OTHER MINDS

1
OTHER MINDS
2
SKEPTICISM ABOUT OTHER MINDS

• Even if minds other than my own exist, I am not
  aware of them directly.
• I have direct or privileged access to my own
  mind, but only to my own mind.
• I can see the body of another, but I cannot see
  or in any way experience the mind of another.
• Just as there may be no external world beyond my
  perceptions, there may be no minds, either in or
  associated with, human bodies that behave as if
  they have minds - there may be no human minds
  behind human faces.

3
ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY

• Argument from analogydf. Concluding that because
  two or more entities share one aspect they share
  another as well. Gould
• Thinking that, if two or more entities are alike
  in one or more ways, then they are probably alike
  in another way or ways.

4
AN EXAMPLE OF ANALOGICAL REASONING

• If two or more apples are alike in color and
  shape, and you have tasted one and it tastes
  good, you reason analogically in thinking that
  the other apples like it would also taste good.

5
REASONING ANALOGICALLY ABOUT OTHER MINDS I

• I observe an association between a mental state
  of mine and my behavior so that, when I observe
  similar behavior in a being or beings who I see
  is similar to myself, I infer by analogy that his
  or her behavior is associated with or caused by a
  mental state which is similar to my own.
• For instance, I laugh when I am amused.
  Amusement is a state of mind with which the
  bodily behavior we call laughter is often
  associated. If I perceive that behavior in you,
  then I infer by analogy that you have a mental
  state of amusement associated with that perceived
  bodily behavior.

6
REASONING ANALOGICALLY ABOUT OTHER MINDS II

• I observe an association between a mental state
  of mine and a physical state of my body, so that,
  when I observe a similar bodily state in a being
  or beings who I see is similar to myself, I infer
  by analogy that the physical state is associated
  with or caused by a mental state which is similar
  to my own.
• For instance, a cut on my hand - a bodily state -
  is associated with pain - a mental state. When I
  see a cut on your hand, I reason by analogy that
  it hurts - that you have a similar mental state
  associated with the similar state of the body
  that we share.

7
SUMMARY OF REASONING ANALOGICALLY ABOUT OTHER
MINDS

• I perceive that there are bodies in the external
  world which are similar to mine. I also see that
  these bodies behave in ways which are similar to
  the way in which my body behaves. I conclude
  that, just as my bodily states and behavior are
  associated with mind in my case, so other bodily
  states and behavior are similarly associated with
  mind.

8
WHY IS THERE A PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS?

• As we have seen, I can only have my own
  experiences, and so, I never have direct contact
  with any mind other than my own.
• Although it may seem that other minds exist,
  based on observation of similar bodies and
  behavior, it is logically possible that I am the
  only one who exists. What is that called?
• All knowledge of any mind other than my own is
  indirect. I can take the similarity of other
  bodies and their behavior to be good evidence of
  other minds, but it is not conclusive.

9
PROBLEMS WITH ANALOGICAL REASONING I

• Analogical reasoning in general is probable only,
  not certain. Any conclusion reached analogically
  could always be incorrect.
• I cant be sure that because two apples look the
  same that they will taste the same. There is no
  logical necessity here - they dont have to taste
  the same.
• And I cant be sure that because I see bodies
  like mine which behave like mine that there are
  minds like mine. Again, there is no necessary
  logical relation between other bodies and
  behavior and other minds. If there were,
  solipsism would not be simply psychologically
  impossible to believe, but would be logically
  impossible, like a round square.

10
PROBLEMS WITH ANALOGICAL REASONING II

• When I reason analogically about other minds, I
  am basing my argument on a single case, my own.
  Thus, I am reasoning from one case to billions of
  others. This seems implausible.
• Since, by the very nature of the case, I can only
  ever observe my own mind directly, there is no
  way for me to confirm that what I think is true
  really is true. I am supposing similar minds to
  exist from the existence of similar bodies and
  behavior, but I can never know that I am in fact
  not alone.

