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Approximate Mechanism Design Without Money

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Security issues Banking issues Ethical Considerations Legal Considerations * App. Mech. Design Without Money Mechanism Truthfulness Without money Approximation ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Approximate Mechanism Design Without Money


1
ApproximateMechanism Design Without Money
2
App. Mech. Design Without Money
  • Mechanism
  • Truthfulness
  • Without money

VCG
3
Money is the root of all evil!
  • Security issues
  • Banking issues
  • Ethical Considerations
  • Legal Considerations

4
App. Mech. Design Without Money
  • Mechanism
  • Truthfulness
  • Without money
  • Approximation

VCG
Facility Location
Election
5
Problem Classes
Class 1 Opt SP Mechanism With money Intractable
Opt Sp Mechanism With money Intractable
Class 3 No opt SP Mechanism Without Money
Class 2 No Opt SP Mechanism With Money
Picture is from slides of 1
6
Facility Location - Definitions
  • Network, Graph
  • Agents
  • Location Profile
  • Deterministic Mechanism
  • Randomized Mechanism
  • SP and GSP

 
 
 
 
 
7
Facility Location - Summary
NETWORK TOPOLOGY NETWORK TOPOLOGY NETWORK TOPOLOGY NETWORK TOPOLOGY
general circle tree line Mechanism Target
LB ?(n) SP LB ?(n) SP UB 1 GSP UB 1 GSP det SC
UB 1 GSP UB 1 GSP rand SC
UB 2 GSP LB 2 SP UB 2 GSP LB 2 SP UB 2 GSP LB 2 SP UB 2 GSP LB 2 SP det MC
UB 2 GSP LB 2-o(1) SP UB 3/2 SP LB 3/2 SP UB 3/2 GSP LB 3/2 SP ran MC
NETWORK TOPOLOGY NETWORK TOPOLOGY NETWORK TOPOLOGY NETWORK TOPOLOGY
general circle tree line Mechanism Target
LB ?(n) SP UB 1 GSP det SC
LB open rand SC
UB 2 GSP LB 2 SP det MC
UB 3/2 SP UB 3/2 GSP LB 3/2 SP ran MC
Picture is from slides of 1
8
Trees Median is optimum
A
A
B
B
D
F
F
C
C
G
E
Picture is from slides of 1
9
Facility Location - Summary
NETWORK TOPOLOGY NETWORK TOPOLOGY NETWORK TOPOLOGY NETWORK TOPOLOGY
general circle tree line Mechanism Target
LB ?(n) SP UB 1 GSP det SC
LB open rand SC
UB 2 GSP LB 2 SP det MC
UB 3/2 SP UB 3/2 GSP LB 3/2 SP ran MC
Picture is from slides of 1
10
Social Cost
  •  

 
11
Facility Location - Summary
NETWORK TOPOLOGY NETWORK TOPOLOGY NETWORK TOPOLOGY NETWORK TOPOLOGY
general circle tree line Mechanism Target
LB ?(n) SP UB 1 GSP det SC
LB open rand SC
UB 2 GSP LB 2 SP det MC
UB 3/2 SP UB 3/2 GSP LB 3/2 SP ran MC
Picture is from slides of 1
12
Maximum Cost
  •  

A
y
B
13
Facility Location - Summary
NETWORK TOPOLOGY NETWORK TOPOLOGY NETWORK TOPOLOGY NETWORK TOPOLOGY
general circle tree line Mechanism Target
LB ?(n) SP UB 1 GSP det SC
LB open rand SC
UB 2 GSP LB 2 SP det MC
UB 3/2 SP UB 3/2 GSP LB 3/2 SP ran MC
Picture is from slides of 1
14
Maximum Cost Randomized UB
  •  

 
d
2d
A
C
B
B
E
D
1/4
1/2
1/2
1/4
1/4
Picture is from slides of 1
15
Facility Location - Summary
NETWORK TOPOLOGY NETWORK TOPOLOGY NETWORK TOPOLOGY NETWORK TOPOLOGY
general circle tree line Mechanism Target
LB ?(n) SP UB 1 GSP det SC
LB open rand SC
UB 2 GSP LB 2 SP det MC
UB 3/2 SP UB 3/2 GSP LB 3/2 SP ran MC
Picture is from slides of 1
16
Election - Definitions
  • Voters
  • Candidates
  • Preference List
  • Preference Profile
  • Approximation

 
 
 
 
17
Election Definitions (cont.)
  • Matching
  • Mechanism
  • Benefit
  • Single
  • Mechanism
  • Benefit

18
Election - Summary
Rnd Det
Single
Matching
19
Single Deterministic UB
  •  

 
20
Single Randomized UB
  •  

 
21
Matching
  •  

C1
C2
2
OPT3
1
OPT4
1
2
3
n
22
  • ?

Thanks
23
Refrences
  1. N. Alon, M. Feldman, A. D. Procaccia, M.
    Tennenholtz. Strategyproof Approximation
    Mechanisms for Location on Networks. CoRR, 2009
  2. A. D. Procaccia, M. Tennenholtz. Approximate
    mechanism design without money. In Proceedings of
    the 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
    (ACM-EC), 2009
  3. J. Schummer and R. V. Vohra. Mechanism design
    without money. In N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E.
    Tardos, and V. Vazirani, editors, Algorithmic
    Game Theory, chapter 10. Cambridge University
    Press, 2007.

24
1/4
A
B
C
F
D
1/2
E
1/4
25
B
1/4
A
3/8
C
C
A
B
3/8
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