CURRENT AMPHIBIOUS FORCE LEVELS

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CURRENT AMPHIBIOUS FORCE LEVELS
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OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT

• TWO TO THREE ARGS FORWARD DEPLOYED
• ONE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN / ARABIAN GULF-INDIAN
  OCEAN AREA
• ONE OR TWO IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC AREA.
• ONE ARG/MEU IS FORWARD BASED IN SASEBO AND
  OKINAWA JAPAN.

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Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic
asset that a sea power possesses.

BHLiddell Hart
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CRITICALITIES

• TRANSITION FROM SEA TO LAND, INVOLVING NAVAL,
  GROUND AND AIR FORCES MOST DIFFICULT.
• COMMANDS AND CONTROL OF MULTI- SERVICE, MULTI
  ENVIRONMENT ACTIVITIES COMPLEX
• CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN RESTRICTED WATERS
  INCREASES VULNERABILITY TO HOSTILE ATTACK,
  PARTICULARLY DURING EARLY PHASES WHEN SUPPORT
  OF OWN HEAVY WEAPONS NOT AVAILABLE

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RECENT EMPLOYMENT

• FRENCH AND THEN US FORCES FOR OVER 25 YEARS IN
  INDOCHINA
• ANGLO-FRENCH ASSAULT IN SUEZ,
• FALKLANDS CONFLICT
• US LANDINGS IN GRENADA
• COALITION LANDINGS DURING GULF WAR IN 1992
• AUSTRALIAN LANDINGS IN EAST TIMOR
• US/ALLIES OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

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EARLY DEVELOPMENTS

• INTRODUCED SINCE EARLY DAYS OF INCEPTION OF
  INDIAN NAVY
• RECOMMENDATION TO POSSESS A SMALL EXPEDITIONARY
  FORCE CAPABLE OF PROTECTING INDIAS REGIONAL
  INTERESTS SUGGESTED IN 1946 WHEN INDEPEDENCE ON
  HORIZON.
• CURRENT CAPABILITY BRIGADE MINUS

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INDIAN NAVAL HISTORY

• LST INS MAGAR, OF W W II VINTAGE ACQUIRED IN
  1949
• APPROVAL ACCORDED IN 1958 TO ESTABLISH A
  PRESENCE IN A N ISLANDS
• POST INDO CHINA WAR DEBACLE RESIDENT NAVAL
  OFFICER WAS APPOINTED IN PORT BLAIR.
• INCREASED INDONESIAN INTRUSIONS IN NICOBAR
  ISLANDS IN 1965

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EARLY DEVELOPMENTS

• ORDER PLACED FOR TWO LST (M) FROM RUSSIA IN 1965
• INDONESIAN THREAT AND INDONESIAN PAK BONDING OF
  1965
• BOTCHED UP AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AT COXS BAZAAR IN
  OPERATION BEAVER AS A PART OF 1971 OPERATIONS .
• LESSONS HOISTED IN IMPORTANCE OF AMPHIBIOUS
  ASSETS ESTABLISHED

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AMPHIBIOUS OPS OF INDIAN NAVY

• SRI LANKA IN 1988, SOMALIA IN 1995,
• CYCLONE RELIEF IN SAURASHTRA IN 1998 /ORISSA IN
  2000.
• AS A FORCE IN BEING ON WEST COAST DURING OP
  PARAKARAM.
• PAKISTAN DIVERTED ONE DIVISION FROM LAND BORDERS
  TO MAKRAN COAST.

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SCOPE

• CURRENT TRENDS IN US NAVY, ROYAL NAVY, PLA NAVY
  AND AUSTRALIAN NAVY
• FOCUSED ATTENTION ON SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT
• TASKS OF INDIAN NAVY
• ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT FORCES
• DEFINING CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE FOR INDIAN
  NAVY

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ROLES OF US NAVY

• SEA CONTROL
• MARITIME SUPREMACY
• POWER PROJECTION
• STRATEGIC DETERRENCE
• FORWARD NAVAL PRESENCE
• STRATEGIC SEALIFT

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ORGANISATION

• AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (ATF)
• RANGE FROM A SINGLE AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP/MARINE
  EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE)
  ARG/MEU (SOC), TO A LARGER ORGANIZATION CAPABLE
  OF EMPLOYING A MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE (MEB)
  OR EVEN A MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

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ROLES/ TASKS

• MAINLAND OPERATIONS
• MAKRAN COAST
• BANGLADESH
• ASSAULT LANDINGS TO RETAKE LOST TERRITORY.
• AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS
• TACTICAL DECEPTION.

