10 Following a Rule

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10Following a Rule
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The Skeptical Paradox

• Kripke, S.,1982, Wittgenstein on Rule and Private
  Language, Harvard University Press
• McGinn, M., 1997, Wittgenstein and the
  Philosophical Investigations, Routledge
• this was our paradox no course of action could
  be determined by a rule, because every course of
  action can be made out to accord with the rule.
  (PI 201)

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• E.g. plus () and quus (?).
• When we are asked to add two numbers we do it on
  the basis of our past intention that constitutes
  our understanding of the rule governing the
  addition.
• That is, my past intention regarding addition
  should determine a unique answer for indefinitely
  many new cases in the future.

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• There is, though, nothing to rule out my
  intention to use another function, say quus,
  i.e.
• x ? y x y, if x, y lt 57
• 5 otherwise

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• The sceptic doubts whether any instruction I gave
  myself in the past justify to answer 125 to the
  question 68 57 ? rather than 5.
• This, then, is the sceptical paradox. When I
  respond in one way rather than another to such a
  problem as 68 57, I can have no justification
  for one response rather than another. Since the
  sceptic who supposes that I meant quus cannot be
  answered, there is no fact about me that
  distinguishes between my meaning plus and my
  meaning quus. Indeed, there is no fact about me
  that distinguishes between my meaning a definite
  function by plus (which determines new
  responses in new cases) and my meaning nothing at
  all. (Kripke 1982 21)

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• Kripkes reconstruction of the sceptical paradox
  is committed to
• 1. The indeterminacy of understanding
• Since language is a rule-governed practice the
  sceptical paradox can affect our linguistic
  practice.

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• 2. Rules are constitutive and normative
• The normative power of a rule is an intrinsic
  part of their nature.

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• Hacker Baker reject this interpretation
• Rules supervene on our behaviour.
• As such they are normative but not constitutive.
  
• Chomsky/Pinker/Fodor/ idea that linguistic
  rules are mental and innate goes against the view
  that they are normative.

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• Understanding is a mix of propositional knowledge
  (knowing that) and practical knowledge (knowing
  how).
• The sceptical paradox rests on the possible gap
  between the intellectual grasping of a rule
  (knowing that) and its (future) application
  (knowing how).

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• General considerations
• The paradox applies first of all to the notion
  of rule following.
• It is only in exploiting the presupposition that
  language is a praxis governed by rules that the
  paradox expands to the general notion of language
  comprehension and on all action aiming to signify
  something.
• This view of language contrasts with Chomskys
  notion of I-language.

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• Radical scepticism
• The gap between a rule and the action of
  following a rule seems unbridgeable.
• It is thus logically possible that one never
  follows a rule, i.e. that one acts at random and
  yet ones behaviour fits the rule.

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• General Moral
• It becomes difficult, even impossible, to
  distinguish between the case when one is
  following a rule and the case when one is not
  following a rule.
• For, each behaviour could fit infinitely many
  rules.

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Kripkes Solution of the Sceptical Paradox
(Kripkenstein)

• Kripke
• Wittgensteins solution to the sceptical paradox
  contains the argument against the private
  language argument, for the solution will not
  admit such a language.

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• Wittgenstein gives a sceptical solution
• A sceptical solution of a sceptical
  philosophical problem begins by conceding that
  the sceptics negative assertions are
  unanswerable. Nevertheless our ordinary practice
  or belief is justified because it need not
  require the justification the sceptic has shown
  to be untenable. (Kripke 1982 66)

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• Communitarian Conception
• The sceptical solution does not allow us to
  consider an individual in isolation.
• As such, this solution underlines the
  impossibility of a private language.
• This solution goes hand in hand with
  Wittgensteins rejection of the classical view
  which bases a theory of meaning on
  truth-conditions.

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• In the Tractatus a declarative sentence gets its
  meaning by virtue of its truth conditions
• I.e. by virtue of its correspondence to facts
  that must obtain if it is true).

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• The second Wittgenstein accepts the redundancy
  theory of truth p is true p.
• Wittgenstein replaces the question, What must
  be the case for this sentence to be true? by two
  others first, Under what conditions may this
  form of words be appropriately asserted (or
  denied)? second, given an answer to the first
  question, What is the role, and the utility, in
  our lives of our practice of asserting (or
  denying) the form of words under these
  conditions? (Kripke 1982 73)

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• Assertability Conditions
• Wittgensteins picture of language is not based
  on truth condition, but on assertability
  conditions.
• (Cf. the positivist verification theory of
  meaning).

