34 Strategyproof PPTs View free & download

Strategyproof Sharing of submodular costs: Budget Balance Vs. Efficiency PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Strategyproof Sharing of submodular costs: Budget Balance Vs. Efficiency - w(S,u) = maxT S ( UT - C(T) ) Coalition S is called efficent if. us - C(S) = w(N,u) ... us - C(S) = W(N,u) ( = maxT N(uT - C(T) ) consequence of submodularity of C ...

w(S,u) = maxT S ( UT - C(T) ) Coalition S is called efficent if. us - C(S) = w(N,u) ... us - C(S) = W(N,u) ( = maxT N(uT - C(T) ) consequence of submodularity of C ...

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Price of Anarchy, and Strategyproof Network Protocol Design PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Price of Anarchy, and Strategyproof Network Protocol Design - Virtual Minimum Spanning Tree Based. Steiner Tree Based ... What is cooperative game. A set of agents N perform some task together and get a value v(N) ...

Virtual Minimum Spanning Tree Based. Steiner Tree Based ... What is cooperative game. A set of agents N perform some task together and get a value v(N) ...

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Designing Incentive-Compatible Routing and Forwarding Protocols in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Designing Incentive-Compatible Routing and Forwarding Protocols in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks - By, Arun Venkat Ramachandran Challenges Routing and Forwarding incentives required. Nash equilibrium not always desirable Wireless and Ad-hoc properties make classic ...

By, Arun Venkat Ramachandran Challenges Routing and Forwarding incentives required. Nash equilibrium not always desirable Wireless and Ad-hoc properties make classic ...

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Cost Sharing and Approximation PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Cost Sharing and Approximation - A-exam Cost Sharing and Approximation Martin P l joint work with va Tardos

A-exam Cost Sharing and Approximation Martin P l joint work with va Tardos

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Caching Game PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Caching Game - Varying Demand Distribution (Transit-stub topology, n = 20) 20. Different Physical Topology ... Varying Read-write Ratio (Transit-stub topology, n = 20) ...

Varying Demand Distribution (Transit-stub topology, n = 20) 20. Different Physical Topology ... Varying Read-write Ratio (Transit-stub topology, n = 20) ...

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Approximate Mechanism Design Without Money PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Approximate Mechanism Design Without Money - Security issues Banking issues Ethical Considerations Legal Considerations * App. Mech. Design Without Money Mechanism Truthfulness Without money Approximation ...

Security issues Banking issues Ethical Considerations Legal Considerations * App. Mech. Design Without Money Mechanism Truthfulness Without money Approximation ...

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The Value of Knowing a Demand Curve: Regret Bounds for Online Posted-Price Auctions PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The Value of Knowing a Demand Curve: Regret Bounds for Online Posted-Price Auctions - ( Our motivation came from ticketmaster.com.) 10. Online Posted-Price Auctions ... ( Our motivation came from ticketmaster.com. ...

( Our motivation came from ticketmaster.com.) 10. Online Posted-Price Auctions ... ( Our motivation came from ticketmaster.com. ...

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Caching Game - Title: Exploiting Routing Redundancy via Structured Peer-to-Peer Overlays Author: EECS Last modified by: EECS Created Date: 9/16/2003 6:20:35 PM Document presentation ...

Title: Exploiting Routing Redundancy via Structured Peer-to-Peer Overlays Author: EECS Last modified by: EECS Created Date: 9/16/2003 6:20:35 PM Document presentation ...

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Multicast Networks Profit Maximization and Strategyproofness PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Multicast Networks Profit Maximization and Strategyproofness - Multicast Networks. Profit Maximization and Strategyproofness. David Kitchin, ... Consumer Sovereignty (CS) If a node bids high enough, it must be included in T. ...

Multicast Networks. Profit Maximization and Strategyproofness. David Kitchin, ... Consumer Sovereignty (CS) If a node bids high enough, it must be included in T. ...

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CS 194: Distributed Systems Incentives and Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design PowerPoint PPT Presentation

CS 194: Distributed Systems Incentives and Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design - Incentives and Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica ... Choose a mechanism so that user selfishness leads to socially ...

Incentives and Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica ... Choose a mechanism so that user selfishness leads to socially ...

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Inefficiency of Equilibria: POA, POS, SPOA PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Inefficiency of Equilibria: POA, POS, SPOA - The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow

The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow

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ACM SIGACT News Distributed Computing Column 9 PowerPoint PPT Presentation

ACM SIGACT News Distributed Computing Column 9 - ACM SIGACT News Distributed Computing Column 9 Abstract This paper covers the distributed systems issues, concentrating on some problems related to distributed ...

