Title: Secure Pork Supply Board Update
1Secure Pork Supply Board Update
2Credit where credit is due!
- Thanks to Dr. Jim Roth and Dr. Pam Zaabel
- Center for Food Security And Public Health _at_ Iowa
State University - and the SPS Planning Committee
3Secure Pork Supply Plan
- Center for Food Security and Public Health _at_ Iowa
State CVM has received USDA funding to develop
the plan. - Coordinating with the Center for Animal Health
Food Safety _at_ University of Minnesota who also
has USDA funding - Will cover movement of swine between production
sites and processing plants
4Secure pork supply (Patrick's Interpretation )
- SPS is basically a club
- The benefits that club members get the
opportunity to move pigs sooner than non-club
members in an outbreak. - This is because members agree to implement
- a valid pre-harvest traceability program
- standardized bio security practices
- disease surveillance the level to achieve a
defined status
5Secure Pork Supply
- Built on the experiences of
- Secure Egg Supply
- Move eggs in the event of HPAI
- Plan has resulted in MOUs between IA, MN, NE and
CO - Secure Milk Supply
- Move milk in the event of FMD
- Secure Turkey Supply
- Move turkeys to harvest in the event of HPAI
6Secure Pork Supply Planning Committee
- First meeting October 11-12, 2011
- Working Groups formed
- Biosecurity (pre and post outbreak)
- Surveillance (pre and post outbreak)
- Compartmentalization/Monitored Premises
- Data Collection, Management, and Sharing
- Risk Assessments
- Communications
- Plan for response to an FAD Outbreak Tomorrow
7Secure Pork Supply
- First draft (completed May 2013) covers
- Biosecurity
- Pre-harvest traceability
- Outbreak tomorrow plan
- Data and information sharing agreements
- Producers
- State Vets
- National animal health laboratory network
- Packers and Processors
8Secure Pork Supply
- Parts still under development
- Data management, risk assessments and disease
surveillance are longer-term projects and will be
incorporated in future drafts as they become
available.
9Secure Pork Supply
- Groups provided the draft for review
- State and Federal Animal Health Authorities
- USDA FSIS
- State Pork Producers Associations / Councils
- Checkoffs Swine Health Committee
- AMI / NAMA
- AASVs FAD and Swine Health Committees
- Packers and Processors
10Secure Pork Supply
- Next steps
- Continue to bird-dog the process
- Review Incorporate Comments
- Focusing on getting the disease surveillance
section completed - Engage industry leadership on compliance and
verification issues - Program needs to be credible and workable
- Need to consider how the industry can verify
compliance
11Secure Pork Supply
- is a game of connect the dots
- Many of the practices already occur
- Needs to be documented and verified
- Data information already exists
- Sits in multiple private and government databases
- A common denominator is necessary to link
everything together - Standard Premises Identification Number
12- Data Collection, Management Sharing
13 14Valid Pre-harvest Traceability
- Identify all premises with the standard PIN
- Industry is solidly behind PINs
- Implement the Swine ID Standards and maintain
records in electronic format - Associates PINs with movements
- Use Electronic Certificates of Veterinary
Inspection or electronic IMRs - Associate PINs with source and destination
- Allow access to movement data by animal health
officials
15(No Transcript)
16Disease Surveillance
- Maintain animal inventories by premises in an
electronic format -
- Submit surveillance data and samples in
accordance with SPS Surveillance Plan - Include validated PIN on all diagnostic
laboratory submission forms
17Validated PINs
18Official PIN Tags
- Sow Packer Requirement
- Condition of sale by January 1st 2015 by various
companies -
- Must be a USDA Approved Official PIN Tag
- http//www.aphis.usda.gov/traceability/downloads/s
wine_device_listing.pdf - Industry support for this _at_ Pork Forum
19(No Transcript)
20Official PIN Tags
- Only 2 companies currently have USDA approval to
manufacture and are selling official PIN Tags - Destron Fearing
- Allflex
- Available in multiple colors
- Some packers prefer pink
21Official PIN Tags
- The PIN on the Official Tag is the USDA allocated
Standardized Premises Identification Number (PIN)
and not the State allocated Location Identifier
(LID) - When ordering the manufacturer will ask for the
PIN so they can validate it to the address of the
site
22Official PIN Tags
- According to the Swine ID Program Standards the
PIN on the Tag should be the PIN of the breeding
farm she was on prior to entering harvest
channels - Works for systems that are not parity segregated
- Parity segregated systems
- Work with the State Vet to determine what PIN
make the most sense - Producer records maintain the traceability
23Official PIN Tags
- One (or one set) and your done
- Once identified with one PIN tag or a set of
official tags with same PIN and production number
then that is it. Producers do not need to put in
a new one if the animal moves to another
production site BUT they do need to record that
movement in case of a traceback. -
24Official PIN Tags
25Disease Surveillance
- Allow veterinary diagnostic labs to pass through
the PINs associated with subsets of diagnostic
samples to the NHALN for the express purposes of
surveillance for foreign animal (and program
diseases) - Allow Packers/ Processors to pass through the
PINs associated with diagnostic samples for the
express purposes of surveillance for foreign
animal (and program diseases).
