The fit between institutions and ecological dynamics

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The fit between institutions and ecological
dynamics

• Marco Janssen
• School of Human Evolution and Social Change,
• Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity

In cooperation with ASU Allen Lee, Deepali
Bhagvat, Marty Anderies, Sanket Joshi, Robert
Tobias Indiana University Elinor Ostrom, Robert
Goldstone, Rob Holahan, Thailand Francois
Bousquet, Kobchai Worrapimphong Colombia
Juan-Camilo Cardenas, Daniel Castillo
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My research interests

• How do institutional rules evolve over time?
• What are the conditions in which groups craft
  effective informal and/or formal institutional
  arrangements that fit ecological dynamics?
• Initially developing agent-based models of
  institutional change -gt using experiments to test
  models.

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Common research questions
Laboratory experiments
Field experiments
Statistical analysis Surveys Interviews
models
role games
Statistical analysis, Surveys Text analysis, ..
Artificial worlds
models
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Real-time virtual common resources

• Exploring effects of communication (text chat),
  costly sanctioning, different ecologies.

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Contributions

• New type of experiments with more relevant
  dynamics of resource dynamics.
• Content of communication does not explain
  differences between group (but amount and
  distribution of messages do).
• Costly sanctioning without communication does not
  have an effect.

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Field experiments Irrigation, forestry,
fisheriesExample Irrigation game

• Each of 5 participants gets 10 tokens and decide
  how much to invest in provision of public
  infrastructure.
• From the generated resource player A gets first
  choice, then B, etc.
• After 10 rounds voting for one of three rules
  (lottery, rotation, water rights)

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Contribution to Provision
- Rule change Lower earnings, but more equal -
Rotation was elected 15 times, water rights 5
times, and lottery 3 times
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Statistical analysis (preliminary results)

• Thai invest more and take a more equal share
• In later rounds less is invested and a larger
  share is taken.
• Downstream invest less and gets a lower share
• Married persons invest more
• Those who trust others in community invest more
• No effects gender, age, education, farmer,
  irrigation village, household size, years
  ancestors, fraction of water (t-1)

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Field experiments inspired irrigation experiment
in the lab

• Downloading files with limited bandwidth
• Invest in public infrastructure (bandwidth)
• Order in access to bandwidth

Downloading files
Creating infrastructure
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Screen of downloading files part
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Cross-country experiments

• How do rules in use affect the way people make
  decisions in experiments on commons dilemmas?
• Applying various resource games to other
  countries.

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Next steps

• Understanding cognitive representation of
  subjects of the problem (and how it change due to
  communication)
• Framing of lab experiments (due to complex
  resource dynamics)
• Changing the formal rules of the game.
• Sharing software and protocols commons.asu.edu

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New Health applications

• With Kim Hill and Magdalena Hurtado a new project
  on self-governance of health-care of the Ache
  (Paraguay). Can we find out which incentive
  structures increase likelihood of investment in
  public goods?