The Demographic Consequences of

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The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to
the UK
David Coleman, University of Oxford david.coleman_at_
socres.ox.ac.uk http//www.apsoc.ox.ac.uk/oxpop
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Major topics

• Recent immigration situation and trend.
• Effects upon total and working age population
  size and household numbers.
• Effects upon population age-structure
• Immigration as demographic salvation?
• Effects upon population composition.

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Current UK migration situation

• Some (two-way) migration normal in advanced
  societies.
• Work - related migration for highly skilled since
  1920, not controversial until recent expansion.
• Net inflow 2002 153,000 foreign 245k, UK -91k.
  Net inflow since late 1990s historically high..
• Most net immigration not work related.
• New policy easier entry for labour and
  non-labour migration, expansion of low-skill work
  entry.
• Two revisions of ONS migration estimates since
  2001 census complicate the story.
• Not to mention three revisions of GAD population
  projections since 2001 census.

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Net Immigration to UK 1963 2003 (1000s).
spliced series. Source data from ONS.
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Net migration to UK by citizenship
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Work permit migration from outside EU (gross
inflow)(some labour migration categories not
included)
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Net migration for purposes of work, UK 1991-2002
(thousands). Source International Passenger
Survey data from ONS
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Spouse migration to the UK 1973 - 2001 (gross
inflow).
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Growth of male South Asian ethnic minority
populations of marriageable age, and
entry-clearance applications for wives/fiancees
1981-2001.
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Asylum claims in UK, including dependants
1983-2003 (thousands). Source of data Home
Office.
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Migration drives population growth. United
Kingdom, 2002-2031.Thousands. Source GAD 2004.
2002-based projections.
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UK population - no decline imminent
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Population projections, Sweden, 2004 - 2050,
(millions) standard and zero-migration. Source
Statistics Sweden
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Projected effect of immigration on US population
growth 1999 - 2100 .Source US Bureau of the
Census.
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Projection of UK population aged 15-64
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Entry to working age population
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Effects of different migration assumptions on
household formation, 1996 - 2021. Assumes each
extra 40k immigration yields 450k households by
2021.
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The case for more immigration - positive and
negative, theoretical and empirical

• Demographic benefits - workforce, ageing.
• Essential for economic growth.
• Entrepreneurial benefits.
• Fiscal benefits.
• Fill skills shortages, keeps NHS going, IT needs.
• Perform dirty jobs.
• London / UK would collapse without them.
• Cultural, social benefits of diversity.
• All with no damage to native interests.

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Three related demographic problems behind
argument for more immigrants.

• End of growth of population, possible decline
• End of growth and possible decline in labour
  force and of young labour force entrants failure
  of economic growth.
• Population ageing leads to crises in pensions and
  old-age care.

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Immigration can solve all that

• Immigration cannot be stopped anyway.
• Will sustain or expand population size.
• Rejuvenated and expand workforce.
• Rectify ageing population while saving natives
  from trouble of reproduction.
• Everyone gets what they want and lives happily
  ever after.

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Immigration as demographic salvation?

• Do we need to be saved? Why should no decline
  targets be met (UN 2000)? Is zero growth or
  decline axiomatically undesirable?
• UK has relatively benign workforce, population
  projections.
• Immigration can keep population, or workforce
  size, approximately constant.
• But that can require very large inflows and
  adjustment difficult.
• Immigration can only 'solve' population ageing
  with large and infinitely increasing population
  increases.
• Given sub-replacement fertility, migration to
  maintain constant size must eventually replace
  original population with immigrant population.
  Does a society save itself that way?

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Population ageing an unavoidable destiny

• Population ageing here to stay an irrevocable
  feature of mature society.
• Birth and death rates for a younger population
  gone for good.
• With constant vital rates, population
  age-structure will eventually stabilize.
• Longer life means even older populations, but
  changes meaning of old age.

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Potential Support Ratio, UK 1980-2100 GAD PP
1998-based. Population Trends 103
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No limits to migration? Immigration and the PSR
Population Trends 103
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Immigrants and their descendants in the British
labour market

• Lower workforce participation rates
• Higher unemployment
• A similar story elsewhere in Europe

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Workforce participation and unemployment by
birthplace, UK 2000
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Why migration trends may continue upwards.

• Government policy to expand migration e.g.
  increase work permits aim 200,000, actual
  129,000 in 2002.
• New channels for migration
• Open doors to Eastern Europe
• Amnesties (see Demography 2003)
• Growth of marriage migration with growth of
  ethnic minority populations, if arranged marriage
  persists.
• UK reputation for ease of entry /overstaying.
• Long timetable for register, identity cards (if
  any).
• But asylum may be trending downwards..

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Unattributable Demographic Change The New ONS
Miracle Ingredient! or Honey, I shrunk the
migration estimates.

• Amaze your audiences!
• Lose 290,000 people per decade!
• Shrink your migration estimates overnight!
• Banish that annoying population growth!
• Remove those awkward inconsistencies!
• Keep the 2001 Census (nearly) infallible!
• http//www.statistics.gov.uk/about/methodology_by_
  theme/revisions_to_population_estimates/implicatio
  ns.asp

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Another (semi) official view (Home Office RDS
Occasional Paper no 67).
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Immigration and changes in population
composition UK and abroad.

• Some countries make official projections of
  population by immigrant / foreign / ethnic
  minority origin (US, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands
  etc.)
• None official in UK since 1979
• Despite higher (average) immigrant fertility,
  immigration level is the more important variable
  in all cases.

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Total Fertility Rates by Ethnic Group, UK,
1965-2001, from LFS (own-child)
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Ethnic change in the USA, projected 1999 - 2100
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US 1999 - 2100 projected proportion of
immigrant-origin minorities only
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Percent of population foreign, Netherlands 2003
2050 medium variant and zero-migration
projections. Source Statistics Netherlands.
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Projected growth of population of foreign origin
2000-2050, selected countries, as of total
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Sample trial projection, ethnic composition
trends , England and Wales 2001- 2051 (millions)
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Trial projection of UK non-white population to
2051 (1000s)mortality constant EW 1998, TFR
declining from 2.14 - 1.90
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Growth of foreign-origin population in Denmark,
three projections, showing projected
consequencesof recent restrictions (green line).
Source Statistics Denmark
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Conclusions

• Positive immigration effect on working age
  population (less effective on actual workforce).
• UK population, numbers of working age not
  declining even without migration.
• Instead, renewed population and household growth
  medium term problem, mostly immigration-driven.
• Replacement migration for working-age
  population difficult, for age-structure
  impossible.
• Current migration projections seem conservative.
• Continuation even of current level will promote
  substantial and progressive ethnic
  transformation.