BIOSECURITY

1
BIOSECURITY BIOSAFETY A NON-PROLIFERATION
INSTRUMENT

• Marc Finaud,
• Geneva Centre for Security Policy,
• Moscow, 9 September, 2005

2
DEFINITIONS

• BIOSAFETY Set of standards and procedures
  defining all aspects of protection of workers
  and the environment against accidental
  dissemination of biological agents, including
  technology to ensure confinement of pathogens
  (filters, sealed equipment, etc.).
• BIOSECURITY Procedures aimed at avoiding
  deliberate dissemination of pathogens (by theft,
  diversion or other hostile acts).

3
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

• A biological weapon (BW) is a system capable of
  disseminating pathogens (biological or toxic
  agents), natural, or genetically modified to
  enhance their characteristics.
• Developments in biotechnology could be used for
  the production or the improvement of BW and
  provide access to new biological agents better
  suited to military uses, making vaccines and
  treatments more complex.

4
INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS

• 1925 Geneva Protocol bans the use in war of
  asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and
  bacteriological methods of warfare. Not
  prohibited use in internal conflicts, threat of
  use, production, RD 133 ratifications with many
  reservations (retaliation).
• 1972 Biological Toxin Weapons Convention No
  verification. 152 ratifications. Expert Group
  negotiating Confidence Transparency Measures,
  incl. a Code of Conduct for Scientists.
• Australia Group control of dissemination and
  transfer of equipment, items and technology in
  both biological and chemical fields of interest
  for proliferating countries or terrorist
  organisations (Lists covering main dual-use areas
  with a catch-all clause to control exports of
  unlisted items).

5
NATIONAL PREVENTION MEASURES

• UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (28/04/04)
  all States () shall adopt and enforce
• () effective laws which prohibit any non-State
  actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop,
  transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or
  biological weapons and their means of delivery
  ()
• () measures to establish domestic controls to
  prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical,
  or biological weapons and their means of
  delivery, including by establishing appropriate
  controls over related materials ()
• (a) () measures to account for and secure such
  items in production, use, storage or transport
• (b) () physical protection measures
• (c) () border controls and law enforcement
  efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat ()
  the illicit trafficking and brokering in such
  items ()
• (d) () national export and trans-shipment
  controls over such items, including () criminal
  or civil penalties for violations of such export
  control laws and regulations.

6
THE TERRORIST RISK

• So far, terrorist attempts to acquire biological
  agents have fallen short of successful
  weaponization. Only 2 significant biological
  attacks
• Japanese religious sect Aum Shinrikyo failed to
  weaponize botulinum toxin and anthrax, and used
  chemical agent sarin for attacks in a Tokyo
  subway in 1994 and 1995.
• In 1984 in Dalles, Oregon, a religious cult,
  Rajneesh, disseminated salmonella bacteria in 10
  restaurants, infecting 750 people, but with no
  fatalities.
• In October 2001, letters containing anthrax sent
  to members of US Congress and the media, killed 5
  and infected 18 others. Mass disruption and
  billions of dollars in decontamination and
  prevention expenses.

7
THE TERRORIST RISK

• Required quantities for lethal effect
• Weapon Grams
• Aerial explosives 320 million
• Fragmentation cluster bombs 32 million
• Hydrocyanic acid 32 million
• Mustard gas 3.2 million
• Sarin nerve gas 800,000
• Radiological weapon 5,000
• Type A botulinal toxin 80
• Anthrax spores 8
• Attack on a water supply
• Potassium cyanide 18,000
• Nerve agent VX 100
• Typhoid culture 1

8
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR)

• G8 Global Partnership 2002gt2012 20bn to help
  Russia FSU to destroy or secure WMD
  WMD-related materials. Priority to Nuclear
  Chemical Weapons/Materials. International Science
  Technology Center (ISTC).
• US Bilateral CTR Programs

9
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR)

• THE EU THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
• 2003-2006 (in M)

10
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR)

• Russian BW Complex
• early 1990s 65,000 personnel 50 facilities,
  huge quantities of agents
• 2000 15,000 personnel 50 labs insecure (2002
  GAO Report).

11
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR)

• International Cooperation Programs
• USA (FY2005)
• Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention
  (DoD) 55M
• Improved safety/security of dangerous pathogen
  collections (2004 11.2M 2005 24.6M).

12
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR)

• France 5M (2003-2004) Biosecurity Program to
  develop new prophylactic and therapeutic means
  for fighting bioterrorism
• 1. Securing pathogens by applying international
  norms to labs
• 2. Training Russian scientists on international
  norms in the framework of scientific
  collaboration
• 3. Joint research in New Generation Therapies in
  conformity with pharmaceutical norms.
• Framework ISTC

13
SCIENTIST REDIRECTION PROGRAMS

• Moscow ISTC
• 1994-2004 600M 60,000 scientists employed.
• 2004 56M for 193 projects, grants to 27,104
  scientists 9,012 full-time/yr
• Biotechnology 31.6 of new projects 38.7 of
  funding.

14
.
Source ISTC Annual Report 2004
15
IDENTIFIED AREAS OF COOPERATION

• Consolidating eliminating dangerous pathogens
  collections
• Upgrading biosafety biosecurity of microbial
  collections and research facilities
• Strengthening epidemiological surveillance
• Integrating coordinating disease surveillance
  systems, incl. Anti-Plague Institutes
• Computerizing paper archives on past disease
  outbreaks
• Training of scientists on proliferation risks
• Improving access to facilities
• Establishing single point of contact of
  government.

16
SOURCES

• John Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals, Tracking
  Weapons of Mass Destruction, Carnegie Endowment
  for International Peace, 2002
• Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control, A Guide to
  Negotiations and Agreements, Peace Research
  Institute, Oslo, 2001
• http//http//www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwiss
  uebrief.asp
• http//www.bioterrorism.slu.edu/bt/products/ahec_c
  hem/ppt/17
• http//www.defense.gouv.fr/portal_repository/15912
  0745__0001/fichier/getData?_ispopup1
• http//www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00138.pdf
• http//cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/possess.htm56
• http//www.ransac.org/Issues/U.S.-Russian20Nonpro
  liferation20Programs/Chemical20and20Biological
  20Weapons/Biological20Weapons/624200331413PM.html
  
• http//cns.miis.edu/research/globpart/funding.htm
  
• http//www.istc.ru/ISTC/sc.nsf/html/annual-report.
  htm
• http//cns.miis.edu/research/globpart/pottertalk.h
  tm