26Disease Surveillance
- Allow access by state and federal animal health
officials to the geospatial information stored in
the National and State Premises Repositories for
the express purposes of emergency preparedness
and surveillance for foreign animal (and program
diseases).
27Recommendations (Not Required)
- Annual Employee FAD Awareness
- Separate PINs for epidemiological separate
premises more than ¼ mile apart. - Provide annual premises updates to SAHO
- Develop Swine Health Production Plans for routine
interstate movements of feeder pigs(9 CFR 71.19) - A word on the Code
28Sow / Boar Surveillance
29Market Hog Surveillance
30Veterinary Diagnostic Labs
31Packer Received Pigs from SPS sites AA13579
on XX / XX /2012 BB24688 on XX / XX
/2012 ETC..
PIN-765432A Pork Packer
PIN-AA13579 Wean to Finish
PIN-1234567B Wean to Finish
What the State Vet can determine 1. Site is a
part of Secure Pork? 2. Valid traceability
system up and running? 3. Standardized
biosecurity in place? 4. Achieved a negative
disease status?
Permitted Movements
PIN-BB24688 Wean to Finish
PIN -123456A Sow Farm
PIN-1234567C Swine Finisher
32E2E Proof-of-Concept Demonstration
Premises and Plants (SCS)
Producer (3rd Party S/W)
Testing Results (Diag. Lab)
Producer Census and Movement Data
State Premises and Plant Data
Testing Data
Show premises disease status and support the
decision on whether or not to move animals.
Show the day-to-day usefulness for monitoring
facility disease status.
33 34Secure Pork Disease Awareness, Preparedness,
Response and Recovery
- Dr. Patrick Webb
- Director, Swine Health Programs
-
35Secure Pork Supply PlanA Continuity of Business
Plan for the Swine Industry in the Face of a
Foreign Animal Disease
- James A. Roth, DVM, PhD, DACVM
- Center for Food Security and Public Health
- College of Veterinary Medicine
- Iowa State University
36US Animal Agriculture is Highly Vulnerable to
Foreign Animal Diseases
- US production animals have no immunity to FADs
- Export markets will be lost
- Prices will drop dramatically
- Emergency vaccine stocks are far below what would
be required to address a livestock dense state or
multi-state outbreak - The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive
movement inherent in the U.S. livestock
industries will present unprecedented challenges
in the event of a FAD outbreak
37USDA APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness
and Response Plan
38USDA FAD PReP FMD Response Plan
39Common Components of Secure Food Supply Business
Continuity Plans
Secure Egg Supply (HPAI) Secure Turkey Supply
(HPAI) Secure Milk Supply (FMD)Secure Pork
Supply (FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD)
- Voluntary pre-outbreak preparedness components
- Biosecurity, surveillance, epidemiology
questionnaires, movement permits - Risk assessments (completed and in process)
- Plans must be based on current capabilities and
will evolve with science, risk assessments and
new capabilities - Guidelines only Final decisions made by
responsible officials during outbreak - Outreach and training pre and post outbreak
40SPS Partners
- SPS Planning Committee
- Federal and State officials
- Representatives of all phases of the swine
industry - NPB, NPPC, AASV
- Academia
- Iowa State University
- University of Minnesota
41FADs included in SPS plan
- Foot and mouth disease
- Swine, cattle, sheep, goats, deer
- Classical swine fever
- African swine fever
- Swine vesicular disease
Foot and Mouth Disease 7 days post infection
PIADC
42Disease Transmission(FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD)
- Not zoonotic
- Direct contact and oral exposure are the most
important routes of infection for swine (Pigs are
relatively resistant to airborne infection by all
