North Korea, American Power, and China

1
North Korea, American Power, and China

• Tim Beal
• Beijing Bookworm
• 23 February 2006

2
Overview

• Latest book
• briefly
• Next book
• Six Party Talks
• NK, SK, China, US
• If time, and interest, photos

3
(No Transcript)
4
North Korea The Struggle against American Power

• Most books on NK
• Focus on it to the exclusion of wider geopolitics
• Portray it as sui generis, bizarre, and a free
  agent
• Situation seen to be entirely of its own making
• Phrases like economic mismanagement,
  self-imposed isolation

5
My book

• Attempts to place NK within historical and
  geopolitical context
• Lays special stress on the US
• US has been, and continues to be, the major force
  in global affairs
• Especially important in East Asia
• Paradox US sees itself as exceptional
  superpower, but portrays itself as an observer

6
Table of contents

• Part 1 historical overview
• Gallop through Korea history from Tangun to
  beginning of second administration of George W
  Bush
• Part 2
• Chapter five The Human Rights record
  complexities, causes, solutionsChapter six
  Drugs and GeneralsChapter seven The Nuclear
  Confrontation

7
Appendixes

• Economic statistics
• Military statistics
• Eg comparative statistics on military expenditure
  in NK, SK, US and Japan
• Documentary sources
• Timeline of nuclear and missile activities
• Includes other countries, esp US

8
Approach

• Critical approach, taking nothing as
  unchallengeable
• Dont claim to know what is in the mind of Kim
  Jong Il, or George W Bush
• But can analyse actions, make intelligent
  conjecture about motivations and policies based
  on available evidence
• Annoyingly academic?
• Solution-oriented

9
Sources

• Usual books, academic papers, congressional
  enquiries etc.
• Most current information gleaned from South
  Korean and US press
• Ongoing collection at http//www.vuw.ac.nz/caplab
  tb/dprk/
• Also produce a bi/tri monthly electronic
  newsletter Pyongyang Report

10
Next book 2008?

• NKs search for independence, security and
  economic development
• Set within the common Asian search
• Starting point is that most (al?) countries share
  these common aims, but paths, solutions,
  successes and failures vary
• NK is not odd man out, but is the place where
  many issues are at their most intense
• Special focus on Japan, China/Taiwan, SK,
  Vietnam, Singapore and India

11
Six Party Talks

• Have been travelling, so not up to date
• Centrality of the US
• Dominates East Asia and for ALL countries the
  relationship with US is most important
• They do things against their own interests eg
  send troops to Iraq to keep US happy
• China plays a waiting game
• Their policy options are limited US is more
  complex

12
DPRK

• Peaceful coexistanece with the US ending of
  hostility - is primary foreign policy
  objective virtually everything himnges on that
• Wanted bilateral negotiations with US but yielded
  to Chinese pressure
• Has been flexible but firm on key demands
• Security guarantees
• Sequencing commitment for commitment, action for
  action
• Light water reactor for energy
• Repeat of Agreed Framework

13
Russia, China

• Common objectives oppose
• War
• Collapse of DPRK (eg refugees)
• Nuclearisation of DPRK (encourage/excuse Japan)
• US policy driving them together
• First joint military exercises in history
• China is more involved, hence initiator and host
  of Six Party talks

14
South Korea

• Similar position to China, Russia
• Eg Kim Dae-jung realised collapse of DPRK would
  be disastrous for ROK
• Sunshine Policy continued by Roh Moo-hyun
• Despite US objections, moves towards economic
  integration
• Eg Kaesong Industrial Complex
• Park Geun-hye (daughter of Park Chung-hee),
  Leader of main (conservative) opposition party
  has called on US to negotiate with NK, put
  herself forward as emissary

15
Limits to sovereignty

• Strong conservative forces in SK
• Especially military
• ROK military is under control of US commander of
  Combined Services Command
• Roh trying to regain wartime command of military
• US promises when it decides that ROK is ready

16
Economic and political constraints

• Examples
• Half of shares of top ten chaebol owned by
  foreigners
• Landline to Kaesong blocked by US for many months
• ROK proposal to invite DPRK delegation to APEC
  meeting in Pusan in 2005 quickly dropped under US
  pressure

17
United States

• In East Asia, centred on fear of rise of China
• Everything else revolves around that
• Especially policy towards NK
• Surrogate for China (eg Missile Defense)
• In Washington China is spelt N.O.R.T.H K.O.R.E.A
• Another strand is Bushs ABC policy
• Anything but Clinton
• Specifically opposition to Agreed Framework
• Destroyed KEDO, balked at LWR

18
Clinton to Bush

• Agreed Framework
• NK would swap existing reactors for Light Water
  reactors, interim deliveries of heavy fuel oil,
  lifting of sanctions and normalisation of
  relations
• Late 2000 Albright in Pyongyang, Clinton nearly
  went
• Two years later deep crisis why?

