SS474: TERRORISM

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SS474 TERRORISM COUNTERTERRORISMLesson 3
Understanding Contemporary Terrorism

• Admin
• 1) Assignment 1 due 8 Sept (next week)
• 2) Wednesday, 30 August Guest Lecture BG(r)
  Russell Howard (E hour, Thayer 348)

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History Review

• What patterns and trends of historical terrorism
  inform our understanding of future threats?
• C2
• Strategic goals, objectives
• Weapons, tactics
• Targeting
• Fundraising/Friendraising
• Similar outcomes re group existence, changes in
  political environment
• What else?
• Future projections?
• Who will likely turn to terrorism, and why?

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History Review

• Why do people resort to violence in pursuit of
  political or ideological ends?
• Political contexts
• Social contexts
• Other options to achieve goals?
• Implications for government policy?

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History Review

• What motivates terrorists?
• Vision - shape the future
• Power to achieve vision
• Belief in higher cause
• What else?
• What role do economics, psychology, sociology or
  other grievances play in motivating terrorist
  groups?

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History Review

• What can we learn from historical examples of
  state response to terrorist organizations?
• What works?
• What doesnt?
• Why?

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Discussion Questions

• What is your understanding of the new model of
  terrorism?
• Compare and contrast the old and new terrorism
  for indicators relating to capabilities and
  future trends. Why did this shift occur?
• What are the implications of the shift from old
  to new models of terrorism?
• What is Al Qaeda? How and why did Al Qaeda evolve
  as it did?
• How did Al Qaeda ascend to power? What are Al
  Qaeda's significant achievements?
• How should we think of Al Qaeda today?
• How do transnational terrorist organizations
  develop?
• What are the implications of this evolution for
  counterterrorists?
• Terrorist Network Analysis

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Contemporary Terrorism

• Website competitions

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Elements of the New Terrorism

• BG Howards model (updated) - 8 Ways Terrorism
  Has Changed
• America is at risk
• Terrorists are more violent different political
  aims
• Terrorists have global reach and are
  transnational non-state actors implications for
  homeland security
• Terrorists are better financed zakat, charity
  orgs., wealthy donors
• Terrorists are better trained in tradecraft, AW,
  IW
• Terrorist cells are more difficult to penetrate
  (esp. AQ)
• Terrorists have access to more lethal weapons
  (Soviets, bio/nukes)
• Success and/or failure are difficult to measure
  no clear outcome

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Elements of the New Terrorism

• Global in scope and strategic objectives
• Generational in scope epic struggle, David vs.
  Goliath - Bin Laden as Robin Hood
• The number of the brothers is large . . . I do
  not know everyone who is with us in this base or
  this organization. Bin Laden as Pied Piper.,
  with a constant call to jihad as the duty of
  every good Muslim
• Educated members as martyrs in AQ longer
  planning cycles (9/11 hijackers arriving in U.S.
  as early as 1994)
• Evolution into a political social movement, a
  global insurgency against Western-oriented
  globalization
• Afghanistan and Iraq offering new locations for
  Jihad, indoctrination, tactical training, network
  formation

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Elements of the New Terrorism

• Increasing number and lethality of attacks
• Attacks are carried out not by AQ or some other
  centralized group, but by affiliates and
  wanna-bes
• Use of children and female suicide bombers by
  terrorist organizations
• Info Ops role of technology
• From DVDs and web videos to Al Jazeera
• Availability of info on government security, CT
  efforts
• EW another role of technology
• Taking instruments from our daily lifethe
  backpack, the car, the shoe, the cell phoneand
  turning them into weapons. Goal damage the
  trust necessary for a successful open society
• Shifting from small groups to motivated and
  resourceful individuals (Madrid, London)

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A Protean Enemy

• Al Qaeda is an increasingly decentralized
  organization, constantly evolving, and employs a
  "virtual network" concept learned from American
  right-wing extremists, which makes it harder to
  detect and destroy.
• Willingness to adapt its mission enables it to
  forge broad alliances with other terrorist
  organizations and attract new recruits (including
  women).
• Ability to secure coordination with other
  like-minded groups (like Hezbollah) and its links
  with organized crime (a crime boss in India gave
  100,000 to Mohammad Atta, the 9/11 hijack
  leader) underscore the advanced stages of
  organization (professionals sharing ideas,
  cross-training, resources, joint planning, etc.)
  that al Qaeda has achieved.

