Title: Windows 2000: Concepts
1Windows 2000 Concepts DeploymentLarry
LiebermanNT Support EngineerPremier Enterprise
SupportMicrosoft Corporation
2Agenda
- Active Directory
- Microsoft DNS
- Distributed Security
- System Management
3Active Directory
- Architecture
- Components
- Planning AD Design
4AD Architecture
- X.500 derived data model
- Directory stored schema
- Windows 2000 Trusted Computing Base security
model - Delegated Administration Model
- DNS integration
5AD Components (1/10)
- Objects
- Organizational Units (OUs)
- Domains
- Sites
- Trees Forests
- Global Catalog
6AD Components (2/10)Objects
ObjectClass
Defined in the schema
Data storage is allocated as necessary
7AD Components (3/10)Object Access
DirectoryObject
- Access to directory objects is controlled via
Access Control Lists (ACLs)
- Fine granularity is provided by Access Control
Entries (ACEs) that apply to specific attributes
8AD Components (4/10)Organizing the Directory
- A hierarchy of objects can be created using
Organizational Units (OUs) - Although OUs are the primary containers used to
create the hierarchy, all directory objects are
potential containers
9AD Components (5/10)OUs
OU
- OU security provides the mechanism for
controlling object visibility and delegating
administration
10AD Components (6/10)Domains
Configuration
- One or more domain controllers
- Multi-master replication
- One or more sites
11AD Components (7/10)Sites
- Controls Active Directory replication
- Site knowledge used
- Logon locator
- Printer locator and pruner
- Dfs and more
12AD Components (8/10)Trees And Forests
- Configuration and schema common to all domains
- Transitive trusts link domains
13AD Components (9/10)Boundaries
14AD Components (10/10)Global Catalog
- Enterprise wide searches
- Resolves enterprise queries
15Planning AD Design (1/6)Considerations
- Defining a logical hierarchy of resources
- Administrative architectures
- Allocation of physical resources and budget
- Current infrastructure and upgrade strategies
- Data availability requirements
- Network bandwidth
- Politics
16Planning AD Design (2/6) One Or More Forests
- All domains in a forest share a common schema and
global catalog - Create multiple forests if
- Separate schemas are required
- One or more domains are required to be isolated
from the spanning tree of transitive trusts - Total administrative autonomy is required
17Planning AD Design (3/6)Domain Structure
- Where possible use a single domain
- Use OUs to delegate administration
- Use sites to tune replication
- Use multiple domains when there is a requirement
for - Scalability across WANs
- Autonomous administrative entities
- Different security account policies
- password, lockout and Kerberos ticket
18Planning AD Design (4/6)Multiple Domains(1/3)
- Containment of network traffic
- Directory replication
- Policies (FRS)
- In-place upgrades from Windows NT domains
- Autonomous divisions with separate names
- No technical reasons, only politics
- Names are not important
19Planning AD Design (5/6)Multiple Domains(2/3)
- Each domain has an incremental overhead
- Increased administration
- Increased hardware
- Separate DCs are required for each domain
- Try to avoid creating divisional or departmental
domains for purely political reasons - Change is inevitable, they are easy to create
and hard to retire
20Planning AD Design (6/6)Multiple Domains(3/3)
- Separate the production forest from development
and testing - Prevents unwanted schema changes propagating
through the enterprise - Create a separate forest to restrict access for
business partners
21Microsoft DNS
- Windows 2000 DNS Requirements
- MS DNS Features
- DNS Design
22DNS Requirements
- A DNS server that is authoritative for a Windows
2000 domain MUST support SRV records (RFC 2052) - It also should support dynamic updates (RFC 2136)
- The NETLOGON service on the domain controller
automatically registers all of the domain
services and the site that it supports
23MS DNS Features (1/12)
- Active Directory integration
- Dynamic Update
- Aging
- Administrative tools
- Caching resolver
24MS DNS Features (2/12) Active Directory
Integration
- AD-integrated DNS zone is multi-master
