DIMENSIONS OF CONTESTATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

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DIMENSIONS OF CONTESTATIONIN THE EUROPEAN UNION

• Tapio Raunio (tapio.raunio_at_uta.fi)
• Credits 2 ECTS
• Location Paasivirta Lecture room, Department of
  Contemporary History
• Dates and topics
• 9.10 14-17 Introduction / Public opinion
• 10.10. 9-12 Political parties / European
  Parliament
• 16.10 14-17 The Council / Democratic deficit
• 17.10 9-12 The future of EU governance

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INTRODUCTIONWhy study dimensions of
contestation(or lines of conflict) in the
European Union?

• While the EU can be characterized as a consensual
  polity (multiple checks and balances), its
  outputs (laws, non-binding decisions, foreign
  policy etc.) are nonetheless the product of
  bargaining between actors that have policy goals
  shaped by their ideological dispositions
• Media seldom pays attention to the dimensions of
  politics in the EUs political system (notably in
  the Council or the Parliament) or to the reasons
  why certain member states favour / oppose
  decisions
• Media far too often provides a simplified picture
  of reality e.g., Poland is a difficult country
  in the EU, or Swedes oppose further
  integration

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Consensus democracy and supermajorities

• Constitutional (Treaty) amendment is subject to
  unanimity, with all member states having the
  power of veto this basically rules out
  large-scale reforms
• EU has no government or president the European
  Council is the collective executive board of
  the Union. The European Council decides with
  some exceptions - by unanimity
• The role of the Commission in initiating and
  implementing legislation is overseen by national
  governments, whose civil servants participate in
  the hundreds of committees and working groups
  that draft the EUs legislative initiatives and
  oversee their eventual implementation
• The Council decides most issues by QMV (over 70
  of votes), but its working methods are still
  consensual, with emphasis on building compromises
  acceptable to all or nearly all governments

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• The Council is still far more powerful than the
  European Parliament
• Consultation procedure is still the most common
  legislative procedure (EP only consulted)
• The two chambers are equal only in matters
  falling under the co-decision procedure (used in
  under half of EU legislation depending how one
  measures the share of issues processed according
  to the co-decision procedure)
• Co-decision procedure involves two readings in
  both institutions, following which a conciliation
  committee is convened if no agreement has been
  reached. In the second reading the Council
  decides by QMV and the EP by absolute majority
  (50 1 of all MEPs)
• Decision rules are reflected in the work of the
  institutions in both the Council and the EP the
  emphasis is on building broad consensus (laws
  based on supermajorities)
• No opposition Example how can citizens oppose
  Common Agricultural Policy? Would require the
  election of parliamentary majorities opposed to
  CAP in all or nearly all member states!!

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Chains of representationin the EUs political
system

• The national channel
• Citizens ? national parliament ? government ?
  Council / European Council
• The European channel
• Citizens ? European Parliament ? Commission

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Co-decision procedure
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PUBLIC OPINION ONEUROPEAN INTEGRATION

• Basic premises
• The political elites (MPs, MEPs, parties,
  business and administrative elites) are more
  pro-integrationist than citizens
• Low salience of EU for voters (permissive
  consensus?)
• Weak attachment to the EU hardly any feeling of
  a political community
• Citizens knowledge of how EU functions remains
  very limited (particularly regarding
  decision-making)
• Public support for integration remained at a high
  level until the early 1990s
• Highest levels of Euroscepticism are normally
  found in the UK, Sweden, Austria, and Finland --
  and also in some of the new member states

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• Explanatory factors
• Utilitarian calculations (perceived benefits) are
  usually seen as the strongest explanatory factor
• those that benefit from trade liberalization
  support integration
• those that otherwise benefit from the removal of
  borders support integration
• The popularity of the national government or
  the state of the national economy influences
  support for the EU
• Identity is becoming more important if citizens
  have an exclusive (national) identity, they are
  more likely to be critical of integration
• New member countries transition winners are
  likelier to support integration

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REFERENDA ON EU MEMBERSHIP
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Referenda and European Integration

