CIEMAT: SL 53-2

1

• CIEMAT SL 53-2 53-4aTasks
• Organisation and QA
• Task SL53.2 Safety Important Components (SIC)
• Task SL53.2 Safety operational limits
• Task SL53.4a Outline of the description of the
  maintenance programme

2

• CIEMAT SL 53-2 53-4aTasks
• Organisation and QA
• CIEMAT CO-ORDINATES, REVIEW DRAFTS, AND ACCEPTS
  REPORTS PRIOR TO SUBMITTAL
• Project co-ordinator Beatriz Brañas, assisted by
  Pablo Zuloaga
• Support by Safety Department Caridad Roldán,
  Paloma Díaz-Arocas
• PUBLIC CALL FOR BIDS
• Spec with all Project and QA requirements
• Commented by EFDA, ITER-France before
  consultation
• Public consultation published in Official Journal
  (BOE)
• Assigned to IBERTEF
• Task 53.8 (Hot cell functions during
  decommissioning) not yet launched, pending on
  design approval).

3

• CIEMAT SL 53-2 53-4a Tasks
• Organisation and QA
• IBERTEF (Empresarios Agrupados - Sener) QA manual
• Three task groups with specific task leaders
• SL53.2 SIC Xavier Jardi
• SL53.2 OLC J A Carretero
• SL53.4a ODMP Olga Asuar
• IBERTEF produces draft reports sent to CIEMAT for
  review, and reports including CIEMAT comments
• CIEMAT keeps responsibility and presents reports
  to EFDA ITER

4
Task SL53.2Safety Important Components (SIC)
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Task Objectives
For RPrS

• Definition of criteria for the safety
  classification of ITER systems and components
• As a function of the above criteria, preparation
  of a list of safety-important systems and
  components (SIC), including
• Type of component (isolation valve, cryopump,
  etc)
• Safety function of the component
• How the component performs its safety function
• Seismic classification

6
Task Objectives For
support document

• Identification of applicable codes and standards
• Demonstration that the list of systems and
  components classified as SIC is complete by
  cross-checking it with the normal, incidental and
  accidental situations

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Level of Completion
Objetive
Definition of criteria for the safety classification of ITER systems and components 100
List of systems and components with SIC classification 80
Codes and standards 70
Cross-checking of the list 10
8
SIC Classification Criteria
SIC structures, systems and components are those
relied upon to remain functional during and
following the reference events to ensure

• Confinement safety function, including the
  ancillary safety functions protecting it, and
• Personnel protection by limitation of exposure to
  radiation of workers and environment

9
Seismic Classification Criteria
Three seismic categories will be considered

• ITER structures that must remain integral and
  systems and components (including their
  foundations and supports) that must remain
  functional or retain their confinement barriers
  in the event of a SL-2 earthquake are designated
  Seismic Category I (SCI).
• Structures, systems and components that perform
  no safety function, but whose structural failure
  or interaction could degrade the functioning of a
  Seismic Category I item to an unacceptable level
  of safety are designated Seismic Category II
  (SCII). These items are designed to structurally
  withstand the effects of a SL-2.
• Structures, systems and components that are not
  categorized as Seismic Category I or II are
  designated no Seismic Category (NSC).