25MS DNS Features (3/12) Active Directory
integration
Primary zones
26MS DNS Features (4/12) Active Directory
integration
- AD-integrated DNS zone is multi-master
- High availability of write, as well as read
- Doesnt require separate from ADÂ replication
27MS DNS Features (5/12) Active Directory
integration
- ADS replication is loosely consistent
- Name-level collision
- Two hosts create same name simultaneously (first
writer wins) - Attribute-level collision
- Two hosts modify A RRset for microsoft.com
simultaneously (last-writer wins)
28MS DNS Features (6/12) Dynamic Update
- Based on RFC 2136
- Client discovers primary server for the zone
where the record should be added/deleted - Client sends a dynamic update package to the
primary server - Primary server processes the update
29MS DNS Features (7/12) Dynamic Update
- Windows 2000 computer registers
- A RR with
- Hostname.PrimaryDnsSuffix (default)
- and Hostname.AdapterSpecificDnsSuffix (if
configured) - PTR RR if adapter is not DHCP configured or DHCP
server doesnt support DNS RR registration
30MS DNS Features (8/12) Dynamic Update
- Windows 2000 DHCP server registers (based on
draft-ietf-dhc-dhcp-dns-.txt) - PTR records on behalf of upgraded
clients (default) - A and PTR records on behalf of downlevel clients
(default) - A and PTR records on behalf of upgraded clients
(if configured) - Windows 2000 DHCP server removes records that it
registered upon lease expiration
31MS DNS Features (9/12) Secure Dynamic Update
- Based on draft-skwan-gss-tsig-04.txt
- Available only on AD-integrated zones
- Per -zone and -name granularity
- ACL on each zone and name
32MS DNS Features (10/12) Aging/Scavenging
- Enables deletion of the stale records in
AD-integrated zones - Requires periodic refreshes of the records
33MS DNS Features (12/12) Caching Resolver
- Windows 2000 service
- Caches RRs according to TTL
- Negative caching
- Tracks transient/PnP adapters
- Reorders servers according to responsiveness
- Fewer round-trips, fewer timeouts, faster
response time
34DNS Design (1/11)To support DC locator
- DNS server authoritative for the DC records MUST
support SRV RRs - Support for Dynamic Updates is recommended
35DNS Design (2/11)
- Delegate a DNS zone for each AD domain to the DNS
servers running on the DCs in that AD domain
36DNS Design (3/11)
corp.example.com
Zones Primary AD-int corp.example.com
37DNS Design (4/11)
corp.example.com
Zones Primary AD-int corp.example.com
Domain1.corp.example.com
Zones Primary AD-int Domain1.corp.example.com
38DNS Design (5/11)
- Delegate a DNS zone for each AD domain to the DNS
servers running on a DC in that AD domain - Install a DNS server on at least two DCs in each
AD domain and one DC in each site
39DNS Design (6/11)
corp.example.com
Zones Primary AD-int corp.example.com
Domain1.corp.example.com
Site3
Site2
Site1
Zones Primary AD-int Domain1.corp.example.com
40DNS Design (7/11)
- Delegate a DNS zone for each AD domain to the DNS
servers running on a DC in that AD domain - Install a DNS server on at least two DCs in each
AD domain and one DC in each site - If different sites in the forest are connected
over slow link, delegate the zone
_msdcs.ltForestNamegt and make at least one DNS
server in every site secondary for this zone
41DNS Design (8/11)
corp.example.com
Zones Primary AD-int corp.example.com Primary
AD-int _msdcs.corp.example.com.
Domain1.corp.example.com
Site3
Site2
Site1
Zones Primary AD-int Domain1.corp.example.com S
econdary _msdcs.corp.example.com.
42DNS Design (9/11)
- Install a DNS server on at least two DCs in each
AD domain and one DC in each site - Delegate a DNS zone for each AD domain to the DNS
servers running on a DC in that ADÂ domain - If different domains of the forest are connected
over slow links, delegate the zone
_msdcs.ltForestNamegt and make at least one DNS
server in every site secondary for this zone - Each client should be configured to query at
least two DNS servers one of which is in the same
site
43DNS Design (10/11)
corp.example.com
Zones Primary AD-int corp.example.com Primary
AD-int _msdcs.corp.example.com.
Domain1.corp.example.com
Site3
Site2
Site1
Zones Primary AD-int Domain1.corp.example.com S
econdary _msdcs.corp.example.com.