• Domestic context and factors impact on voting
  behaviour in EU referenda and EP elections and
  also explain to some extent public opinion on
  integration
• Why the French voted against the Constitutional
  Treaty on 29 May, 2005? (turnout 70 , 55
  against the Constitution)
• Outcome mainly explained by
• French economy worries about unemployment,
  relocation of businesses, and the decline of the
  French social model (and lack of social
  dimension in the Treaty) and
• opposition to the government and the president
  (which were in favour of the Constitutional
  Treaty)
• Argument even though the citizens may overall be
  supportive of integration, referenda provide them
  the opportunity to protest against particular
  aspects of integration (e.g., Turkeys potential
  membership)

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Irish referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon

• Irish referendum on 12 June 2008 53 against,
  47 in favour. Turnout was 53
• All three government parties supported the 'Yes'
  campaign. So did all opposition parties in the
  parliament, with the exception of Sinn Féin. Most
  Irish trade unions and business organisations
  also supported the 'yes' campaign
• Ireland was the only member state that held a
  referendum on the Treaty (in addition to a
  parliamentary vote)
• Outcome probably explained by a combination of
  domestic (resignation of PM Ahern due to
  corruption pro-EU consensus of the political
  elite worries about economy) and European
  (fears of tax harmonisation and common EU
  defence agricultural policy) reasons
• Citizens also suffered from lack of information ?
  Ahern's successor PM Brian Cowen admitted that
  not even he had read the text of the Treaty!

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Image of the EU (Eurobarometer 69, spring 2008)
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Support for membership
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Public opinion IIElites versus the citizens

• Hooghe, Liesbet (2003) Europe Divided? Elites
  vs. Public Opinion on European Integration.
  European Union Politics 43, 281-304.
• Elites (both national and European) are by and
  large more supportive of European integration
  than the citizens
• How should authority be distributed between the
  EU and national governments?
• Elites favour a European Union capable of
  governing a large, competitive market (currency,
  single market) and projecting political muscle
  (foreign and defense policy)
• Citizens are more in favour of a caring European
  Union, which protects them from the vagaries of
  capitalist markets

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• Elites and public preferences are similar in that
  both are least enthusiastic about Europeanizing
  high-spending policies such as health, education,
  or social policy -- shifting authority in these
  policies could destabilize powerful vested
  interests and disrupt policy delivery
• However, the public wants to Europeanize
  market-flanking policies, and elites do not
• As the single market intensifies labor market
  volatility, the public seems intent to contain
  this other distributional risk through
  selectively Europeanizing policies that flank
  market integration employment, social policy,
  cohesion policy, environment, and industrial
  policy
• The views of elites are consistent with a
  functional rationale, which conceives integration
  as an optimal solution for reaping economies of
  scale the policies elites want to Europeanize
  most are currency, foreign policy, development
  aid, immigration, environment, and defense

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POLITICAL PARTIES ANDEUROPEAN INTEGRATION

• European integration has not altered the basic
  structure of national party systems by resulting
  in the formation of new parties
• But, most national parties are divided over EU
  for example, the main British and French parties
  have experienced serious internal disputes on
  integration matters since the 1950s
• There are very strong reasons to expect that we
  would not witness the entry of new parties as a
  result of European integration -- or any other
  issue for that matter
• The main explanatory factor for the observed
  stability is that the established national
  parties have an interest in sustaining the status
  quo and the prevailing structures of party
  competition

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• Parties that are successful in the existing
  structure of contestation have little incentive
  to rock the boat, while unsuccessful parties,
  that is, parties with weak electoral support or
  those that are locked out of government, have an
  interest in restructuring competition. The same
  strategic logic that leads mainstream parties to
  assimilate the issues raised by European
  integration into the Left/Right dimension of
  party competition leads peripheral parties to
  exploit European integration in an effort to
  shake up the party system. (Hooghe et al. 2002
  970)
• Does ideology or country-specific factors explain
  how parties view European integration?
• The standard finding has been that of an inverted
  U-curve, with opposition to European integration
  found at the extreme ends of the left-right
  dimension while more centrist parties are
  supportive of further integration
• This implies that party family is a powerful
  predictor of party positions on EU