4 FADs) - Indirect contact (fomites) also can play a lesser
role for transmission - Pigs exhale large concentrations of FMDV, cattle
are highly susceptible to aerosolized virus
43Secure Pork Supply Planning Committee
- First meeting October 11-12, 2011
- Working Groups formed
- Biosecurity (pre and post outbreak)
- Surveillance (pre and post outbreak)
- Compartmentalization/Monitored Premises
- Data Collection, Management, and Sharing
- Risk Assessments
- Communications
- Plan for response to an FAD Outbreak Tomorrow
44 45North American Animal Agriculture Industry is
Unique
- The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive
movement inherent in the U.S. and North American
livestock industries will present unprecedented
challenges in the event of a FAD outbreak - Strategies for the response to, and management
of, a FAD outbreak will change as the outbreak
progresses and will depend upon the magnitude,
location and other characteristics of the
outbreak.
46Phases and Types of FMD Response
http//www.cfsph.iastate.edu/pdf/phases-and-types-
of-an-fmd-outbreak
47Phases of FMD Response
48FMD Detection in the United States Types of an
FMD Outbreak
Six Types of FMD Outbreaks
48
49Differentiating between Types of FMD Outbreaks
Geographic Size of Outbreak Animal Movement Number of Premises Size of Premises Vaccine Assumptions Appropriate Strategies Minimum Time Required to Achieve FMD Free Status
Type 1-Focal FMD outbreak One state or small region No extensive animal movement Small number Relatively small Not applicable Stamping-out 3 months after the last case
Type 2-Moderate regional FMD outbreak Few focal areas in one region No extensive animal movement out of the Control Area Small to moderate number Small to medium Sufficient vaccine is available to vaccinate designated animals Stamping-out Vaccinate-to-kill Vaccinate-to-slaughter Discontinue vaccination after the last case 3 months after the last case and slaughter of all vaccinated animals, or 6 months after last case or last vaccination if all vaccinated animals are not slaughtered
Type 3-Large regional FMD outbreak Multiple areas in a region No extensive animal movement outside of the region Moderate number Medium to large Sufficient vaccine is available to vaccinate designated animals Vaccinate-to-live Vaccinate-to-slaughter Discontinue vaccination after the last case 12 months after the last evidence of FMD infection and the last FMD vaccine was administered
Type 4-Widespread or national FMD outbreak Widespread areas of infection Extensive animal movement Moderate to large number Medium to large Sufficient vaccine is available to vaccinate designated animals Vaccinate-to-live Vaccinate-to-slaughter Continue vaccination after the last case FMD Free with Vaccination 18 months after the last case
Type 5-Catastrophic FMD outbreak Widespread areas of infection Extensive animal movement Large number Large Sufficient vaccine is NOT available to vaccinate designated animals Endemic FMD control program Vaccinate-to-live Continue vaccination after the last case FMD Free with Vaccination 2 years after the last outbreak
Type 6-North American FMD outbreak Widespread infection in Mexico / Canada/ US Extensive animal movement Large number Large Sufficient vaccine is NOT available to vaccinate designated animals Endemic FMD control program Vaccinate-to-live Continue vaccination after the last case FMD Free with Vaccination 2 years after the last outbreak
50FMD Outbreak in IowaLarge Control Area
Source NASS, 2007
Number of Swine Affected 19,883,988 Number
of Bovines Affected 2,366,535 Number of
Operations Affected 110,727
50
51Type 5 Catastrophic FMD Outbreak
- Widespread areas of infection are detected
involving a large portion of the United States.
