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Éthique et concurrencela quadrature du cercle?

• Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné
• Professeur titulaire
• Chaire dÉconomie internationale et de
  gouvernance
• HEC Montréal

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Plan de la présentation

• Le panorama
• Evolution - Des Sentencing Guidelines à
  Sarbanes-Oxley
• Un paradoxe de la conformité?
• Antidotes

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1. Le panorama

• Les crimes de cols blancs (white-collar crimes)
  coûteraient aux compagnies américaines entre 200
  milliards et 600 milliards par année.
• Par comparaison, les crimes de rues et autres
  larcins (vols, cambriolages) coûteraient
  respecti-vement 4 milliards et 15.6 milliards
  par an.
• La fraude chez une compagnie typique repré-sente
  une perte allant de 1 à 6 de son chiffre
  daffaires.
• Plus de 30 des faillites de nouvelles
  entre-prises seraient dues à des crimes de cols
  blancs.

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2. Évolution maintenant (1)

• The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (30 juillet 2002)
• - Accuracy of financial reports
• - Off-balance sheet transactions
• - Pro-format financial information
• - Loans to executives
• - Officer/Director bars and penalties
• - Changes in stock ownership
• - Internal controls
• - Code of ethics
• - Audit committee expertise
• - SEC enhanced review of periodic disclosures
• - Real-time disclosure

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2. Évolution maintenant (2)

• Sarbanes-Oxley pour les cies non-US
• - Officer certifications
• - Loans to directors and executive officers
• - Bonus and other forfeitures in event of
  restatements
• - Whistleblower protection
• - Reports of personal securities transactions of
  directors
• and executive officers
• - Audit committee organization and
  responsibilities
• - Independence of accounting firm
• - Registration of U.S. and non-U.S. accounting
  firms with
• board
• - Disclosure of material correcting adjustments
• - Codes of ethics for senior financial officers
• - Internal control assessments
• - Off-balance sheet transactions

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2. Évolution maintenant (3)

• Sarbanes-Oxley et au delà
• Canadian Council of Chief Executives
• Codes of ethics. In order to serve the interest
  of our shareholders, it is not enough to make
  business decisions guided only by what is
  permitted by the letter of law. Sustainable
  growth in sharehoder value requires that we set
  high ethical standards for operating our
  businesses and champion a corporate culture based
  on doing what is right. We recognize that it is
  the actions rather than just the words of the
  chief executive that sets the tone for the
  behavior of employees within our companies and
  that determines the companys reputation with
  customers, suppliers and other stakeholders.

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2. Évolution il y a 15 ans

• The 1991 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
• Laufer (1999) Following Congressional passage
  of the Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations in
  1991, there has been a notable shift of liability
  away from the entity, one that now reflects a
  risk disequilibrium between firms and their
  agents.
• Langevoort (2001) () perhaps in the exercise
  of bona fide business judgment, firms choose
  compliance structures in which the values of
  motivation and cohesion (not to mention
  out-of-pocket costs) often trump high-powered
  monitoring, thus opting for higher compliance
  risk because it is the most sensible strategy.

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3. Un paradoxe de la conformité?

• ? On a observé une corrélation positive entre le
  nombre de programmes de mise en conformité et le
  nombre de crimes de cols blancs.
• Arlen and Kraakman (1997) pursuing the basic
  enforce-ment goals of (1) inducing efficient
  activity levels and (2) minimizing the joint
  costs of misconduct and enforcement () places
  different, and potentially inconsistent demands
  on a corporate liability regime.
• Hasnas (2005) () in the context of federal
  criminal law, there are many ways in which
  compliance is not ethical and ethical behavior is
  not compliance.

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4. Antidotes (1)

• Conformité plus diligente / gouvernance plus
  serrée
• 1. Clarté des politiques et procédures
• 2. Engagement de la direction
• 3. Délégation diligente
• 4. Communication et transparence
• 5. Suivi et protecton des sonneurs dalarme
• 6. Mise en vigueur et corrections uniformes
• 7. Amélioration continue
• ? Les U.S. Sentencing guidelines prévoient des
  réductions substantielles de peines fondées sur
   leffort de mise en conformité.

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4. Antidotes (2)

• Dispositifs de mise en conformité de nouvelle
  génération
• ? Promotion de la diversité
• ? Nouveaux partenariats ONG-Entreprises
• - Lafarge et WWF
• - Starbuck et Oxfam
• - Body Shop et Friends of the Earth
• - McDonalds et Environmental Defense Fund
• - Bristol-Myers Squibb et Conservation
  International
• Lindseth (2004) () each additional dollar of
  compliance spending saves organizations, on
  average, 5.21 in heightened avoidance of legal
  liabilities, harm to the organizations
  reputation and lost productivity.