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• Centrist party families are in favour of
  integration
• Leftist parties -- particularly social democrats
  but also greens and the radical left -- have
  become considerably more pro-integrationist since
  the early 1990s
• Leftist parties want to counterbalance economic
  integration with increasing the EUs role in
  social and environment policies, while the
  centre-right parties focus primarily on EMU
  (broad agreement about the deepening of
  integration)
• According to recent studies deeper integration
  enjoys more support among representatives of
  leftist parties
• Opposition to the EU is mainly the reserve of
  anti-system or ideologically more radical
  (extreme left or right) parties these parties
  find it difficult to establish regular
  cooperation with each other largely the same
  group of parties that are excluded from
  government in their countries

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• However, more recent research has partially
  challenged this argument, particularly as a
  result of the enlargement that took place in 2004
• Marks et al. (2006) show that another cleavage,
  the GAL (Green / alternative / libertarian) -TAN
  (traditional / authoritarian / nationalist)
  dimension is a strong predictor of parties EU
  positions -- with opposition to further
  integration mainly found among extreme left/right
  and TAN parties
• There are important differences between the old
  member states and those that joined the Union in
  2004. In the West, the leftist parties tend to
  be GAL parties while rightist parties are more
  TAN in their orientation. In the East, on the
  other hand, opposition to the EU is primarily
  concentrated among a group of left/TAN parties

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Domestic structure of party competition and
positioning on European integrationWest vs.
East(Vachudova Hooghe 2006)
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Domestic structure of party competition and
positioning on European integrationWest vs.
East(Vachudova Hooghe 2006)
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PARTY POLITICS INTHE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

• Compared with parties in EU member state
  legislatures, the party groups of the European
  Parliament operate in a very different
  institutional environment
• There is no real EU government accountable to the
  Parliament
• There are no coherent and hierarchically
  organized European-level parties
• MEPs are elected from lists drawn by national
  parties and on the basis of national electoral
  campaigns
• The social and cultural heterogeneity of the EU
  is reflected in the internal diversity of the
  groups, with a total of 170 national parties from
  25 member states winning seats in the Parliament
  in the 2004 elections

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• However, despite the existence of such factors,
  EP party groups have gradually over the decades
  consolidated their position in the Parliament
• At the same time the shape of the party system
  has become more stable, at least as far as the
  main groups are concerned. One can thus talk of
  the institutionalization of the EP party system
  
• Throughout its history the EP party system has
  been based on the left-right dimension
• Initially the party system consisted of only
  three groups socialists/social democrats (PES),
  Christian democrats/conservatives (EPP), and
  liberals (ELDR), the three main party families in
  most EU member states
• Since the first direct elections also the Greens
  and the group of the radical left parties, now
  titled the Confederal Group of the European
  United Left / Nordic Green Left (EUL-NGL), have
  become institutionalized in the chamber
• Moreover, Eurosceptical parties, parties whose
  main reason of existence is opposition to further
  integration, have formed a group under various
  labels since the 1994 elections

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Seat distribution in the EP after the 2004
elections
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• The EP groups achieve rather high levels of
  voting cohesion (around 90 )
• The main cleavage structuring competition in the
  Parliament is the familiar left-right dimension,
  the main dimension of contestation in European
  democracies (Hix et al. 2007)
• While the primary decision rule in the EP is
  simple majority (50 1 of those voting), for
  certain issues (mainly budget amendments and
  second reading amendments under the co-decision
  procedure) the EP needs to muster absolute
  majorities (50 1 of all MEPs)
• The absolute majority requirement facilitates
  co-operation between the two main groups, EPP and
  PES, as the surest way of getting the required
  number of MEPs behind the Parliaments decision
  is when the two large groups agree on the issue
• Cooperation between EPP and PES could also be
  regarded as a sign of maturity, as the
  Parliament needed to moderate its resolutions in
  order to get its amendments accepted by the
  Council and the Commission. After all, the
  overwhelming majority of national ministers
  represented in the Council and members of the
  Commission are either social democrats or
  Christian democrats/conservatives
• However, in recent years (particularly after the
  1999 EP elections) this co-operation has played a
  lesser role than before, with EPP and PES
  opposing each other more often regardless of the
  voting rule but still the two large groups vote
  together most of the time

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Life in the post-enlargement 2004-2009 EP has
anything changed? (Based primarily on Hix and
Noury 2008)

