Civil peace

1
Civil peace the democratic peace at the
intrastate levelLecture at HEI, 26 April
2007Course E 584 Topics in Peace Research

• Nils Petter Gleditsch
•  
• Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW at
• International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
  (PRIO)
• Department of Sociology and Political Science,
• Norwegian University of Science and Technology

2
Levels of analysis

• Dyadic level
• do democracies fight one another?
• Monadic level I interstate war
• are democracies generally peaceful?
• Monadic level II colonial war
• do democracies fight colonial war more or less
  frequently?
• Monadic level III political change
• do politically unstable countries fight more
  frequently?
• System level
• more democracy in the world more peace?
• Intrastate war
• do democracies experience more or less civil
  war?

3
Democracies more conflict or less?

• Do democracies experience fewer conflicts than
  other regimes?
• Do democracies experience less durable conflicts
  once they erupt?
• Do democracies experience less violent conflicts
  once they erupt?
• What is the influence of
• Political instability
• Elections
• Type of conflict
• Development
• The political neighborhood
• Different forms of democracy
• The end of the Cold War

This lecture largely builds on Gleditsch, Hegre
Strand (2007)
4
Theory of Conflict and Democracy

• Motivation by rebels
• Democracies are less oppressive and provide
  potential access to power for a broader range og
  political elites. This increases the relative
  cost of violence and reduces motivation
• Opportunity for rebels
• Liberal democracies provide individual freedoms,
  which increase opportunity for conspiracies
  against the government.
• and identity
• Democratic identity as a unifying ideology across
  existing identities. This identity is assumed to
  be stronger in a highly democratic country
• This leads to an inverted U-curve hypothesis for
  conflict onset

5
Theory of Conflict and Democracy

• Motivation for leaders
• Leaders seek public approval in order to secure
  support. In general, democracy lowers motivation
  to use excessive force
• Opportunity for leaders
• Democratic leaders are constrained by political
  institutions, and also face a high audience cost
  when breaking norms, such as committing
  atrocities or applying collective punishment
  measures
• This should make conflicts in democracies less
  violent
• But it can also bar elected leaders from
  effectively pursuing counterinsurgency
  strategies, hence increase duration of conflicts

6
State of the literature

• Inverted U-curve
• Mueller Weede (1990), Ellingsen Gleditsch
  (1997), Hegre et al. (2001), Fearon Laitin
  (2003), and others report semidemocracies as more
  war prone than other regimes
• Collier Hoeffler (1998, 2004) report no effect
  from political regimes using five-year periods
• Vreeland (2005) reports no effect when
  controlling for political instability
• Strand (2006) reports no effect when controlling
  for operationalization problems with the Polity
  IV dataset
• Hegre Sambanis (2006) find semidemocracy and
  anocracy (as measured in Polity) to be robustly
  associated with civil war (Doyle Sambanis) but
  not with armed conflict (Uppsala)

7
State of the literature

• Political instability
• Hegre et al. (2001), Fearon Laitin (2003), and
  others report a strong relationship between
  proximity to regime change and conflict onset.
  This finding is not disputed. However the
  endogeneity problem in Polity could affect the
  political instability variable, too
• Hegre Sambanis (2006) find political
  instability to be among the most robust variables
  associated with civil war (Doyle Sambanis) and
  with armed conflict (Uppsala), no correction for
  endogeneity

8
State of the literature

• Severity
• Lacina (2005) found conflicts in democracies to
  be only half as violent as autocracies
• Rummel, Poe Tate, and others find democracies
  to engage in less one-sided violence
• Duration
• Few studies. Collier, Hoeffler Söderbom (2004)
  do not find any effect from democracy on duration
  of Civil Wars

9
State of the Literature

• Bates (2003) and Strand (2006) find a
  relationship between elections and violence
• Buhaug (2006) found parabolic relationship for
  democracy only for government conflicts
  territorial conflicts more frequent in
  democracies
• Hegre (2003) found a democratic civil peace only
  for developed countries
• Gleditsch (2002) found that democracy in
  neighboring countries had a restraining effect on
  civil violence
• Reynal-Querol (2002), Schneider Wiesehomeier
  (2005), Hartzell Hoddie (2003), and Binningsbø
  (2006) have found that more inclusive types of
  democracy have less civil violence
• But Hegre Sambanis (2006) find that
  presidentialism is robustly associated with less
  civil war

10
Hypotheses

• (1) Democracy is negatively related to the
  onset, duration, and severity of civil violence
• (2) Democracy relates to civil war through an
  inverted U-curve semi-democracies are most
  prone to violence
• (3) Political instability is positively related
  to civil violence, most clearly for onset
• (4) The curvilinear effect of democracy on civil
  war persists even when controlling for political
  instability
• (5) The risk of civil war is higher in
  conjunction with elections
• (6) The effect of democracy on civil violence is
  more pronounced for government conflicts than
  for territorial conflicts
• (7) The effect of democracy on civil violence is
  stronger for developed countries
• (8) A democratic neighborhood is negatively
  related to civil violence
• (9) The negative effect of democracy on civil
  violence is more pronounced for inclusive types
  of democracy
• (10) These relationships are generally
  strengthened after the end of the Cold War

