Armageddon averted or just postponed?

1
Armageddon averted or just postponed?

• Prospects for the Six Party Talks in Beijing
• Tim Beal
• Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
• Political Economy Research Centre, Sheffield
• Thursday 14 December 2006

2
OVERVIEW I

• Six Party Talks
• Background, Breakthrough, Breakdown
• Characteristics of the contestation
• Positions of the contestants
• Russia, Japan, China, ROK, DPRK,
• US

3
OVERVIEW II

• The year of suspension
• Counterfeiting, drugs, human rightsgtgtgtfinancial
  sanctions
• Armageddon averted, postponed or something
  else?
• Prospects

4
Six Party Talks - background

• Where does it begin?
• Japanese period, Liberation and Division, Korean
  WarAgreed Framework
• Agreed Framework
• Origins, course and collapse

5
Origins - nuclear issue

• DPRK two main nuclear objectives
• Electricity
• Energy security nuclear fuel cycle
• Military Security (assumed but denied)
• Same as every other nuclear-capable country
• Parallels with India particularly topical and
  relevant

6
Need for electricity often overlooked

• Key constraint on economic recovery
• ROK (Japan) large dependence on nuclear energy
• UK reactivating nuclear energy programme

7
1993/4 crisisgtgtAgreed Framework

• Jimmy Carter meets Kim Il Sung
• Agreement forced upon Clinton

8
Agreed Framework

• I Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRKs
  graphite-moderated reactors and related
  facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power
  plants.
• Due 2003 five years behind schedule, now
  cancelled
• US-led Korean Peninsula Energy Organization (KEDO)

9
KEDO

• Initiated and controlled by US, paid for mainly
  by ROK and Japan
• Now formally disbanded
• ROK having to pick up final bills
• US to provide annual supplies of heavy fuel oil
  as compensation for energy forgone

10
Agreed Framework

• II The two sides will move toward full
  normalization of political and economic
  relations.
• Little progress except late 2000 frozen by Bush
• III Both sides will work together for peace and
  security on a nuclearfree Korean peninsula

11
nuclearfree Korean peninsula

• US to give formal assurances against the threat
  of nuclear weapons
• Bush Nuclear Posture Review threatened preemptive
  nuclear strike
• DPRK implement N-S denuclearization agreement
• Enriched uranium would breech that
• IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen
  the international nuclear non proliferation
  regime.

12
Sunshine to clouds

• Kim Dae-jungs sunshine policy
• Engagement with North was necessary to prevent
  war
• Collapse of DPRK would disastrous for ROK
• Defuse tensions, move to peaceful reunification
• Pressure on Clinton gtgtPerry Report gtgtUS DPRK
  modus vivendi
• NK missile moratorium

13
Pyongyang Summit 2000

• June highly successful summit
• October Secretary Albright visits Pyongyang,
  comes back with invitation to Clinton
• Clinton packs his bags but Gore loses election

14
Kim Dae-jungs final years

• Bush makes clear he is abandoning Clintons
  policies, Korea and elsewhere
• ABC policy
• March 2001 Kim Dae-jung goes to Washington, is
  rebuffed
• North-South relations go up and down

15
January 2002

• Nuclear Posture Review
• Violates NS- nuclear accord Nuclear
  Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
• Axis of Evil speech
• State of the Union speech links Iraq, Iran and
  DPRK

16
Roh Moo-Hyun

• Human rights lawyer, commercial school education
• Rohs victory 2002 due to large degree to
  Anti-Americanism
• Less deferential to Americans than Kim Dae-jung
• Careful not to annoy US
• Adamant that US must negotiate
• US says it will talk but not negotiate

17
Collapse of Agreed Framework

• US never fully implemented AF, effectively
  destroyed it late 2002
• Charged DPRK with having enriched uranium
  programme