44DNS Design (11/11)Hardware planning
- Memory usage
- No zones loaded 4 MB
- Each record requires 100 bytes
- Performance
- Alpha 533 MHz dual-processor with 25 Processor
utilization - 1600 queries and 200 dynupd/second
- Intel P-II 400 MHz dual-processor with 30
Processor utilization - 900 queries and 100 dynupd/second
45Security Topics
- Kerberos Integration with Windows NT
- Security Provider Architecture
- Public Key Security Components
- Smart card logon and authentication
- Encrypting File System
- Security Policies and Domain Trust
- Secure Windows NT Configuration
46Security Goals
- Single enterprise logon
- Integrated security services with Windows NT
Directory Service - Delegated administrationand scalability for
large domains - Strong networkauthentication protocols
- Standard protocols for interoperability of
authentication
47Authentication/ Authorization
- Authenticate using domain credentials
- User account defined in Active Directory
- Authorization based on group membership
- Centralize management of access rights
- Distributed security tied to the Windows NT
Security Model - Network services use impersonation
- Object-based access control lists
48One Security Model Multiple Security Protocols
- Shared key protocols
- Windows NTLM authentication compatibility in
mixed domains - Kerberos V5 for enterprise networks
- Public key certificate protocols
- Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) / Transport Layer
Security (TLS) - IP Security
- Multiple forms of credentials in the Active
Directory
49NTLM Authentication
Application server
1. NTLM challenge/response
4. Server impersonates client
Windows NTDirectory Service
Netlogon
MSV1_0
Windows NT domain controller
50Kerberos Integration
Client
Server
Kerberos SSPI providermanages credentials
andsecurity contextLSA manages ticket cache
Session ticket authorization data supports NT
access control model
Windows NTDirectory Server
KDC relies on the Active Directory as the store
for security principals and policy
Key DistributionCenter (KDC)
Windows NT Domain Controller
51Kerberos Protocol Advantages
- Faster connection authentication
- Server scalability for high-volume connections
- Reuse session tickets from cache
- Mutual authentication of both client, server
- Delegation of authentication
- Impersonation in three-tier client/server
architectures - Transitive trust between domains
- Simplify inter-domain trust management
- Mature IETF standard for interoperability
- Testing with MIT Kerberos V5 Release
52Kerberos Unix Interoperability
- Based on Kerberos V5 Protocol
- RFC 1510 and RFC 1964 token format
- Testing with MIT Kerb V5 Release
- Windows NT DS hosts the KDC
- UNIX clients to Unix Servers
- UNIX clients to NT Servers
- NT clients to UNIX Servers
- Simple cross-realm authentication
- UNIX realm to NT domain
53Kerberos AuthNetwork Server connection
Application Server (target)
3. Verifies session ticket issuedby KDC
1. Send TGTand request session ticket from KDC
for target server
Windows NTDirectory Server
TGT
Key DistributionCenter (KDC)
Windows NT domain controller
54Building An Access Token with Kv5
- Kerberos package gets auth data from session
ticket
Server application
LSA
Kerberos
- Auth data
- User SID
- Group SIDs
- Privileges
Target
Session ticket
55Remote File Access Check
Client
File application
\\infosrv\share
SMB protocol
Server
Rdr
SSPI
Kerberos SSP
Kerberos SSP
NTFS
File
56Architecture For Multiple Authentication Services
Internet Explorer, Internet InformationServer
Directoryenabled appsusing ADSI
Mail, Chat, News
DCOM application
Remote file
LDAP
HTTP
POP3, NNTP
Secure RPC
CIFS/SMB
SSPI
NTLM
Kerberos
DPA
SChannelSSL/TLS
MSV1_0/ SAM
KDC/DS
Membershipservices
57Windows NT 4.0 - 5.0 Interoperability
- Windows NT 4.0 clients and servers
- Use NTLM authentication
- Windows NT 5.0 clients
- Locate NT 5.0 Active Directory and KDC
- Support smart card logon
- Use Kerberos or NTLM protocol
- Windows NT 5.0 Servers
- Accept both NTLM or Kerberos protocol
58Public Key ComponentsX.509 and PKCS Standards
- For servers
- Key and certificate management
- Secure channel
- Client authentication
- Auto enrollment
- For clients
- User key and certificate mgmt
- Secure channel
- Secure storage
- Auto enrollment
Windows NT Directory Server
Certificate Server
- Enterprise
- Certificate services
- Trust policy
59Crypto API Architecture
Application
Secure channel
Certificate management services
Crypto API 1.0
Certificatestore
SmartCard CSP
RSA base CSP
Fortezza CSP
Keydatabase
- CryptographicService Providers
60SSL Client AuthenticationIntegrated Security
Administration
- Strong authentication using X.509 certificates
- Single user ID for multiple protocols
- Security account management
- Use existing infrastructure ccount admin and
access control - Accept third-party X.509 certificates from
trusted Certificate Authorities - Inter-business authentication
61SSL Client Authentication
Server
Client certificate
SChannel SSP
Å’
Certificate Storeof Trusted CAs
1. Verify user certificate based on trusted CA,
CRL
62Client AuthenticationUsing SmartCards
- Secure channel between Internet Explorer and
Internet Information Server - Keys and certificates managed by Crypto API
- SmartCard CSP gets certificate and protocol
signature from card
Internet Explorer 4.0
SSPI
Secure channel
Crypto API
SmartCard CSP
Readerdriver
Reader
ICC
63Smart Card Logon
- Private key and certificate on card
- Public key domain authentication
PK Kerberos
64Management Of Trust
- Trust policy decisions
- What CAs are trusted?
- What are they trusted for?
