
- 12 CFR 9.5 Policies and Procedures
- Must adopt and follow written policies and
procedures addressing - Brokerage placement practices 12 CFR 9.5(a)
- Methods for ensuring that officers and employees
do not use material inside information in
connection with any decision or recommendation to
purchase or sell any security 12 CFR 9.5(b) - Methods for preventing self-dealing and conflicts
of interest 12 CFR 9.5(c) - Selection and retention of legal counsel to
advise the bank and its officers and employees on
fiduciary matters 12 CFR 9.5(d) - Investment of funds held as fiduciary and the
treatment of fiduciary funds awaiting investment
or distribution 12 CFR 9.5(e)
15 Federal Regulations (Cont.)
- 12 CFR 9.10 Fiduciary Funds Awaiting Investment
or Distribution - Funds awaiting investment or distribution in
discretionary accounts shall not remain
uninvested and undistributed for an unreasonable
amount of time and should be invested at a rate
consistent with applicable law 12 CFR 9.10 (a) - Funds of a fiduciary account awaiting investment
or distribution can be placed in an interest
bearing account in the fiduciary bank, unless
prohibited by applicable law 12 CFR 9.10(b)(1) - Funds of a fiduciary account awaiting investment
or distribution can be placed in an interest
bearing account in affiliated bank, unless
prohibited by applicable law 12 CFR 9.10(b)(1)
16 Federal Regulations (Cont.)
- 12 CFR 9.12 Self-Dealing and Conflicts of
Interest - Discretionary investments in the stock or
obligations of the bank or an affiliate
(including their respective directors, officers
and employees) are only permitted if authorized
by applicable law 12 CFR 9.12(a)(1) - Discretionary loans, sales or transfers of assets
from fiduciary accounts to the bank or an
affiliate (including their respective directors,
officers and employees) are only permitted if
authorized by applicable law 12 CFR 9.12(b)(1) - Loans from fiduciary accounts to bank directors,
officers, or employees are strictly prohibited
12 CFR 9.12(b)(1) - Loans from the bank to fiduciary accounts are
permitted if the transaction is fair to the
account and not prohibited by applicable law 12
CFR 9.12(c)
17 Federal Regulations (Cont.)
- 12 CFR 9.15 Fiduciary Compensation
- Fiduciary may charge a reasonable fee for its
services if not set or governed by applicable law
12 CFR 9.15(a) - Fiduciary may not permit officers or employees to
earn compensation for acting as a co-fiduciary,
except with approval of the board of directors 12
CFR 9.15(b)
18Consider the Cimex Lectularius
- Commonly known as the Bed bug!
- Thought to have been significantly eradicated in
the early 1900s. Started seeing a resurgence
after 1995. - Resurgence is generally attributed to a change in
habits of the primary hosts. - More foreign travel, exchange of bedding
materials, focusing on other pests and ignoring
them!
19Bed bugs and conflicts
- Cant readily see them coming so you have them
before you know it. - When they bite, they hurt!
- Embarrassing to acknowledge and address.
- Requiring a re-focus in order to eliminate.
- New tools available to look for them!
20Where are we today?
- Law and regulation much the same.
- Fundamental nature of conflicts still the same.
- Basic transaction types that cause concern -
still the same. - Perhaps there is more complacency toward
potential conflict situations?
21Where are we today?(Cont.)
- Size and complexity of our financial
institutions responsibility is the same. - Technical knowledge and depth of understanding
about conflicts of interest. - The primary change in perspectives has occurred
in how, where, and why we see conflicts of
interest emerging. They come at us in some
different ways!
22Sources of Emerging Conflicts
23Investments
- New and increasingly complex investment vehicles
provide opportunity both for benefitting the
client and for additional underlying conflicts. - Banks and affiliates are assuming additional
duties relative to financial instruments. - Management of fiduciary cash remember the
fundamentals.
24Potential Conflicts - Investments
- Roles related to investment vehicles (sales,
service, underwriting) - Fees and other financial benefits associated with
investing - Underlying purpose of the investment
- Failure to take actions on behalf of client
interests (contrary interests) - Proxy voting (must vote clients interest not
that of the bank)
25Potential Conflicts - Investments
- Soft dollar arrangements not meeting requirements
of Section 28(e).