18
Enriched uranium issue

• Not new
• Going back to Gilman
• 3 Nov 99 Representative Benjamin A. Gilman
  (Rep), Chairman of the House International
  Relations Committee, released a congressional
  report today on DPRK threat to the US and its
  allies

19
Gilman report

• First, the American people need to know that
  there is significant evidence that North Korea
  is continuing its activities to develop nuclear
  weapons.
• Remarkably, North Korea's efforts to acquire
  uranium technologies, that is, a second path to
  nuclear weapons, and their efforts to weaponize
  their nuclear material do not violate the 1994
  Agreed Framework. That is because the Clinton
  Administration did not succeed in negotiating a
  deal with North Korea that would ban such
  efforts. It is inexplicable and inexcusable

20
Pollack- the summit trigger

• Jonathan Pollack (US) Naval War College Review,
  Summer 2003 argued
• US had new evidence of NK heavily enriched
  uranium (HEU) weapons programme
• Crisis triggered by Japans surprise announcement
  of Pyongyang Summit
• Preparations had been kept secret from the
  Americans
• Tokyo-Pyongyang rapprochement would sideline US,
  weaken its NK policy
• Ass Sec Jim Kelly sent to Pyongyang

21
Kellys Pyongyang visit October 2002

• Kelly came back from Pyongyang claiming
• He had accused NK of having HEU programme
• They admitted this
• Pyongyang soon denied both charges, but crisis
  had been set in motion
• US suspended deliveries of oil, abrogating AF
  Pyongyang reactivated reactors. US refused to
  negotiate, gtgt10 February 2005 NK suspends
  participation in Six Party talks, says has
  nuclear deterrent

22
Selig Harrison

• Article in Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2005
• US feared warming of relations between North and
  South, as well as Japan-NK
• Said it was likely that there had been a
  programme to enrich uranium for feedstock for
  light water reactors but no evidence of weapons
  programme
• Post-Iraq loss of credibility

23
Misinformation

• Widespread feeling that there was a repeat of
  Iraq misinformation campaign
• Chinese, in particular, made it clear that they
  do no believe US
• Repeat in early 2005 with US charges that NK had
  exported nuclear material to Libya
• 20 March article in Washington Post US Misled
  allies about nuclear export

24
Enriched uranium

• Violation not of AF, but of N-S nuclear accord
• SK has admitted infringing accord
• Technology originated in West Europe in search
  for nuclear independence from USgtgtPakistan gtgtIran
• Energy security as much as weapons
• Small and dispersed DPRK can never prove it is
  not enriching

25
SIX PARTY TALKS

• Brokered by China
• 3 Party April 2003
• 1 27-29 August 2003
• 2 25-28 Feb 2004
• 3 June 2004
• 4 July- August and September 2005

26
Six Party Talks 2005gtgt

• Breakthrough
• Joint Statement 19 September 2005
• Breakdown
• 19/20 September 2005

27
BREAKTHROUGH

• Joint Statement took everyone by surprise
• No indication earlier of any shifting of
  positions
• JS
• Very ambiguous
• Two interesting omissions

28
Omissions

• Heavy enriched uranium
• Had been the alleged reasons for US tearing up
  Agreed Framework
• Cheney
• Architect of US Korea policy
• Had personally intervened at previous rounds

29
NY Times account

• U.S.-Korean Deal on Arms Leaves Key Points Open
• September 20, 2005
• By JOSEPH KAHN and DAVID E. SANGER
• Chinese applied pressure on DPRK, but more on US

30
Chinese pressure

• As this unfolded over the weekend, the Chinese
  increased pressure on the United States to sign -
  or take responsibility for a breakdown in the
  talks.
•  "At one point they told us that we were totally
  isolated on this and that they would go to the
  press," and explain that the United States sank
  the accord, the senior administration official
  said.

