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Telecomm history and regulation

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Title: Telecomm history and regulation


1
Telecomm history and regulation
  • MGT 825

2
Brief History of Telecommunications
  • 1876 Alexander Graham Bell receives patent for
    the telephone. Bell speaks the first complete
    sentence transmitted by a variable resistance
    transmitter (Mr. Watson, come here. I want
    you!). The first two way conversation takes
    place between Cambridgeport and Boston.
  • 1878 The first telephone exchange is opened in
    New Haven CT with 28 subscribers.
  • 1885 - - The certificate of incorporation for the
    American Telephone and Telegraph Company is filed
    in New York City. Its broad claim...to establish
    telephone communication to cities on the American
    continent and elsewhere around the world by wire,
    cable and "other appropriate means".
  • Bell system built out over and between major
    urban areas in the 1880s-1890s.

3
  • 1893/1894 principal Bell system patents expired.
    98 independent commercial telephone systems were
    established, both in cities that American Bell
    had originally bypassed and in competition with
    ATT.
  • Build-out of independent systems peaked in 1907,
    with independent systems accounting for 50 of
    telephones (about 3mm). In 1907, 50 of US
    cities had competing telephone services.

4
How could this happen if network externalities
were important?
  • Evidence (Mobius 2001) that competing systems in
    cities served ethnically and socioeconomically
    islands of customers.
  • 75 of calls social according to data from the
    turn of the century.
  • Many businesses subscribed to both phone networks
    in a city.

5
How did ATT regain its Monopoly?
  • By the 1920s, ATT had regained its monopoly over
    telephone service.
  • Acquisitions
  • Demand forces from businesses who did not want to
    subscribe to both.
  • Bell system extensions and improvements to long
    distance service made their local services
    relatively more attractive consumers switched.
  • ATT long lines initially refused to interconnect
    with competing local carriers.
  • Predation? (Weiman and Levin 1994)
  • ATT CEO motto One policy, one system, one
    Universal Service

6
ATT divisions (pre-1984)
  • Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs)
  • Provided local telephone service.
  • ATT Long Lines
  • Provided long distance service
  • Western Electric
  • Provided Equipment
  • Bell Laboratories
  • RD (invented, among other things, the transistor)

7
Early Regulatory History
  • By 1925, RBOC price regulations in most states.
  • Entry sometimes explicitly forbidden.
  • Federal Communications Commission created in
    1934.
  • FCC regulated long distance rates. Any changes
    to the service required approval.

8
Universal Service
  • Universal service requirements an important
    component of state and federal regulations.
  • Universal service arguably necessitated
    cross-subsidization in telecomm pricing.
  • Certainly, urban consumers subsidized rural ones.
  • Arguably, long-distance/business customers
    subsidized local residential service.
  • Universal service under the 1996 Telecomm Act
    includes 411 service, 911 service, touch tone,
    operator access, access to a long distance
    carrier.

9
What precipitated the ATT antitrust case?
  • Competitors like MCI wanted to enter the long
    distance market, using new microwave technology.
  • FCC allowed limited long distance competition.
  • Complex regulatory issues because high long
    distance rates allegedly cross-subsidized
    universal local service.

10
ATT breakup
  • 1974 DOJ filed an antitrust case against ATT.
  • 1984 ATT broken up into
  • ATT Long Distance service
  • Faced serious competition from MCI, Sprint,
    others.
  • Average revenues per minute for interstate and
    international calls originating in the United
    States dropped from 62 cents per minute in 1983
    to 10 cents per minute in 2001.
  • 7 RBOCs
  • Remained monopolies in local telephone service
    and intrastate toll service.
  • Often intrastate toll calls more expensive than
    interstate long distance calls
  • Not allowed to enter the long distance market,
    provide certain other services, or manufacture
    equipment.

Rationale?
11
Alphabet Soup
  • RBOC Regional Bell Operating Company
  • ILEC Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier
  • ILEC RBOCs GTE SNET Cincinnati Bell
    plus a few others.

12
Purpose of the 1996 Telecom Act
  • Attempt to end the monopoly franchise system
    governing local wireline calling.
  • Set the conditions by which carriers would be
    allowed to provide local and long-distance
    services.
  • Requirement that ILECs provide network access to
    CLECs at regulated rates.
  • Include long-distance, cable, wireless firms.
  • Once the local market was shown to be
    functionally open to competition, the ILECs were
    allowed to enter the long-distance market, offer
    TV services, and manufacture equipment.