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ROLES/ TASKS

• DEFENCE OF ISLAND TERRITORIES -1197 ISLANDS
• POACHING, SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND GUN
  RUNNING
• PENETRATION BYOF FUNDAMENTALIST IN LAKSWADWEEP
  ISLANDS WITH THE PREDOMINANTLY MINORITY
  POPULATION
• AIRPORT/PORT/ KEY FACILITY SEIZURE

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OUT OF AREA CONTIGENCIES

• IN SUPPORT OF UN /COALITION OPERATIONS
• EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS
• SHOW OF FORCE/ REINFORCEMENT

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OTHER TASKS

• CONDUCT LANDINGS IN SUPPORT OF WITHDRAWING TROOPS
  
• LIMITED OFFENSIVE ATTACK
• HOSTAGE RECOVERY.
• GAS AND OIL PLATFORM OPERATIONS.
• HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

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LIMITATIONS AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

• SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT
• LST(L), LST(M) AND LCUs LACK SPEED
• CAPACITY TO CARRY OUT VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT
  MINIMAL.
• HARD BEACHING TO DISCHARGE ARMOUR
• VULNERABLE

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ARMY COMPONENT/ NEED FOR RAISING MARINES?

• MOUNTAIN BRIGADE MINUS OF THE INDIAN ARMY IS
  DESIGNATED AS THE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE.
• BASED IN PORT BLAIR UNDER ANC
• BATTALIONS CHANGED/ REPLACED EVERY TWO YEARS ON
  A STAGGERED BASIS
• ANOTHER BRIGADE IS KEPT STAND BY ON THE MAINLAND
  TO AUGMENT THE PORT BLAIR BRIGADE SHOULD THE NEED
  ARISE.

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LIMITATIONS AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS

• LIMITED STAND OFF CAPABILTY 1-2 NM
• LCAS/GEMINIS VULNERABLE IN SURF ZONE
• LIMITED SITES FOR HARD BEACHING BY LST(L)
• UNDERLOADING OF ENGINES

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LIMITATIONS - AAV

• AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE-BMP AND BDR FROM
  MECHANIZED INFANTARY
• INADEQUATE SEA KEEPING ABILITY
• VULNERABLE IN SURF ZONE
• LIMITED OTH CAPABILTY
• GUN TOO LIGHT
• CG HOVERCRAFT LCAC?

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ARMY COMPONENT/ NEED FOR RAISING MARINES?

• STRETCHED ARMY - OP PARAKRAM, THE AMPHIBIOUS
  BRIGADE MOBILIZED TO THE WESTERN COMMAND.
• THE TWO YEARLY CHANGES EFFECTS TRAINING.
• TIME FOR CHANGE OVER BY THE TIME, INCOMING
  BATTALION GOES THROUGH THE TRAINING AND BECOMES
  PROFICIENT

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AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING

• NEED YEAR-ROUND TRAINING.
• TRAINING SEASONAL- WEATHER DEPENDENT
• HIGH SKILLS- NEGOTIATION OF SURF ZONE BY BMPS
  OR LCA
• MUSTERING VARIED ASSETS OF COMPONENTS DIFFICULT.
• NEED FOR DEDICATED AMPHIBIOUS SCHOOL.

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INTELLIGENCE

• MOST CRITICAL
• AIR RECONNAISSANCE BY ARC, IAF, IN, CG RESOURCES
  INCLUDING UAV
• SATELLITE
• INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES LIKE RAW, IB , DIA AND
  SBS/NAVAL LIAISON TEAMS
• SUBMARINE RECONNAISSANCE
• SIGNIT AND COMINT

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COMMAND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

• SUCCESS DEPENDENT ON C3
• LESSONS LEARNT FILES OF AMPHEXES
• INABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL SERVICES TO EXCHANGE
  INFORMATION LATERALLY

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OPS- MAKRAN COAST

• FAVORABLE SEA/ AIR SITUATION
• ROA OF FLEET AIR DEFENCE
• PAKISTANI SURVEILLANCE
• FALKLANDS CAMPAIGN
• LOW SPEED- AMPHIBIOUS UNITS- A CONSTRAINT
• RAIDS, DECEPTION, OR OPENING A NEW FRONT FOR
  ONGOING LAND OPERATIONS
• HIGH WASTAGE
• FORCE IN BEING

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NAVAL GROWN MARINES ? IS IT THE ANSWER
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CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

• TREND- MODERN AMPHIBIOUS FORCES
• TASKS
• MARITIME INTERESTS GULF TO MALACCA.
• BRIGADE STRENGTH

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CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

• TWO LPD CAPABLE OF CARRYING FOUR LCACS/ LCUS
• THREE LSL (L) WITH IMPROVED SPEED AND SHIP SIDE
  MEXEFLOTES
• DETERMINE- LST (M) / LCUs AS PER A BRIGADE LEVEL
  TABLE
• MODERN MEDIUM LIFT HEPTR (10 TONS)

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FOOD FOR THOUGHT

• VIRAAT- EX HERMES- HELO CARRIER
• OPERATE HEAVY/ATTACK HELOS OF IAF
• PLAN AN EXERCISE IN AN ?