• Enlargements (2004 and 2007) have increased the
  number of MEPs 626 to 785. These MEPs represent
  27 countries and around 180 parties
• The increase in heterogeneity of membership
  plausibly leads to less predictable and less
  stable voting patterns. Moreover, it may
  complicate coalition formation across national
  lines
• Some scholars argue that political parties in the
  new Central and Eastern European member states
  are not easily placed in party families based on
  durable ideological cleavages such as the
  left-right conflict
• Around 60 of MEPs from the new member countries
  are members of the PES and the EPP. In general,
  there is little evidence that formal affiliations
  are markedly different for the new members (but
  note the lack of green MEPs from the new member
  states)

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Life in the post-enlargement 2004-2009 EP has
anything changed? (Based primarily on Hix and
Noury 2008)

• In general party cohesion has remained very
  stable
• The EPP and PES voted together almost exactly the
  same amount of times in the 1999-2004 EP (65 of
  the time) and in the first 18 months of the
  2004-2009 Parliament (67 of the time)
• In the 2004-2009 Parliament there has (so far)
  been a clearer centre-right majority bloc
  (ALDE-EPP/ED-UEN), while the three leftist groups
  (PES, G/EFA, EUL/NGL) have been in a minority
  position and have also been less united
• Certain nationalities exhibit a stronger tendency
  to vote against the group line Polish, British,
  Danish, Swedish, and Czech MEPs

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VOTING AND COALITIONS IN THE COUNCIL (OF
MINISTERS)

• Based primarily on Mattila, Mikko (2008) Voting
  and Coalitions in the Council after the
  Enlargement. In Daniel Naurin Helen Wallace
  (eds) Unveiling the Council of the EU Games
  Governments Play in Brussels. Palgrave Macmillan
  Basingstoke (forthcoming)
• How has the accession of ten new member states in
  2004 affected decision-making in the Council?
• How has the contestation of decisions changed and
  what is the role of the new member states in this
  potential change?
• Has the introduction of ten new members affected
  coalition formation in Council voting?
• How do the new members fit into the existing
  political space of Council interaction?

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• Data roll call records of the Council during the
  whole period of the EU25 from May 2004 to the end
  of 2006
• During this period the Council decided on 416
  legislative acts and 942 other acts. Of these
  about 38 were decisions, 32 regulations, 8
  directives, 6 joint actions and the rest
  consisted of various other types of decisions
  (resolutions, common positions, declarations,
  agreements etc.)
• Of all the decisions in the data set about 90
  were agreed upon unanimously. Negative votes were
  given in 8.9 and 6.2 of cases, respectively.
  This means that the share of contested decisions
  has not increased after the enlargement
• One interpretation of this would be that the ten
  new member states have been very quick to
  internalise the prevailing norms of the EU
  decision making, particularly the culture of
  consensus

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Uncontested votes, negative votes and abstentions
by member state( of all decisions)
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Multidimensional scaling map of Council voting
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• The overall alignment of member states in the
  Figure points to the existence of a north-south
  dimension that affects voting patterns in the
  Council. The situation has not changed in any
  significant way when compared to the time before
  the enlargement
• At least tentatively, these results show that the
  fears of a gridlock in Council decision-making in
  the enlarged union were exaggerated
• However, one should not draw too far-reaching
  conclusions from this analysis
• Roll-call data can provide only a limited and
  rather superficial picture of the way the Council
  operates. In order to evaluate the effects of the
  enlargement in its entirety these results should
  be supplemented by a more thorough analysis of
  the content of contested Council decisions. In
  addition, qualitative analyses based on
  interviews and participant observations could
  show how the day-to-day interaction in Council
  bargaining has changed
• Note also that bargaining in the Council (the
  political space) differs most likely from
  bargaining in Intergovernmental Conferences and
  in the European Council!

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DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT?

