THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW:

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• THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW
• Past, Present, and Prospective

Presentation to AIAA Strategic and Tactical
Missiles Conference David J. Trachtenberg Vice
President CACI-NSR, Inc. 31 January 2006 Note
The views represented here are those of the
briefer and not those of CACI International or
CACI-NSR, Inc.
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What Is the Nuclear Posture Review?

• Mandated by Congress in FY 2001 NDAA
• A broad-based strategic review
• An effort to explain the nature of the dynamic
  security environment
• An attempt to match military means with strategic
  ends
• A rationale for tailoring our deterrent to
  contemporary threats

U.S. Nuclear Policy Cannot Be Based on Bluff To
Be Effective, It Must Be Credible
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The ABCs of the NPR

• The global security environment has changed
• Russia no longer an enemy not an immediate
  threat
• Future relationship with China uncertain
• Regional nuclear tensions (e.g., Iran/Israel
  India/Pakistan)
• Rogue states seek WMD capabilities
• U.S. strategic capabilities must be transformed
• Deterrence increasingly uncertain against rogue
  states that may not act rationally (as we
  define it) Cold War approach no longer
  appropriate
• Nuclear weapons still necessary to deterrence,
  but not sufficient
• Broader range of strategic capabilities necessary
• Advanced non-nuclear strike
• Missile defenses
• Robust infrastructure
• Improved C2, intelligence, and adaptive planning
• Nuclear weapons remain vital to U.S. security
  strategy
• Smaller arsenal reflects change in security
  environment
• Nuclear weapons support assurance, dissuasion,
  deterrence, defense
• Nuclear and non-nuclear capability gaps reduce
  credibility of deterrence

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NPR Future Contingencies

• Immediate Contingencies
• Well-recognized, current dangers
• Examples include Soviet threat in Cold War, WMD
  attack on U.S. forces or allies
• Potential Contingencies
• Plausible, but not immediate dangers
• Timely warning can be expected
• Examples include emergence of hostile coalition,
  re-emergence of hostile peer competitor
• Unexpected Contingencies
• Sudden, unpredicted challenge
• Examples include unanticipated regime change,
  surprise WMD acquisition by hostile group
• Dealing with uncertainty is the greatest challenge

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Policy Guidance

• Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) called for
  capabilities-based approach
• Replace Cold War Strategic Triad with New
  Triad, including greater emphasis on advanced
  conventional systems and deployment of missile
  defenses
• Reduce strategic nuclear forces consistent with
  security requirements and changes in security
  environment
• Maintain maximum flexibility (i.e., Responsive
  Capability) to respond to changes or
  technological surprise

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The New Triad

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Implementation Path

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New Triad Capabilities

• Nuclear and non-nuclear strike capabilities
• ICBMs
• Bombers
• SLBMs
• Advanced strike capabilities (e.g., new delivery
  vehicles and conventional precision munitions)
• Defenses
• Active and passive (incl. missile defense)
• Responsive Infrastructure
• e.g., test readiness, pit facility
• C2, Intelligence, Adaptive Planning

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Defense Policy Goals

• Assure allies and friends
• U.S. security guarantees must be credible
• U.S. nuclear capability must be second-to-none
• Active defenses protect allies and friends and
  forward deployed forces
• Dissuade competitors
• Broad spectrum of capabilities reduces incentive
  to compete
• Advanced non-nuclear capabilities maintain U.S.
  advantages
• U.S. strategic edge maintained by robust
  infrastructure

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Defense Policy Goals (2)

• Deter aggressors
• Tailored deterrent based on portfolio of
  capabilities
• Defenses discourage attack by complicating
  adversary plans
• Robust infrastructure helps U.S. maintain
  technological edge
• Defeat enemies
• Broad capabilities provide flexible options
• Defenses protect should deterrence fail
• Rapid response assured by enhanced C2,
  intelligence, and adaptive planning