11
Data

• Conflict measured by the Uppsala/PRIO data
• Onset Strand (2006)
• Incidence Gleditsch et al. (2002), Harbom
  Wallensteen (2005)
• Duration Gates Strand (2005) Severity Lacina
  Gleditsch (2005)
• Democracy
• Polity IV (Marshall Jaggers, 2003) MIRPS
  (Gates et al., 2006)
• Political instability
• Number of days since a change in the MIRPS data
• Type of democratic system
• - Goulder (2005), Schneider Wiesehomeier
  (2005)
• Election dates Strand (2006b)

12
Design

• Onset
• Raknerud-Hegre calendar-time Cox regression,
  including all onsets (from war and peace),
  proximity to conflict
• Incidence
• Country-year setup, logistic regression with
  temporal and spatial lag of dependent variable,
  and proximity to previous conflicts
• Duration
• Weibull regression Duration measured in days,
  but findings robust to choice of distribution
• Severity
• Natural log of Battle deaths per year, excluding
  peaceful country-years. OLS, with lag of
  dependent variable

13
Bivariate results
Onset Onset Incidence Incidence Duration Duration Severity Severity
Polity IV democracy-autocracy 0.60 0.95 3.61 0.37
Polity IV dem-autocr. squared 0.22 0.30 1.40 0.37

SIP democracy index 0.53 0.90 2.80 0.41
SIP democracy index squared 0.41 0.70 3.66 0.44

Vanhanen index of democracy 0.24 0.49 4.06 0.21
Vanhanen ID, squared 0.005 0.072 1.81 0.059

Freedom House index 0.34 0.38 2.06 0.28
Freedom House index squared 0.44 0.51 0.64 1.19
Democracies have fewer onsets, lower incidence,
and less severity but higher duration of civil
violence. Semi-democracies are more violent
14
More bivariate results
Onset Onset Incidence Incidence Duration Duration Severity Severity
Proximity of regime change 2.61 2.17 0.76 2.02
Proximity of election 1.15 0.88 1.70 0.75
Difference to political system in neighborhood 0.75 1.29 3.78 0.52
Difference squared 1.84 2.77 1.22 0.17
Presidentialism 0.96 1.44 0.50 1.79
Proportional representation 0.32 0.70 2.66 0.76
Federalism 2.56 0.69 1.35 1.08
Political instability matters, as does political
neighborhood, and type of democracy. Elections
matter only for (lower) severity
15
Trivariate results
Democracy Democracy Democracy squared Sq. diff. to political system in neighbhd Sq. diff. to political system in neighbhd Sq. diff. to political system in neighbhd Sq. diff. to political system in neighbhd Prox. to el. Prox. to el.
Bivariate results (159/204) 0.53 0.41 0.75 1.15 1.15
Control for political stability 0.59 0.52 2.42 1.67 1.67
High level of dev. 0.30 0.08 4.54 4.54 4.54
Low level of dev. 0.92 0.76 1.99 1.91 1.91
Governmental conflict 0.41 0.30 0.74 2.09 2.09
Territorial conflict 0.85 0.58 8.40 2.56 2.56
Cold War 0.79 0.60 1.57 2.66 2.66
Post-Cold War 0.34 0.24 5.03 1.94 1.94
Most results hold when controlling for political
stability. Development matters, as do type of
conflict and the end of the Cold War
16
Multivariate Results
with Polity Onset Onset Incidence Incidence Duration Duration Severity Severity
Democracy 0.90 0.82 2.06 0.40
Democracy squared 0.42 0.53 0.98 0.52
with SIP
Democracy 0.80 1.26 3.03 0.63
Democracy squared 0.58 1.0061 2.13 0.984
Proximity of regime change Proximity of election 1.35 1.26 0.949 1.13 1.12 1.95 1.60 0.88
Democratic neighborhood Difference squared 0.83 2.38 0.61 2.60 1.93 0.12 0.86

17
Some conclusions

• In a multivariate analysis, democracy is
  negatively related to severity, but has no
  significant relationship to onset, incidence, or
  duration
• Semi-democracies have fewer onsets
• Political instability is significantly related
  only to severity
• The squared political difference to the
  neighborhood is related to onset (higher),
  incidence (higher), and severity (lower), but not
  the first-order term
• Proportional systems have less bloody wars,
  presidential and federal bloodier
• To avoid the onset of conflict, it is most
  important to move away from semi-democracy. To
  avoid bloody wars, stable democracy is especially
  important

18
More conclusions

• Democracy only has a peaceful effect on
  government conflicts territorial conflicts will
  have to be dealt with in other ways
• Economic development helps to prevent the onset
  and reinforces the effect of democracy. It also
  lowers the severity of conflict
• A politically similar neighborhood is negatively
  related to civil violence but the results are not
  robust democratic neighborhood may be more
  important
• The negative effect of inclusive types of
  democracy on civil violence is only robust for
  severity (and the effect is opposite of what we
  expected for the federalism variable)

19
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• Required reading

24
Next week

• Democratic interventionism
• Note time Wednesday 2 May 1015-200
• Place As usual