ACM SIGACT News Distributed Computing Column 9 Abstract This paper covers the distributed systems issues, concentrating on some problems related to distributed ...

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Cost Sharing and Approximation - Cost Sharing and Approximation

Cost Sharing and Approximation

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Group Strategyproofness and No Subsidy via LPDuality PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Group Strategyproofness and No Subsidy via LPDuality - Group Strategyproofness and No Subsidy via LP-Duality. By Kamal Jain and Vijay V. Vazirani ... Duality theorem. If LP has a solution then DLP has a solution ...

Group Strategyproofness and No Subsidy via LP-Duality. By Kamal Jain and Vijay V. Vazirani ... Duality theorem. If LP has a solution then DLP has a solution ...

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Vickrey Prices and Shortest Paths What is an Edge Worth? PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Vickrey Prices and Shortest Paths What is an Edge Worth? - Vickrey Prices and Shortest Paths What is an Edge Worth? By John Hershberger and Subhash Suri Carlos Esparza and Devin Low 3/5/02

Vickrey Prices and Shortest Paths What is an Edge Worth? By John Hershberger and Subhash Suri Carlos Esparza and Devin Low 3/5/02

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Cost Sharing and Approximation - Cost Sharing. Internet: many independent agents. Not hostile, but selfish ... Cost sharing mechanism ..is a protocol/algorithm that. requests utility uj from ...

Cost Sharing. Internet: many independent agents. Not hostile, but selfish ... Cost sharing mechanism ..is a protocol/algorithm that. requests utility uj from ...

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Reputations Based On Transitive Trust PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Reputations Based On Transitive Trust - Reputations Based On Transitive Trust. Slides by. Josh Albrecht. Overview ... ie, if A trusts B, and B trusts C, then A trusts C more than unknown node D ...

Reputations Based On Transitive Trust. Slides by. Josh Albrecht. Overview ... ie, if A trusts B, and B trusts C, then A trusts C more than unknown node D ...

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Mechanism Design PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Mechanism Design - Suppose each edge is a link in the internet and is controlled by separate entities. Further suppose the weights are the costs for ... Quote from Aaron Archer ...

Suppose each edge is a link in the internet and is controlled by separate entities. Further suppose the weights are the costs for ... Quote from Aaron Archer ...

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Reputations Based On Transitive Trust - Title: PowerPoint Presentation Last modified by: Kirk Pruhs Created Date: 1/1/1601 12:00:00 AM Document presentation format: On-screen Show (4:3) Other titles

Title: PowerPoint Presentation Last modified by: Kirk Pruhs Created Date: 1/1/1601 12:00:00 AM Document presentation format: On-screen Show (4:3) Other titles

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Mechanism Design and Computer Security PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Mechanism Design and Computer Security - Blind obedience, rational self-interest, malicious disruption ... Prevent tragedy of the commons. Include security measures. Economics = adaptive behavior ...

Blind obedience, rational self-interest, malicious disruption ... Prevent tragedy of the commons. Include security measures. Economics = adaptive behavior ...

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Computational Complexity of Social Choice Procedures PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Computational Complexity of Social Choice Procedures - ... of this type (together w/Dodgson score thm) ... Second order Copeland: sum of Copeland scores of alternatives you defeat. Once used by NFL as tie-breaker. ...

... of this type (together w/Dodgson score thm) ... Second order Copeland: sum of Copeland scores of alternatives you defeat. Once used by NFL as tie-breaker. ...

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School choice procedures: How do they matter? Theory and evidence from Belgium PowerPoint PPT Presentation

School choice procedures: How do they matter? Theory and evidence from Belgium - Education policy split along language lines ... The algo terminates when all students are assigned a seat. Comparisons among procedures ...

Education policy split along language lines ... The algo terminates when all students are assigned a seat. Comparisons among procedures ...

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A BGPbased Mechanism for LowestCost Routing PowerPoint PPT Presentation

A BGPbased Mechanism for LowestCost Routing - V (c) = Tij Ik(c;i,j)ck. i,j. N k N. Model : Limitations. per-packet cost model ... Computation at node i in single stage : O(nd x degree(i)) Static environment ...

V (c) = Tij Ik(c;i,j)ck. i,j. N k N. Model : Limitations. per-packet cost model ... Computation at node i in single stage : O(nd x degree(i)) Static environment ...