31
Why did US sign?

• Cheney absent
• Rice
• Each country, she suggested, would issue separate
  statements describing their understanding of the
  deal, with a specificity that is not in the
  agreement itself
• Did that, in Washington and Beijing, DPRK
  reacted, gtgtBREAKDOWN

32
CHARACTERISTICS of Six Party Framework

• 1 US salience
• 2 Asymmetry
• 3 Global interconnections the network effect

33
US Salience

• 1 US is salient
• US is by far the most important country for each
  of the others
• Not reciprocated
• Except perhaps China
• All of them want good relations with US
• Not least DPRK

34
US position the default

• They do things against their own interests eg
  ROK sending troops to Iraq to keep US happy
• China plays a waiting game
• They do not oppose US head-on in UN, but work to
  water down resolutions
• Eg over invasion of Iraq, condemnation of NK
  missile and nuclear test
• Focus in analysis should be on US, not DPRK
• DPRK policy options limited, US much more complex

35
2 Asymmetry

• Six parties are very disparate
• Population, wealth, military power, political
  system, culture, sovereignty, etc. etc.

36
Sovereignty and power I

• US is the superpower
• No serious threat from any other power
• Question of projecting power
• Iraq shows limits
• Russia, China and Japan
• Equal in military spending
• But Japan not normal country
• Has US bases. large element of US military control

37
Sovereignty and power II

• ROK
• Much bigger and richer than DPRK, much larger
  military spending, advanced equipment.
• But US has wartime control, and bases
• DPRK
• Weakest and smallest
• Limited project of power defense paramount
• No foreign bases, military exercises
• IS DPRK-China mutual defence treaty operable?

38
Asymmetry DPRK and US
39
DPRK

• Negotiations with US key to future
• Mistakes could be fatal
• Only US can attack, or allow attack
• Options limited
• Determined and focussed

40
US

• DPRK itself not important, no threat
• It is implications of DPRK for global and
  regional strategies which is important
• Wide range of problems and issues around the
  world (Iraq, Iran, Islamic nationalism
• Open society, traditionally confident in
  invulnerability and mission
• Partisanship (eg ABCgtgtLWR)
• Many options, no urgency

41
3 Global interconnections and network

• No country is an island
• Even NK has relationships around the world
• US, in particular, a global power
• Korean policy must be seen in wider context

42
For each of the Six Parties

• Its relationship with one of the others has
  ramifications for its relationship with all
• The actions of any one of the others impacts on
  its relationship with all
• We can conceptualise a dual layer network
• Between each of the Six with each other
• Between each of the Six with their global
  relationships
• Networks can be hard (political, military,
  economic) or soft (cultural, influence..)

43
Tyranny of geographical convenience I

• Media talks of NK nuclear issue
• Misleading
• Nuclear issue only arises because of other
  parties
• Especially US
• Were it not for US threat it is highly unlikely
  that NK would have attempted to develop a nuclear
  deterrent

44
Geographical convenience II

• Tendency to label events in geographical terms
• Usually the weaker/less warlike party
• We talk of the Iraq War
• As if we had nothing to do with it
• French, Americans talked of Vietnam War
• Vietnamese talk of the French War and the
  American War

45
Too many American wars
new ROK Foreign Minister) Song Min-soon.... Last
month, he caused a diplomatic stir with
Washington when he described the United States as
a warmonger. Perhaps the United States as a
nation has fought the most wars in the history of
humankind, given the number of years of its
establishment and existence." Korea Times, Seoul,
17 November 2006 http//times.hankooki.com/lpage/2
00611/kt2006111717334310440.htm
46
Characteristicsgtgtpositions

• 1 Salience of US
• 2 Asymmetry
• 3 Network
• Now look at positions and policies of the Six

47
POSITIONS

• Russia, China, ROK fairly similar
• Oppose DPRK nuclear weapons
• Facilitate Japanese remilitarisation and
  nuclearisation
• Could provoke US to war
• War would have horrendous consequences for Korean
  peninsula and region
• China fear that hawks might use opportunity to
  attack

