Kant

1
Kants Transcendental Idealism according to
Henry E. Allison

• Itzel Gonzalez
• Phil 4191
• March 2, 2009

2
Overview

• Henry E. Allison (biographical facts)
• Ch.7 The Transcendental Deduction from Kants
  Transcendental Idealism An Interpretation and
  Defense
• Introduction
• Sec. 1 Apperception, Synthesis, and Objectivity
• Sec. 2 The Problem of Subjective Unity
• Sec. 3 Imagination, Perception, and Experience
• Conclusions

3
Henry E. Allison

• Currently, he is an Emeritus Professor at the
  University of Boston
• He published the 1st edition of Kants
  Transcendental Idealism in 1983 (the 2nd (ours)
  in 2004)

4
Introduction

• He focuses on the B-edition of Kants
  Transcendental Deduction (B-Deduction)
• And claims Kants central problem in it to be
  the demonstration of a connection between the
  intellectual and sensible conditions of human
  cognition. (159) That is, he maintains Kants
  worry to be the existence of a correspondence
  between the deliverances of sensibility and the a
  priori rules of thought.
• Further, Henry, in agreement with Dieter Henrich,
  claims that Kant, as a solution, attempts to
  establish the necessity of the categories.

5
Introduction (cont.)

• Also, like Henrich, he claims that Kant divides
  the argument in the B-Deduction for the necessity
  of the categories into 2 parts
• The 1st being meant to assert the necessity of
  the categories with respect to objects of
  sensible intuition in general (that is, any
  sensible content must be subject to the
  categories if it is to be brought to the unity of
  consciousness)
• The 2nd being meant to argue for the necessity
  of the categories with respect to human
  sensibility and its objects (160)

6
Introduction (cont.)

• According to Allison, Henrich, asserts that the
  1st part of the B-Deduction affirms the validity
  of the categories under a restricting condition
  that is then removed in the second part. (161)
• However, Allison finds questionable Henrichs
  claim that the 1st part of the Deduction
  effectively demonstrates that the
  categoriesapply to a certain range of
  intuitions, particularly, because Kant intends
  the 1st part of the Deduction to contain the
  broader claim and Henrichs assertion appears to
  place the broader claim, instead, in the 2nd
  part. (Note 7, p.476)
• Hence, Allison assumes a different interpretation
  from that of Henrich.

7
Introduction (cont.)

• Allison, contrary to Henrich, interprets the 1st
  part of the B-Deduction to show that the thought
  of objects stands under the categories, while
  the 2nd the further claim that the perception of
  objects is also linked to the categories. (162)
• A Foreshadowing

8
Apperception, Synthesis, and Objectivity

• (t)he I think must be able to accompany all
  my representations for otherwise something would
  be represented in me that could not be thought at
  all, which is as much as to say that the
  representation would either be impossible or else
  at least would be nothing to me. That
  representation that can be given prior to all
  thought is called intuition. Thus all manifold
  of intuition has a necessary relation to the I
  think in the same subject in which this manifold
  is to be encountered. (Critique of Pure Reason,
  B131 132)

9
I. (cont.)

• Allisons 3 claims
• For any representation to be anything to me,
  that is, to represent anything for me, it must be
  possible to think it as mine. Since a
  representation for which this is not possible
  could not represent anything for me, it wouldbe
  nothing to me. (163)
• One just means that the I think must be able to
  (but need not actually) accompany all my
  representations. (164)
• The Principle of the Necessary Synthetic Unity of
  Apperception (the fundamental premise of the 1st
  part of the argument in the B-Deduction) (164)

10
I. (cont.)

• The Principle of the Necessary Synthetic Unity of
  Apperception (PNSUA)
• the components of a complex thought must be
  connected in such a way as to allow for the
  possibility of their ascription to a single
  thinking subject, which entails that they
  constitute a synthetic unity. (164)
• (Argument for PNSUA derives from the idea that
  a single complex thought logically requires a
  single thinker) (164)

11
I. (cont.)

• The Principle of the Necessary Unity of
  Apperception (PNUA)
• all representations in any given intuition must
  stand under the condition under which alone I can
  ascribe them to the identical self as my
  representations, and thus can grasp them
  together, as synthetically combined in an
  apperception, through the general expression I
  think. (Critique of Pure Reason, B 138)
• This principle, which Kant claims to be an
  analytic proposition, is a claim about how the
  thinking subject must be thought (or conceive of
  itself) qua engaged in such activity. (167)

12
I. (cont.)

• Note PNUA is an analytic proposition because it
  is derived by abstracting from the nature of
  sensibility, which leads thought to be related
  to the concept of sensible intuition in
  general. (167)