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VOTING TO ELECT A SINGLE CANDIDATE PowerPoint PPT Presentation

VOTING TO ELECT A SINGLE CANDIDATE - VOTING TO ELECT A SINGLE CANDIDATE Single-Winner Elections Single-Winner Elections Election of a [unitary] executive office. Election of a representative from a ...

VOTING TO ELECT A SINGLE CANDIDATE Single-Winner Elections Single-Winner Elections Election of a [unitary] executive office. Election of a representative from a ...

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Group strategy proof mechanisms via primaldual algorithms Cost Sharing PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Group strategy proof mechanisms via primaldual algorithms Cost Sharing - Cost sharing & Approximation. 1. Group strategy proof mechanisms via primal-dual algorithms ... for which cross-mono sharing exists? Known cross-monotonic ...

Cost sharing & Approximation. 1. Group strategy proof mechanisms via primal-dual algorithms ... for which cross-mono sharing exists? Known cross-monotonic ...

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The Boston Mechanism Reconsidered PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The Boston Mechanism Reconsidered - Title: Resolving Conflicting Interests in School Choice: Reconsidering The Boston Mechanism Author: Muriel Niederle Last modified by: Muriel Niederle

Title: Resolving Conflicting Interests in School Choice: Reconsidering The Boston Mechanism Author: Muriel Niederle Last modified by: Muriel Niederle

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Natural Selection in PeertoPeer Streaming: From the Cathedral to the Bazaar PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Natural Selection in PeertoPeer Streaming: From the Cathedral to the Bazaar - Utility (content) benefit (incoming bandwidth) cost (forwarding bandwidth) cost (latency) ... Individual peer incoming bandwidth. June 14, 2005. ACM NOSSDAV ...

Utility (content) benefit (incoming bandwidth) cost (forwarding bandwidth) cost (latency) ... Individual peer incoming bandwidth. June 14, 2005. ACM NOSSDAV ...

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CS 194: Lecture 28 PowerPoint PPT Presentation

CS 194: Lecture 28 - Rendezvous: uses DHT to store current 'location' Storage: uses DHT to store data objects ... store full articles in DHT (only once, not N times) only transmit ...

Rendezvous: uses DHT to store current 'location' Storage: uses DHT to store data objects ... store full articles in DHT (only once, not N times) only transmit ...

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Aucun titre de diapositive PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Aucun titre de diapositive - Title: Aucun titre de diapositive Author: Helene Fargier Last modified by: Helene Fargier Created Date: 6/3/2003 1:45:44 PM Document presentation format

Title: Aucun titre de diapositive Author: Helene Fargier Last modified by: Helene Fargier Created Date: 6/3/2003 1:45:44 PM Document presentation format

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Algorithms for Incentive-Based Computing PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Algorithms for Incentive-Based Computing - Algorithms for Incentive-Based Computing. Carmine Ventre ... Used Car market: The Kelley Blue Book the Trusted Resource (www.kbb.com) The Trusted Resource ...

Algorithms for Incentive-Based Computing. Carmine Ventre ... Used Car market: The Kelley Blue Book the Trusted Resource (www.kbb.com) The Trusted Resource ...

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Profit Guaranteeing Mechanisms for Multicast Networks PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Profit Guaranteeing Mechanisms for Multicast Networks - Assign payments fe to edges. Goals: Strategyproofness, Individual ... Functions fi and fe are bid-independent and non-decreasing. Keeping c constant, increase u ...

Assign payments fe to edges. Goals: Strategyproofness, Individual ... Functions fi and fe are bid-independent and non-decreasing. Keeping c constant, increase u ...

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CPSC156: The Internet Co-Evolution of Technology and Society - Electronic commerce is a set of technologies, applications, and business ... Name: Richard Sears of Sears Roebuck. B2C Revenue Models ...

Electronic commerce is a set of technologies, applications, and business ... Name: Richard Sears of Sears Roebuck. B2C Revenue Models ...

Applying the Repeated Game Framework to Multiparty Networked Applications - Repeated games can be an important and practical tool for the design of networked applications. ... Confluent (BGP-like) routing. Large class of strategies ...

Repeated games can be an important and practical tool for the design of networked applications. ... Confluent (BGP-like) routing. Large class of strategies ...

CS155a: ECommerce - Buyers want to find the best prices with many sellers, so they go to eBay. ... Market Design (e.g., Auction Types) Payment Systems (can't always use credit cards) ...

Buyers want to find the best prices with many sellers, so they go to eBay. ... Market Design (e.g., Auction Types) Payment Systems (can't always use credit cards) ...

Strategyproof PowerPoint PPT Presentations