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Lecture 9 Scientific Explanation

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Title: Lecture 9 Scientific Explanation


1
Lecture 9Scientific Explanation
2
Is explanation reduction to the familiar?
  • A natural suggestion explaining means to reduce
    something strange (and not understood) to
    something familiar.
  • But sometimes we explain phenomenon A by
    phenomenon B, although B is actually less
    familiar than A.
  • Example Olbers paradox.
  • Why is the sky dark at night?
  • The obvious answer Because there is no sun is
    incorrect.
  • The fact is that from certain plausible
    assumptions (e.g., that the universe is not very
    small, that stars or galaxies are uniformly
    distributed in space, etc.), we should expect
    that the night sky would not look different from
    the sky during the day.
  • The sky at night should not be dark!

3
Olbers paradox
4
Hempels covering law model of explanation
  • The explanation consists of the explanandum (what
    has to be explained) and the explanans (what is
    explaining it).
  • Four basic conditions for explanation
  • The explanation must be an argument where the
    explanandum deductively follows from the
    explanans (in the D-N, or deductive nomological
    explanation), or where the explanandum is made
    highly probable by the explanans (in the I-S, or
    inductive statistical explanation).
  • The explanans must have empirical content, be
    independently testable (to avoid
    pseudo-explanations, like dormitive power,
    entelechy).
  • The explanans must contain at least one general
    law (hence the name, the covering law model).
  • The explanans must be true.

5
What is a law?
  • Law is not any universal generalization.
  • Some generalizations are accidental
    generalizations, like All coins in my pocket are
    HK dollars.
  • How to distinguish between accidental and
    law-like generalizations? The latter support
    counterfactual statements, while the former do
    not.
  • For example, All metals expand when heated
    supports the counterfactual statement If x had
    been a metal, it would have expanded when
    heated.
  • But All coins in my pocket are HK dollars does
    not support the counterfactual statement If x
    had been a coin in my pocket, it would have been
    a HK dollar.

6
Problems with Hempels model
  • One can criticize Hempel in two ways
  • That his conditions are not sufficient, i.e. that
    something can fail to be an explanation, despite
    satisfying all the conditions.
  • That his conditions are not necessary, i.e., that
    something can be an explanation, despite not
    satisfying some of his conditions.
  • Both lines of criticisms have been tried, and
    numerous counterexamples were proposed.
  • Hempels general idea that explanations are
    always arguments was also attacked. It led to his
    defending the structural identity of
    explanation and prediction, which was a special
    source of problems.

7
Not sufficient
  • In some cases, all the conditions are satisfied
    but the explanans is irrelevant for the
    explanandum. For example
  • 1. No man taking contraceptive pills becomes
    pregnant.2. Peter has been taking contraceptive
    pills.Therefore, Peter has not become pregnant.
  • The explanans (1 2) is true, has empirical
    content, contains a general law, and deductively
    entails the explanandum, yet it is not an
    explanation.
  • Another example
  • 1. Everyone who takes a pound of arsenic dies.2.
    Peter took a pound of arsenic.Therefore, Peter
    died.
  • But assume Peter was killed before the poison
    took effect. Again, no explanation although all
    the conditions satisfied.

8
Not sufficient (2)
  • Sometimes, all the conditions are satisfied and
    the explanans is relevant but there is no
    explanation. Take first case C
  • 1. Laws of optics (light rays are straight
    lines).2. Position of the sun and the height of
    the flagpole.Therefore, the length of the
    flagpoles shadow.
  • Good explanation! But now consider D
  • 1. Laws of optics (light rays are straight
    lines).2. Position of the sun and the length of
    the shadow.Therefore, the height of the
    flagpole.
  • Well, this does not look like an acceptable
    explanation at all. Surely, we cannot explain the
    height of the flagpole by the length of its
    shadow! (But Hempels conditions are met.)

