GLOBAL NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY REGIME

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GLOBAL NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY REGIME

• TASAM Conference on World Outlook in Nuclear
  Technology Generation III and III NPPs
• 27 28 March 2008, Istanbul
• Aybars Gürpinar, Independent Consultant (Ret.
  Dir-NSNI, IAEA)

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Definitions (informal)

• Nuclear Safety Prevent accidents in nuclear
  installations and mitigate consequences should
  they occur (CNS)
• Nuclear Security Prevent theft of nuclear and
  other radioactive material prevent acts of
  sabotage to nuclear installations (and transport)
  and mitigate consequences should they occur
  (CPPNM others)
• Nuclear Safeguards State accountancy and control
  of nuclear material and its independent
  verification to ensure that it is not used for
  other than peaceful purposes (NPT AP)

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Foreword (summary result of a recent
brainstorming session)

• Nuclear energy is needed in the energy mix of
  industrialized countries to ensure the security
  of energy supply
• Nuclear energy will be a sustainable alternative
  only if nuclear safety and nuclear security are
  assured.
• Therefore for the security of energy supply to be
  assured, nuclear safety and security is needed.

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Contents

• 1970s the golden age of nuclear energy
• TMI and aftermath
• 1980s and Chernobyl the role of the IAEA in the
  post Chernobyl world the rapprochement
• RBMKs and WWERs
• 1990s - Consensus Building and the CNS
• Safety standards, safety services, safety culture

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Contents

• 2000 consolidation of the global nuclear safety
  regime CNS, standards/services top down
  approach
• 9/11 security concerns another round of
  consensus building (safety/security)
• Lesser known dates 12/24 and 7/16
• The Nobel Peace Prize
• General optimism for nuclear renaissance
• Remaining issues

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1970s the golden age of nuclear energy

• Nuclear power plants built and planned all over
  the world also because of the OPEC crisis
• Nuclear industry brings a new dimension to
  quality assurance and safety
• IAEA starts work on the NUSS (NUclear Safety
  Standards) program Siting, Design, Operation,
  Governmental Organization and Quality Assurance

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TMI (1979) and aftermath

• First major (severe) accident in a commercial
  NPP.
• Beginning of 1980s witnesses the end of the OPEC
  crisis (oil prices stabilize)
• Sharp downturn (especially in the USA) for new
  NPP orders
• Two outcomes of the TMI event look at severe
  accidents seriously (design fixes and/or accident
  management) and a proof that DiD actually works,
  although a severe accident occurred no offsite
  consequences due to the containment

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1980s and Chernobyl the role of the IAEA in
the post Chernobyl world polarization and
rapprochement

• (mid-1980s) Signs of socio-political changes in
  Eastern Europe and the USSR (Perestroika and
  Glasnost)
• April 1986 Chernobyl accident the worst
  nuclear accident with major offsite consequences
• August 1986 Conference in Vienna (IAEA) on
  Chernobyl

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Chernobyl Aftermath
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1980s and Chernobyl the role of the IAEA in
the post Chernobyl world polarization and
rapprochement

• (Vienna Conference, August 1986)
• USSR delegation view human error ? will be
  fixed, responsibles are punished ? will not be
  allowed to happen again.
• Western view design error (although design of
  RBMKs was not well known in the West) ? therefore
  cannot happen in the West
• Cold war approach to the problem polarized and
  political. However, some major technical points
  surface during discussion.

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RBMKs and WWERs

• Rapid evolution of events until 1990 public
  associates Soviet designed NPPs (RBMKs and WWERs
  thought to be similar by the public) push Eastern
  European countries for safety review of WWERs
• German unification forces WWER in East Germany to
  shut down
• In USSR itself, the first design review (1989) by
  the IAEA to Gorky NPP (a district heating plant
  completed but never operated). Sakharov was
  interned in Gorky at the time and IAEA team was
  the first foreign group to visit to the closed
  city.

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1990s - Consensus Building and the CNS

• General agreement on the whys of Chernobyl
  Design/analysis shortcomings led to the result
  that human errors caused a catastrophic failure
  i.e. design was not forgiving of human errors.
  DiD did not consider beyond design basis events.
• The term safety culture used for the first time
  (by INSAG chairman, Edmondson) having the
  safety requirements and complying with them
  voluntarily

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Safety standards, safety services, safety
culture

• Two major projects on safety of WWERs and RBMKs
  started early 1990s at the IAEA
• Consensus building consolidated IAEA SS revised
  (ad hoc) taking into account the lessons learned
  (from TMI and Chernobyl)
• Safety Fundamentals (for nuclear installation
  safety) issued
• First steps for the Convention on Nuclear safety
  (CNS) using the IAEA Safety Fundamentals as basis

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Safety standards, safety services, safety
culture

• Boom in IAEA Safety Review Services
• Operational safety review teams (OSARTs)
• Design Reviews (mainly for operating WWERs)
• Site/seismic reviews
• Plans for regulatory reviews (IRRTs)
• First review meeting of the CNS in Vienna (1999)

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2000 consolidation of the global nuclear safety
regime CNS, standards/services top down approach

