Title: The Religious Scruples of
1Lecture 3
- The Religious Scruples of
- public Office-bearers
2The human right of religious freedom
- ECHR Art 9 guarantees the right to manifest
ones religion or belief in practice and
observance - Art 14 prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment
of Convention rights - Human Rights Act 1998 makes ECHR claims
justiciable in domestic courts, forbids public
authorities to act in violation of such rights,
and requires courts to have regard to Strasbourg
ECtHR jurisprudence
3The human right of religious freedom
- Religious people who believe consummated same-sex
relationships to be sinful regularly claim that
the ways in which they show this disapproval
(e.g. in verbal argument, in their employment
practices, in refusal of services) are protected
manifestations of their religion - But the right cited from ECHR Art 9 is qualified
it may be subject to limitations prescribed by
law and necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of public safety, for the protection of
public order, health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
4Other relevant human rights
- Art 8 ECHR guarantees respect for private and
family life - This guarantee is also qualified (interference
allowed e.g. for the protection of morals or of
the rights of others) - ECtHR decisions include same-sex relations under
private life but not family life - Legal recognition of same-sex unions is one way
in which respect for private life can be shown,
although whether and how to recognise such unions
probably falls within contracting states margin
of appreciation - Art 6 ECHR requires civil rights to be determined
before an impartial tribunal
5Other relevant rights and duties
- EU Council Directive 2000/78/EC imposes a general
framework for equal treatment in employment and
occupation - The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief)
Regulations 2003 prohibit direct or indirect
discrimination against an employee or
office-holder because of his/her religion - The Civil Partnership Act 2004 provides for
same-sex partnerships, entered into by signing a
register in front of a civil partnership
registrar, and allows civil partner couples to
adopt children on the same basis as married
couples - The Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) 2007
prohibits public authorities from discriminating
against any person because of his/her sexual
orientation
6Other relevant rights and duties
- The Judicial Oath
- I swear by Almighty God that I will well and
truly serve our sovereign lady Queen Elizabeth
the second in the office of Justice of the Peace
for the County of South Yorkshire and I will do
right to all manner of People, after the laws and
usages of this realm, without fear or favour,
affection or ill-will so help me God. - The Oath is taken to require a judge to hear all
cases that may come before him although a judge
can recuse himself for recognised grounds, e.g.
an appearance of bias
7McClintock
- 1988 Appointed a J.P. ( lay magistrate) for
South Yorkshire swears the Judicial Oath - 1991 Joins the Family Panel of the Bench,
entitling him to decide cases where decisions are
taken on care placement, fostering and adoption - 2004 Regards the CPA provision for adoption of
children by civil partner couples as using
children as guinea-pigs in a social experiment - 2006 When told he cannot be excused from judging
such cases, resigns from the Family Panel
8McClintock v. Dept of Constitutional Affairs
2008 IRLR 29
- Employment Tribunal discrimination claim under
EE(R/B)Regs 2003, reiterating social experiment
reasoning, fails - Appeal to Employment Appeal Tribunal, adding
religious objection to same-sex unions and ECHR
Art 9 claim, also fails - Accepted that the 2003 Regs must be read, if
possible, in a manner compatible with Art 9
9McClintock discrimination law issues
- The reason given to the DCA and to the ET for
McClintocks unwillingness to hear same-sex
adoption cases was the social experiment
argument, based on allegedly inadequate
government research. Religious objections were
not voiced so there could have been no religious
discrimination because of them. - Even had they been voiced, there would have been
a proportionate reason for the indirect
discrimination involved in insisting on the
judicial oath
10McClintock discrimination law issues
- Employment Tribunal
- To have allowed the Appellant, or anyone else
for that matter, to opt out of cases where they
disapproved or were less than enamoured with the
law because of their views on a particular matter
or because their conscience would not allow them
to consider doing something, would have been
abdication of the responsibilities of those whose
task it is to uphold the administration of
justice in this country. Even if a Judge
personally has particular views on any subject,
he or she must put those views to the back of his
or her mind when applying the law of the land
impartially as their judicial oaths of office
require them to do. It is the only way the public
can place any trust in the law. To allow Judges
with a particular point of view the ability to
avoid cases which come before them because they
feel it will likely cause them embarrassment or
difficulty could, apart from anything else,
impose greater burdens on others or lead to a
situation whereby another pool of Judges with
views in another direction might have to sit and
adjudicate on such cases. The Respondent's stance
was therefore wholly proportionate and wholly
justified and, in our view, wholly necessary. In
a country where there is such a diverse range of
opinions and beliefs held and expounded by people
from many religions and walks of life, it would
be invidious were judges to pick and choose which
cases they were prepared to sit on. It would
undermine the basis of our judicial system, one
that warts and all has served people well for a
very long time.