Stern, 2003
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Netwar A Modern Form of Asymmetric Warfare

• Netwar Information-related conflict at a grand
  level between nations or societies.
• It means trying to disrupt or damage what a
  target population knows or thinks it knows about
  itself and the world around it.
• A netwar may focus on public or elite opinion, or
  both.
• It may involve diplomacy, propaganda and
  psychological campaigns, political and cultural
  subversion, deception of or interference with
  local media, infiltration of computer networks
  and databases, and efforts to promote dissident
  or opposition movements across computer
  networks. (John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt,
  1993 2001)

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Networked Terrorism

• Social interactions
• Affiliation networksTies developed at events or
  activities, like sporting events, clubs, or
  religious meetings
• Communities of identity
• Communities of locality
• District or geographic region in which people
  live, interact, or under which they are governed
• Examples neighborhood, village, city, town or
  province
• Communities of interest
• Communities formed around a common interest or
  shared experience
• Examples prisoners or inmates, members of the
  military, scientists, sports enthusiasts, and
  hobbyists comprise communities of interest.

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Networked Terrorism

• Three important concepts in social network
  analysis (SNA) diversity, redundancy, and
  adaptability
• Diversity of identity individuals often have
  multiple identities a familial identity, an
  employment identity, a religious identity, an
  academic identity, etc.
• Redundancy individuals sharing multiple
  identities across networks (e.g., two individuals
  attending the same church, graduating from the
  same university, and working in the same office
  building).
• Multiple shared identities (location, religion,
  education, and employment) means that some links
  between sets of individuals may be
  disproportionately strong.
• Adaptability relationships change over time - a
  social network may evolve as a persons interests
  change, he moves to another community, or his
  position within that community shifts.

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Terrorist Network Structures
Source Networks and Netwars The Future of
Terror, Crime, and Militancy, John Arquilla and
David Ronfeldt (eds.), November 2001
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Terrorist Network Structures
Source On Distributed Communications
Introduction to Distributed Communications
Networks, Paul Baran, August 1964
UNCLASSIFIED
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Global Terrorism Networks
Interconnected terrorist groups, criminal
organizations, individuals, etc. around the
world.
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Global Terrorism Networks
Interconnected terrorist groups, criminal
organizations, individuals, etc. around the
world.
Shared strategies Sharing tactics,
training Cross-fertilization, inter-organizationa
l learning Shared profits from trafficking in
drugs, arms, other contraband Increasingly
connected via technologies/Internet
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Strategy and Training

• Establish training camps developing the will to
  kill and the skill to kill
• Operational space Geographic isolation
• Teachers Experts in relevant knowledge, e.g.,
  military combat experience
• Committed learners
• Time, money, and basic necessities

• Afghanistan
• Algeria
• Bosnia
• Chechnya
• Colombia
• Egypt
• Indonesia
• Japan
• Kashmir
• Lebanon
• Libya

• Northern Ireland
• Peru
• The Philippines
• Somalia
• Spain
• Sri Lanka
• Sudan
• Syria
• Turkey
• United States
• Uzbekistan

Think back to your basic training or basic
officer courses...
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Global Salafi Network
Interconnected by common ideology (Militant Islam
revivalist movement), with strong bonds formed
through fighting together, family, etc.
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Terrorist Networks

• Even though its a decentralized network, there
  are still critical functions that enable the
  network to operate
• Critical functionary roles can become a hub of
  multiple networks
• weapons procurement
• financier (funder or banker) (particularly in
  Halawa system)
• document forgerer
• human traffickers
• Support individuals (trusted contacts) can and
  sometimes do support multiple networks can
  provide supplies/facilitate trafficking of
  weapons funds to multiple networks
• Example 60 of day spent moving legitimate
  charity money around 20 of day on Hamas
  transactions, other activity on side
• Some may get profit for doing these
  support/function roles

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Different members of the network play support and
action roles
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Networked Terrorism

• Implications
• We tend to target operational (attack/combat)
  cells and overlook support cells that disseminate
  propaganda, recruit members, procure supplies,
  maintain transport, forge false and adapted
  identities, facilitate travel, and organize safe
  houses.
• For example, operating through front, cover, and
  sympathetic organizations, Al Qaeda and its
  associate groups established charities, human
  rights groups, humanitarian organizations,
  community centers, and religious associations to
  raise funds and recruit youth. (Gunaratna)

