The Mind-Body Problem

1
The Mind-Body Problem
2
Some Theories of Mind

• Dualism
• Substance Dualism mind and body are differerent
  substances. Mind is unextended and not subject to
  physical laws.
• Interactionism mind and body interact
• Occasionalism/Parallelism mind and body dont
  interact
• Property/Event Dualism
• Epiphenomenalism physical events cause mental
  events but mental events dont cause anything
  (may not be a substance theory)
• Property Dualism(some) mental states are
  irreducibly non-physical attributes of physical
  substances

3
Some Theories of Mind

• Physicalism mental states are identical to
  physical states, in particular, brain states or,
  minimally, supervene upon physical states.
• (Analytical or Logical) Behaviorism talk
  about mental states should be analyzed as talk
  about behavior and behavioral dispositions
• The Identity Theory (Type-Physicalism) mental
  states are identical to (so nothing more than)
  brain states
• Functionalism mental states are to be
  characterized in terms of their causal relations
  to sensory inputs, behavioral outputs and other
  mental states, that is, in terms of their
  functional role.

4
Dualism(s)

• Pro
• Qualia
• Irreducibility of psychology
• The Zombie Argument
• The Cartesian Essentialist Argument

• Con
• Causal closure of the physical
• Simplicity

5
Descartes Arguments for Dualism

• Empirical Argument
• The complexity and flexibility of human behavior,
  including linguistic behavior, couldnt be
  achieved by mere mechanism so we need to assume
  some non-physical substance as an explanation for
  such behavior.
• Essentialist Argument
• It is conceivable that ones mind might exist
  without ones body
• Whatever is conceivable is logically possible
• Therefore, it is possible ones mind might exist
  without ones body
• Therefore ones mind is a different entity from
  ones body

6
The Zombie Argument

• A (philosophical) zombie is a being which is a
  perfect duplicate of a normal human
  beingincluding brain and neural activitybut
  which is not conscious.
• The Zombie Argument for property dualism
• Zombies are conceivable
• Whatever is conceivable is logically possible
• (Some) mental states/properties/events are not
  identical to any brain states/properties/events
• Note this argument doesnt purport to establish
  substance dualism or, as Descartes wished to
  show, that minds/persons could exist in a
  disembodied state.

7
Problem with Cartesian Dualism

• We do not need that hypothesis complex
  behavior can be explained without recourse to
  irreducibly non-physical states.
• Contra Descartes, purely physical mechanisms can
  exhibit the kind of complex, flexible behavior,
  including learning (or learning) characteristic
  of humans.
• All physical events have sufficient causes that
  are themselves physical events
• Physicalism is an aggressor hypothesis we
  explain more and more without recourse to
  non-physical events/states
• Agency explanations are eliminated in favor of
  mechanistic explanationsincluding explanations
  for agency itself.
• Claims to the effect that non-physical events
  cause physical events introduces an even bigger
  mystery what is the mechanism?

8
Epiphenomenalism

• Motivation for Epiphenomenalism
• All physical events have sufficient causes that
  are themselves physical events
• But some mental eventsqualitative states, the
  what-it-is-like experienceseem to be irreducibly
  nonphysical it seems implausible to identify
  them with brain events.
• Problem intuitively some mental states cause
  behavior
• E. g. pain causes people to wince
• Moreover, part of what we mean by pain seems to
  involve an association of with characteristic
  behavior
• Well leave association intentionally vague

9
(Philosophical) Behaviorism

• Motivation
• We want to hold that there are no irreducibly
  non-physical causes of physical events
• But we also need to accommodate the fact that
  what we mean by terms designating mental states
  involves an association with characteristic
  behavior.
• Problems
• Intuitively, theres more to some mental states
  the problem of qualia
• Intuitively, there can be less to mental states
  its conceivable that one may be in a given state
  without even being disposed to characteristic
  behavioror that one may be disposed to
  uncharacteristic behavior
• Dispositions arent causes so, while behaviorism
  associates mental states with behavior, they
  still dont cause behavior.

10
The Identity Theory

• Motivation
• We want to hold that there are no irreducibly
  non-physical causes of physical events
• But we also want to understand them as inner
  states that are causally responsible for
  behavior
• Problems
• Qualia again intuitively there is more to
  consciousness than brain states
• Species chauvinism if we identify a type of
  mental state, e.g. pain, with a type of brain
  state that is responsible for pain in humans,
  e.g. the firing of C-fibers, what do we do about
  non-humans who dont have the same kind of brain
  states but who, we believe, can never the less
  have the same kind of mental states?

11
What a theory of mind should do

• Make sense of consciousness The Hard Problem
• Avoid commitment to irreducibly non-physical
  states, events or substances
• Explain the causal role of mental states as
• Effects of physical events
• Causes of behavior
• Causes of other mental events
• Allow for multiple realizability in order to
  avoid species chauvinism
• We want to be able to ascribe the same kinds of
  mental states we have to humans who may be wired
  differently, other animals and, possibly to
  beings that dont have brains at all, e.g.
  Martians, computers

12
Functionalism

• What makes something a mental state of a
  particular type does not depend on its internal
  constitution, but rather on the way it functions,
  or the role it plays, in the system of which it
  is a part.
• Topic Neutrality mental state concepts dont
  specify their intrinsic character, whether
  physical or non-physicalthats a matter for
  empirical investigation.
• So Functionalism is in principle compatible with
  both physicalism and dualism
• Multiple Realizability A single mental kind
  (property, state, event) can be "realized" by
  many distinct physical kinds.
• The same type of mental state could, in
  principle, be realized by different physical
  (or non-physical) states
• Disagreement about how liberal we should be in
  this regard

13
An Example Pain

• Were interested in analyzing or ordinary concept
  of pain
• We understand it in terms of its causal role
• As being typically produced by certain stimuli,
  e.g. bodily injury
• As tending to produce certain behavior, e.g.
  wincing
• As producing further mental states, e.g.
  resolving to avoid those stimuli in the future
• We recognize that different kinds of physical (of
  non-physical) mechanisms may play that role
• Compare to other functional concepts like can
  opener
• We leave empirical questions to empirical
  investigation

14
The Big Questions About Functionalism

• Consciousness some mental states appear to have
  intrinsic, introspectable featuresand those
  features seem to be essential
• Inverted Qualia (see Block Inverted Earth)
• Zombies
• The Knowledge Argument (see Jackson What Mary
  Didnt Know)
• Understanding controversial whether
  understanding can be reduced to the ability to
  mediate input and output by manipulating symbols
  (see Turing Computing Machinery and
  Intelligence vs. Searle on The Chinese Room
• Some sly questions Can the program of analysis
  be plausibly carried through? Compare to the
  problem of carrying through the phenomenalist
  program. And, if so, could we be stuck with
  species chauvinism again?