- Client Authentication,
- Server Authentication,
- Authenticode
- Trust determination made locally
- Certificate path verification
- Configure trust policy centrally
- Define trust policy in Policy Editor
- Signed by an authorized user
65Encrypting File System
- Privacy of data that goes beyond access control
- Protect confidential data on laptops
- Configurable approach to data recovery
- Integrated with core operating system components
- Windows NT File System - NTFS
- Crypto API key management
- LSA security policy
- Transparent and very high performance
66EFS Architecture
Applications
EFS service
Win32 layer
Crypto API
User mode
Kernel mode
I/O manager
LPC communication for all key management support
EFS.sys
NTFS
FSRTL callouts
Encrypted on-disk data storage
67File Encryption
File decryption (e.g., DES)
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Data decryption field generation (e.g., RSA)
DDF
Users public key
Data recovery field generation (e.g., RSA)
DRF
Randomly- generated file encryption key
Recovery agents public key in recovery policy
RNG
68File Decryption
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File decryption (e.g., DES)
File encryption key
Users privatekey
DDF is decrypted using the private key to get to
the file encryption key
DDF extraction (e.g., RSA)
DDF contains file encryption key encrypted under
users public key
DDF
69Active Directory Security Features
- Organization Units (OU) to organize the
directory name space - Users, groups, computers in separate containers
- Directory object security
- Per property access control
- Per property auditing
- Delegation of administration
- Who can create, manage users, groups, computer
accounts, other objects
70Domain Trust
microsoft.com
Downleveldomain
Domain
fareast. microsoft. com
europe. microsoft. com
Explicit Windows NT 4.0-style trusts
Domain
Domain
Kerberos trust
Domain
71Managing Security
- Security Configuration Editor (SCE)
- Defines security configuration templates
- Group Policy Editor
- Defines hierarchy of user or computer policy
templates for OUs up to the Domain - Security configuration is part of Group Policy
- Group Policy for a computer includes the security
configuration - Security configuration applied at startup
72A Security Configuration
- Covers various security areas
- Account Policies -- password, lockout, kerberos
- Local Policies -- auditing, user rights,...
- Restricted Groups -- Administrators, Power
Users, - Registry File System -- security descriptors
- Services -- startup mode and security descriptors
73Summary (1/2)
- Kerberos for domain authentication for the
Enterprise - Mutual authentication, transitive trust
- Public key security components
- Certificate Services to issue organization
certificates - Personal key and certificate management
- Public key credentials for servers
- Directory-based SSL/TLS client authentication
using X.509 certificates
74Summary
- Crypto API enhancements
- Smart card logon and dialup access
- Message encryption using SSPI
- SMB data encryption using IPsec
- Encrypting File System
- DS Security Administration and Policy
- Security Configuration Editor
- Cross-platform authentication interoperability
75Group Policy Objects
76Group Policy Definition
- The ability for the administrator to state a
wish about the state of their users environment
once, and then rely on the system to enforce that
wish!
77Group Policy Review
- Policies Are Not Profiles
- A profile is a collection of user environment
settings that the user may change - Group Policy is a collection of user environment
settings, specified by the administrator - Group Policy is more than simple lockdown
- Group Policy enhances the Follow Me! experience
by enabling organizations to - Set registry settings securely and without fear
of tattooing (Administrative Templates) - Specify security oriented settings (Security
Settings) - Install software (Software Installation)
- Re-direct My Documents, Desktop, etc. to the
network (Folder redirection) - Implement tiered scripts (Scripts)
78Group Policy And The Active Directory
- Sites are described by Subnet addresss and may
cross Domain boundaries, normally they would not - GPOs are per Domain
- Multiple GPOs may be associated with a single
SDOU - Multiple SDOUs may use a single GPO
- Any SDOU may be associated with any GPO, even
across Domains (slower - maybe very slow) - The affect of a GPO may be filtered based on
security group membership (ACLs)
- Sites are described by Subnet addresss and may
cross Domain boundaries, normally they would not
- Multiple GPOs may be associated with a single
SDOU
- Multiple SDOUs may use a single GPO
- Any SDOU may be associated with any GPO, even
across Domains (slower - maybe very slow)
- The affect of a GPO may be filtered based on
security group membership (ACLs)
What is my policy?
79Group Policy Linked To OUs
- The OU structure is your administrative structure
- Group Policy configuration must be tuned to fit
your OUs structure - Design for the most stable and maintainable
solution
80Filtering
- Security Groups may be used to filter the effect
of Group Policy - Any Group Policy may have its scope modified by
setting ACL permissions - Read and Apply Group Policy (AGP) ACEs are
required for Group Policy to be applied - Only filter if necessary
- Keep simple if possible
81Example
GP
ou
ou
ou
ou
ou
ou
ou
- Filtering can be inclusionary or using deny
exclusionary
82Conclusion
- Active Directory
- DNS
- Security Features
- Group Policy
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