11
CONCLUSIONS REASONING ANALOGICALLY ABOUT OTHER
MINDS

• Because I can never confirm what I take
  analogical reasoning to show, some philosophers
  think that reasoning analogically about other
  minds is a bad argument. It certainly is not
  proof that other minds exist.
• Other philosophers wonder what else we have to go
  on, given that we only ever experience our own
  minds directly, and so only have similar bodies
  and behavior to go on.
• Nagel suggests that belief in other minds might
  be instinctive, but doubts that instinct can
  count as knowledge. And instinctive belief in
  other minds will not disprove the claims of
  skepticism.

12
TWO VERSIONS OF SKEPTICISM ABOUT OTHER MINDS

• The weaker version of skepticism about other
  mindsdf. I will grant that minds other than my
  own exist, there seem to be good reasons to
  suppose that, but how do I know that they
  experience the world in the same way that I do?
• Do things look the same, sound the same, taste
  and feel the same to them as they do to me? The
  skeptic would say that we cant know that they do
  or that they do not.
• Nagel Something experienced as a flavor to one
  person may be experienced as a sound to another.
  How can I tell if I cant get beyond the confines
  of my own experience?
• The stronger version of skepticism about other
  mindsdf ??

13
OTHER MINDS SKEPTICISM AND ANIMAL FAITH

• Nagel A skeptic, will say that appealing to
  bodies and behavior as evidence of mind is just
  to assume that behavior indicates the presence of
  mind. But this is just what you cant know - you
  cant know it because you cant confirm it.
• And if you take bodies and behavior to prove that
  other minds exist, then you are simply assuming
  that they indicate the existence of other minds,
  not proving it.
• However, just as with the non-existence of the
  external world, it is impossible to believe that
  other people dont have minds. And we have every
  need to do that in ordinary daily living. It is
  just that our common beliefs will not meet the
  challenge of skepticism.

14
PANPSYCHISM I

• Nagel Not only may there be less mind in the
  universe than we normally think, because
  solipsism is possible, but there may be more mind
  than we commonly suppose, including in things
  which we typically judge not to have minds.
• panpsychismdf. The basic physical constituents
  of the universe have mental properties, whether
  or not they are part of living organisms. Nagel

15
PANPSYCHISM II

• For the panpsychist, mind is everywhere. Perhaps
  everything which exists in the physical universe
  is conscious to some degree, or has some kind of
  mental existence, however primitive.

16
HOW MUCH MIND IS THERE?

• And just as we cant be sure from the presence of
  bodies and behavior that other people have minds,
  so we cant be sure from the lack of obvious
  signs of intelligence that other objects do not
  have minds.
• Could trees, rocks, computers, and ice cream be
  conscious? We cant be certain that they are not
  conscious simply because they dont appear to be,
  or dont behave as we do.

17
MIND AND EXTERNAL OBJECTS

• Two rules regarding observation of external world
  objects
• 1) From the fact that an entity exhibits
  mind-like behavior we cant be sure that it has a
  mind. 2) From the fact that an entity fails to
  exhibit mind-like behavior we cant be sure that
  it does not have a mind.

18
THE DISCOVERY OF MIND

• Nagel There is no way for us to discover or
  determine conclusively that other things are
  conscious.
• We could know that other things have minds only
  if we could witness both their mental experiences
  and their external appearances together.
• However, we can witness these things together in
  a single case - our own.
• And we cant tell that other things do not have
  minds when they dont seem to, because we cant
  witness directly that, with the absence of
  mind-like behavior there is in fact an absence of
  mind.

19
MIND IN THE UNIVERSE

• Epistemological conclusions
• I cant really know how much mind there is in the
  universe beyond my own. However, perhaps the
  argument from analogy from my own case suggests
  the presence of mind in some similar cases, and
  its absence in other dissimilar cases.