3. Morals and Motivation

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3. Morals and Motivation

• PY 3702
• Antti Kauppinen
• Martinmas Semester 2007

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I Moral Motivation in Metaethics
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Moral Judgment

• Moral judgment is a generic term for the kind
  of psychological state were in when we take
  something to be morally right, wrong, or
  obligatory
• Many of the arguments in metaethical discussions
  could be naturally extended to other types of
  normative judgment, such as (arguably) normative
  statements about what expressions mean
• Note that sometimes in the literature people use
  the term for the corresponding speech act, such
  as the utterance of Cheating on your partner is
  morally wrong

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Moral Judgment and Utterance

• Moral judgment in our psychological sense can
  also be characterized as the mental state that
  utterances of moral sentences express
• Expression is not a causal notion here, unlike in
  the case of, say, wincing and pain utterances
  can express judgments that the speaker doesnt
  hold
• In this sense, when I say The parliament is on
  fire, I am expressing the belief that the
  parliament is on fire, even if I in fact think
  that the parliament is perfectly fine
• A simple way to cash this out is to say that a
  sentence expresses its sincerity conditions
• My utterance of The parliament is on fire is
  sincere if I really do believe that the
  parliament is on fire my utterance of I promise
  to bring the book back tomorrow is sincere if,
  inter alia, I intend to return the book
• So, when is a moral utterance sincere?

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Investigating Moral Judgment

• There are various empirical questions that can be
  asked about moral judgments
• What biological and sociological factors
  influence the moral principles people hold?
• What is the role of affective reactions in
  leading to particular verdicts?
• Philosophical views, by contrast, make few
  empirical assumptions
• What are characteristically moral ways of
  arriving at decisions like?
• What are the necessary and sufficient conditions
  for someone having made a genuine moral judgment?
  In other words, when are psychological
  attributions like John thinks we have an
  obligation to intervene in Darfur true?

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Investigating the Nature of Moral Judgment

• The standard manner of discovering how things
  must be for a psychological state to count as
  moral judgment is by way of locating patterns in
  our intuitive reactions to particular cases (the
  Method of Cases)
• That is, we consider actual and hypothetical
  scenarios involving agents, utterances, actions,
  and attitudes, and try to formulate an analysis
  in other terms that makes sense of our reactions
  to them
• Hypothetical scenarios are essential, since we
  are trying to find out what is necessary for
  moral judgment, not merely an accident of how
  things happen to be in the actual world
• Compare with the process of analysing knowledge
  we consider putative cases of someone knowing
  something, note that what they have in common is
  that they involve beliefs that are not only true
  but justified, and then refine the analysis in
  response to counterexamples
• The end result is a better understanding or even
  knowledge about the essence of knowledge, or at
  least our concept of knowledge

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Moral Judgment and Motivation

• Pre-philosophically, it appears that genuine
  moral convictions make a difference to peoples
  lives
• For example, people who are convinced that we
  have a moral obligation to provide health care to
  everyone support politicians who advocate it and
  are content to pay the necessary taxes
• This raises the question of whether corresponding
  motivation is essential to thinking that
  something is a moral obligation
• The main reason why metaethicists are interested
  in this connection is that it seems to support a
  conception of moral judgments as conative
  (non-cognitive) states

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Humes Argument

• Morality is supposed to influence our passions
  and actions ... And this is confirmed by common
  experience, which informs us that men are often
  governed by their duties, and are deterred from
  some actions by the opinion of injustice, and
  impelled to others by that of obligation
• Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood
  ... It can never in the least concern us to know
  that such objects are causes, and such others
  effects, if both the causes and effects be
  indifferent to us ... As reason is nothing but
  the discovery of this connection, it cannot be by
  its means that the objects are able to affect us
• So, When you pronounce any action or character
  to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from
  the constitution of your nature you have a
  feeling or sentiment of blame from the
  contemplation of it ... To have the sense of
  virtue is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a
  particular kind from the contemplation of a
  character. The very feeling constitutes our
  praise or admiration

