Dag 4: Statsansvar og tvistelsning

1
Dag 4 Statsansvar og tvisteløsning

• Skillet mellom primærregler og sekundærregler
• Reglene om statsansvar gjelder når primærreglene
  om statenes forpliktelser er brutt
• Når foreligger et folkerettsbrudd hvilke
  konsekvenser får det?

2

• ILCs rolle
• Siden 1920-tallet. På dagsorden siden 1949
  påbegynte arbeidet i 1956 utkast i 2001
• Videre skjebne er åpen, anbefalt traktatkonferanse

3
ILC-utkastet

• Art. 1 Responsibility of a State for its
  internationally wrongful acts
• Every internationally wrongful act of a State
  entails the international responsibility of that
  State

4

• Hva menes med en internationally wrongful act of
  a State?
• Handlingen må være wrongful
• Handlingen må kunne tilordnes staten

5

• Art. 2 Elements of an internationally wrongful
  act of a State
• There in an internationally wrongful act of a
  State when conduct consisting of an act or
  ommission
• Is attributable to the State under international
  law and
• Constitutes a breach of an international
  obligation of the State

6

• Hvilke regler er relevante?
• Folkeretten?
• Nasjonal rett?

7

• Article 3 Characterization of an act of a State
  as internationally wrongful
• The characterization of an act of a State as
  internationally wrongful is governed by
  international law. Such characterization is not
  affected by the characterization of the same act
  as lawful by internal law.

8

• Når foreligger et folkerettsbrudd?
• Brudd på folkerettslig forpliktelse
• Forpliktelsen må være bindende for den aktuelle
  staten

9

• Article 12 Existence of a breach of an
  international obligation
• There is a breach of an international obligation
  by a State when an act of that State is not in
  conformity with what is required of it by that
  obligation, regardless of its origin or character.

10

• Article 13 International obligation in force for
  a State
• An act of a State does not constitute a breach
  of an international obligation unless the State
  is bound by the obligation in question at the
  time the act occurs.

11

• Kreves noe mer enn objektivt folkerettsbrudd?
• Kreves skyld?
• To skoler
• objektivt ansvar
• skyldansvar

12

• Flertallet innenfor reelle saker og rettsteori
  forfekter den objektive teorien
• I Korfu kanal-saken (1949) kom ICJ med uttalelser
  som kunne tyde på en skyld-teori
• it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the
  control exercised by a state over its territory
  and waters that the state necessarily knew, or
  ought to have known, of any unlawful act
  perpetrated therein

13

• Men i Korfu kanal-saken understreket ICJ
  samtidig at det forhold at handlingene hadde
  funnet sted på en annen stats (Albanias)
  territorium hadde betydning for hva som kunne
  kreves av beviser fra offerstatens side.
• ILCs kommentar understreker at utkastet ikke tar
  stilling til spørsmålet om objektivt ansvar eller
  skyldansvar, og at vurderingen vil kunne variere
  fra sak til sak, avhengig av folkerettsbruddets
  karakter.

14

• Når kan en handling tilordnes staten?
  (Imputability)
• Staten kan bare handle gjennom personer
• Staten kan ikke være ansvarlig for alle
  statsborgernes handlinger
• Objektivt statsansvar for enhver handling utført
  av en statsrepresentant ville vært et incitament
  for staten til å ha god kontroll
• Men ingen rimelig regel umulig for stater å
  kontrollere

15

• I Korfu kanal-saken (ICJ, 1949) ble Albania hold
  ansvarlig for minelegging I havet til tross for
  at det ikke var på det rene hvem som hadde lagt
  minene.
• I Rainbow Warrior-saken (UNSG, 1986) ble
  Frankrike holdt ansvarlige for franske agenters
  virksomhet I New Zealand
• Eichmann i Argentina (ikke reist sak)

16

• Kreves en kopling mellom staten og personen som
  faktisk begikk handlingen eller unnlatelsen

17

• Attribution of conduct to a State
• Article 4 Conduct of organs of a State
• 1. The conduct of any State organ shall be
  considered an act of that State under
  international law, whether the organ exercises
  legislative, executive, judicial or any other
  functions, whatever position it holds in the
  organization of the State, and whatever its
  character as an organ of the central government
  or of a territorial unit of the State.
• 2. An organ includes any person or entity which
  has that status in accordance with the internal
  law of the State.

18

• Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal
  Process of a Special Rapporteur (ICJ, 1999)
• According to a well-established rule of
  international law, the conduct of any organ of a
  state must be regarded as an act of that state

19

• Hva med private enheter som utøver myndighet som
  ellers tilligger staten?
• Eks. privat selskap som fungerer som driver et
  fengsel i Irak
• Outsoursing of war en pulverisering av ansvar?
• Kan staten holdes ansvarlig for deres handlinger?