• Does the EU suffer from a democratic deficit?
• Moravcsik, Andrew (2002) In Defence of the
  Democratic Deficit Reassessing legitimacy in
  the European Union. Journal of Common Market
  Studies 404, 603-624.
• Follesdal, Andreas Simon Hix (2006) Why There
  is a Democratic Deficit in the EU A Response to
  Majone and Moravcsik. Journal of Common Market
  Studies 443, 533-562.
• How to make the EU more democratic? the answer
  depends on what kind of Europe one wants
  (intergovernmental or supranational or
  something in between?)
• Note national political systems also have
  serious problems of their own most notably
  falling participation rates and the (alleged)
  move towards spectator or audience democracy

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Definitions of the democratic deficit

• Broader definition or meaning
• limited role of the citizens in the EUs policy
  process or
• weak connection between public preferences and
  EUs decisions
• The institutional definition
• weak role of directly-elected institutions
  (national parliaments and the European
  Parliament)
• The electoral dimension
• no election really focuses on European matters
• referendums do, but opinion is divided on whether
  they should be used in integration matters
  (agenda manipulation)
• Lack of a European public sphere
• no European media
• no real European parties
• no European debates or European language!

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Defending supranational democracy

• Not a state, may never be one not a federation,
  but operates increasingly like federal systems
• Yet the EU to an increasing extent carries out
  functions traditionally associated with
  independent countries
• Foreign and security policy
• Trade policy
• Citizenship and legal system
• Currency etc.
• A constitution that defines the competence of
  the EU the jurisdiction of the Union covers
  nearly all policy areas from cultural exchange
  programmes to security policy
• The EU already possesses significant
  policy-making powers hence there should be
  competition for leadership of the Union
• Democracy is good for its own sake it will also
  contribute to the gradual emergence of a European
  identity

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Does the EU need input (democracy) or does its
legitimacy depend on outputs (results)?

• But arguably most issues that are salient for
  European voters are still decided nationally
  (taxation, health care, education, social and
  employment policies etc.)
• National politicians use the EU for solving
  domestic problems, with the oversight of common
  interest delegated to supranational agents
  (Commission, ECJ)
• Lack of common identity
• The success of integration depends primarily on
  the ability of the EU to produce efficient
  outputs peace and stability, economic growth,
  removal of barriers to trade, counterweight to
  globalization and excesses of capitalism
• Low turnout in EP elections is used as an
  argument against strengthening supranational
  democracy

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THE FUTURE OFEU GOVERNANCE

• Limited capacity for change constitutional
  amendment subject to unanimity, thus ruling out
  large-scale reforms
• Asymmetry of national preferences the final
  outcome of IGCs reflects the configuration and
  intensity of national objectives
• Institutional questions have proven more
  problematic than transfer of competencies
  (compare with USA and Philadelphia in 1787)
• Producing supranational laws through the
  Community method or relying increasingly on
  intergovernmental policy coordination?
• The purpose of the following comparison is to
  identify the strengths and weaknesses of these
  two modes of EU governance, and to examine how
  genuine supranational democracy would work in the
  EU

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OPTION ICommunity method

• The Community method is the expression used
  for the institutional operating mode for the
  first pillar of the European Union
• It has the following salient features1)
  Commission monopoly of the right of initiative
  2) General use of QMV in the Council
• 3) An active role for the European Parliament in
  co-legislating frequently with the Council
• 4) Uniformity in the interpretation of Community
  law ensured by the Court of Justice
• The method used for the second and third pillars
  is similar to the so-called intergovernmental
  method, with the difference that the Commission
  shares its right of initiative with the Member
  States, the European Parliament is informed and
  consulted and the Council may adopt binding acts.
  As a general rule, the Council acts unanimously.

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OPTION IIIncreasing use of soft law and
(intergovernmental) policy coordination

• The growing use of the open method of
  coordination (OMC) and other forms of policy
  coordination common objectives defined by member
  states and the EU, monitoring by the EU
  institutions, and implementation and choice of
  instruments for meeting the objectives delegated
  to member states
• While intergovernmental policy coordination has
  been a feature of the EUs decision-making system
  throughout the history of integration, such
  informal policy coordination has become much more
  prominent since the early 1990s
• The European Employment Strategy (EES) adopted at
  the Essen European Council in 1994 and the
  coordination of national economic policies agreed
  in the Maastricht Treaty extended this
  coordination to two highly salient issue areas of
  domestic politics

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• OMC became officially a part of EU jargon at the
  Lisbon European Council in 2000
• OMC has four main components
• 1) Fixed guidelines set for the EU, with short-,
  medium-, and long-term goals
• 2) Quantitative and qualitative indicators and
  benchmarks
• 3) European guidelines translated into national
  and regional policies and targets and
• 4) Periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer
  review, organized as a mutual learning process
• In recent years OMC has been applied to a broad
  range of policies, including employment, social
  policy, environment, taxation, immigration,
  research, social protection, education, social
  infrastructure, regional cohesion, and social
  inclusion