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Systems classified (1/2)
WBS System SIC
1.1 Toroidal Field (TF) Coils Systems SIC
1.2 Poloidal Fiel (PF) Coils Systems SIC
1.3 Central Solenoid System (CS) SIC
1.5 Vacuum Vessel SIC
1.6 Blanket non SIC
1.7 Divertor non SIC
1.8 Fuelling and Wall Conditioning SIC
1.9 Plasma non SIC
2.3 Remote Handling Equipment SIC
2.4 Cryostat SIC
2.6 Cooling Water Systems SIC
2.7 Thermal Shields non SIC
3.1 Vacuum Pumping and Leak Detection Systems SIC
3.2 Tritium Plant SIC
3.4 Cryoplant and Cryodistribution SIC
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Systems classified (2/2)
WBS System SIC
4.1 Coil Power Supplies SIC
4.2 Heating and Current Drive Power Supplies non SIC
4.3 Steady State Electrical Power Network SIC
4.5 Supervisory Control System non SIC
4.6 Interlock System SIC
4.7 Poloidal Field Control non SIC
5.1 Ion Cyclotron HCD SIC
5.2 Electron Cyclotron HCD SIC
5.3 Neutral Beam HCD SIC
5.4 Lower Hybrid HCD SIC
5.5 Diagnostics SIC
5.6 Test Blankets SIC
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Systems to be classified
WBS System SIC
6.2 Buildings SIC
6.3 Hot Cell Processing and Waste Treatment SIC
6.4 Radiological Protection SIC
6.5 Liquid SIC
6.6 Gas Distribution SIC
6.7 Plant Sampling Systems SIC
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Task sample for RPrS WBS 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3
  SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY
  Main Components SIC Classification Safety Function Safety Requirements Seismic Classification
WBS 1.1 TOROIDAL FIELD (TF) COILS SYSTEM WBS 1.1 TOROIDAL FIELD (TF) COILS SYSTEM        
1. TF coils non SIC - - NSC
2. Feeders through the cryostat SIC Confinement Confinement function with cryostat SCI (S)
3. Other auxiliary systems non SIC - - NSC
4. Magnet gravity supports SIC - - SCI (S)
5. Other mechanical structures non SIC - - NSC
WBS 1.2 POLOIDAL FIELD (PF) COILS SYSTEM WBS 1.2 POLOIDAL FIELD (PF) COILS SYSTEM WBS 1.2 POLOIDAL FIELD (PF) COILS SYSTEM WBS 1.2 POLOIDAL FIELD (PF) COILS SYSTEM WBS 1.2 POLOIDAL FIELD (PF) COILS SYSTEM WBS 1.2 POLOIDAL FIELD (PF) COILS SYSTEM
1. PF Coils non SIC - - NSC
2. Feeders through the cryostat SIC Confinement Confinement function with cryostat SCI (S)
3. Other auxiliary systems non SIC - - NSC
4. Correction coils non SIC - - NSC
WBS 1.3 CENTRAL SOLENOID SYSTEM (CS) WBS 1.3 CENTRAL SOLENOID SYSTEM (CS) WBS 1.3 CENTRAL SOLENOID SYSTEM (CS) WBS 1.3 CENTRAL SOLENOID SYSTEM (CS) WBS 1.3 CENTRAL SOLENOID SYSTEM (CS) WBS 1.3 CENTRAL SOLENOID SYSTEM (CS)
1. Central solenoid non SIC - - NSC
2. Feeders through the cryostat SIC Confinement Confinement function with cryostat SCI (S)
3. Other auxiliary systems non SIC - - NSC
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Task sample for RPrS WBS 2.6 (1/2)
  SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY
  Main Components SIC Classification Safety Function Safety Requirements Seismic Classification
WBS 2.6 COOLING WATER SYSTEMS WBS 2.6 COOLING WATER SYSTEMS WBS 2.6 COOLING WATER SYSTEMS WBS 2.6 COOLING WATER SYSTEMS WBS 2.6 COOLING WATER SYSTEMS WBS 2.6 COOLING WATER SYSTEMS
4. Vacuum vessel primary heat transfer system (PHTS) Vacuum vessel primary heat transfer system (PHTS)      
4.1 Circulating pump SIC Confinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (S)
4.2 Water-Air Heat Exchangers (3 per loop) SIC Confinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (S)
4.3 Electtrical Heater SIC Confinement Confinement of HTS source terms. SCI (S)
4.4 Pneumatic Pressurizer SIC Confinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (S)
4.5 Isolation Valves SIC Confinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (SF)
4.6 Control valves SIC Confinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (SF)
4.7 Piping and associated valves SIC Confinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (S)
4.8 Filter SIC Confinement Confinement of HTS source terms SCI (S)
4.9 Relief valves SIC Confinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (S)
4.10 Pressure relief tank SIC Confinement Confinement of HTS source terms SCI (S)
4.11 Drainage tank SIC Confinement Confinement of in-vessel source terms and hydrogen SCI (S)
4.12 Drain sump tank SIC Confinement Confinement of HTS source terms SCI (S)
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Task sample for RPrS WBS 2.6 (2/2)
  SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY
  Main Components SIC Classification Safety Function Safety Requirements Seismic Classification
WBS 2.6 COOLING WATER SYSTEMS WBS 2.6 COOLING WATER SYSTEMS WBS 2.6 COOLING WATER SYSTEMS WBS 2.6 COOLING WATER SYSTEMS WBS 2.6 COOLING WATER SYSTEMS WBS 2.6 COOLING WATER SYSTEMS
4.13 Sump pump SIC Confinement Confinement of HTS source terms SCI (S)
4.14 Drain cooler SIC Confinement Prevent coolant loss SCI (S)
4.15 Isolation valves from/to HXs SIC Confinement Prevent coolant loss SCI (SF)
4.16 Isolation valves to N-VDS SIC Confinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (SF)
4.17 Isolation valves to associated CCWS SIC Confinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (SF)
4.18 Associated loops of Draining Refilling System SIC Confinement Confinement of HTS source terms SCI (S)
4.19 Helium Supply System non SIC
4.20 Isolation valves to Helium Suply System SIC Confinement Confinement of HTS source terms SCI (SF)
4.21 Associated loops of Drying System SIC Confinement Confinement of HTS source terms SCI (S)
4.22 Isolation valves (Evacuation Unit) SIC Confinement Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural circulation under accident SCI (SF)
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SIC Classification Summary (sample)
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Sample of cross-checking
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Task SL53.2 Safety operational limits
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Introduction
(1/2)
OLCs are a set of operating rules that include
safety limits, safety system settings and
operational limits on equipment and conditions on
inventories, surveillance and administrative
requirements.