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The Humean argument for non-cognitivism

• Moral judgments are essentially motivating (moral
  judgment internalism)
• All psychological states have either a
  mind-to-world or world-to-mind direction of fit
• Only psychological states with a world-to-mind
  direction of fit are essentially motivating. (The
  Humean Theory of Motivation)
• Therefore, moral judgments have a world-to-mind
  direction of fit that is, they are non-cognitive
  states

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Direction of Fit

• Compare the following scenarios
• Gordon is in a supermarket. He has a piece of
  paper with the following text on it Milk,
  butter, cheese, beer. Glancing at the paper, he
  puts milk, butter, cheese, and beer in his
  basket.
• A reporter is following Gordon in a supermarket.
  As Gordon puts milk, butter, cheese, and beer in
  his basket, the reporter writes down on a piece
  of paper the following text Milk, butter,
  cheese, beer.
• In the first case, the text has what we might
  call a basket-to-list direction of fit its
  functional role is fulfilled when the basket fits
  the list
• In the second case, the text has a
  list-to-basket direction of fit its functional
  role is fulfilled when the list fits the basket

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Classifying Mental States

• Anscombe and Searle have proposed to divide
  mental states according to their direction of fit
• World-to-mind desire, intention, wish
• Mind-to-world belief, supposition
• Cashing out the metaphor has proven difficult
• Michael Smith A mental state S(p) has a
  mind-to-world direction of fit if it tends to go
  out of existence when the agent has evidence that
  not-p, and a world-to-mind fit otherwise
• But what is the direction of fit of emotions like
  anger, for example?

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The Humean Theory of Motivation

• States with different directions of fit play
  different roles
• Only states with the mind-to-world direction of
  fit can be true if the world matches their
  content
• Only states with the world-to-mind direction of
  fit can lead to action, bringing about the fit by
  changing the world
• Thus, beliefs alone are motivationally inert
• I may believe that there is ice cream in the
  fridge, but unless I want some ice cream, I have
  no motivation to go to the bridge and get some

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Moral Judgment Internalism

• Moral judgment internalism (MJI) is the view that
  an agent who judges that she morally ought to f
  will necessarily have (some) motivation to f
• Internalism is thus a modal thesis, not just a
  claim about the actual world
• Internalism comes in many varieties, as we will
  soon see
• Note that as I have formulated it, internalism is
  a thesis in the first instance about
  first-personal, present-tense ought-judgments
• Other moral judgments may imply ought-judgments,
  but there may be some slack if I think it is
  morally wrong to smoke, I may be committed to
  thinking that I morally ought not to smoke, but
  fail to draw the conclusion
• Other moral judgments have a looser connection to
  ought-judgments (and thus motivation even on the
  internalist account)
• Marcus Aurelius was a good man

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Moral Judgment Externalism

• Moral judgment externalism is simply the denial
  of internalism
• (EXT) If an agent judges that she morally ought
  to ?, she will have some degree of motivation to
  ? only if there is some further contingent fact
  about her that forms a link between judgment and
  motivation.
• For example, the simplest externalist view is
  that moral judgments are motivationally as inert
  as other beliefs, and thus require the further
  contingent fact that the agent wants to do what
  is morally right to lead to any action
• So, just like if I believe Atonement is playing
  in the movie theatre but dont want to see it, I
  wont go to the movies, if I believe that serving
  my country is my duty but dont have the desire
  to do what is my duty, I wont have any
  motivation to serve my country

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Humean Argument Recap

• Some version of the HTM is the received view in
  the philosophy of action, though it has become
  increasingly unpopular
• Since HTM is independently plausible and the
  conjunction of HTM and internalism leads to
  non-cognitivism, the view that moral judgments do
  not purport to represent how things are, the
  internalist claim has received much scrutiny in
  metaethics