Sufficient vaccine and resources are not
available to quickly vaccinate all designated
susceptible animals in the affected regions. The
number of vaccinated animals is too great to
consider a vaccinate-to-kill or
vaccinate-to-slaughter (only) policy. It becomes
apparent that FMD is widespread, and will not be
eradicated within a year. - Declare FMD to be an endemic disease and
implement a program for long term eradication and
control, including vaccinate-to-live
52 53(No Transcript)
54Controlled Movement of Swine in an FMD Outbreak
- At the beginning of an outbreak
- No new movements initiated from the FMD control
area - 625,000 pigs on the road each day
- Some will have come from the control area
- 400,000 to 500,000 hogs and sows slaughtered
daily - Restarting movement
- Depends on the type of outbreak
55Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility
- Swine may be infected with FMD virus before
showing any clinical signs or testing positive by
PCR - It is not possible to prove freedom from FMD
infection in a herd, or in an individual animal.
It is only possible to establish that there is
lack of evidence of infection - Therefore, all pork from a processing facility
that has received swine from the FMD Control Area
will be considered to potentially contain the FMD
virus
56Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility
- FMD is not a public health or food safety problem
- Animals which pass ante-mortem and post-mortem
inspection by USDA FSIS are safe for human
consumption, even if they may be in the
pre-clinical stage of FMD infection - Regulations regarding feeding garbage to swine
must be strictly enforced.
57Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility
- At the beginning of an FMD outbreak (Phase 1)
- Packing plants should continue to process all
swine in the plant and in transit to the plant
which cannot be turned back or euthanized while
in transit - During a large FMD outbreak (Phase 2, Type 3 or
greater) - Market ready hogs and sows, from herds in the
Control Area with no evidence of infection should
be sent to slaughter as quickly as possible
58Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility
- Processing of swine should continue, even if it
is known that FMD infected animals have been in
the plant - Federal and State Officials (Incident Command
Post) would need to agree to this - Packing facility owners/managers would also need
to agree to this
59Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility
- Modern packing facilities process thousands of
swine daily. At any point in time, there may be
thousands of live animals in lairage awaiting
slaughter. -
- If any animals are incubating the virus, and the
processing of swine is stopped, the virus will
rapidly multiply in the swine in lairage. -
- The thousands of animals that are in transit to
slaughter facilities will not be able to be
unloaded if the processing of swine at the plant
is not continued.
60Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility
- Processing of all healthy animals in the
slaughter facility and in transit to the facility
is the fastest way to dispose of those animals
and presents the lowest risk of spreading FMD
infection - It also reduces the need for carcass disposal and
preserves high quality protein for human
consumption -
-
61Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility
- Finished products from any processing plants that
received swine from the Control Area must be
considered to potentially contain FMD virus -
- Processed product should be quarantined and
placed in cold storage until a decision is
reached by Incident Command on allowable uses for
the product - If the outbreak is quickly controlled by stamping
out, the product should be destroyed - If it becomes apparent that the outbreak is
extensive, the product should be released for
domestic sale
62Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility
- Packing plant employees, service personnel, and
truck drivers must observe proper biosecurity
protocols to avoid transmitting the FMD virus
when they leave the plant - All potential fomites leaving the plant must be
cleaned and disinfected - This will be difficult to implement on an
emergency basis - Ideally, an emergency plan for implementing
biosecurity will be in place before an outbreak - Biosecurity measures will be needed whether the
plant receiving FMD infected animals continues or
halts processing of healthy animals
63Problems to Address
- Will the pork consuming public accept the
product? - Will Packers be willing to continue to process
animals from an FMD control area in a large
outbreak? - Will the economics make sense for the Packers?
- Cold storage facilities for excess pork in the
first months of an outbreak? - Disposition of herds that have recovered from
infection?