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Critical Problems

• Little public knowledge of the NPR and New Triad
• Document remains classified
• Little public domain information most articles
  negative
• Requires turning Cold War theories on their head
• e.g., stability, MAD, etc.
• Limited public understanding of national security
  policies and relevance to contemporary security
  threats
• Nuclear strategy considered a Cold War academic
  discipline
• Congressional understanding and interest minimal
• Lack of comprehension regarding relevance of
  nuclear weapons in global war on terror
• Budget austerity, other priorities lead to
  atrophy of nuclear capabilities
• Belief that these are weapons that will never be
  used
• Bureaucratic impediments
• e.g., Service priorities
• Lack of understanding, experience, and support
  among senior decision-makers and military
  officials
• Organizational issues
• Process for generating sustained support for NPR
  initiatives within DOD requires adaptation

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Some NPR Myths

• According to critics, the NPR
• Rejects deterrence
• Blurs the distinction between conventional and
  nuclear forces
• Places greater emphasis on nuclear weapons
• Makes nuclear weapons more useable
• Calls for new nuclear weapons and nuclear testing
• Lowers the nuclear threshold
• Spurs nuclear proliferation
• Supports nuclear preemption
• NPR critics use Cold War logic to challenge
  its findings

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Some NPR Facts

• The NPR validates deterrence, it does not
  repudiate it
• It rejects the Cold War balance of terror
  philosophy
• Because deterrence is increasingly uncertain, we
  need new tools to strengthen it
• The NPRs New Triad is intended to provide
  those tools
• The New Triad would provide a wide spectrum of
  capabilities to better tailor deterrent
  strategies to more diverse threats
• This includes nuclear and non-nuclear, offensive
  and defensive capabilities
• The NPR keeps the distinction between nuclear and
  non-nuclear weapons intact
• It does not revise procedures for nuclear release
  authority
• It preserves the firewall between nuclear and
  conventional systems
• The NPR downgrades the role of nuclear weapons in
  U.S. defense strategy
• It supports reductions in nuclear forces to the
  levels of the Moscow Treaty
• It advocates improvements in conventional and
  defensive capabilities

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Some NPR Facts (cont.)

• The NPR sees nuclear weapons as important for
  deterrence, not warfighting
• Deterrence rests on having credible capabilities
• Current nuclear capabilities were designed for a
  different adversary in a different era
• Existing nuclear capabilities are inappropriate
  to todays threats
• Hence, their deterrent effect is questionable
• Modern nuclear capabilities, tailored to todays
  threats, would be a more credible deterrent
• Lower yield nuclear weapons may be critical to
  deterrence because of their ability to hold
  targets at risk that cannot be defeated with
  current capabilities
• The NPR does not lower the nuclear threshold or
  make nuclear weapons more useable
• The decision to use nuclear weapons of any
  yield remains fraught with significant
  consequences
• The nuclear threshold remains as high as always
• The NPR seeks to deter nuclear proliferation, not
  accelerate it
• Nations act in their own self interest
• U.S. nuclear disarmament may provoke
  proliferation as enemies seek an equal footing
  with the United States and friends seek to
  compensate for loss of the U.S. nuclear
  umbrella
• Rogue states see benefits in acquiring nuclear
  weapons, regardless of U.S. actions

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Status of NPR Implementation

• Policy and Guidance
• NSPDs, SecDef guidance, etc.
• Implementation actions
• Budgets and Programs
• FY05 and FY06 results, POM process
• Nuclear drawdown
• New Triad capabilities
• Congressional Action
• Statutory direction
• Opposition concerns
• Issues and Impediments
• Implementation Challenges

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Conclusion

• The NPR is not well understood
• Public commentary, Congressional interest lacking
• NPR Implementation is in jeopardy
• Lack of senior-level attention competition for
  scarce resources belief that nuclear weapons
  less relevant to todays challenges
• Opposition to modernizing our nuclear
  capabilities will leave us with a deterrent that
  is
• Structured for Cold War threats
• Insufficient for deterring todays challenges
• Increasingly seen as not credible
• Based on bluff

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Solutions

• Public Education
• Speaking, writing, and setting the record
  straight on the NPR
• Organized Activities, e.g.
• AIAA Conferences
• U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum
• Commission on the Implementation of the New
  Strategic Posture of the United States
• Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear
  Capabilities
• Top-Level Leadership
• Need to overcome bureaucratic and organizational
  impediments to understanding need for U.S.
  nuclear deterrent