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II The Dialectic Between Internalism and
Externalism
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Very Strong Internalism

• In its strongest form, internalism states a
  necessary connection between moral judgment and
  action
• (VSI) If an agent judges that she morally ought
  to ?, she will necessarily ? unless prevented by
  some external circumstance
• The motivation for VSI comes from cases of
  hypocrisy
• Suppose your friend John likes to rail against
  people who live on government handouts. He makes
  it very clear he values independence and hard
  work instead. But one day as youre on your way
  to class a little earlier than usual, you walk
  past the Government Handout Agency and spy John
  at the top of the queue, receiving a wad of cash
  from a clerk and being greeted like an old friend
  by him.

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Weakness of Will

• Though most philosophers acknowledge the need to
  make sense of hypocrisy, virtually nobody
  subscribes to VSI, because it appears to make
  moral akrasia or weakness of will impossible
• Surely there are people who genuinely think that,
  say, adultery is wrong, in spite of once yielding
  to temptation
• In cases of weakness of will, we act against our
  best judgment, because some consideration plays a
  causal role that is disproportionately strong
  compared to its subjective normative weight
• The source may be either the attractiveness of
  the object of the wayward desire or
  unattractiveness of the object of the best
  judgment

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Strong Internalism

• In response to cases of weakness of will,
  internalists typically retreat to what I will
  call strong internalism
• (SI) If an agent judges that she morally ought to
  ?, she will necessarily have some motivation to ?
• Strong internalism allows that some other source
  of motivation may override moral motivation, but
  requires that there is some internal motivational
  conflict for the judgment to count as genuine
• Either the agent must be torn between what she
  regards as morally obligatory and what would
  please her most, or at least, if she gives in to
  temptation or pressure, she must feel guilt or
  shame
• So, suppose your friend John at the Government
  Handouts confesses he takes the money because his
  mother insists so, and that he cant sleep at
  night for doing something so base

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Externalist Counterexamples I

• Externalists thus have to show that there can be
  people who act against their moral judgments
  without any conflict or guilt
• One such character is the amoralist or cynic
• Virginia asks Patrick to help a politically
  persecuted stranger, appealing first to his
  compassion for such victims. Patrick rather
  wearily tells her that he has no inclination to
  concern himself with the plight of strangers.
  Virginia then appeals to explicit moral
  considerations in this case, helping the
  strangers is his moral obligation and a matter of
  fighting enormous injustice. Patrick readily
  declares that he agrees with her moral
  assessment, but nevertheless cannot be bothered
  to help. Virginia presses him further, arguing
  that the effort required is minimal and, given,
  his position, will cost him close to nothing.
  Patrick responds that the cost is not really the
  issue, he just does not care to concern himself
  with such matters. Later he shows absolutely no
  sign of regret for either his remarks or his
  failure to help. (Svavarsdottir, 'Moral
  Cognitivism and Motivation', Phil Review 108 (2),
  176)

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Internalism and Amoralists

• Strong internalists must show that amoralists are
  not really conceivable, though they appear to be
  so
• R. M. Hares early suggestion was that the
  putative amoralists speak in inverted commas
• They in effect say that It would be morally
  obligatory to help the persecuted, merely
  reporting what other people think about the case,
  without committing themselves to the norm
  reported
• Compare saying Eric Clapton is the greatest
  guitarist ever when you dont particularly like
  Clapton
• Thus, the amoralist does not really make the
  judgment, so it is no objection to internalism
  that he lacks inner conflict

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Brink and Smith on Amoralists

• David Brink and Svavarsdottir reject the inverted
  commas response, since their amoralists make
  creative moral judgments that may even go against
  what anyone else thinks
• Michael Smith provides a different response to
  the amoralist, according to which his
  understanding of moral concepts must be only
  superficial
• Compare to a blind persons understanding of
  colour concepts they possess concepts like red
  only parasitically on those who can see colours

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Externalist Counterexamples II