26Potential Conflicts - Investments
Private Equity Fund Proposal
- Investment opportunity for select fiduciary
accounts - New fund for company incubation
- Bank affiliate to manage
- Executive employees are investing partners
- Fiduciary accounts limited partners
27Potential Conflicts - Investments
- Proprietary Investment Managers (who are also
investors) get gain sharing, incentive
compensation, and management fees - Fund allowed to incur debt from own bank
- Management team indemnified for financial loss
- Shared Counsel with waiver of conflict
28Potential Conflicts - Investments
- Bank may act as investor, investment banker,
investment manager, advisor, agent and principal
in the deal. - Bank to have multiple relationships with
portfolio companies and other parties lender,
advisor, servicer, shareholder, underwriter, or
trustee. - Officers of bank may be directors of portfolio
companies.
29Potential Conflicts - Investments
- Fund cash may be invested in bank instruments.
- Warehoused investments to be transferred from
bank balance sheet to the fund.
30Revenue
- Structure of fees and fee schedules
- Layers of fees (performance fees, enhanced
services fees, etc.) - Unfair or unreasonable fees
- Extra fees for routine, traditional fiduciary
services - Additional revenue received due to fiduciary
appointment
31Revenue (Cont.)
- Revenue from serving in multiple capacities
- Placement fees
- Sweep fees
- Sales incentives (internal and external)
- Revenue share (internal and external)
- Commissions
- Account or Transactional fees
- Service fees
32Affiliated Products and Services
- Everyone wants their piece of the (very
proverbial) pie!
33Affiliated Products and Services
- Lending relationships
- Insurance products and services
- Brokerage services
- RE Sales/Servicing
- Investment vehicles (Alternatives and other
internal investment products) - Deposit and cash management instruments
34Third Party Services
- Goods, services, and other benefits that may be
made available by vendors to the bank (or DOEs)
in return for - Investing money
- Using account or professional services
- Potential for interlocking relationships
35Indirect Conflicts
- An action taken with respect to a fiduciary
account that could indirectly benefit the bank or
any of its DOEs. - Corporate benefits from service arrangements.
- Price breaks or gratuities in return for full
retail pricing (or more) for servicing fiduciary
accounts. - A fiduciary cant do anything indirectly that he
is prohibited from doing directly.
36Cash Management
- OCC Bulletin 2010-37
- Deposits or Investment of Cash Balances
- Dont leave cash uninvested
- May deposit in own bank if properly pledged
- Dont invest cash in own-bank deposits
- Consider the rates of return available
- Sweep vehicles basis of selection
37Potential concerns involving personal interests
- Transactions involving DOE or affiliated
business interests - Bequests and gifts to DOEs
- Family accounts transactions and decisions by
DOEs - Benefits in return for services from clients OR
3rd parties
38Leveraging Consent
- Must get informed consent both the specifics of
the transaction and the conflict itself must be
disclosed. - Consent is not direction
- Full beneficiary consent
- Negative consent does not fully mitigate a
conflict
39Risk Perspectives
- Regulatory Risk punitive action by regulators
can include formal agreements, civil money
penalties, and potential loss of fiduciary
powers. - Financial Risk conlfict transactions are
voidable loss of revenue and potential damages - Reputation Risk- significant public risk for the
professional fiduciary
40Recommended strategies
- Education programs
- Strong Policies and Procedures at multiple levels
- Effective preventive AND detective controls
- Leverage technology and accounting system
capabilities encourage development of additional
tools
41Recommended strategies
- Effective Risk Analysis
- Refocus and identify areas of potential problems
consult with legal counsel - Limit mitigation of conflicts through papering
the account. - Consider using screening processes or checklists
designed to identify potential conflicts in new
accounts, new products, and in relevant
transactions.
42Recommended strategies
- Consider language that will protect the bank in
transactional contracts. - Include conflicts screening in all vendor due
diligence programs.
43Final wish
- Good night,
- sleep tight,
- and dont let the bed bugs bite!