20

• Article 5 Conduct of persons or entities
  exercising elements of governmental authority
• The conduct of a person or entity which is not
  an organ of the State under article 4 but which
  is empowered by the law of that State to exercise
  elements of the governmental authority shall be
  considered an act of the State under
  international law, provided the person or entity
  is acting in that capacity in the particular
  instance.

21

• Hva om vedkommende handler som myndighetsperson,
  men handlingen
• ligger utenfor vedkommende persons kompetanse?
• går i mot instrukser?

22

• Caire-saken (UN Reports of International Arbitral
  Awards, 1929)
• The state officials have acted at least to
  all appearances as competent officials or organs
  or they must have used powers or methods
  appropriate to their official capacity.

23

• Mossé-saken (UNRIAA, 1953)
• acts performed by officials within teh apparent
  limits of their functions, in accordance with a
  line of conduct which was not entirely contrary
  to the instructions received
• Sml. sondringen mellom private handlinger og
  offisielle statshandlinger mht. individuell
  strafferettslig immunitet...

24

• Sandline-saken (International Law Reports)
• ... even if the officials act ultra vires or
  unlawful under the internal law of the state ...
  when they purport to act in their capacity as
  organs of the state.
• (Et objektivt ansvar avgrenses bare mot
  private handlinger. Sml. sondringen for
  strafferettslig immunitet.)

25

• Article 7 Excess of authority or contravention
  of instructions
• The conduct of an organ of a State or of a
  person or entity empowered to exercise elements
  of the governmental authority shall be considered
  an act of the State under international law if
  the organ, person or entity acts in that
  capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or
  contravenes instructions.

26

• Kan staten holdes ansvarlig for andre aktørers
  handlinger med den begrunnelse at staten har en
  viss autoritet over eller øver en viss kontroll
  med handlingen?

27

• Article 8 Conduct directed or controlled by a
  State
• The conduct of a person or group of persons
  shall be considered an act of a State under
  international law if the person or group of
  persons is in fact acting on the instructions of,
  or under the direction or control of, that State
  in carrying out the conduct.

28

• Vilkåret om instructions er uomtvisted, mens
  vilkåret direction or control er mer
  kontroversielt.
• Hva kreves her?
• ILCs kommentar Such conduct will be
  attributable to the state only if it directed or
  controlled the specific operation and the conduct
  complained of was an integral part of the
  operation.

29

• Nicaragua-saken (ILC, 1986)
• For at aktivitetene til Contras-geriljaen skulle
  kunne tilordnes USA, it would in principle have
  to be proved that that state had effective
  control over the military or paramilitary
  operations in the course of which teh alleged
  violations were committeed.
• - Generell overall-kontroll ikke tilstrekkelig.

30

• Hva med ansvar for statlige investeringer i
  private selskaper som begår f.eks.
  menneskerettighetskrenkelser?
• Sml. Etikkrådet for oljefondets investeringer og
  deres anbefalinger
• Artikkel 8 om kontroll antakelig avgjørende

31

• Stedfortredende statshandlinger
• Kan staten holdes ansvarlig?

32

• Article 9 Conduct carried out in the absence or
  default of the official authorities
• The conduct of a person or group of persons
  shall be considered an act of a State under
  international law if the person or group of
  persons is in fact exercising elements of the
  governmental authority in the absence or default
  of the official authorities and in circumstances
  such as to call for the exercise of those
  elements of authority.

33

• Hva med rebel-handlinger?
• Faller utenfor statsansvaret når staten har vært
  i god tro og ikke utvist uaktsomhet
• Hvis staten siden godkjenner og identifiserer seg
  med handlingen, kan staten holdes ansvarlig

34

• Gisselsaken i Teheran i 1979
• Gisseltakingen ble i utgangspunktet utført av en
  militant gruppe som ikke kunne identifiseres med
  den iranske stat
• Gisseltakingen ble siden godkjent av Ayatollah
  Khomeini
• Iran unnlot å gripe inn
• Den militante gruppen ble dermed en iransk state
  agent

35

• Ansvarsfritaksgrunner
• samtykke
• selvforsvar
• represalier
• force majeure
• nødrett

36

• Article 20 Consent eks. En stat sender væpnede
  styrker inn i en annen stat på sistnevntes
  anmodning
• Article 21 Self-defence - i samsvar med
  FN-pakten

37

• ICJ i Atomvåpen-saken (1996)- om nødverge
• Respect for the environment is one of teh
  elements that go to assessing whether an action
  is in conformity with the principles of necessity
  and proportionality.

38

• Article 22 Countermeasures in respect of an
  internationally wrongful act
• Reprisals som ikke involverer maktbruk

39

• Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (1997)
• Firstly it must be taken in response of a
  previous international wrongful act of another
  state and must be directed against that state
  Secondly, the injured state must have called upon
  the other state to discontinue its wrongful
  conduct or make reparation effects to induce
  the wrongdoing state comply with its obligations
  and the measure must therefore be reveisible.