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Networks to Map
Relationship/Network Data Sources
1. Trust Prior contacts in family, neighborhood, school, military, club or organization. Public and court records. Data may only be available in suspect's native country.
2. Task Logs and records of phone calls, electronic mail, chat rooms, instant messages, Web site visits. Travel records. Human intelligence observation of meetings and attendance at common events.
3. Money Resources Bank account and money transfer records. Pattern and location of credit card use. Prior court records. Human intelligence observation of visits to alternate banking resources such as Hawala.
4. Strategy Goals Web sites. Videos and encrypted disks delivered by courier. Travel records. Human intelligence observation of meetings and attendance at common events.
Table 3 Networks to Map

Krebs, 2002 - http//www.firstmonday.org/issues/is
sue7_4/krebs
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Knowledge Transfer and Terrorist Networks

• Learning Organizations committed to capturing
  knowledge, analyzing it, forming new doctrine and
  tactics which are informed by lessons from the
  past
• Learn from each other
• Learn from trial and error (IRA example)
• Media showcasing best practices to others
• Managing public image (PR) (becoming more
  sophisticated)
• Emerging professional networks in the terrorist
  world

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Knowledge Transfer and Terrorist Networks

• The network challenge
• As far back as 1968 the PLO . . . had welcomed
  terrorists from around the world to their
  guerilla camps in Jordan for training,
  indoctrination, and the general building of
  transnational revolutionary bridges. In this
  respect, the Palestinians pioneered the
  networking dimension of international terrorism
  still in evidence among many groups today.
• Bruce Hoffman, 1997, p. 82

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Knowledge Transfer and Terrorist Networks

• The network challenge
• Strategic partnerships between Al Qaeda and
  groups like Hezbollah, Jemaah Islamiya, HT, IMU,
  and MILF, as well as drug cartels in Latin
  America and other criminal organizations
• For example, Hezbollah . . . trained Al Qaeda
  fighters in Sudan, Lebanon, Iran . . .
  (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 196)(why would Shiite
  Muslims work so closely with Sunni Muslims?)

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Challenges of Terror Networks

• Overall CT challenge How to fight a network of
  networks
• Specific challenges include
• Identifying network members, especially when
  membership is hidden until demonstrated by overt
  behavior
• Determining network structure, leadership/decision
  -making cells
• Intelligence gathering/Infiltrating the network
• Defending against an attack from unknown network
  members

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1. Joining the Jihad

• 1.1 Decide on Jihad
• 1.2 Joining the Jihad in Spirit
• 1.3 Praying Honestly for Martyrdom

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2. Financially Aiding the Jihad

• 2.1 Jihad Through Money
• 2.2 Tending to the Fighters Family
• 2.3 Tending to Families of Martyrs
• 2.4 Supporting the Families of Wounded and
  Imprisoned Fighters
• 2.5 Collecting Donations
• 2.6 Paying the Alms Tax for the Mujahidin

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3. Other Support for Jihad

• 3.1 Outfitting a Fighter
• 3.2 Healing the Wounded
• 3.3 Sheltering the Mujhadin and Providing them
  with Hospitality
• 3.4 Freeing and/or Ransoming Prisoners

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4. Public Education

• 4.1 Praising the Mujahidin and Commemorating
  their Exploits
• 4.2 Defending the Mujahidin
• 4.3 Exposing the Hypocrites and Defeatists
• 4.4 Urging People Toward Jihad
• 4.5 Distributing books and Brochures
• 4.6 Advising Muslims and the Mujahidin
• 4.7 Distributing News of the Jihad
• 4.8 Keeping Scholars Informed
• 4.9 Spreading News of Prisoners

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5. Aiding the Mujahideen Directly

• 5.1 Encouraging the Mujahidin
• 5.2 Guiding the Mujahidin
• 5.3 Concealing the Mujahidins Secrets

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6. Jihad Through Prayer

• 6.1 Praying for the Mujahidin
• 6.2 Qunut Prayers in time of calamity

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7. Preparing for Active Jihad

• 7.1 Physical Training
• 7.2 Weapons Training and Marksmanship
• 7.3 Swimming and Horsemanship
• 7.4 First Aid

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8. Intellectual Preparation

• 8.1 Learning the Jurisprudence of Jihad
• 8.2 Hostility and Hatred of the Infidels
• 8.3 Electronic Jihad

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9. Living as a Good Muslim

• 9.1 Discouraging Friendship w/ Polytheists
• 9.2 Abandoning Luxury
• 9.3 Boycotting Goods
• 9.4 Avoid Employing Hostile Labor
• 9.5 Raising Children to Love Jihad

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Questions?