Organization Theory and Nuclear Proliferation

1
Organization Theory and Nuclear Proliferation

• History 5N The Challenge of Nuclear Weapons

2
Assumption of Rationality

• Government leaders may intend to behave
  rationally, but they are influenced by
  organizational actors and constraints
• Organizational rationality is bounded
• Organizations use standard operating procedures
  and routines
• Organizations satisfice
• Organizations siphon information
• Members are heavily influenced by past
  experiences
• Goal displacement

3
Bureaucratic Politics

• Organizational actors are self interested and
  competitive sub-units
• Policy sometimes reflects the narrow interests of
  individual organizations, not the national
  interests of the state

4
Offensive Doctrines

• New proliferators may lack civilian control of
  stockpiles
• Military organizations have strong proclivities
  toward offensive doctrines
• See war as an inevitable end the better now
  than later logic
• Incentive to implement standard scenario
• More likely to support preventive war

5
First Operational Requirement for Deterrence

• First operational requirement for deterrence
  the first state to acquire weapons must not
  attack its rival in a preventive war now, in
  order to avoid the risk of a worse war after the
  second state has acquired a large nuclear
  arsenal.
• Evidence proves that even in the United States
  government there was strong support for
  preventive war
• In the Truman Administration the Joint Chiefs of
  Staff (JCS) were in support of first strike
  doctrines
• In the Eisenhower Administration key military
  officers supported preventive options
• Other examples
• Russian military leaders considered a preventive
  war on China

6
Second Operational Requirement of Deterrence

• The second operational requirement of deterrence
  is that both sides have invulnerable
  second-strike nuclear forces
• The United States gained invulnerable forces only
  after civilians forced the production of new
  weapons systems
• Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs)
  were opposed by US Navy leadership, hoping that
  Strategic Air Command would pick up the cost
• Intercontinental Ballistic Missles (ICBMs) were
  not a priority in the Air Forces budget

7
Third Operational Requirement of Deterrence

• The final operational requirement is that nuclear
  arsenals are secure from accidents and
  unauthorized use
• Unfortunately, organizations change standard
  operating procedures after the threat has been
  noticed
• Evidence from US experience
• Test missile fired from Vandenberg Air Force base
  during Cuban Missile Crisis
• Staff at a Montana silo gave themselves
  independent ability to launch missiles
• New proliferants will choose an opaque path to
  proliferation, which is even more unstable
• Furthermore, new proliferants will not have the
  same time security that the US and USSR had

8
Conclusions

• The spread of nuclear weapons will make the world
  less secure
• Realists such as Kenneth Waltz have confused
  what rational states should do with predictions
  of real states will do.
• Organizational theory yields a troubling outlook
  on nuclear proliferations
• Three policy implications
• US should maintain its non-proliferation policy
• The international community should be convinced
  that non-proliferation is not only in US
  interests but for global security
• If proliferation does occur, the US should
  consider helping organizations develop the safety
  mechanisms to help them achieve deterrent
  capability and secure systems