Tools of Statecraft

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Tools of Statecraft

• Military intervention, foreign aid, and sanctions

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I. Military Intervention

• Predicting intervention
• Escalation Joining an ongoing armed conflict
• Best predictor Prior third-party intervention
• Alliance Portfolios predict side choice

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What is an alliance portfolio?

• All of the allies of a state
• Similar portfolios generally reduce conflict /
  increase cooperation
• Better predictor than dyadic alliance!

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I. Military Intervention

• Predicting intervention
• Escalation Joining an ongoing armed conflict
• Best predictor Prior third-party intervention
• Alliance portfolios predict side choice
• More likely when existing parity between
  combatants

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Balances of Power Disparity and Parity

• Disparity
• Parity

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I. Military Intervention

• Predicting intervention
• Escalation Joining an ongoing armed conflict
• Best predictor Prior third-party intervention
• Alliance portfolios predict side choice
• More likely when existing parity between
  combatants
• Great powers intervene much more frequently!

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2. Predicting War Initiation

• What factors increase the probability of war?

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a. Contiguity and Proximity
Contiguity Sharing common border
MID Use, threat, or display of force short of
war
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Proximity Loss of Strength Gradient
Resources that can be applied to a conflict decay
at distance Shift in gradient due to technology
or development
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b. Different Regime Types
Regime Country A Regime Country B Probability of War
Democracy Democracy Lowest
Democracy Autocracy Highest
Autocracy Autocracy Middle
State level finding that magnifies dyadic
effects Democracies more stable than
autocracies, which in turn are more stable than
intermediate regimes
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c. Issue Type Territory
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d. Power Parity A Balance of Power Produces
War, Not Peace!

• Disparity Low Risk
• Parity High Risk

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War initiators since 1980

• United States (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq)
• Iraq (1981 and 1990 attacks on Iran and Kuwait)
• Israel (1982 and 2006 invasions of Lebanon)
• Argentina (1982 occupation of Falklands)
• Armenia (1991 war with Azerbaijan, depending on
  definition)
• China (1987 attack on Vietnam)
• Ecuador (1995 war with Peru)
• Eritrea (1998 war with Ethiopia)
• Georgia (2008 war with Russia)
• Pakistan (1999 Kargil War with India)
• Rwanda and perhaps Uganda (1998 war with the DRC)
  
• (Note War is defined as minimum 1000
  battle-deaths/year)

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B. When does intervention work?

• Who wins interstate wars?
• Who started it? Initiators win most wars
  quickly, but tend to lose long wars.
• Bigger economy usually wins (GDP outperforms
  military predictors)
• Bigger military also helps parity makes victory
  less likely for both sides (stalemate)

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Parity Leads to Long Wars, Makes Stalemate More
Likely
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2. Intervention in Civil Wars
No Pro-Rebel Intervention Pro-Rebel Intervention
No Pro-Government Intervention 119 (60.41) 24 (12.18)
Pro-Government Intervention 29 (14.72) 25 (12.69)
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2. Intervention in Civil Wars

1. Does intervention lead to compromise?

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2. Intervention in Civil Wars
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2. Intervention in Civil Wars

1. Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes
2. Does intervention prolong wars?

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2. Intervention in Civil Wars

1. Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes
2. Does intervention prolong wars? Yes
3. Is intervention getting more common?

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Intervention Over Time
1825 - 1849 1850 - 1874 1875 - 1899 1900 - 1924 1925 - 1949 1950 - 1974 1975 - 1997
Number of Civil Wars 22 28 16 23 21 39 43
Intervention Frequency 36 25 31 35 24 49 51
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2. Intervention in Civil Wars

• Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes
• Does intervention prolong wars? Yes
• Is intervention getting more common? Yes
• The intervenors dilemma Saving lives vs.
  Justice
• Want to end the war quickly? Help the strong
  crush the weak
• Want to find a compromise? Write off another
  10,000 people

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II. Sanctions and Pressure

• Predicting Sanctions
• US Sanctions Best single predictor is targets
  relationship with US
• Domestic factors, target characteristics almost
  irrelevant
• Interesting Belligerence towards US after threat
  reduces chance that US imposes sanctions