48
Russia, China, ROK

• Want stability, peace
• Different attitudes towards unification but all
  want economic cooperation and growth
• All oppose collapse of DPRK

49
Japan

• Currently a spoiler bringing abductee issue
  to SPT
• Abductee issue good for domestic consumption
• Tension with DPRKgtgtremilitarisation
• Aimed at China
• Worried about Korean reunification

50
US response to JS

• Intensified use of psychowar weapons
• Human rights, allegations about counterfeiting,
  drugs
• Seldom any hard evidence
• Even by US charges, scale of offences small, not
  proportional to effect on SPT
• Deliberate attempt to derail Six Party Talks?

51
Examples Drugs and counterfeit currency
52
Drugs

• Pong Su
• Centrepiece of US allegations State Dept annual
  report on international drug trafficking
• The report cited examples such as in Australia in
  2003 when the North Korean cargo vessel Pong Su
  was seized by Australian authorities as the ship
  was allegedly delivering a large load of heroin.
  At the time of the seizure, a North Korean
  communist party secretary was also found aboard.
  A trial is still in process (March 2005)
• 2004 Australian Federal Police give evidence

53
AFP evidence

• N. Korea drug-trade charges in question Evidence
  shaky in case cited by U.S. By Cam Simpson
  Washington Bureau Published March 10, 2004
  WASHINGTON -- Days after the Bush administration
  asserted that the North Korean government most
  likely is dealing drugs as a matter of state
  policy, questions about the evidence underlying a
  key piece of that case are emerging from official
  Australian sources. In addition to Friday's
  ruling by Magistrate Duncan Reynolds, a lead
  investigator from the Australian Federal Police
  testified that a Southeast Asian organized crime
  figure--not the North Korean government--arranged
  the shipment, according to court transcripts.
  Other evidence, records show, also suggests the
  heroin was produced in the Golden Triangle region
  of Southeast Asia, not in North Korea
• http//www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi
  -0403100260mar10,1,5792396.story

54
2006 Pong Su cleared

• N Koreans cleared over heroin The Pong Su was
  found carrying 50m of heroin A North Korean
  shipping company is considering suing Australia's
  government after its senior officers were cleared
  of drug trafficking. The captain and three senior
  officers of the Pong Su were found not guilty on
  Sunday of aiding heroin smuggling, by Victoria
  state's Supreme Court. The suggestion that senior
  crew were implicated in the smuggling had led to
  accusations of backing by Pyongyang.
• http//news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4778118.st
  m

55
Counterfeiting
56
Scale small

• NK Fakes 2.8 Million Annually, US Says A U.S.
  secret service official claimed Tuesday his
  agency has made definitive'' connections
  between North Korea and its counterfeiting of
  U.S. currencies, saying Washington has
  confiscated supernotes'' worth 2.8 million on
  a yearly basis. Providing a frame of reference,
  he said the Secret Service seized over 113
  million in counterfeit U.S. currency during the
  2005 fiscal year. High-quality, counterfeit 100
  U.S. bills allegedly produced by North Korea are
  collectively referred to as supernotes.
• http//times.hankooki.com/lpage/200604/kt200604261
  7415853460.htm

57
Georgia on my mind

• Fake 100 Bills in Maryland Tied to Organized
  Crime in Separatist Enclave
• From a printing press in South Ossetia George,
  a sliver of land with no formally recognized
  government, more than 20 million in the fake
  bills has been transported to Israel and the
  United States, according to investigators. The
  counterfeit 100 notes have also surfaced in
  Georgia and Russia, officials said.
• That compares to the approximately 2.8 million
  in "supernotes" linked to North Korea that the
  agency says it confiscates, on average, each
  year.
• Washington Post, November 26, 2006
• http//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/artic
  le/2006/11/25/AR2006112500963.html

