Tunnel Security Concerns

1
Tunnel Security Concerns

• draft-ietf-v6ops-tunnel-security-concerns-02
• James Hoagland
• Suresh Krishnan
• Dave Thaler

2
Status update

• The authors received some private comments from
  Joel Halpern (Thanks Joel) about some issues with
  the draft

3
Audience

• Issue
• The document mentions that it provides advice for
  tunnel protocol designers, but it does not.
• Resolution
• The document does provide SOME advice for tunnel
  protocol designers, but they are not the primary
  audience.
• The wording concerning the audience will be
  changed to primarily mention network
  administrators

4
User warnings

• Issue
• User warnings are not a protocol design issue,
  they are an application design issue
• study after study has shown that they do not
  actually accomplish anything.
• Resolution
• We agree and we will remove the associated text

5
Generic countermeasures

• Issue
• Some of the counter-measures suggested in the
  document are not specific to tunnels. They should
  not be dealt with here.
• Resolution
• Agree that some of the counter-measures are
  generic
• We believe that if a generic counter-measure
  (e.g. hosts must not forward packets) mitigates a
  tunnel vulnerability, it should be listed here

6
Security posture

• Issue
• The document assumes that the network
  administrators are paranoid and always want
  complete control of the applications and
  protocols running on the end hosts
• Resolution
• We agree. We will make a pass over the document
  to make the recommendations applicable to a wide
  variety of security postures in networks.

7
Way forward

• Does the WG agree with our resolutions?
• We will make the edits to the document and submit
  a new version before IETF79

8
Thank you