• Objectives
• To ensure safe operation and protection of site
  personnel, the public and the environment from
  radiological hazards
• To guarantee the required operation flexibility

Most of the limits are controlled automatically,
such as for pressure or concentration. Others
(such as inventories) are controlled through
administrative procedures.
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Introduction
(2/2)
OLC interrelationship
OLC classification in France

• LC limites de conduite
• LF limites de fonctionnement
• LS limites de sûreté
• LD limites de dimensionnement

21
Task Objectives
(1/2) OLCs updating

• Review of previous study of operational domain
  (Definition of Authorized Operational Domain for
  ITER licensing, final report of task EFDA
  93/851-JA (2005))
• Review and updating of OLCs based on current
  project documents PSR, GSSR, DRG1, DRG2, PID,
  DDDs
• Incorporating of OLCs resulting of new
  experiments TBM (Test Blanket Module), NBI
  (Neutral Beam Injection), diagnostics, etc, and
  DCR (Design Change Request)

OLCs
22
Task Objectives
(2/2) Top Safety
OLCs

• Selection of a series of limits more
  representative for safety (Top Level Safety
  OLCs), combining them in a reduced group of
  parameters

• With a view to their inclusion in the DAC
  (Décret dAutorisation de Création)

• The result has been embodied in a report (Top
  Level Safety OLCs)

23
Review of Input Documents

• Input data ITER Technical Web (Baseline
  Documentation)
• New versions
• PID Project integration document, Release 2.0
  September 2005
• No OLC changes
• Other/New Inputs ?
• New experiments, Test Blanket Module, Neutral
  Beam Injection, diagnostics, DCR Open
  issue

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Safety Top OLCs
Methodology
1. OLCs of the various systems were grouped per
parameter (for example tritium inventory and
content, dust amount, dose, pressure, loads,
temperature, leaktightness, etc). 2. The most
significant parameters for safety (confinement,
limitation of external exposure, residual power
evacuation) were selected.
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Safety Top OLCs List
(1)

• Tritium inventory in vacuum vessel, tritium plant
  and hot cell
• Tritium concentration in water systems
• Tritium concentration to isolate and initiate ADS
• Efficiency of Detritiation System
• Dust and activated products in vacuum vessel and
  water systems

26
Safety Top OLCs List
(2)

• Radiation and dose levels for personnel
  evacuation
• Leak tightness in system components forming part
  of primary or secondary confinement barriers, in
  tritium plant, ventilation and detritiation, in
  cooling water and heat rejection system and in
  buildings
• Pressure of primary and secondary confinement
  barriers
• VVPSS bleed and drain line actuation pressure,
  and opening pressure of VVPSS rupture disks
• Level of water in VVPSS tank

27
Activities in course

• Documentation of the cross-checking performed
  between Top OLCs and the Reference Events.
• Table of the surveillance method /
  instrumentation foreseen in the project for Top
  OLC.