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II. Sanctions and Pressure

• Predicting Sanctions
• US Sanctions Best single predictor is targets
  relationship with US
• Domestic factors, target characteristics almost
  irrelevant
• Interesting Belligerence towards US after threat
  reduces chance that US imposes sanctions
• General Asymmetric dependence
• If I depend on you, I am unlikely to sanction you
• If you depend on me, I am more likely to sanction
  you
• Problem Measuring dependence is hard

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Example US-South Africa

• 1984 Asymmetric Interdependence? US 15 of
  S.A. trade, but S.A. only 1 of US trade
• Issue Apartheid
• US backs South Africa, vetoes UN resolutions for
  sanctions
• US imposes minor sanctions only (to forestall
  larger ones)
• Question Why not sanction?

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Example US-South Africa

• Answer Minerals
• USSR was obviously unreliable for strategic
  minerals

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Example US-South Africa

• US needed imports of critical minerals

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F-100 Engine Use of Imported Metals(F-15 and
F-16 aircraft key to air defense in 1980s)
Cobalt 910 lbs 73 (Norway, Finland)
Tantalum 3 lbs 80 (China)
Titanium 5,366 lbs 77 (Australia, South Africa)
Columbium 171 lbs 100 (Brazil)
Aluminum 720 lbs 100 (Australia)
Chromium 1,656 lbs 80 (South Africa)
Nickel 5,024 lbs 63 (Canada)
(Note Metals indicated are used in more than one
place in engine)
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Example US-South Africa

• Best case end trade price increases
• Worst case end trade inferior hardware

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Example US-South Africa Did South Africas
Minerals Make It Secure?

• No Fear of resource conflict ? nuclear
  proliferation
• 1957 US provides nuclear reactors, enriched
  uranium
• 1970s Insecurity in southern Africa
  security-based rationale for atomic bomb (South
  Africa fears Soviet influence)
• 1975-1976 US cuts off nuclear cooperation over
  NPT dispute UK terminates bilateral defense
  treaty over apartheid
• laager mentality Fear of Soviet invasion, need
  to force Western defense, conventional arms
  embargoes, isolation ? proliferation
• 1977-1979 US-Soviet pressure fails to prevent
  probable nuclear test (possibly joint
  Israeli-South African test)
• 1980s Six atomic bombs constructed
• 1990 White government dismantles arsenal before
  majority rule

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B. Do sanctions work?

• The basic problem The best sanctions are never
  imposed
• Keys to success
• Sanction must be large of targets GDP
• Sanction must not harm sender (very much)
• Problem Trade is mutually beneficial. Cutoff
  will always harm sender
• Success usually takes less than 5 years

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III. Foreign Aid

• Predicting foreign aid
• In general (who gets the most aid?)
• Free market countries (especially during Cold
  War)
• Post-Colonial states (especially during
  decolonization)
• Poverty and Debt
• Specific relationships
• US Egypt, Israel, Iraq (since 2003)
• Japan Friends of Japan similar UN voting and
  trade
• Western Europe Former colonies

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B. US Gives Low of GDP for development
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but still manages to be the largest donor
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1. Recent International Affairs spending (aid and
diplomacy) Surprising stability
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2. Long-Term Decline in Foreign Aid
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3. Top Three Recipients of US Aid FY 2001 FY
2009 (And 2010 Request)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1st Israel Israel Iraq Iraq Iraq Iraq Iraq Israel Israel Israel
2nd Egypt Egypt Israel Israel Israel Afgh Afgh Egypt Egypt Afgh
3rd Jord Pak Egypt Afgh Afgh Israel Israel Afgh Afgh Egypt
Israel and Egypt were the top two from 1979 to
2002 and in the top five ever since 9/11 (along
with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan countries
where US forces have been fighting). Why?
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C. Does foreign aid work?

• Aid and corruption No overall correlation,
  positive or negative
• More corrupt countries tend to attract US aid
• Less corrupt countries tend to attract aid from
  Australia and Scandinavia
• Aid and growth
• Good policies Aid may have positive effect
• Bad policies Aid has no effect
• Problem Hard to establish effect of aid on
  growth. Why?

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