Traditional and NonTraditional

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• Traditional and Non-Traditional
• Conflict Management UNI 360Y Fall 2005
• Week 3
• Alan S. Alexandroff, alan_at_alexandroff.com
• Research Director, PCMN

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Summary

• The new and old puzzles (revisited)
• The Changing II Architecture
• BoP
• Realist Diplomacy
• Preemption and Prevention
• Balance of Threat
• Soft Balancing

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The New Puzzles

• The puzzle of U.S. Exceptionalism
• A Shining Example
• A Liberal Involvement
• A Conservative Spread of Democracy
• The conundrum of the individual in international
  relations
• Interventions good and bad
• Humanitarian intervention
• Regime change

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The Debate
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Taxonomy of Conflict Management

• Traditional Structures
• Inter-State International Law and Organization
• State Sovereignty
• Realism/Neo-Realism
• Diplomacy and Force

• Non-Traditional Structures
• International Human Rights Laws
• Individuals
• Wilsonianism
• Democracy and Freedom

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Taxonomy(Contd)

• Traditional
• Operations
• Balance of Power
• Concert Creation Management
• Mediation
• Cooperation and Conflict
• Force

• Non-Traditional
• Courts,Truth Comm. Tribunals
• Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR) Elites
• PSW
• ICR Citizens
• Citizen Engagement

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THIRD AXIS
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Classic System
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Wilsonianism
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21st CenturyPost Cold War Engagement
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21st CenturyPax Americana
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Elements of BoP

• Self Help-Preserving Independence (an anarchic
  system means no central governing authority)
• Preserve the State System-(states will form
  defensive alliances and acquire capabilities)
• Prevent Dominance power competition is a fact
  of IR

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BoP II

• The Peace Requirement?
• Status Quo/Flux Doctrine
• Motivation-general good or self interest?

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Motivation of Statesmen

• Offensive Realism-Aggressive Hegemon
• Another structural theory
• A struggle for survival-in a world of anarchy
• Status quo powers rarely found
• Look for opportunities to gain power
• Ultimate goal to become the hegemon
• All effort to maximize power create
  security-increase odds of survival and leaves
  open the possibility of achieving hegemony

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OffensiveRealism I

• Structure drives state behavior
• Absence of a central authority
• The capability to act
• Uncertain over others intentions (security
  dilemma)

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Offensive Realism II

• IR is a ruthless dangerous business
• States seek to maximize share of world
  power-gaining power at the expense of others
• The coming challenge
• Ultimate aim to be a hegemon
• States have revisionist intentions
• A desire to alter the balance of power
• Defend BoP when others seek hegemony

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Kaplan, KissingerMetternich Hitler

• Prince Clemens von Metternich- A World Restored
• Alliances on philosophical values
• Not a focus on ethnic identification
• Napoleon-The Revolutionary Chieftain
• Kissingers realism
• Struggling against appeasement
• Kissingers shortcomings

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Architecture ofIR

• Objective of all statesmen
• Create a balance of fear, cooperation, and
  defensive mechanisms
• Not a just or fair system but accepted by all-and
  as long as maintained dealt with all
  revolutionary changes
• Cannot settle international disputes on good
  faith and a willingness to agree
• The great threat to IR

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The End of Balancing?

• Did not fear US states acquired deterrence with
  nuclear weapons their existence not at issue
• US did not involve itself it secessionist
  movements of second-tier powers China, India
  and Russia
• A post imperial age?

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NSS Preemption and Prevention

• Our priority will be to disrupt and destroy
  terrorist organizations of global reach and
• We must be prepared to stop rogue states and
  their terrorist clients before they are able to
  threaten or use weapons of mass destruction
  against the United States and our allies,

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Preemption andPrevention

• We will disrupt and destroy terrorist
  organizations by
• the United States can no longer solely rely on a
  reactive posture as we have in the past.
• We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to
  the capabilities and objectives of todays
  adversaries

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Means

• Proactive Counterproliferation
• Strengthened Non-Proliferation
• Effective Consequence Management

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The Liberal Institutional Dilemma

• NSS argues traditional concepts of deterrence
  will not work against a terrorist enemy whose
  avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the
  targeting of innocents
• (preemption and prevention)For centuries,
  international law recognized that nations need
  not suffer an attack before they can lawfully
  take action to defend themselves against forces
  that present an imminent danger of attack

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Balance ofThreat

• Competition between great nations is inevitable,
  but armed conflict in our world is not.More and
  More civilized nations find ourselves on the same
  side united by common dangers of terrorist
  violence and chaos.
• ( George W. Bush, West Point speech, June 1,
  2002)
• Gaddis other great powers prefer management of
  the international system by a single hegemon as
  long as its a relatively benign one. When
  theres only one superpower, theres no point for
  anyone else to compete with it in military
  capabilities. - from Bush West Point speech
• America has, and intends to keep, military
  strengths beyond challenge. from Bush west
  Point speech

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A New Doctrine

• The attack on multilateralism and collective
  action
• NSS argues not just preemption but also
  prevention
• Preempt in the process of mobilizing military
  forces deny the aggressor the advantages of
  completing the first move
• Preventive war is designed to keep an opponent
  from acquiring military capabilities long before
  it mobilizes maybe years

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BofT II

• Unilateralism
• Open US political system
• Institutional arrangements
• Sufficient institutional glue
• Focus not on power but threats
• Balance to deal with threats
• Power, proximity, offensive power, offensive
  intentions

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Soft Balancing

• The efforts of second-tier powers
• Territorial denial
• Entangling diplomacy
• Economic strengthening (regional trading blocs)
• Effective coalition behavior that signals a
  commitment to resist the superpowers future
  ambitions

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Effecting Soft Balancing

• Hegemons actions a concern but not a threat to
  sovereignty for second-tier powers
• Dominant state a source of benefits in both the
  economic and security areas that cannot be easily
  replaced
• Unlikely the dominant stae will retaliate