9
Not sufficient (3)
  • Two more examples where all the conditions are
    satisfied, the explanans is relevant for the
    explanandum, but does not explain it
  • 1. Laws of meteorology.2. A drop in the
    barometer.Therefore, the storm is coming.
  • We do not think that a barometer drop explains
    the storm.
  • 1. Laws of celestial mechanics (motions of sun,
    planets)2. Present positions and speeds of sun,
    earth and moon.Therefore, the time of the next
    eclipse of the sun.
  • Good explanation! But if using (1) and (2) we
    derive the time of the past eclipse of the sun
    (which is easily done), in that case we do not
    see this derivation (F) as an explanation of the
    past eclipse.

10
Not necessary (condition 1)
  • Let us consider Hempels condition (1), that the
    explanandum has to follow deductively from the
    explanans (D-N) or to be made highly probable by
    it (I-S).
  • The famous counter-example due to Michael
    Scriven
  • Paresis is caused only by untreated syphilis, but
    most people with untreated syphilis do not get
    paresis. John has paresis. Therefore, Johns
    paresis is explained by his untreated syphilis,
    although it cannot be predicted from it.
  • Hempel argued that if most syphilis patients do
    not get paresis, then Johns paresis is not
    explained by his having syphilis.
  • According to him, to explain X is to show that,
    given the facts in the explanans, X was to be
    expected.

11
Not necessary (condition 3)
  • Are the laws really indispensable for
    explanation? Some examples seem to show that this
    central requirement of Hempels covering-law
    model may not be necessary. Consider example H
  • An ink stain on the carpet is explained by my
    knocking over an ink bottle.
  • The idea here is that we explain a situation (ink
    stain) by an event, without postulating any laws
    that cover the two.
  • If the example is not convincing, more persuasive
    illustrations can come from history (the
    assassination of the arch-duke Ferdinand
    explaining the beginning of World War 1) or
    biology (the meteorite explaining the extinction
    of dinosaurs).

12
How to improve on Hempels model
  • The first option is to try to patch up the model,
    especially the defects of sufficiency. In fact,
    all the examples A-F can be subsumed under the
    model if there is an additional requirement of
    causal relationship between the explanans and the
    explanandum.
  • There is a causal influence from the flagpole to
    the shadow (C), but not the other way around (D),
    yes from earlier to later (F) but not from later
    to earlier (F), not from arsenic to death (B),
    nor from contraceptive pill to non-pregnancy (A),
    nor from barometer to storm (E).
  • Hempel and positivists did not like to invoke
    causality because the concept was unclear. It is
    not particularly clear today, but some
    philosophers prefer to analyze explanation in
    terms of causality, without the covering law part.

13
Pragmatics of explanation
  • Van Fraassen emphasizes the importance of
    context. Every explanation is an answer to a
    Why-question, but every question has the form
    of Why this rather that? To understand the
    request for explanation we have to know what the
    contrast class is.
  • When gangster Willie Sutton was asked by the
    judge Why did you rob the banks?, he answered
    Because this is where the money is.
  • He misunderstood (or pretended to misunderstand)
    the judges question. The question was not Why
    did you rob the banks rather than libraries?. It
    was Why did you rob the banks rather than
    getting a job? The contrast class defines the
    Why-question.
  • Different requests for explanation in the
    question Why did Adam eat the apple?, depending
    on what is emphasized (Adam, eat, or apple).

14
Contrast class
  • Take the paresis example (G). Is syphilis the
    explanation of Johns paresis? Well, it depends
    on what is the contrast class.
  • If the question is why John, rather than someone
    without syphilis, got paresis, then syphilis is
    the explanation.
  • But if the question is why John, rather than
    someone else with syphilis, got paresis, then
    syphilis is not the explanation.
  • In the flagpole and the shadow example (C), we
    can actually imagine a context in which the
    length of the shadow would explain the height of
    the flagpole.
  • For example, a flagpole of a given height is
    chosen just because at a crucial time of the day
    it gives a shadow of the same length as a
    romantically important person who stood at that
    place in a memorable moment in the past.
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