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• The increasing use of OMC and other forms of
  informal, non-binding, primarily
  intergovernmental soft law instruments needs to
  be understood in the context of the sensitive
  question of dividing competencies between the EU
  and its member states
• European integration has reached the stage where
  the core areas of welfare state, such as social
  policy, employment, and education are starting to
  be affected. In these policy areas (that are both
  money-intensive and touch core areas of national
  sovereignty) it is very difficult to build the
  needed consensus among national governments for
  transferring policy-making authority to the
  European level -- hence the resort to
  intergovernmental policy coordination
• The national governments want, on the one hand,
  to achieve highly-valued policy objectives, such
  as reducing unemployment and making their
  economies more competitive, while on the other
  hand they are not willing to cede formal
  sovereignty to the Union

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• The Commission sees these new modes of governance
  as a way to expand EUs competence in the face of
  resistance from the member states
• The literature on OMC and other forms of soft law
  instruments or new modes of governance is
  already quite extensive, and it has produced
  three main findings
• 1. It is still too early to make any definitive
  assessments of the success of OMC. Scholars
  usually point that, unlike top-down supranational
  legislation, it is flexible and (supposedly)
  respects subsidiarity and national autonomy. The
  down-side of this non-binding nature of outputs
  is that the EU has few if any means to make
  national governments follow its recommendations
• 2. OMC has strengthened the leadership role of
  the Council (and the European Council) the
  Commission has a central role to play through its
  role as the institution setting objectives and
  issuing guidelines to national governments

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• The EP has until now been effectively
  marginalized, and, the contribution of local and
  regional actors, often identified as the main
  stakeholders in these processes, has so far been
  quite disappointing. At the national level OMC
  seems to be the preserve of a fairly small circle
  of civil servants that possess expertise on the
  issues.
• 3. It appears that the actual impact of OMC and
  other forms of informal policy coordination has
  so far been relatively modest, if not even
  inconsequential, in many policy areas
• Trade-off between efficiency and democracy
  cooperative federalism and intergovernmental
  policy coordination can be seen as decision
  methods prioritizing efficiency. However, the
  decision process is removed from the public
  sphere to intergovernmental meetings taking place
  behind closed doors. As a result, cooperative
  federalism weakens the transparency of collective
  decision-making and, hence, the accountability of
  the representatives

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Comparing the two modes of EU governance

• Agenda setting and proposal power
• In supranational legislation the Commission
  basically has the monopoly of initiative, but
  obviously its initiatives are largely based on
  instructions from the Council and the European
  Council. The OMC is much more a tool to be used
  collectively by the member states, but here too
  the EU institutions mainly the Commission and
  the Council set the agenda and coordinate
  subsequent actions
• Policy competence
• In supranational legislation the competence
  belongs to the EU, whereas the OMC is primarily
  used in policy areas where the Union has no
  access to binding legislation
• Decision rule
• Most supranational legislation is passed nowadays
  in the Council by QMV, but in OMC processes
  issues are decided by mainly by unanimity

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• The role of the European Parliament
• The EP performs an increasing role as a
  co-legislator in producing supranational laws,
  but it is merely consulted (or kept informed) in
  OMC
• Bureaucrats vs. elected office-holders
• Civil servants are central actors in both types
  of governance. However, in the OMC their role
  appears to have been far more influential, with
  much less guidance and instructions from members
  of government
• Openness and transparency
• The European Parliament meets in public the
  Council is gradually moving towards deliberating
  and voting on laws in public. OMC processes are
  conducted behind closed doors
• Policy learning
• As the OMC produces non-binding outputs, it has a
  higher capacity for policy learning. In
  supranational legislation the same solution
  applies throughout the Union (with the partial
  exception of directives)

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OPTION IIITwo models of supranational democracy