58
Evidence unconvincing

• The four-member delegation visited Hong Kong and
  Macau from Tuesday to Friday before arriving in
  Seoul on Saturday. There was some information
  we can refer to (regarding the counterfeiting),''
  the Seoul official told reporters on condition of
  anonymity. However, the briefing did not seem to
  fully convince Seoul, which has been unwilling to
  accept Washington's sanctions due to concerns the
  issue could prevent the resumption of the
  six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons
  programs
• http//search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?te
  rmevidencepathhankooki3/times/lpage/200601/kt
  2006012317270553460.htmmediakt

59
Ex-President Urges Lifting of U.S. Sanctions on
N.Korea Former President Kim Dae-jung has urged
the United States to consider lifting sanctions
it imposed on North Korea last year and talking
directly to Pyongyang. In an interview with the
financial news service Bloomberg, Kim said
Washington must lift financial sanctions on the
North for the Stalinist states alleged money
laundering and counterfeiting if there is no
proof. Kim says the Bush administration's
hardline stance against the North is partially to
blame for the North's development and testing of
nuclear weapons. He also defended his Sunshine
Policy of engagement with North Korea that won
him the Nobel Peace Prize six years ago. Chosun
Ilbo, Seoul, 24 November 2006 http//english.chosu
n.com/w21data/html/news/200611/200611240022.html
60
German expert

• Sharply Increased US Sanctions are based on the
  USD Supernote Accusation against North Korea. But
  Counterfeit Experts say the Accusation is
  Baseless. In an interview with the Associated
  Press (AP) on 19.4.2006 Klaus W. Bender, the
  author of the new book ?Moneymakers - The Secret
  World of Banknote Printing?, Wiley-VCH Verlag,
  Weinheim, Germany, 39.90 Euro, outlines that ?in
  the opinion of experts, this allegation is not
  tenable.? It is to do with the paper used in the
  ?supernotes? using original dollar paper (made by
  a specialist company in Massachusetts) with
  genuine security ink based on a secret chemical
  make up and reserved exclusively for the printing
  of dollars. ?It is unimaginable that anyone else
  (than the Americans themselves) could come by
  these materials.

61
Bender continues

• He stressed that the machines bought by North
  Korea in the seventies are outdated and not able
  to produce the USD supernote, a high tech
  product. In addition, Bender explained that the
  ?supernotes? have two or three designed defects
  that would ensure that they will be immediately
  detected by the American checking systems. ?The
  supernotes have therefore no chance of
  circulating within the USA?, he points out. He
  says that the USA?s allegation that (North
  Korean) counterfeiters are waging an economic
  warfare is baseless but points to the fact that
  the US CIA itself runs a secret printing facility
  equipped with the sophisticated technology which
  is required for the production of the notes.
• http//www.eba-pyongyang.org/index.php?infos

62
Effect on legitimate business

• Presentation by Nigel Cowie, General Manager of
  Daedong Credit Bank
• Joint venture bank operating in Pyongyang
  servicing aid groups, etc

63
Nigel Cowie European Business Association
presentation

• My name is Nigel Cowie, I'm GM of DCB, and I'd
  like to take this opportunity to address with you
  the recent financial allegations and actions
  against the DPRK by the US Treasury. Where they
  have acted against specific companies, I can't
  make any comment, except perhaps that we have not
  seen any evidence of any wrongdoing by them,
  because I don't know anything about those cases,
  but I can tell you what they mean in the case of
  our bank and the budding legitimate foreign
  business community in the DPRK which we serve.
  Which brings me to the point that there is a
  danger of legitimate businesses being squeezed
  into routes that are more normally used by real
  criminals, and the result of these actions
  against banks doing business with the DPRK being
  that criminal activities go underground and
  harder to trace, and legitimate businesses either
  give up, or end up appearing suspicious by being
  forced to use clandestine methods.
• 11 April 2006 http//www.vuw.ac.nz/caplabtb/dprk/
  Cowie060411.doc