19
Its in the book

• In brief
• Accusation that NK had military hevy enrichment
  uranium programme
• Trigged by Kim-Koizumi summit in 2003 fear that
  flank be turned
• Follow US commentator Selig Harrison
• US has produced no evidence
• (Chinese have openly expressed scepticism)
• Probably enrichment programme for anticipated
  LWRs
• Cf Iran, EuropeRussia, US
• Energy security a major issue

20
What is explanation for US policy?

• US precipitated crisis and refuses negotiations
  that would resolve it
• Negotiations advocated by China, Russia, ROK
  government and opposition, and earnest
  individuals and institutions, US and
  international
• Pyongyangs demands very modest, and position
  weak
• Chalmers Johnson the North-Korean nuclear
  stand-off could be resolved virtually overnight
• Two explanations ABC and incompetance
• More to it than that

21
China

• Johnson raises the real target China
• The North Korean issue is a smokescreen for wider
  policy objectives
• Missile Defense
• Preservation of American hegemony in East Asia
• China joins these together
• renewed US Japan alliance becoming key
  component
• Presence in SK gives US ownership of SK
  military gtgtstrategic flexibility

22
US China policy

• Becoming more confrontational under Rice
• US encouraging domestic Japanese political forces
  that want Japan to become a normal country
• Support for permanent seat in UN Security Council
  part of bait
• Abolition of Peace Constitution troops to Iraq
• Remilitarisation (to defend against NK AND China)

23
US anti-China alliance

• Japan being brought in on Taiwan
• Overtures to India
• Support for Indian nuclear industry, and missiles
  
• Iran is torn over Iran, and also has developed
  relation with China

24
US is a global empire

• Niall Ferguson has described US as an empire in
  denial
• gtgtLanguage of liberal democracy but underneath
  there is the logic of empire
• Two strands global and regional
• NK is not important in itself, or a threat
• Military imbalance is huge
• Important as factor in logic of empire

25
Global imperatives

• NK is small, rebellious state on fringe of empire
• Empires do not willingly negotiate with small
  peripheral states
• Cheney We do no negotiate with evil
• evil rebellion ( cf Miltons Paradise
  Lost)
• Fear of precedent eg Iran

26
Example

• NK must be punished as an example to others
• If NK is able to negotiate peaceful coexistence
  from position of defiance then others will try
• Cf Iraq which disarmed and was invaded
• From global perspective destruction of DPRK
  (regime change) is desirable

27
Regional imperatives

• Focus is China and anti-China alliance
• Need NK perceived as threat
• To keep SK and Japan in state of tension, fearful
  of China
• Bolster military lobby in SK
• Facilitate Japanese remilitarisation
• Perhaps nuclear weapons (and in SK, Taiwan)

28
Contradictions and setbacks

• Two sets of imperatives sometimes clash
• Eg China
• Refusal to negotiate bilaterally (Global)gtgtChina
  diplomatic leverage
• EG DPRK to be or not to be?
• Global wants to destroy, regional wants to keep
• In denial means US cannot reconcile conflicting
  objectives
• Strategic incoherence
• US strategy has had mixed results

29
Reaction in Asia

• Moves to a loose coalition centred on China
• In particular South Korea is moving away from US
  and towards China
• Propelled by disagreements over NK policy, fears
  of Japanese remilitarisation, Tokto/Takeshima
  dispute

30
Korea Times 21 February 2006 http//times.hankooki
.com/lpage/nation/200602/kt2006022117121711950.htm

31
  Korea Times 21 February 2006 http//times.hankoo
ki.com/lpage/nation/200602/kt2006022117341211950.h
tm
32
Statement of 19 September 2005

• Claimed to be a breakthrough
• Pressure on DPRK, but mainly US
• No reference to HEU, or Cheney
• But did nothing to bridge gap between
  participants
• The confrontation continues, with no end in sight

33
Where to from here?

• US unable to move forward on military action,
  unwilling to go back to negotiated coexistence
• NK (relectuctantly) moving towards China
  politically and economically
• NK-SK relations continuing to develop
• Kim Dae-jung now scheduled to visit NK in June
• China will increase in importance, will act as
  restraining factor
• Beijing is where its at..