• Beginning to mid-2000s top down approach to
  safety standards logical structure (thematic
  and facility specific standards), integrating
  nuclear installation safety with radiation
  safety, waste safety and transport safety.
• IAEA SS become the foremost reference to the
  regulations of major countries (UK, France,
  China, WENRA, Japan, Korea, Russia, ..)
• IAEA Revision of Fundamental Safety Principles
  published (2006)

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SAFETY STANDARDS HIERARCHY

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STRUCTURE OF THE STANDARDS
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2000 consolidation of the global nuclear safety
regime CNS, standards/services top down approach

• IAEA Safety Services are cited as assets in
  country reports and CNS review meetings their
  absence considered a shortcoming and criticized.
• IRRT turns to IRRS (Integrated Regulatory Review
  Services) covering all NS (not only
  installations) major countries are in queue
  UK, France, Japan, Canada, Spain, Germany, USA,
  Russia, China

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Pentagon Aftermath
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Known Unknowns, etc

• Known knowns, known unknowns, unknown knowns,
  unknown unknowns (Rumsfeld)
• He who knows and knows he knows is wise, follow
  him
• He who knows and knows not he knows is asleep,
  wake him
• He who knows not and knows he knows not is
  ignorant, teach him
• He who knows not and knows not he knows not is a
  fool, beware of him
• Maturity is the ability to endure uncertainty

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Four Concerns of Nuclear Terrorism

• Theft of a nuclear weapon
• Theft of nuclear material to make an improvised
  nuclear explosive device - IND
• Theft of other radioactive material for a
  radioactive dispersal device - RDD
• Sabotage of a facility or transport

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Inventories facilities and materials

• Pu gt1.670 tons civil, gt155 tons military
• HEU gt 175 tons civil, gt1720 tons military
• gt440 operating nuclear power plants in 31 States
• gt480 research reactors (gt70 with HEU)
• gt100 fuel cycle facilities
• gt 100.000 Cat I and II radioactive sources
• gt 1.000.000 Cat III radioactive sources

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9/11 security concerns another round of
consensus building (safety/security)

• Major impact on nuclear security concerns. For
  NPPs, checks for major sabotage events (including
  malevolent crash of commercial airliners) IAEA
  starts the only international nuclear security
  program.
• The IAEA program is very comprehensive here we
  will only touch on the sabotage protection
  related aspects
• Nuclear Sabotage Malevolent acts directed to
  nuclear installations (and transport) having the
  objective of causing uncontrolled dispersion of
  radioactive material

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9/11 security concerns another round of
consensus building (safety/security)

• In 2005 CPPNM is amended to include nuclear
  facilities more explicitly
• The suicidal nature of attacks and the
  sophistication in planning are new elements in
  the threat to nuclear installations
• In 2007 (after 5 years of consensus building
  between MS as well as between safety/security
  specialists) publishes the security series
  Technical Guidance on the Engineering Safety
  Aspects for the Protection of NPPs against
  Sabotage

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Protection of Nuclear Facilities Against Sabotage

• Threat Assessment

Consequences
Beyond DBT
DBT
Extreme Load Evaluation
Sabotage Protection Design Evaluation
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Vital Areas Identification
States Responsibility
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• System Design
• Facility Layout
• Safety Measures
• PPS

• Detection
• Delay
• Response/
• Recovery

Response
SSC capacity evaluation
States Security
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SA Crisis management
6d
Emergency Response
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Acceptable Risk
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Norwegian Nobel Committee Citation

• The Committee has decided that the Nobel Peace
  Prize for 2005 is to be shared between the IAEA
  and its Director General for their efforts to
  prevent nuclear energy from being used for
  military purposes and to ensure that nuclear
  energy for peaceful purposes is used in the
  safest possible way.
• At a time when there is a danger that nuclear
  arms will spread both to states and to terrorists
  groups, and when nuclear power again appears to
  be playing an increasingly significant role,
  IAEAs work is of incalculable importance.

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The Indian Ocean Tsunami 12/24/2004
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07/16/2007 Offshore Japan EQ Shuts down the
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP (the worlds biggest)

• The worlds largest nuclear power plant, with 5
  BWR-5 units and 2 ABWR units. Total generating
  capacity reaches 8,212 MWe.

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An example of the damage

• ltMain exhaust ductgt (Seismic ClassC)
• - Some gaps occurred in the main exhaust duct.

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General optimism for nuclear renaissance

• 22 years after Chernobyl, good (and improving)
  track record on safety
• Concerns for global warming and tendency for
  technologies that do not contribute to green
  house gas emissions
• Increasing and unstable prices in the gas market
  also difficult to store for long periods
• Sharp increase for electricity demand in emerging
  economies

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Remaining issues

• Overconfidence/complacency countries considered
  to have good safety culture keep having
  incidents (USA, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden)
• Gap in knowledge base retiring generation not
  replaced by younger cadres
• Nuclear Power Plants are robust, but are they
  resilient??? The case of K - K NPP
• Public information on nuclear safety,
  environmental impact communicated poorly

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Nuclear energy and the environment Public Opinion
Understanding

• EU Public opinion survey