13
Other provisions in the Act
  • Phase out of price controls on cable TV
  • Mandated telecommunications subsidies to public
    schools.
  • Relaxed restrictions on cross-ownership of media
    properties.

14
Unbundled network elements (UNEs)
  • CLECs to petition FCC for access to the ILECs
    network. The idea was that CLECs would partially
    (and perhaps temporarily) use part of the ILECs
    network, while building out their own facilities.
  • For example, cell phone users need to receive
    calls from and send calls to the local loop.
  • FCC to consider, at a minimum, whetherthe
    failure to provide access to such network
    elements would impair the ability of the
    telecommunications carrier seeking access to
    provide the services that it seeks to offer

15
UNEs (continued)
  • FCC authority to determine which switches, lines,
    etc. would be shared and how UNE would be priced.
  • Later, FCC required all ILECs to provide all
    elements of the network platform (UNE-P) at
    regulated rates, allowing CLECs to resell ILEC
    services.

16
UNEs pricing
  • 1996 Act held that prices charged should be based
    on cost (Section 252d(1))
  • Left it to the FCC to define cost
  • State regulators to actually implement the FCC
    cost formula
  • Cost formula FCC established Total Element Long
    Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC)

17
TELRIC
  • Forward looking, long-run, (minimized) economic
    cost of an unbundled element, including the
    competitive return on capital.
  • Long run means costs measured with reference to
    a period long enough such that all costs are
    avoidable.
  • Forward looking means replacement cost rather
    than historic cost.
  • Cost calculation assumes the most efficient
    telecommunications technology currently available
    and the lowest cost network configuration, given
    the existing location of the incumbent LECs wire
    centers.
  • Fixed costs not directly linked to the element,
    such as executives, billing costs, etc. cant be
    included.

18
Example
  • CLEC wants to rent copper loop into a house from
    a ILEC
  • Payment to the ILEC based on what it would cost
    to build a brand new copper loop with the most
    efficient and lowest cost equipment available
    today, without consideration of what the ILEC
    actually paid historically to construct it.
  • Functionally, its an AC measure.

ATT embarks on a CLEC strategy
19
Arguments for/against UNEs/TELRIC
  • For
  • More competition is better
  • UNE-P a possible stepping stone to
    facilities-based CLEC competition.
  • Certain parts of the network may have natural
    monopoly characteristics, but other parts dont.
    Allow entrant to rent the parts that do.
  • ILEC investments were made under a regulatory
    regime with protected rates of return.

20
Against
  • TELRIC prices discourage facilities-based entry.
  • Why enter if you can get access to ILECs network
    on the cheap?
  • TELRIC doesnt compensate ILECs for their
    historical costs.
  • State PUCs were random in implementing TELRIC,
    leading to unacceptable cross-state variation in
    what ILECs can charge for unbundling.
  • TELRIC removes ILECs incentives to invest in
    risky new services/technology
  • If it doesnt work out, ILEC stuck paying for it.
  • If it does work out, CLEC can just rent it at
    cost.

21
Slow death of UNEs
  • Bush FCC chairs not fans of UNEs.
  • Court decisions limiting the scope of UNEs.
  • Bush admin didnt appeal.
  • UNEs deemed not appropriate for broadband
    infrastructure.
  • UNE-P effectively eliminated.

France, Korea, Japan going in the other direction
22
Telecomm meltdown in local-long distance
telephone markets
  • As of June 2003, 3.4 of end-users were served
    over CLEC-owned facilities.
  • Most CLECs went bankrupt
  • CLECs disproportionately serve large businesses,
    institutions, and government customers.
  • RBOCs have been approved to enter the
    long-distance markets in all states.

UNE-P CLECs
Facility CLECs
23
Mergers
  • 7 RBOCs -gt 3 surviving
  • Vertical re-integration
  • ATT SBC BellSouth
  • MCI - Verizon

Why was local and long distance broken up in the
first place, and why is it okay to put it back
together now?
Some conditions put on mergers Net neutrality
for a time, naked DSL, etc.
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