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• This contrasts, for instance, both with the
  Augustinian picture and Platonism in mathematics.
  
• Wittgenstein, like the nominalists, suggests
  that instead of positing entities as the
  referents of numbers we look at the circumstances
  under which numerical assertions are actually
  uttered, and at what role such assertions play in
  our lives..

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• Assertability conditions involve reference to a
  community
• Since they are inapplicable to a single agent in
  isolation, Wittgenstein rejects the private
  language argument.

21

• A sceptical problem is posed, and a sceptical
  solution to that problem is given. The solution
  turns on the idea that each person who claims to
  be following a rule can be checked by others.
  Others in the community can check whether the
  putative rule follower is or is not giving
  particular responses to that they endorse, that
  agree with their own. (Kripke 1982 101)

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• The solution rests on three key concepts
• 1. agreement
• 2. form of life
• what has to be accepted, the given, is the form
  of life. (PI 226)
• 3. criteria
• an inner process stands in need of outward
  criteria. (PI 580)

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• Since rules are norms, then
• the normative element (i.e. the distinction
  between a correct and incorrect use of a word or
  application of a rule)
• (i) is an essential part of our ordinary concept
  of meaning or rule-following and
• (ii) it enters into the picture when we consider
  the individual in relation to a community of
  speakers.

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• Why is it a sceptical solution?
• It leaves the sceptical paradox as it stands,
  i.e. it does not propose a direct answer to the
  paradox.
• That is to say, it does not rely on an objective
  fact the sceptic may have ignored.

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• Main advantage of the sceptical solution
• While the sceptical paradox forced us to give an
  objective solution of semantic competence, a
  semantic based on assertability conditions
  stresses the fact that semantic competence rests,
  at least partly, on intersubjective factors.

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• General moral
• Semantics competence does not merely rest on
  objective facts belonging to the speakers
  individual psychology.
• It also rests on the audience judging the
  speakers competence.
• This goes hand in hand with the argument against
  the possibility of a private language.

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General Criticism of Kripkes Interpretation

• Kripke takes Wittgenstein as offering a
  constructive philosophical picture on how meaning
  and understanding are possible.
• Wittgenstein, though, does not take philosophy
  to embody a particular doctrine.
• So a philosopher can make no substantial claim.
• Philosophy is a mere therapy.

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• The connection between a rule and a practice that
  Wittgenstein proposes is not put forth as a
  philosophical analysis of the concept of a
  rule.
• It is merely intended to describe what can be
  observed in our language games.
• Following a rule is a analogous to obeying and
  order. We are trained to do so we react to an
  order in a particular way. (PI 206)

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Rules and Understanding

• Four thesis can be ascribed to Wittgensteintree
  negative and one positive (see Colin McGinn 1984,
  Wittgenstein on Meaning, Blackwell)
• 1. To mean something by a sign is not the
  subject of an inner state or process
• This goes hand in hand with the idea that
  understanding is not a mental process, i.e. that
  meaning something consists in certain conscious
  or experiential state and processes.

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• 2. To understand a sign is not to interpret it
  in a particular way
• This goes with the view that understanding
  cannot be reduced to a kind of propositional
  knowledge (knowing that).
• It mainly corresponds to a knowing how activity,
  a practical knowledge.

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• 3. Using a sign in accordance with a rule is
  not founded upon reasons
• It is not sufficient for a sign to possess a
  particular meaning that some item come before
  ones mind.
• One follows a rule blindly, without interpreting
  it When I obey a rule I do not choose. I obey
  the rule blindly. (PI 219)

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• 4. To understand a sign is to have mastery of a
  technique or custom of using it
• Understanding is a practice. As such
• (i) understanding is manifested in a
  behaviour/activity,
• (ii) understanding qua practice must be
  repeatable, and
• (iii) understanding is closely related to the
  circumstances in which the activity occurs.

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• General moral
• Meaning is use (Wittgenstein) and a theory of
  meaning is a theory of understanding (Dummett).
• Use occurs in a language, thus in a language
  game.

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• The notion of language game rests on a system of
  rules.
• Rules determine the game and depend on a
  community playing that game.
• Hence, if meaning is use in a language game and
  a theory of meaning is a theory of understanding,
  understanding ultimately rests on an
  intersubjective activity.