• a) Parliamentary model
• Parliamentary system the government is
  accountable to the parliament (and can be voted
  out of office by the latter)
• The members of the lower house (EP) would be
  directly elected the people while the upper
  house/senate (Council) would consist of either
  directly-elected representatives (as in the U.S.
  Senate) or of government representatives (as in
  the German Bundesrat)
• Government formation would be based on elections
  to the lower house and the cabinet would have to
  enjoy the confidence of the lower house (or
  alternatively, of both houses)

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• For the parliamentary model to work effectively,
  four criteria should be met
• 1) The choices offered to voters should be
  identical throughout the Union (common Europarty
  manifestos)
• 2) The elections should be contested on the basis
  of issues relevant to the Union
• 3) Democratically elected party leaders would
  head the campaigns (who would also be potential
  future prime ministers)
• 4) The party groups of the Europarties should be
  cohesive enough to enable the government to
  execute its programme once in office
• The effective performance and durability of the
  executive would require a hierarchical, cohesive
  party organisation, and it is unlikely that this
  would happen without giving the Europarties the
  right to influence or determine candidate
  selection

48

• The Commission would have to be the real EU
  government, thus reducing the powers of the
  European Council
• But, would majoritarian parliamentary democracy
  work in a Union characterised by strong national
  identities (and a weak European identity)?
• This potential problem could be alleviated by
• 1) A constitutional rule guaranteeing all
  countries representation in the government as
  they currently have an own commissioner
• 2) Bicameralism and demanding parliamentary
  voting rules (absolute majorities, QMV) in
  certain questions (like in Germany)
• Would change fundamentally the role of the
  Commission by making it a party-political
  institution (and not anymore so much a neutral
  defender of the common EU interest or a guardian
  of the Treaties)

49

• Government formation after the 2004 EP elections
• Alternative 1
• Grand coalition between EPP and PES (note the
  absolute majority rule in the Parliament)
• This would be the safest option in terms of
  building the needed majorities, but it would also
  lead to a weak opposition (particularly if the
  ELDR was also in the government)
• Alternative 2
• Centre-right coalition between EPP, ELDR (ALDE),
  and possibly Greens and UEN
• Alternative 3
• Centre-left minority coalition between PES,
  EUL/NGL, and Greens (and possibly liberals)

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• b) Presidential model
• Importing the U.S. presidential system to the EU
• The presidential model would not put similar
  pressure on the EP party groups to achieve
  unitary behaviour, but would require EU-wide
  parties that would each put forward a single
  candidate
• While this reform would undoubtedly improve the
  leadership capacity of the Commission (when
  coupled with strengthening its competence), it
  might also lead to a two-party system, at least
  in the presidential elections
• The winner would either be the candidate
  receiving the plurality of the votes or then a
  second round would be organised between the most
  successful candidates if none of the candidates
  gets a majority of the votes (as in France)
• 1st round candidates by EPP, PES, ELDR, Greens,
  radical left (EUL-NGL), and anti-EU parties 2nd
  round most likely EPP and PES

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Predicting the Future

• Strengthening parliamentarism by (a) tying the
  formation of Commission more explicitly to the EP
  elections -- this will also become the
  constitutional rule should the Lisbon Treaty
  enter into force and (b) extending the use of
  co-decision procedure and QMV in the Council
• Simultaneously most of the member states and
  their main parties emphasize maintaining the
  European Council (and the Council) as the leading
  decision bodies. The presidential version
  receives only very marginal support
• OMC, together with other forms of soft law,
  will be used to an increasing extent
  particularly as it is so difficult to transfer
  new law-making powers to the European level

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FINAL QUESTIONS

• 1) Will the unanimity rule in amending the
  Treaties and in other important matters lead to
  increasing use of flexibility (enhanced
  cooperation)? According to the Lisbon Treaty at
  least 1/3 of the member states must want to
  co-operate, and others must be free to join
• 2) Should EU have a stronger role in carrying out
  redistributive policies? Are the EU citizens
  willing to support active EU fiscal or regional
  policies (compare with Belgium, Canada and
  Switzerland)? Note the lack of common identity
  (emotional attachment) or feeling of a political
  community!
• 3) How to connect citizens to EU decision-making?
  In EP elections parties have campaigned primarily
  on domestic political issues. EU questions are
  marginalized also in national elections, and thus
  no electoral forum focuses directly on EU. More
  precisely, should constitutional amendment be
  subject to referendum?