L22 - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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L22

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... (Bertrand) When goods are not homogenous - Monopolistic competition Cournot Model - Assumptions Homogenous good 2 firms (duopoly) ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: L22


1
L22
  • Oligopoly

2
Market structure
  • Market structures
  • Oligopoly industry with 2 or more large
    sellers.
  • Intermediate level of fixed cost
  • Have market power (but smaller than monopoly)
  • Also oligopsony and bilateral oligopoly

N 1 2 3-10 10-
Name
pall
3
Oligopolies in practice
  • Examples of oligopolies in the USA
  • - accounting audit services, tobacco, beer,
    aircraft, military equipment, motor vehicle, film
    and music recording industries
  • Inefficiency and regulation (Federal Trade
    Commission)
  • Industry is legally recognized as oligopolistic
  • 1. concentration ratio big fourgt40
  • (share of top 4 firms in the market)
  • 2. HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN I
  • Moderately concentrated industries HHIgt1000
  • Concentrated industry HHIgt1800

4
IO - Models
  • Strategic environment harder than before
  • Careful about timing and strategy
  • Quantities
  • - chosen simultaneously (Cournot)
  • - leader and follower (Stackelberg)
  • Prices (Bertrand)
  • When goods are not homogenous - Monopolistic
    competition

5
Cournot Model - Assumptions
  • Homogenous good
  • 2 firms (duopoly)
  • Aggregate supply
  • Market price
  • chosen simultaneously
  • Cost function
  • Maximize profit

6
Firm 1 Best response to

7
Best response Geometry

8
Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
  • Cournot equilibrium
  • Output of each firm is a best response to the
    output of the other firm
  • No firm has incentives to deviate, given
    production of the other firm.

9
Equilibrium (Example)

10
Nash Equilibrium Geometry

11
Incentives to collude
  • Are there profit incentives for both firms to
    cooperate by lowering their output levels?
  • If yes than collusion.
  • Firms that collude form a cartel.
  • Good for firms, bad for consumers and efficiency
    (DWL)
  • Under what condition cartels are stable?

12
Collusion

13
Collusion Geometry

14
Incentives to collude
  • In long run reputation helps!
  • - see movie Informant
  • Cartels are hard to sustain if
  • Only short run interactions
  • Imperfect monitoring of price
  • Alternative Mergers
  • - Problem Federal Trade Commission

15
Cournot with N firms
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