64- Data Collection, Management Sharing
65 66Valid Pre-harvest Traceability
- Identify all premises with the standard PIN
- Industry is solidly behind PINs
- Implement the Swine ID Standards and maintain
records in electronic format - Associates PINs with movements
- Use Electronic Certificates of Veterinary
Inspection or electronic IMRs - Associate PINs with source and destination
- Allow access to movement data by animal health
officials
67(No Transcript)
68Disease Surveillance
- Maintain animal inventories by premises in an
electronic format -
- Submit surveillance data and samples in
accordance with SPS Surveillance Plan - Include validated PIN on all diagnostic
laboratory submission forms
69Validated PINs
70Disease Surveillance
- Allow veterinary diagnostic labs to pass through
the PINs associated with subsets of diagnostic
samples to the NHALN for the express purposes of
surveillance for foreign animal (and program
diseases) - Allow Packers/ Processors to pass through the
PINs associated with diagnostic samples for the
express purposes of surveillance for foreign
animal (and program diseases).
71Disease Surveillance
- Allow access by state and federal animal health
officials to the geospatial information stored in
the National and State Premises Repositories for
the express purposes of emergency preparedness
and surveillance for foreign animal (and program
diseases).
72Recommendations (Not Required)
- Annual Employee FAD Awareness
- Separate PINs for epidemiological separate
premises more than ¼ mile apart. - Provide annual premises updates to SAHO
- Develop Swine Health Production Plans for routine
interstate movements of feeder pigs(9 CFR 71.19) - A word on the Code
73- National Animal Health Laboratory Network
74Data Collection
- Request premises identification numbers (PIN) on
all swine diagnostic specimens submitted as a
part of the surveillance component of the SPS
plan - Use either separate forms or have an area on
current form to indicate the samples submitted
are for the surveillance component of the SPS plan
75Process Surveillance Submissions
- Receive surveillance samples with accompanying
producer information submitted for SPS plan - Scan validated PINs into the LIMS and associate
with the accession/case - Pass through PINs with diagnostic samples for
surveillance for FADs (and program diseases) - Conduct routine testing on samples and report out
results to producers / veterinarians
76Data Sharing
- Coordinate transfer of FAD surveillance results
with PINs into SPS information reporting system
prior to and during an outbreak - Follow current NAHLN protocols for reporting FAD
testing data related to the SPS plan including
reporting to state and federal animal health
officials
77Recommendations (Not Required)
- Add a statement to the diagnostic submission form
reminding producers of what participation means - I agree to the steps outlined in the document
titled secure pork supply step for producers
participation
78 79Pre-harvest traceability
- Develop ability to capture and associate PINs of
sending premises with normal business information - Develop a mechanism to record information
regarding conveyances for each group / lot - Develop a mechanism to share the following
information associated w/ each group / lot - Sending premises, conveyance identification,
group lot number or animal identification, date
of shipment, number of head
80Biosecurity
- Develop plan with USDA for implementation and
verification plant biosecurity standards in the
Packer / Processor FAD strategy document
81Disease Surveillance
- Develop and test a mechanism to associate PINs
with diagnostic samples collected at the plant - Develop protocols to deliver diagnostic samples
to laboratories using common shipping methods or
plant employees - Pass through PINs associated with diagnostic
samples for the express purpose of surveillance
for FADs (and program diseases) prior, during and
after an outbreak
82Recommendations (Not Required)
- Implement awareness training for employees
- Develop and implement plans for reporting suspect
FADs - Develop policies for plant operations in the
control area based on the Packer / Processor FADs
Strategy Document - Categorized products into trade categories as
outlined in the Packer / Processor FADs Strategy
Document
83- State Animal Health Officials
84Pre-harvest traceability
- Issue separate PINs for epidemiologically
separate premises separated by more than a
quarter-mile - Accept electronic formats of CVIs and interstate
movement reports that include validated PINs for
sending and receiving premises participating in
an SPS plan
85Disease surveillance
- Access geospatial information stored in the
State/National premises repository for the
express purposes of emergency preparedness and
surveillance for foreign animal (and program)
diseases
86Communication
- Communicate with NAHLN labs concerning FAD
testing results using current reporting channels
for samples submitted through the SPS plan - Communicate with SAHOs in surrounding states
concerning compliance with SPS plans - Premises information, approved biosecurity
audits, test results for samples submitted under
the surveillance component of the SPS plan
87Communication
- Communicate with other SAHOs and the incident
command any adverse findings, noncompliance with
SPS standards or protocols, results of site
evaluations and regulatory actions taken
88Animal Movement
- Allow swine already in transit to cross state
borders according to the controlled movement
component of the SPS plan at the beginning of an
FAD outbreak - Allow swine across state borders according to the
controlled movement component of the SPS plan
when movement is restarted after beginning of an
outbreak
89Recommendations (Not Required)
- Work with producers to develop swine production
health plans for routine interstate swine
movements of feeder pigs with no change of
ownership as established by 9 CFR 71.19
90 91Biosecurity Lines On Production Sites
- Lines are imaginary or real barriers to reduce
risk of pathogen exposure to pigs - Perimeter Buffer Area (PBA)
- Outer control boundary set up around the
perimeter of the site to limit access of the
outside world to close contact with animal
buildings - Interior Clean-Dirty Line (ICD)
- Established to isolate pigs on the clean side of
the production site from sources of infection on
the dirty side of the production site
92Biosecurity Lines on Production Sites
- Criteria for each line addresses risk mitigation
measures for swine, people and fomites - Producers would work with herd veterinarians to
establish lines and protocols.