13
I. (cont.)

• The analytic unity of apperception presupposes a
  synthetic unity, as
• The consciousness of the identity of the I think
  contains a synthesis, and
• The consciousness of the identity of the I think
  is possible only through a consciousness of this
  synthesis
• This follows because a subject cannot think its
  own identity with respect to distinct
  representations without in the same act bringing
  them into a synthetic unity. (169 - 170)

14
I. (cont.)

• Argument for the connection between the doctrine
  of apperception and the necessity of a
  consciousness of synthesis
• A single complex thought (formed by a A and B)
  requires both a single thinker, as well as a
  unified act of thinking (in which A and B are
  thought together).
• The I think lacks content apart from the
  consciousness of the identity of this unifying
  action through which the thinking subject becomes
  aware of his or her own identity. (171)

15
I. (cont.)

• This connection results in Kant viewing
• all general concepts as analytic unities,
• the I think(as) itself the thought of what is
  common to all conceptualization, and
• the act of becoming aware of this identical I
  think(as) themeans (by)which the mind grasps
  the identity in difference in the formation of
  general concepts. (172)

16
I. (cont.)

• According to Allison, from the connection of
  apperception to the understanding, Kant derives
  the claim that in so far as the manifold of a
  given intuition is grasped as a manifold or
  brought to the synthetic unity of apperception,
  it is by this very act, also unified in a
  judgment (which is the way to bring given
  cognitions to the objective unity of
  apperception B 141 - 142). And, further, that
  as the logical functions of judgment are the
  forms of such unificationthat the manifold is
  also determined with regard to them. That is,
  for a discursive understanding to think the
  manifold of a given intuition just is to unify it
  in a judgment by means of the logical functions.
  (177)

17
I. (cont.)

• This claim ties apperception to the categories,
  establishing their necessity, as the categories
  just are(the mentioned) logical functions.
• Allison maintains that Kant shows how the
  manifold, insofar as it is thought together in a
  single consciousness, is necessarily subject to
  the categories. (177)

18
II. The Problem of Subjective Unity

• Here Allison presents a problem of Kants
• According to Allison, by Kant claiming that the
  empirical unity of apperception is derived from
  the transcendental or objective unity under
  given conditions in concreto, he must mean that
  though the content of such consciousness is
  determined by contingent empirical factorsits
  form as a mode of consciousness is subject to the
  transcendental conditions of unity. (184)
• But how is a non-objective form of consciousness
  possible?

19
III. Imagination, Perception, and Experience

• According to Allison, Kant introduces the idea of
  the imagination in Sec. 24 under the name
  figurative synthesis (synthesis speciosa) and
  makes two claims about it.
• Kant claims
• That this synthesis, under the name of the
  transcendental synthesis of the imagination, has
  both an a priori dimension and a transcendental
  function in the determining of time as the form
  of inner sense
• That since this function must accord with
  conditions of the synthetic unity of
  apperception, it is subject to the categories
  (189)

20
III. (cont.)

• Allison notes that Kant furthers his project of
  establishing the necessity of the categories by
  demonstrating that the transcendental synthesis
  of the imagination connects the categories with
  the forms of sensibility.
• However, Allison also notes that such move is not
  sufficient for Kant to meet his goal, as to meet
  his goal he must also demonstrat(e)that the
  categories stand in a necessary connection with
  empirical intuition. (193)

21
III. (cont.)

• According to Allison, Kant attempts to solve this
  problem by linking the categories to the
  synthesis of apprehension, which he defines as
  the composition of the manifold in an empirical
  intuition, through which perceptionbecomes
  possible. (193)

22
III. (cont.)

• In other words, according to Allison, Kant
  attempts to resolve his problem by claiming that
  even perception must stand under the categories.
• But a further problem arises
• Namely, that linking the categories to
  perception cannot account for the epistemic
  function of all the categories. (200)
• And an argument must incorporate this point,
  because the different category types have
  significantly different experiential functions.
  (201)

23
Conclusions

• Allison maintains that Kants project in the
  B-Deduction to link the deliverances of
  sensibility to the a priori rules of thought
  (that is, toconnectthe intellectual and
  sensible conditions of human cognition) though
  begun is not completed. (201)
• It is begun as Kant in the B-Deduction does
  effectively link the categories to thought and
  then, subsequently, to perception.
• However, it is not completed as Kant cannot
  account for the epistemic function of all the
  categories. (200)
• So while there is no complete vindication of
  Kants account, it must also be noted, as Allison
  does, that Kants account lacks intrinsic
  incoherencies in it. (201)