40

• Article 23 Force majeure
• I Rainbow Warrior-saken hadde Frankrike latt en
  av agentene flytte tilbake til Frankrike uten New
  Zealands samtykke. Hevdet at det var nødvendig
  pga. sykdom. Det krevdes likevel absolute and
  material impossibility og det at forpliktelsen
  ble vanskeligere og mer byrdefull utgjorde ingen
  force majeure.

41

• Article 25 Necessity
• a) only way for the State to safeguard an
  essential interest against a grave and imminent
  peril and
• b) does not seriously impair an essential
  interest of the State or States towards which the
  obligation exists, or of the international
  community as a whole.

42

• Article 26 Compliance with peremptory norms
• Nothing in this Chapter precludes the
  wrongfulness of any act of a State which is not
  in conformity with an obligation arising under a
  peremptory norm of general international law.

43
Rettsvirkninger av ansvar

• Plikt til opphør og garanti mot gjentakelse (art.
  30) sml. Rainbow Warrior hvor repatrieringen
  ikke representerte noe fortsatt brudd og hvor
  forpliktelsen ikke lenger bestod...

44

• Article 30- Cessation and non-repetition
• The State responsible for the internationally
  wrongful act is under an obligation
• (a) To cease that act, if it is continuing
• (b) To offer appropriate assurances and
  guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so
  require.

45

• Reparasjon av skade (art. 34)
• Gjenetablere situasjonen forut for handlingen
• Erstatning (compensation)
• Oppreisning (satisfaction)

46

• Chorzow Factory-saken (PCIJ, 1928)
• The essential principle contained in the actual
  notion of an illegal act is that reperation must
  ... wipe out all the consequences of the
  illegal act and re-establish the situation which
  would, in all probability, have existed if that
  act had not been committed.

47

• Article 31- Reparation
• The responsible State is under an obligation to
  make full reparation for the injury caused by the
  internationally wrongful act.
• 2. Injury includes any damage, whether material
  or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful
  act of a State.

48

• Article 34- Forms of reparation
• Full reparation for the injury caused by the
  internationally wrongful act shall take the form
  of restitution, compensation and satisfaction,
  either singly or in combination, in accordance
  with the provisions of this Chapter.

49

• Article 35- Restitution
• A State responsible for an internationally
  wrongful act is under an obligation to make
  restitution, that is, to re-establish the
  situation which existed before the wrongful act
  was committed, provided and to the extent that
  restitution
• (a) Is not materially impossible
• (b) Does not involve a burden out of all
  proportion to the benefit deriving from
  restitution instead of compensation.

50

• Article 36 Compensation
• 1. The State responsible for an internationally
  wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate
  for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such
  damage is not made good by restitution.
• 2. The compensation shall cover any financially
  assessable damage including loss of profits
  insofar as it is established.

51

• Article 37- Satisfaction
• 1. The State responsible for an internationally
  wrongful act is under an obligation to give
  satisfaction for the injury caused by that act
  insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution
  or compensation.
• 2. Satisfaction may consist in an
  acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of
  regret, a formal apology or another appropriate
  modality.
• 3. Satisfaction shall not be out of proportion
  to the injury and may not take a form humiliating
  to the responsible State.

52

• Brudd på jus cogens normer
• Var foreslått at stater skulle kunne holdes
  strafferettslig ansvarlige
• Vist til utviklingen av jus cogens utviklingen
  av individuelt straffeansvar etter folkeretten
  og FN-paktens mulighet for autorisering av
  maktbruk mot stater
• Likevel oppgitt pga. kontroversialiteten

53

• I stedet
• Article 40 - Application of this Chapter
• 1. This Chapter applies to the international
  responsibility which is entailed by a serious
  breach by a State of an obligation arising under
  a peremptory norm of general international law.
• 2. A breach of such an obligation is serious if
  it involves a gross or systematic failure by the
  responsible State to fulfil the obligation.

54

• Article 41- Particular consequences of a serious
  breach of an obligation under this Chapter
• States shall cooperate to bring to an end
  through lawful means any serious breach within
  the meaning of article 40.
• 2. No State shall recognize as lawful a
  situation created by a serious breach within the
  meaning of article 40, nor render aid or
  assistance in maintaining that situation.
• 3. This article is without prejudice to the
  other consequences referred to in this Part and
  to such further consequences that a breach to
  which this Chapter applies may entail under
  international law.