28
Safety Top OLCs List
(3)

• VV temperature in Baking
• Degraded levels of Voltage/Time delays for
  initiating full transfer/start of Class III loads
  (switch DG)
• Time intervention of Fusion Power Shutdown System
• Top OLCs to be discussed
• Maximum fusion power
• TF magnetic energy dumping
• VV heat transfer system

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Top Level OLCs EX Table Sample
Top Level OLC Limit Possible instrument or procedure to measure the limit Rationale for choice of the limit ITER safety analysis Documentation reference
Tritium inventory in the vacuum vessel lt 450 g The amount of tritium is assessed monitoring inventories and flows Radiological consequence assessments remain valid provided that these inventories remain lower than the specified limits (maximum inventory project guidelines). For the safety assessment in GSSR, as noted in Volume III, assessment inventory values are used to provide margins for uncertainty PSR, GSSR I.5.2.1, PID 3.1.1.2
Tritium content in Cooling water VVPHTS (Vacuum vessel cooling system). lt0.0001 g/m3 (37 MBq/kg) Monitoring concentrations To reduce as a mminimum if a leak in the water-to-air heat exchanger happens PSR, GSSR I.5.2.1, PID 3.1.1.2
Tritium (radioactivity) leak rate for automatic or manual isolation of Heat Rejection System (HRS) automatic lt600 MBq/s manual after sampling TBD Monitoring systems to detect large leak. Detection is based on on-line measurement of tritium Safety analysis assumes automatic isolation of HRS (two minutes delay in the signal and three minutes in valve actuation are assumed) in case of a higher HTO leak rate (Heat exchanger tube rupture) GSSR VII 1.2.4, 3.4.2
Leak rate of system components confining in-vessel source terms, forming part of primary or secondary barrier lt1 volume /day at 0.2 Mpa Monitoring systems to detect leak This leak rate limit is required to prevent air ingress that could result in hazardous air/H2 mixtures and protect against the spread of radioactive materials. PID 3.1.2.1
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Conclusions and Comments
(1/2)

• OLCs are based on the safety analysis taking
  into account the provisions made in the design.
  Therefore, OLCs and their correlated procedures
  will be updated throughout the various ITER
  phases, like detailed design, commissioning test
  and results of specific RD like those on tritium
  and dust measurement and control.
• The surveillance programme relevant to all OLCs
  -including the frequency, the detailed procedures
  to carry out, the evaluation of the results and
  the corrective actions, when necessary- will be
  defined at a later stage of the ITER project.
• In certain cases (like tritium inventory in
  vacuum vessel) the OLC is a more restrictive
  value than the assessment used in the GSSR safety
  analysis. Lower project guidelines are set to
  account for uncertainties and these values are
  pending confirmation of feasibility.

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Conclusions and Comments
(2/2)
TOP Safety OLC document derives a minimum set of
conditions which define the top main safety
parameters that should be retained with regard to
the DAC (Décret dAutorisation de Création),
grouping various constraints as much as practical
and reducing the total list. Therefore, this
document intends to show a group of the most
representative parameters analyzed in previous
study ? and these top level safety OLCs can be
completed or modified in accordance with
different criteria, changes or design upgrades.
? Definition of Authorized Operational Domain
for ITER Licensing, Issue Rev 0, March 2005
(Task order EFDA 93/851-JA)
32
Task SL53.4a Outline of the description of the
maintenance programme

• O. Asuar
• M. Vázquez

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Task Objectives

• Identification of SIC systems and components
• Description of the systems above,
• Find their flow diagrams,
• Identification of their main components, location
  and amount.
• Identify hands-on schedule maintenance
  requirements for the SIC systems/components
  identified above
• Breakdown of the maintenance operations
  including
• Objective,
• Operation sequence,
• Initial conditions of the components,
• Tools,
• Waste estimation,
• Reference documents.
• Non-active support systems (e.g., electrical
  systems) are excluded from this report as they do
  not have any impact on worker dosis.

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Level of Completion
35
Document Structure
36
Components and maintenance requirementsExample
37
Appendix A Breakdown of maintenance
operationsTask sample motor driven valve
maintenance operations (1/3)
38
Task sample motor driven valve maintenance
operations (2/3)
39
Task aample motor driven valve maintenance
operations (3/3)
Screw driver
Manufacturer requirements
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Difficulties/Issues of concern

• Estimated times
• Tools
• Which components are repaired in situ and which
  ones are replaced? Related with bullet 1.
• Difficulties with general plant layout. Cannot
  find all components (all roughing pumps, all
  cryopumps)
• Difficulties with maintenance operations of ITER
  specific components (cryopumps, roughing pumps,
  ZrCo beds) . Designers help/inputs required.
• Difficulties with conventional components.
  Sometimes not enough information e.g. pumps
  vertical/ horizontal, big/small. Its not the
  same. Manufacturers information not yet
  available.
• Diagnostics. Impossible to identify all of them.
  Not enough information
• Initial conditions of the components (
  radioactivity, waste amounts) Reference
  documentation is required.