11McClintock discrimination law issues
- Employment Appeal Tribunal
- the issue is whether a judge should be allowed a
blanket objection not to have to hear cases which
involve a consideration of laws to which they
have a principled or conscientious objection. It
does not of course mean that he or she will have
to hear particular cases where, because of their
activities or public pronouncements, their
hearing the case might give the appearance of
bias. - Recusal is different from a situation where the
judge is refusing to apply the law because he has
moral objections to it, or thinks that it has
been introduced prematurely or has been
insufficiently considered. He is then expected to
put his personal views to one side which judges
frequently have to do and there is no reason
why the parties should not trust him to be able
to do that. - cp. McClintock argument for a representative
judicial Bench with a cross-section of citizens
views
12McClintock Human rights issue
- Employment Appeal Tribunal
- line of authority in ECtHR which strongly
suggests that, at least in circumstances where a
party voluntarily places himself or herself in a
position where a conflict might arise between his
or her religious or philosophical beliefs and the
duty imposed by an employment or office, then it
is not in general an infringement of Article 9(1)
to insist that the duties are complied with - consider also Art 6 ?
-
13Ladele
- 2002 appointed a Registrar of Births Deaths and
Marriages - 2007 Registrar service becomes a local government
function and L. becomes an employee of the London
Borough of Islington (LBI) - 2005 LBI designates all existing registrars to be
also Civil Partnership Registrars - 2006 LBI refuses to allow L. to opt out of
officiating at civil partnership registration.
Ls continued refusal leads to a disciplinary
hearing and other disadvantages, although she is
not dismissed
14Ladele v. LB of Islington (2008)
- L. claims religious discrimination in relation to
LBIs refusal to make special provision for her
beliefs, and in relation to the subsequent
treatment - The claim succeeds before the ET but LBI appeals
to the EAT (judgment 19.12.08), where the appeal
is allowed - the Tribunal has fallen into the trap of
confusing the council's reasons for treating the
claimant as they did with her reasons for acting
as she did
15Ladele the legitimate aim
- LBI aim, as summarised by the EAT
- To provide an effective civil partnership
arrangements service as an employer public
authority which is wholly committed to the
promotion of equal opportunities and to fight
discrimination part of this commitment is
that employees should not be permitted to refuse
to provide services to the community for
discriminatory reasons
16Ladele discrimination law
- The council was entitled to adopt the position it
did. Once it is accepted that the aim of
providing the service on a non-discriminatory
basis was legitimate -and in truth it was bound
to be - then in our view it must follow that the
council were entitled to require all registrars
to perform the full range of services. They were
entitled in these circumstances to say that the
claimant could not pick and choose what duties
she would perform depending upon whether they
were in accordance with her religious views, at
least in circumstances where her personal stance
involved discrimination on grounds of sexual
orientation. That stance was inconsistent with
the non-discriminatory objectives which the
council thought it important to espouse both to
their staff and the wider community. It would
necessarily undermine the council's clear
commitment to that objective if it were to
connive in allowing the claimant to manifest her
belief by refusing to do civil partnership duties.
17Ladele human rights law
- Cases such as Ahmad v UK 1982 4 ECHR 126 and
Stedman v UK 1997 23 ECHR CD show that the act
of an employer who refuses to accommodate an
employee's wish to have time off for religious
worship does not even engage Article 9 . In each
case the Commission took the view that the reason
for the conduct was the refusal to work the
hours, rather than the religious belief as such.
The rights under Article 9 were not subject to
interference because the employee could resign
and take up other employment. - Did it matter that the duties were imposed after
L. took up employment? - We doubt, however, whether even this argument
could succeed here because the range of duties
appropriate for registrars had been extended by
Parliament and the claimant was being required to
carry out precisely the kind of tasks which those
in her situation do.
18Ladele human rights law
- The limitations imposed on freedom of religion
are particularly strong where a person has to
carry out state functions. In Kalak v Turkey
1999 27 ECHR the court found that the military
judge's Article 9 rights were not breached when
he was compulsorily retired for reasons
associated with his religion. He had adopted
fundamentalist Muslim opinions inconsistent with
his position as a judge. The court said this
(para 27-28) - Article 9 does not protect every act motivated
or inspired by a religion or belief. Moreover, in
exercising his freedom to manifest his religion,
an individual may need to take his specific
situation into account. - In choosing to pursue a military career, Kalak
was accepting of his own accord a system of
military discipline that by its very nature
implied the possibility of placing on certain of
the rights and freedoms of members of the Armed
Forces limitations incapable of being imposed on
civilians. - In that case it was not the Muslim beliefs which
created the problem - indeed, he was allowed, for
example, to pray five times a day and to keep
fasts - rather it was, as the court put it, his
conduct and attitude. - see also Knudsen v. Norway, 1964
19Points to ponder
- Are state office-holders a special case in
relation to human rights claims? Should they be? - Are democratic bodies entitled to adopt and
enshrine in law a national (or local) morality
which may exclude certain candidates from office? - What would have been the situation, were the
position reversed (e.g. a Roman Catholic or
Mormon fostering service which would not employ a
gay manager who saw no objection to same-sex
fostering)?