55
Rettshåndhevelse I

• Statssuverenitet som grunnleggende problem
• Mangler tvangsmiddel
• Er et rettssystem uten tvangsmiddel tomt?
• Konsensus som grl. forutsetin

56

• Ulike grunner til folkerettsbrudd
• Manglende evne eller vilje til å oppfylle
• Uklare forpliktelser
• Mekanismer for å sikre rettshåndhevelse
• Myke mekanismer
• Positive teknisk/finansiell støtte evne
• Negative ulike typer sanksjoner
• Forhandlinger
• Eksponering av folkerettsbrudd

57

• Løsning av interessekonflikter
• Avklaring av rettstilstanden
• Avklaring av om folkerettsbrudd foreligger
• Grunnlag for håndhevningstiltak?
• Fordeling av ansvar
• Forebygging av folkerettsbrudd

58

• Former for tvisteløsning
• Forhandlinger mellom partene
• Nøytral tredjepart deltar
• Tvisten overlates til int. institusjoner
• Voldgift
• Domstol

59

• FN-paktens art. 2(3)
• All Members shall settle their international
  disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
  international peace and security, and justice,
  are not endangered.

60

• Pacific Settlement of Disputes
• Article 33
• 1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance
  of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
  international peace and security, shall, first of
  all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,
  mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
  settlement, resort to regional agencies or
  arrangements, or other peaceful means of their
  own choice.
• 2. The Security Council shall, when it deems
  necessary, call upon the parties to settle their
  dispute by such means.

61

• Article 34
• The Security Council may investigate any
  dispute, or any situation which might lead to
  international friction or give rise to a dispute,
  in order to determine whether the continuance of
  the dispute or situation is likely to endanger
  the maintenance of international peace and
  security.

62

• Article 35
• 1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring
  any dispute, or any situation of the nature
  referred to in Article 34, to the attention of
  the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

63

• Article 36
• 1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a
  dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33
  or of a situation of like nature, recommend
  appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
• 2. The Security Council should take into
  consideration any procedures for the settlement
  of the dispute which have already been adopted by
  the parties.

64

• Article 37
• 1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature
  referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by
  the means indicated in that Article, they shall
  refer it to the Security Council.
• 2. If the Security Council deems that the
  continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to
  endanger the maintenance of international peace
  and security, it shall decide whether to take
  action under Article 36 or to recommend such
  terms of settlement as it may consider
  appropriate.

65

• Article 38
• Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles
  33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the
  parties to any dispute so request, make
  recommendations to the parties with a view to a
  pacific settlement of the dispute.

66
Oversikt over mekanismer

• Globale FN
• ICJ, ITLOS. ICC, Permanent Court of Arbitration,
  ILO Commissions, World Bank Inspection Panel
• Globale utenfor FN
• WTO, ICSID
• Regionale/bilaterale
• ECJ, EFTA Court, NAFTA, EMD, andre frihandels- og
  MR-domstoler

67

• Iran-US Claims Tribunal, UN Compensation
  Commission, ICTY og ICTY
• Andre gjennomføringsmekanismer
• UN Human Rights Committee, CERD Committee m.m.

68
Fremtidsutsikter

• Økt fragmentering?
• Gravitasjon mot noen sterke systemer?
• Styrking av ikke-statlige aktørers roller?
• Initiering av prosessen
• Deltakelse i prosessen
• Gjenstand for prosessen
• Økende bruk?

69
Haag-domstolen ICJ

• Effektiv eller irrelevant?
• Jurisdiksjonsspørsmål
• Politisk rolle?
• Tvistesaker vs. rådgivende rolle

70

• Art. 1
• The International Court of Justice established
  by the Charter of the United Nations as the
  principal judicial organ of the United Nations
  shall be constituted and shall function in
  accordance with the provisions of the present
  Statute.

71

• Article 34
• 1. Only states may be parties in cases before
  the Court.
• ...

72

• Article 36
• 1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all
  cases which the parties refer to it and all
  matters specially provided for in the Charter of
  the United Nations or in treaties and conventions
  in force.
• 2. The states parties to the present Statute may
  at any time declare that they recognize as
  compulsory ipso facto and without special
  agreement, in relation to any other state
  accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction
  of the Court in all legal disputes concerning
• a. the interpretation of a treaty
• b. any question of international law
• c. the existence of any fact which, if
  established, would constitute a breach of an
  international obligation
• d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be
  made for the breach of an international
  obligation.

73

• Article 38
• 1. The Court, whose function is to decide in
  accordance with international law such disputes
  as are submitted to it, shall apply
• a. international conventions, whether general or
  particular, establishing rules expressly
  recognized by the contesting states
• b. international custom, as evidence of a
  general practice accepted as law
• c. the general principles of law recognized by
  civilized nations
• d. subject to the provisions of Article 59,
  judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
  highly qualified publicists of the various
  nations, as subsidiary means for the
  determination of rules of law.

74

• Article 59
• The decision of the Court has no binding force
  except between the parties and in respect of that
  particular case.
• Article 60
• The judgment is final and without appeal. In the
  event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of
  the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon
  the request of any party.