64
Counterfeitinggtgtsanctions

• Counterfeiting allegations around for a long time
• Ramped up after Joint Statement (19/9/065)
• September US accuses Banco Delta Asia in Macau of
  money laundering for NK
• Imposes financial sanctions, pressures bank and
  China to freeze NK accounts, pressures

65
NK response

• Refuses to participate in SPT until sanctions are
  lifted

66
NK offers to cooperate

• Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan planned to go
  to US 9-11 December 2005 to discuss allegations
• Hill said they would only be briefed on law
  enforcement actions unrelated to the talks
• So Kim cancels

67
Reasons for US actions

• US claims this is a legal matter not related to
  talks
• Fear of NK de-stabilisation of US currency
• Others suggest the sanctions were intended
• To force NK to the talks
• But in them anyway
• Regime change

68
Another explanation

• Gavan McCormack has pointed out that US was
  unhappy with SPT
• North Korea and the US "Strategic Decision"
• Japan Focus
• http//japanfocus.org/article.asp?id498
• Entered them as a way of pressuring NK via the
  others
• Network effect
• But was itself coming under increasing pressure
  from C, SK, R

69
US and SPT

• US had been pushed into JS by China (and SK, R)
• Sanctions offered way of forcing NK out of talks
• Current statements show that US is returning to
  talks reluctantly
• Chinese pressure
• Mid term elections

70
Two strands of logic in US strategy

• Overlapping, sometimes contradictory imperatives
• Global and Regional

71
Global

• DPRK must be punished and destroyed as an example
  to others
• Peaceful coexistence would send wrong message
• Not as pressing an issue as Middle East
• NK is no threat, there is no real danger of
  things getting worse cf Iraq
• Rational for Missile Defense

72
Regional

• Prime objective is containment of China
• US-Japan alliance (now involving Taiwan)
• Overtures to India, support for nuclear
  (missile?) programmes
• Using India to Keep China at Bay
• December 12, 2006
• Foreign Policy in Focus
• http//www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3775

73
Perception of Threat

• DPRK threat and tension essential ingredient
• Keep and consolidate Japan and ROK under US
  hegemony
• Reunification would undercut military presence in
  Korea

74
Strategic incoherence

• US critics often accuse Administration of
  strategic incoherence
• ClintongtgtPerry
• Bush doing the same
• No solution real reason
• Lack of clarity about strategic aims
• Refusal to recognise conflicts between them

75
ROAD TO ARMAGEDDON?

• Armageddon remains real possibility if major
  nuclear conflict
• Nuclear winter revisited
• J. Geophys. Res.2006
• http//climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/nw4.pdf

76
NK itself

• Counter-attacker
• Conventional (nuclear) ability to cause huge
  damage in SK and Japan
• Not further afield
• At the moment
• Attacked
• Eg US strike at reactors
• Danger to peninsula, Japan,( China?)

77
Not a bang but a whimper?

• Conflagration in Northeast Asia could be
  dreadful, but not Armageddon
• Real danger is Japan
• Abe Shinzo pushing hard for abolition of Article
  Nine, and legitimisation of remilitarisation of
  Japan
• Nuclear weapons pose no great technological
  challenge

78
Nuclear, remilitarised Japan

• Already major military power expenditure
  comparable to UK, France, bit behind China,
  Russia
• Has range of technology
• Would spur arms race with China (Russia)
• Further spur to India, Taiwan, South Korea

79
Prospects for the SPT

• Unlikely there will be any progress
• NK has back to the wall
• So no major change likely
• Japan wants excuse for remilitarisation
• China, ROK, Russia have limited power
• US shows no sign of real negotiations

80
US is the key player

• US attempt to contain rising China
• Korean situation, Six Party Talks have to be
  interpreted within that context
• Chinas rise, problems in the Middle East will
  constrain, influence, perhaps determine US policy
  for foreseeable future