93(No Transcript)
94Factors Considered in Setting up Production Site
Biosecurity Lines
- Restricting Entry into the PBA
- Access control
- Ingress / egress
- People
- Routing, designated parking
- Animals
- Animal disposal, feral swine prevention, other
livestock - Fomites
- Area for cleaning and disinfection, feed routing
95(No Transcript)
96Factors Considered in Setting up Production Site
Biosecurity Lines
- Crossing the ICD line
- People
- Biosecurity protocols
- Animals
- Prevention of non-swine animal exposure
- Fomites
- Biosecurity protocols for delivery of equipment
feed etc.
97Factors Considered in Setting up Production Site
Biosecurity Lines
- Crossing the ICD line
- Load outs
- Portable chutes, common load outs, animal flow
etc. - Carcass removal
- Movement of carcasses and people
- Weather
98(No Transcript)
99Biosecurity Protocols
- Broken into Level I Level II
- Level I is the default for day-to-day practice
- Level II is a heightened protocol for after an
FAD event - Producers can choose to operate in level II on a
day-to-day basis which would shorten the time for
transition and verification in the event of an
FAD
100Visitor Biosecurity
- Two levels and each addresses
- Limiting visitors
- Requiring sign in
- Following biosecurity protocols
- Cleaning of equipment
101Employee Biosecurity
- Two levels and each addresses
- General employee guidelines
- Employee entry
- Employee movement between sites
- Facility entry
102Production Site Biosecurity
- Two levels and each addresses
- Access deterrents
- Buildings
- Pest wildlife control
- Crossing the ICD line for operating procedures
- Carcass removal
- Loose pigs
103Loadout Biosecurity
- Two levels and each addresses
- Drivers
-
- Each load-out area
- Load-out procedures
104 105Natl Surveillance Program Streams
106PIN Tag Pilot
107What is next?
108Iowa E2E Project
109 110Communications
- Cross Species FMD Communications Team
- Developed messaging for FMD outbreaks to reassure
the consumer about the safety of pork, beef and
milk. - Currently studying consumer perceptions regarding
vaccine - Working on an educational strategy to raise
retailer awareness (ounce of prevention) - http//www.fmdinfo.org/
111- Monitored Premises Compartmentalization
112Setting a High Bar
113 114What is an acceptable risk?
115SPS Enrolment /Compliance / Verification
- We will be addressing the issue this year
- Goal is to develop a workable, credible and
affordable solution - Could develop it as a part of PQA plus
-
116 117Packer Received Pigs from SPS sites AA13579
on XX / XX /2012 BB24688 on XX / XX
/2012 ETC..
PIN-765432A Pork Packer
PIN-AA13579 Wean to Finish
PIN-1234567B Wean to Finish
What the State Vet can determine 1. Site is a
part of Secure Pork? 2. Valid traceability
system up and running? 3. Standardized
biosecurity in place? 4. Achieved a negative
disease status?
Permitted Movements
PIN-BB24688 Wean to Finish
PIN -123456A Sow Farm
PIN-1234567C Swine Finisher