Title: Hydrogen Review
1Hydrogen Review
Yury Ivanyushenkov for the RAL group Applied
Science Division, Engineering and Instrumentation
Department RAL
MICE Collaboration Meeting, Osaka, February 28,
2006
2Scope
- Design and Safety Review of the MICE Hydrogen
Delivery System, RD Stage on 21-22 November
2005 at RAL - Review of the review
- Comments by the Review Panel
- Response to the comments.
- Project status and plans
3Safety Review Roadmap
- Set up by MICE management with RAL approval
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4Review panel
Gary Allen RAL Gianpaolo Benincasa CERN Peter
Bout Air Products John Dowell
Birmingham (Chair) Jane Vickers RAL John
Weisend SLAC Jim Wells RAL
MICE-UK representatives Ken Long and Paul
Drumm MICE representative Mike Zisman
5Terms of reference
- Scope of the review
- To examine the mechanical, electrical and
functional design of the hydrogen delivery system
and test cryostat proposed to be used for the RD
examination of the parameters needed for MICE. - To consider the design and the test programme in
terms of the applicability to the ultimate
application in the MICE experiment. - To recommend what further level of review is
required, by highlighting potential risks, before
the results of the RD are implemented in MICE
absorber focus coil module. - To report the findings to the ISIS management
responsible for ISIS Facility Safety.
6Terms of reference (2)
- General questions to the review
- Does the proposed design allow for safe operation
of the system and does it comply with the
appropriate design codes? - Does the proposed operational plan allow for safe
operation of the system including the case of
failures? - Is the proposed environment (experimental hall,
surrounding activities, and adjacent hazards)
considered safe to carry out the proposed work? - Is the system likely to achieve the stated
scientific aims and are the risks commensurate
with the value of the results?
7Overview of talks
Talks are on the web http//www.isis.rl.ac.uk/acc
elerator/mice/hreview/index.html
8Objectives of RD - by Tom
9Control logic. Helium purge sequence - by Mike
Evacuate
Evacuate
Purge Sequence
Evacuate
Close PV18, Open PV19, Open CV4 100
Close PV18, Open PV19, Open CV4 100
Open PV19
H2 system pump on, valves ready
VG5lt1mbar
VG5lt1mbar
VG5lt1mbar
No
No
No
VP1 On Close PV1,18,19 Close PV14,17 Open
PV2,3,5,7 Open CV4 100
Yes
Yes
Yes
System evacuated
System evacuated
System evacuated
Purge
Purge
Purge
Close PV19 Open PV18 Open CV4 5 to control flow
Close PV19 Open PV18 Open CV4 5 to control flow
Close PV19 Open PV18 Open CV4 5 to control flow
1barltPG1lt1.3bar AND 1barltPG2lt1.3bar
1barltPG1lt1.3bar AND 1barltPG2lt1.3bar
1barltPG1lt1.1bar AND 1barltPG2lt1.1bar
Leave system under pressure
No
No
No
Close PV18 Open CV4 100
Yes
Yes
Yes
System purged
System purged
System purged
H2 System Purged
10Control sequences. Example spreadsheet - by Mike
11Hydrogen system PID by Matthew
12Hydrogen RD system test area layout - by Tony
13Hydrogen system test cryostat - by Tony
14Hydrogen system HAZOP. Node 1 - by Yury
Node 1 Metal hydride storage unit
Intent To keep hydrogen gas in the storage unit
- absorber vessel closed system.
15Review Results Panel Findings and Recommendations
- The Panel sent their Findings and
Recommendations to Tim Broome on November 28,
2005 - The Panel is impressed by the serious way in
which the MICE collaboration is approaching
safety issues and was pleased to note the
excellent progress made since the last review in
December 2003. - Our overall impression, based on the
presentations, is that there are no serious
safety issues that have not been addressed. - However, we wish to present the following
comments or recommendations on points to which
particular attention should be paid
(comments and our response are listed later in
the talk)
16Panel Findings and Recommendations(2)
The Panel concluded that the HAZOP study as
presented is incomplete. A full HAZOP study, and
a failure modes effects analysis (FMEA) carried
out with the aid of an external specialist,
should be completed as a priority. The findings
of these studies and the response of the MICE
team should be independently examined before the
designs are finalised and accepted. We wish to
stress that the above remarks are restricted to
the safety issues associated with the handling of
liquid hydrogen. We have not considered the wider
risks that may be encountered in carrying out the
RD activity. We suggest that a full qualitative
risk assessment is undertaken by the MICE team to
ensure that all hazards have been identified.
17Panel Findings and Recommendations (3)
Finally, the Panel is of the opinion that no
further external safety review of the Hydrogen
Delivery System, RD stage, is required before
the proposed operations review, provided that the
HAZOP study and FMEA are satisfactorily
completed. We agree with the MICE team that a
review of how the Hydrogen Delivery System
interacts with an absorber focus coil module as
well as with the full control and interlock
system of the MICE experiment will be needed
before the implementation of the next stage.
18Post-Review To-do List
- Analyze the Panels comments and response to
them - See the comments list and the draft responses
in a moment. - Organize HAZOP with the help of an external
company - - Peter Bout from Air Products has been contacted
concerning a HAZOP session by Air Products in
March-April at RAL, positive reply received,
waiting for a quote.
19Panel Recommendations and MICE Responses
20Panel Recommendations and MICE Responses (2)
21Panel Recommendations and MICE Responses (3)
22Project status and plans
- Design
- Conceptual design is completed.
- Detailed design is under way.
- Comment MICE CM14 recommends to change the type
of the cryocooler from the GM one to the pulse
tube one. - Hardware
- Metal hydride storage was ordered on January 30,
2006. - Delivery time is 16 weeks after the order.
- Technical specification for the test cryostat is
being prepared, - soon will be ready for a tender ( but see the
comment above). - Control system
- detailed design has been started