• Another type of case in which the connection
  between moral judgment and corresponding
  motivation is broken is that of wicked or Satanic
  agents who are motivated to do something
  precisely because they think it is wrong
• Miltons Satan Evil be thou my good!
• St. Augustine confesses that, in his youth, he
  and some friends once stole pears from a
  neighbour, just because it was wrong they had no
  interest whatsoever in the pears and could get
  much tastier fruit along morally acceptable and
  less strenuous routes. (Björnsson, 339)

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Internalism and Wickedness

• One strong internalist response is to deny that
  truly wicked agents are intelligible we can
  always give a better interpretation of purported
  counterexamples
• Miltons Satan in fact thought he was morally
  wronged by God and wanted to get back to him by
  doing things that God regarded as bad, not things
  that he thought were wrong
• Another line of response is to say that it is
  precisely the motivational pull of the moral
  judgment that makes striving for the forbidden
  fruit so sweet
• Björnsson bungee jumping would be no fun if you
  werent scared
• There is a certain joy of transgression in
  overcoming your own better self but for that to
  be any kind of achievement, you really feel the
  need to do the right thing

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Externalist Counterexamples III

• Another set of cases of people lacking moral
  motivation are the listless, who have no desire
  to do anything, perhaps no will to live, as we
  say
• Consider an unfortunate person someone who is
  neither amoral nor wicked who is suffering from
  clinical depression because of the recent tragic
  deaths of her husband and children in a plane
  crash. Seemingly, we can imagine that she retains
  some of her beliefs that she is morally required
  to do certain things while being utterly devoid
  of motivation to act accordingly She has aided
  her ailing uncle for years, believing herself to
  be morally required to do so. Perhaps she
  continues to believe this but now is utterly
  unmotivated to assist him. (Mele, Motivation and
  Agency, 111)

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Internalism and Listlessness

• Again, internalists can either deny the
  conceivability or explain it away
• In Meles case, is it really plausible that the
  depressed woman feels no guilt or shame for
  failing to help her uncle?
• Also, since motivation is a dispositional notion,
  is it plausible that the woman is not at all
  disposed to help her uncle? What if all she had
  to do was to press a button by her bed?
• The other option is to allow that moral judgments
  fail to motivate when nothing else motivates
  either
• This amounts to weakening the internalist thesis
  by adding a clause like if the agent doesnt
  suffer from a general motivational disorder

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III Weak Internalism
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Weak Internalism

• Internalists who want to allow individual cases
  of amoralism, wickedness, and/or listlessness may
  further weaken their thesis to
• (WI) If an agent judges that she morally ought to
  ?, then, other things being equal, she will
  necessarily have some motivation to ?
• As long as the ceteris paribus clause is not
  cashed out in trivial terms (unless the agent
  has some motivation), this is still a
  substantial and controversial thesis

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Asymmetry Accounts

• Evan Simpson argues that genuine moral judgment
  in the absence of motivation is logically
  dependent on successful moral motivation
• "One kind of thing logically depends upon
  another if it is logically impossible for things
  of the first kind always to occur in the absence
  of the second, but logically possible that the
  first should sometimes occur alone.
• Thus, it is possible that someone is always
  motivated by her judgments, but not possible that
  someone is never motivated by her judgments
• Similarly, Simon Blackburn argues that cases in
  which judgment and motivation are not aligned
  "only exist against either a psychological
  background of motivation by what is perceived as
  duty, or a social background of insistence upon
  duty as a practical constraint."

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Rationality and Moral Motivation

• An alternative way to cash out weak internalism
  is rationalist internalism
• (WI-R) If an agent judges that she morally ought
  to ?, then, if she is practically rational, she
  will necessarily have some motivation to ?
• Rationalist internalism presupposes that moral
  demands are rational ones, or at least that moral
  judgments are judgments about reasons
• Rationalist internalists explain amoralism,
  wickedness, and/or listlessness as resulting from
  failures of rationality