Embodiment and Intersubjectivity

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Embodiment and Intersubjectivity

• Nick Crossley

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The body was at the centre of the classical
philosophical formulation of the problem of
intersubjectivity

• Mind and body are distinct.
• Body is perceivable from outside, by (external)
  perception.
• Mind (subjectivity) isnt. Mind is only knowable
  through introspection.
• How do I know that your body contains a mind?
• How do I know what you are thinking?
• Your body is my only clue but its only a clue.

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This might be a questionable starting point but
it highlights the corporeal nature of the social
world.

• Face-to-face is just that.
• The interaction that generates the social world
  is necessarily and irreducibly embodied.
• And intersubjectivity must hinge upon embodiment
  (unless its telepathy!).
• Intersubjectivity rests upon intercorporeality
  (Merleau-Ponty).
• The social world presupposes an intercorporeal
  foundation.

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Solutions

• Many solutions rest upon the notion of analogy
• Your body looks like mine.
• It behaves like mine.
• My body contains a mind.
• So perhaps your does too.

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Husserl Analogical Apperception

• Apperception perceiving more than we actually
  see e.g. backs of houses, weight of heavy
  objects etc.
• Works by habitus and pairing
  (typification) e.g. this computer with my own.
• Problem- Ive never seen anothers consciousness
  so what do I pair with?

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Husserl Analogical apperception (2)

• I pair other with self.
• Even in the absence of intersubjective relations
  I know my own mind (my spehre of ownness).
• E.g. I know what pain feels like, so when I see
  you behaving as I behave when I am in pain in
  project my pain experriences onto you.

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But

• This presupposes mind/body dualism embodied
  behaviour as a signal of mental states which
  belong to another realm.
• I cant see much of my own behaviour (esp. my
  face).
• My sense of what is mine already presupposes
  the perspective of the other and thus
  intersubjectivity.
• If subjectivity was truly private and disembodied
  there would be no words (in a shared language) to
  describe it.
• Etc.

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We need an alternative approach (using Mead,
Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, Ryle)

• Behaviour is not an external expression of events
  in a disembodied mental realm.
• To be meaningful embodied behaviour must be
  embedded in shared forms of life.
• We learn, socially, to ascribe mental states to
  ourselves, based upon public criteria.
• Our sense of self and other are achieved
  coterminously, in interaction (play/games).
• Etc.

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Underlying this is embodied interaction
(intercorporeality)

• A conversation of gestures.
• An embodied grasp upon (the role of) the other.
• An embodied grasp of the games of the social
  world, esp. language games.

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Empathy is embodied

• You drop a weight on your toe and I cringe.
• You walk a tightrope and I wobble.
• I finish your sentences.
• I feel shame, pride, guilt in your presence.
• I feel you looking at me.

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However, even if our subjectivity is embodied and
thus public in principle (philosophically)

• Experience is privatised in modern societies
  (Elias).
• There are norms of acceptable expression/disclosur
  e.
• And it is strategically advantageous to control
  information flow (Goffman).
• We learn to keep secrets, control our expression,
  lie and present self

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Perhaps social life requires it

• Some interactions are functionally specific the
  bus driver doesnt need to know my life story and
  doesnt want to know.
• Relations presuppose repulsion/distance as well
  as attraction/proximity (Simmel)
• Even romantic attachments are only kept
  excitement through the gaps that allow for
  imaginative projection and hide and seek.
  (Simmel).
• But in cases akin to the latter this generates a
  tension (and that is the point)

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So the problem of intersubjectivity comes back in
a sociological form

• The body of the other reveals but perhaps only
  what they want it reveal e.g. in emotional
  labour.
• The body of the other tells two stories
  (Bateson/double bind).
• Assurances may never be enough.
• Intersubjectivity has to be negotiated (face
  work, accountability/reflexivity, reparation
  etc.)
• Simmels tension drives interaction.